

WHEN ARABIC IS THE "TARGET" LANGUAGE: NATIONAL SECURITY,
TITLE VI, AND ARABIC LANGUAGE PROGRAMS, 1958-1991

by

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ABSTRACT

This study is based on an interpretive policy analysis of Title VI of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (later of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended) and the higher education Arabic language programs it has funded. In light of a number of contemporary policies motivated by national security to fund instruction in "critical languages" such as Arabic, this study examines historical interpretations of the nexus of national security, education policy and language learning in an effort to help clarify the current debates. The study is based on analysis of Title VI-relevant documents and interviews with policy-relevant actors from three distinct interpretive communities, including policy elites, university actors, and Arab American actors. Findings from the study suggest that Title VI has played a complicated role in promoting Arabic instruction in the U.S. On the one hand, the funding that has been in place has been instrumental in the development of teaching materials and pedagogy, and in the formation of the cadre of Arabists that currently exists. On the other, the subordination of language education to national security concerns has limited the potential of such programs, especially with respect to heritage language education. Most consequentially, policy-relevant actors regularly employed and ascribed to others powerful assumptions about the nature of U.S. leadership in the world and the relationship of language education to that influence. These assumptions not only excluded consideration of actual U.S. foreign policy and intervention abroad, but also served to limit the terms of imagining and executing more effective language education advocacy.

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You read a lot of books when you're in graduate school. This means you flip through many acknowledgment pages. Some authors thank everyone and everything, including their dogs and the good weather during data collection. Others take a more aloof approach and spend time explaining why they won't thank everyone and everything, neither their dogs nor the good weather during data collection. In these last days of completing my dissertation, however, I realize how little this dissertation is merely my own work. Some thanks, therefore, are in order.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AAS - Association for Asian Studies, Inc.
- ASTP - Army Specialized Training Program
- CASA - Center for Advanced Study of Arabic, Cairo, Egypt
- ED - U.S. Department of Education
- EHSP - Ethnic and Heritage Studies Program of 1974
- ESEA - Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
- F-H - Fulbright-Hays Act, common name for the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961
- FLAP - Foreign Language Assistance Program
- FLE - Foreign language education
- FLES - Foreign Language in Elementary Schools
- HEA - Higher Education Act of 1965
- HLE - Heritage language education
- IEA - International Education Act of 1966
- IEPS-IRIS - International Education Programs Service, International Resource Information Service database
- LCTL - Less commonly taught language
- LEP - Language education policy
- LOTE - Language other than English
- MLA - Modern Language Association
- NDEA - National Defense Education Act of 1958

NRC - National Resource Center (originally known as language and area studies centers)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement

What follows is a qualitative study of the role that perceived¹ national security concerns have played in the formation and implementation of federal language education policies (LEPs) in the United States. Of particular concern are the implications of this relationship for heritage language speakers, i.e. speakers from families in which the target language is used and who have at least limited proficiency in that language (Valdés, 2001). To better understand the interplay between perceived national security concerns and LEPs, the study focuses on the case of Title VI Arabic language programs. The study emerges from several important gaps in the literature. The first concerns the relationship between language practices and the nation-state. Much scholarship has documented the monolingual ideologies that emerge from the modern nation-state (cf. Hobsbawm, 1962, 1987, 1990; May, 2001, 2006), as well as the use of dominant national languages in imperial projects (cf. Canagarajah, 1999; Pennycook, 2000; Phillipson, 1992, 2006). Moreover, there is an abundance of literature concentrating on the relationship between the nation-state and minority languages within it (in the case of the U.S., see Kloss, 1977/1998; Wiley, 1998, 2000, 2002a). There remains however the fundamental question of what happens when minority language resources are employed to project state power abroad. In addition, missing in the literature is an historical reading of foreign language education policies in the United States from a critical

¹ I use the term perceived throughout this text to indicate that “national security” is a nebulous term defined in various, often divergent ways by different actors relevant to the policies under investigation here. This caveat is important given that most often the concept “national security” is employed so as to suggest there were a singular way to define what makes a society stable or secure.

perspective; and flowing from this, any consideration of how heritage speakers of the languages these policies target understand and act on them. In this study, I argue that assessing how policy-relevant actors and targeted groups have appropriated past LEPs explicitly linked to national security is a crucial step in understanding the language policies emerging today in the name of national security; in foreseeing what the consequences of these new policies may be, especially for heritage speakers of the languages these new policies target; and in helping clarify current debates about the most effective basis on which to advocate for language education, indeed for a more multilingual society.

Background

The following brief example helps to sketch out the parameters of the phenomenon at the heart of this dissertation. In December 2006 the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel convened to examine the disaster unfolding in U.S.-occupied Iraq and to propose a series of alternative plans, released its long-awaited report. Two numbers embedded in that report have taken on a life of their own. The report documented a lack of U.S. diplomats and other government officials working in Iraq who speak Arabic at any level of proficiency. It states:

All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 [in Baghdad] has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. (2006, p. 92)

That the federal government would be concerned with such deficiencies in the language of a country it is occupying is self-evident.

What is more perplexing is the degree to which advocates for language learning in the United States have themselves heralded these two numbers. Take for example the advertisement, reproduced in Figure 1 below, that ran in the January 8, 2007 edition of *Roll Call*, a newspaper dedicated to the happenings on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. The ad was placed by the American Council on Education. Citing the Iraq Study Group Report, the advertisement features a disproportionately large “6” at the top of the page, and explains just below the meaning of the number. The body of the advertisement reads, “It’s hard to represent America’s interests abroad when we can’t speak the language.” The ad goes on to name various federal policies to promote foreign language education (FLE) and calls for greater funding for them. Referencing “America’s interests abroad” in a general sense might be a reasonable invocation of any number of concerns: economic, diplomatic, political, cultural, etc. However, by connecting this statement to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and to the Iraq Study Group Report, “America’s interests abroad” become quite specific, namely victory in war and occupation. That an educational advocacy organization would employ such a rationale to call for greater funding of language learning initiatives raises troublesome questions about the relationship between education, language learning, and the nation-state.

6

* Number of fluent Arabic speakers
in the United States Embassy in Iraq.

It's hard to represent America's interests abroad when we can't speak the language. While the US has a number of programs that are ideally suited to increasing America's foreign language competency—Fulbright-Hays, the National Security Education Program, the Foreign Language Assistance Program, and Title VI of the Higher Education Act—federal support for these has lagged the years. Increased investment in these programs today will yield big and lasting dividends.

SOLUTIONSFOROURFUTURE.org

For all the different ways you can help, visit [solutionsforourfuture.org](http://www.solutionsforourfuture.org).

*Source: Fulbright-Hays Study Report: The Performance of Multilingualism, 1999
Copyright © 2006 by Solutions for Our Future, Inc. All rights reserved. 1001 10th Street, NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20004

Figure 1: Advertisement from Roll Call advocating greater funding for language Education. (Retrieved September 4, 2007 from <http://www.languagepolicy.org/documents/RollCallAd.pdf>.)

But the American Council on Education is not alone is appropriating (Levinson & Sutton, 2001) this number. The quote cited above from the Iraq Study Group report also came across the listserv associated with the recently formed Institute for Language and Education Policy. Its director, James Crawford, sent the quote in an email, along with a link to the report itself, with no other discussion other than a subject line that read: “Food for thought for English-only advocates” (James Crawford, personal communication, December 8, 2006). Knowing Crawford’s remarkable commitment, as much scholarly as political, to multilingualism and educational equity, one would anticipate that he is aware

of the double-edged sword that accompanies toying with these numbers as a basis for advocacy. Nevertheless, the implied message remains that one way to counter English-only discourses is to draw attention to the lack of linguistic capacity in the military as it occupies not one, but two sovereign nations. To be sure, the dearth of linguistic expertise in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad suggests a certain imperial arrogance in not bothering to learn the language of the countries one invades and occupies. Such points are certainly useful in waging other debates, i.e. over the occupation of Iraq or the “war on terrorism” more broadly. However, scholars and practitioners of language education need to ask ourselves: is this in fact an effective way to frame our advocacy for *language learning*? What consequences, both intended and otherwise, result from linking language education to national security?

This example of the Iraq Study Group Report is meant to underscore that any consideration of language learning—which ones we learn, where and how we learn them, for what purposes they are offered and learned, who learns them in the first place, who teaches them, the policies and persons supporting or thwarting language study, etc.—has as much to do with broad socio-historical concerns, such as war and occupation, as it does with cognitive issues of discrete language acquisition. This study does not pretend to be the first to have arrived at such a conclusion, nor to be the first to pose the two questions above about the effectiveness of linking language learning to national security and what the consequences are of such a relationship (cf. Blake & Kramersch, 2007; Byrnes, 2004, 2005; Kramersch, 2005; McGroarty, 2006; Petrovic, 2005; Ricento, 2005; Schmidt, 2007; Scollon, 2004). However, as will be discussed further in later chapters, a series of parallel developments has unfolded in the United States in the wake of the

events of September 11, 2001 that brings an increasing urgency to addressing these two questions.

Most important among these developments of course are the experiences and discourses surrounding war and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the panicked responses (Hill, 2001) to increased migration to the United States from Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. These issues weigh heavily on any discussion of the interconnections among education, language learning and the nation-state. More specific to the field of language policy and language education, however, are three distinct, yet interrelated trends. The first is a greater attention paid to what is known in the United States as heritage language education (HLE)². Two major national conferences have been organized since 1999 around the issues facing HLE (Kono & Wiley, 2002; Peyton, Ranard & McGinnis, 2001). The first of these resulted in a book on the topic (Peyton, Ranard & McGinnis, 2001); the second led to the formation of the Alliance for the Advancement of Heritage Languages, a collaboration based at the Center for Applied Linguistics in Washington, D.C. of scholars, professionals, individuals and organizations, committed to furthering heritage language education in the United States (Peyton, 2006).

The second trend concerns the re-emergence of discussion and debate about an overall national language education policy for the U.S. As will be explored in later chapters, this discussion has taken place fairly consistently since the advent of the Cold

² The term 'heritage languages' refers to languages other than English spoken in the United States by indigenous groups, immigrant communities, and descendants of either group. Fishman (2001) uses a broad definition of a heritage language speaker as someone with any personal contact to indigenous, immigrant and/or colonial languages. Valdés (2001) raises the bar somewhat by maintaining that a heritage language speaker must have some level of proficiency, whether active or passive, in the heritage language.

War. However, in the wake of September 11, 2001, calls to better assess and expand the linguistic capacity of the United States in order to support perceived national interests have grown more insistent. One recent example of this discussion takes place in the pages of *The Modern Language Journal*. Guest-edited by Robert Blake and Claire Kramersch (2007), the *Perspectives* section of the summer issue publishes papers given at a two-day colloquium held at the University of California, Berkeley in 2005, which explored the topic of whether the United States needs a national language education policy, and if so, what that policy might look like. More recently, Heidi Byrnes organized a series of four panels to discuss and debate the question of whether the U.S. needs a national language policy, and if so, what such policy should address. The panels, each of between four and six participants from scholarly, professional, governmental and community organizations, were convened in 2007 and 2008 at the following conferences: the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages meeting in San Antonio in November 2007; the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association in Chicago in December 2007; the Northeast Conference of Modern Language Teachers in New York in March 2008; and the annual meeting of the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Washington, DC in March 2008. The series of panels concluded with an invitation-only one-day conference at Georgetown University in early April 2008. Proceedings from the panels and the one-day conference will be published in the second *Perspectives* section of the 2008 volume of *The Modern Language Journal*.

The final trend lending greater urgency to the questions surrounding the intersection of language learning and national security concerns specific language education policies (LEPs) enacted by the federal government in recent years. Some, such

as the National Security Education Program and its various programs for language learning and study abroad, pre-date the events of September 11, 2001; others, such as the National Security Language Initiative of 2006, directly invoke that moment as they call for greater emphasis on language education in the United States (National Defense University, n.d.; U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). What both policies—and the individual programs and initiatives they fund—share in common is a commitment to expanding national capacity in what the federal government labels interchangeably “strategic” or “critical” languages. Such languages include: Arabic, Farsi, Hindi-Urdu, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Pashto, Russian, Swahili, and Turkic languages.

Research Questions

In my previous efforts to address the two broad questions listed above, i.e. whether advocacy for language learning should be based on national security concerns, and what the consequences of framing such advocacy might be, it seemed to me that a crucial perspective missing in the literature is an historical analysis of what the policy connection between language learning and national security has looked like. Time and again, references appear in the contemporary literature to the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, or to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (commonly known as Fulbright-Hays [F-H]), and the profound effects they had on all aspects of language learning in this country, but especially for the Less Commonly Taught Languages (known as LCTLs, many of which are also considered strategic languages). However, the tone of many of these references is that of an assumed, shared understanding of what such historic policies represented in word and deed. There are, in

fact, some histories of federal LEPs like the NDEA and F-H. Those that take a socio-historical, or even critical perspective to policy analysis (e.g. Clowse, 1981; Spring, 2006) spend little time considering such policies as language policies and the impact they had on the practices of language education. Other histories (e.g. Gumperz, 1970; Lambert, 1984a, 1984b, 1993; O'Connell & Norwood, 2007; Ruther, 1994) treat initiatives like the NDEA more like language policies insofar as they consider the language programs these policies funded as part of the broader project of international education. However, these histories are more traditional implementation studies that follow a policy's history in a more linear way from design to debate to deployment, with any number of recommendations to improve and build on them. In other words, these studies do not take a critical approach to the goals behind federal LEPs such as the NDEA or F-H, or what the ideological and practical fall-out of them may be because of those goals. Finally, my preparations for this dissertation proposal found no scholarship assessing the history of LEPs such as the NDEA in terms of their implications for heritage speakers of the languages targeted by such policies. An example of what these implications might examine would be the degree to which heritage speakers participated in NDEA language programs. In short, given the growing controversy that surrounds advocacy for LEPs explicitly linked to national security, there is simply not enough scholarship on what the nexus between LEPs and national security has looked like. This leaves a difficult question unanswered, namely: what happens when minority language resources are marshaled in the name of national security? Again, because of the many instances in the current literature that invoke historical LEPs linked to national security, as if we already know and agree on what those historical experiences meant, there is a

need to explore more closely just how different policy actors have interpreted these historic policies. Considering these gaps in the literature, I formulated two research questions to frame an historical analysis of the policy connections between language learning and national security interests, while at the same time attempting to keep the perspective of heritage speakers of languages targeted by such policies at the forefront of my research. Those research questions are:

- 1) How have perceived national security concerns influenced historically the formation and implementation of federal language education policies in the United States? And;
- 2) What have been the implications of that influence for heritage language learners, particularly in the context of higher education programs in Arabic funded by federal language education policies?

Theoretical Framework

My efforts to answer these research questions are grounded by socio-historical and critical approaches to language planning and policy (LPP). In particular, two recent developments in the field have deeply shaped my understanding of the conceptual framework within which the phenomenon and the research questions about it operate. The first is the notion of the safety zone of national identity and interests (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006). Safety zone theory is an attempt not simply to describe policy shifts over time, but instead to explain the driving forces behind those shifts. Safety zone theory as originally developed by Lomawaima and McCarty is meant to explain federal policy affecting Indian education in general. When applied to language policy more

specifically, safety zone theory contends that when Native languages and their speakers are determined to constitute a threat to national identity or national interests, specific policies emerge that aim to restrict or repress the practice of those languages.

Conversely, as these same languages and their speakers are deemed to be non-threatening to national interests, policy restrictions begin to fall away; indeed, policies to promote the practice of “safe” languages may even appear. Although the specific language of interest to this proposal is an immigrant language, i.e. Arabic, not a Native one, safety zone theory still played a critical role in shaping the research design. In particular, safety zone theory helped me address my first research question by identifying the ideological boundaries of “national security.” Above all, what is safe and what is threatening? How do policy actors use notions of safety and threats to define national security? How do policy actors apply their definitions of national security in promoting or limiting the practice of languages other than English (LOTEs) through formal language education policies? How do these notions of national security define who benefits from and who is threatened by LOTEs in the United States?

The second recent development in the field of LPP that has deeply shaped the theoretical framework behind this research proposal is the concept of language policy mechanisms (Shohamy, 2006). Shohamy frames this concept as a contribution to an expanded view of LPP analysis that goes beyond the confines of formal policy documents. Mechanisms are those covert and overt devices that shape and perpetuate *de facto* language policies. Shohamy locates language policy mechanisms “at the heart of the battle between ideology and practice” (p. 54). She argues that mechanisms can take many forms, including: rules and regulations; language education policies; language

tests; and ideologies, myths, propaganda and coercion. The concept of mechanisms aided me in moving from my first research question to the second, i.e. in better understanding how specific language policy mechanisms transform the ideological parameters set by the safety zone of national interests into the practice of higher education programs of language learning.

Methodology

To address my research questions, I conducted an interpretive policy analysis as defined by Yanow (2000). This approach to policy analysis assists in identifying policy-relevant actors, those charged with implementing given policies, as well as those affected by policies, whether formal and overt or not. In each case, interpretive policy analysis seeks to identify the meaning these constituencies make of a given policy, both symbolically in the form of words and objects, and concretely in terms of how a given policy is practiced. Interpretive policy analysis employs a number of conventional qualitative research methods and analysis, such as document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation. A second important contribution to the methodology of this study is what Wiley (1999) has defined as comparative historical analysis of language policies. This approach to analysis draws from several typologies of LPP analysis (Heath, 1976; Kloss 1977/1998; Leibowitz, 1969, 1971, 1976, 1980, 1984); it builds on them by seeking to understand the origins of specific language ideologies and why some dominate over time. A key feature to this form of historical analysis is cross-case comparisons to better understand how specific policies and ideologies affect various language groups, and how those groups in turn respond.

In applying the methodological approaches defined by Yanow (2000) and Wiley (1999), I identified three interpretive communities relevant to the phenomenon of this study. They are:

- 1) policy elites, e.g. elected officials, representatives of federal agencies, and spokespersons for interest groups related to language learning in the United States, and the role they play in forming and implementing federal LEPs tied to national security;
- 2) university actors, e.g. representatives of specific institutions of higher education in the administration of and instruction in Arabic language programs funded by federal LEPs tied to national security, and how they appropriate these policies;
- 3) the heritage language community, e.g. Arab Americans both as students and professionals in higher education programs in Arabic, as well as representatives of advocacy groups for Arab and Muslim Americans, and how they appropriate these policies.

To be sure, I did not mistake the process of identifying distinct interpretive communities for an assumption that each would have a distinct, consistent interpretation of the policies investigated here.

In addition to these three interpretive communities, data sources to understand how each of these interpretive communities have established, understood and acted on LEPs explicitly linked to national security included: formal policy documents; transcripts of Congressional hearings; policy briefs, newsletters, internal correspondence, and opinion pieces for the media written by representatives of all three communities; project evaluation reports; surveys conducted by any of the communities listed above; as well

secondary, archival sources about the policies and relevant actors. In addition, interviews with policy-relevant actors from each interpretive community helped to establish an insider perspective on historical LEPs tied to national security. Finally, archival research and media accounts served to frame the socio-historical context in which these policies existed.

The Case

In designing this study, I was most interested in understanding the relationship between national security and language learning with an eye on its implications for heritage language learners. To approach this relationship in terms of all heritage language groups in the United States would have been an impossible task for one research project. Therefore, I limited my investigation of this relationship to focus specifically on federally funded Arabic language programs in higher education. Several considerations justified my choice of this case. The first flowed from the preliminary research I had already conducted on the topic, which revealed that the vast majority of federal LEPs explicitly linked to national security such as Title VI have targeted higher education. It is important to acknowledge an immediate limitation with this choice. The vast majority of enrollments in language programs are (and have been) at the secondary level, not in higher education (Watzke, 2003). However, because I was interested in a subset of language education, namely that portion directly impacted by federal LEPs, the logical choice was to look at the level of education most affected by these LEPs, which is tertiary education. The second explanation for my choice of this case related to the selection of Arabic as the heritage language to explore. As I suggest in the review of literature on

Orientalism and its critics, which follows in the next chapter, the experiences of Arab Americans, Muslims (and those assumed to be such) stand out as particularly contested ones, especially since the end of World War II. As Stake (1994) has argued, it is often from the atypical cases that we can learn the most about a given social phenomenon. That is, by explicitly investigating what I would argue is the most contested heritage language (next to Spanish) in the United States, we stand to learn a great deal about the implications of the relationship between national security and language education policy. A final word concerns the type of case study this dissertation reports. Again, I relied on Stake (1994) for insight. He contrasts intrinsic with instrumental interests in identifying cases and conducting studies of them. In the former instance, the purpose is to design a study that reveals as much information as possible about the case itself, independent of the broader context in which that case exists. In the latter instance, the aim is to explore a case with the intention either of providing greater insight into a broader social phenomenon, or to refine theories about that social phenomenon. I concluded that the goals of this research related more closely to both instrumental interests. On the one hand, I wanted to better understand the implications of the relationship between perceived national security concerns and federal LEPs, i.e. the big question of what happens when minority languages are employed in the projection of state power abroad. On the other, I aimed to intervene in theoretical and scholarly debates about that relationship.

The Relationship between Researcher and the Case

I acknowledge from the outset that there is a contradiction inherent to designing an “instrumental” case study of Arabic so as to shed light on broader issues. As the discussion on Orientalism in the coming chapter seeks to make clear, Arab Americans—their experiences, history, culture, language, etc.—have been “used” in such ways all too often in the past. This history complicated my efforts to design the research reported here in two specific ways. The first concerned the choice of topic overall. Based on my own political commitments, I believed (and continue to believe) that the urgent issues of war and contested immigration to the U.S. demand principled and committed responses, as much in scholarship as in other ways. I would not have been able to dedicate the amount of time required for doctoral studies and a dissertation were they not somehow related to better understanding and responding to these issues. One space in society where questions of war, immigration and schooling intersect is federal language education policy targeting Arabic. Therefore, my interest in this particular case was not simply academic, but deeply committed politically. The second complication related to my position as a researcher inasmuch as I am not Arab American, nor am I Muslim. I do not speak Arabic, and I do not have formal qualifications in graduate level studies of Middle East history. While I do not believe my outsider status disqualified me from researching issues surrounding Arabic as a heritage language, I recognized from the outset that the burden was on me throughout this project—i.e. from inception, to implementation and reporting—to ensure that Arab American voices spoke for themselves as much as possible in my work. At the risk of trivializing this ethical concern by constructing a quota-like checklist, I believe it is worth reporting my efforts to follow through on this

commitment in this dissertation. They included: attempting to recruit as many Arab American policy-relevant actors as possible to participate in interviews (in the end, one-third of interview participants were Arab American); relying on demographic data from political and civic Arab American organizations (versus solely relying on U.S. Census or other government data); including representatives of a variety of civic, professional and political Arab American organizations both for guidance and for interview participants (although in more than a few instances, these representatives in the end were not themselves Arab American); and seeking out historical and archival sources on the history of U.S. foreign policy penned by Arabs and/or Arab Americans. Seeing as interviews comprised only a portion of the data on which the analysis presented in the dissertation is based, I have intentionally foregrounded document and archival research written by Arab Americans in reporting the findings of this dissertation. To be sure, I did not pretend to enter into this project without preconceived notions about the topic at hand; at the same time, I have tried to state clearly my intention to conduct and report research that was as unbiased as possible in *design* while thoroughly committed politically in its *purpose*.

Organization

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature pertaining to the many concepts that inform both the design and the theoretical framework behind this study. In addition, it returns to the two texts that comprise the theoretical framework of the study for a more thorough discussion. Chapter 3 reviews both the approach to research and the specific methods I employed in this

study. Chapters 4 and 5 present background on two aspects related to this study. Chapter 4 reviews the history of the Arabic language and the Arab American community in the United States. It also recounts historical efforts to maintain Arabic in the U.S. and briefly touches on contemporary efforts of language maintenance. Chapter 5 offers a narrative history of the language education policy central to this study, i.e. Title VI of the NDEA. Some context is provided in this historical account, and the reader will certainly identify a number of interesting themes that need further discussion. However, I have made an effort to construct a linear history of Title VI primarily to aid in the reading (and the writing) of Chapter 6, which presents the findings of my interpretive analysis of Title VI. Without the chronological narrative of Title VI, I was concerned that the thematic analysis would become too cumbersome to follow. Chapter 7 reports my conclusions drawn from the thematic analysis presented in Chapter 6. I close this dissertation with an epilogue that connects the previous analysis to contemporary debates about heritage language education and its (mis)uses in bolstering U.S. national security.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the literature that relates to the conceptual framework in which the research problem identified in Chapter 1 is located. The review is organized around four themes: 1) theories, approaches and typologies of language planning and policy; 2) ideology and language; 3) current perspectives on heritage language education (HLE) in the United States; and 4) Orientalism in U.S. scholarship and its critics. Grounded by this review, the chapter returns to the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 1 for elaboration.

Language Planning and Policy

The field of language planning and policy (LPP) has developed in the last fifty years into a major discipline within applied linguistics. Its breadth and depth make an overview increasingly difficult. As such, I will consider LPP from three perspectives: the role of theory in LPP; approaches to LPP analysis; and typologies of LPP.

Theory and LPP

Two recent texts have raised important questions about the role of theory in LPP (Ricento, 2006b; Spolsky, 2007). In both cases, the central question is less about how social theories, or epistemology more broadly inform the study of LPP. Rather, the discussion focuses on whether there is, or whether there can be, an overall theory of language planning and policy.

Ricento (2006b) does not reach a conclusion as to a singular theory of LPP. At first, he seems to endorse a postmodern perspective on linguistics, indeed on what

constitutes language itself. He cites Hopper and Pennycook in arguing that language is not a fixed, discrete entity. Instead, language is a collection of discourses, some of which are shared by various individuals across various social spaces and times. Such an understanding of language works to undo traditional approaches to LPP, which sought to identify language problems that could be overcome with policy solutions. Furthermore, Ricento argues that a more fluid understanding of the nature of language leads to reconsidering, if not altogether abandoning, positivist or structuralist analytical categories, e.g. nation-state, policy, native speaker, etc., that influence traditional linguistics and the approaches to LPP that flowed from them. Of course, such an epistemology rejects by definition the sorts of “grand narratives” that are at play when one talks about “a theory” of LPP.

Despite Ricento’s endorsement of this conception of language, and the theoretical and practical fallout it entails for the study of LPP, he concludes his discussion with four points that may in fact constitute a theory of LPP. The first point is that debates about language are always about more than language, instead incorporating political, economic and social issues that require a multidisciplinary approach. The second assertion is that how researchers define language, language policy, the state, etc. have important consequences for the methodologies and analytical approaches they employ. Third, ideology influences how researchers interpret the language policies we study, but it impacts as well which policies we choose (or not) to study in the first place. Finally, Ricento argues that LPP research must be multi- and interdisciplinary in its approaches, analytical tools and methods, and that LPP research must be grounded in applied, real-world contexts.

The balance of Ricento's edited volume (2006a), meant to serve as an introduction to and overview of the issues surrounding language policy, confirms the tenuousness in declaring a singular theory of LPP analysis. Chapters discussing the role of theory in LPP range from critical theory (Tollefson, 2006) and post-modernism (Pennycook, 2006) to decidedly liberal political approaches underlying bourgeois economics (Grin, 2006) and identity politics (Schmidt, 2006). Furthermore, the diversity of theoretical approaches to LPP analysis carries over to the chapters discussing methodologies for investigating language policies. From more critical positions towards historiography (Wiley, 2006) and ethnography (Canagarajah, 2006), to post-modern applications of discourse analysis (Wodak, 2006), to psycholinguistic approaches (Baker, 2006), the variety of methodologies presented reflects numerous, in fact competing, theoretical stances. This certainly is not meant to be a criticism of Ricento's volume; quite the opposite. By including a wide range of perspectives on language policy and its meanings, Ricento confirms in practice that no singular theoretical approach to the field currently exists.

Spolsky (2007) builds on his influential text *Language Policy* (2004) to outline the parameters of what a theory of LPP might entail. His main argument is that the test of whether a theory is successful is its ability to explain the linguistic choices made by individuals in terms of established patterns in the communities to which these individuals belong. Spolsky adopts Fishman's concept of domain (i.e. a specific social space such as the family, a school, the workplace, local media, etc.) as the sociolinguistic unit of study. Within each domain, this theory of LPP incorporates three interrelated phenomena, namely language practices, language beliefs, and language management. Spolsky prefers

the term “beliefs” to “ideology”, since the latter is particularly loaded with political connotations, when in fact language beliefs need not be overtly political to be of relevance. He also favors “management” over the more traditional term of “planning”, which implies that language “problems” can be solved by rational, specific language planning.

That several new texts attempt to define whether there is or can be a theory of LPP speaks to the establishment of LPP as a major line of inquiry in applied linguistics and in the social sciences overall. However, it is fair to argue that the conclusions that Ricento and Spolsky arrive at are so broad that they reflect everything and nothing at the same time. To be sure, this criticism does not come from postmodernist pessimism that overarching, explanatory theories (i.e. those devilish grand narratives) are impossible to identify or “operationalize” in our research. However, I do think that the purpose of theory is to draw some boundaries around social phenomena so as to provide a guide for practice, which then in turn verifies whether our theories explain the real world or not. When those boundaries are so wide as to include everything at once, it remains difficult to find our way. What I take from Ricento’s definition of a theory of LPP is that one must approach the question from various epistemological and disciplinary perspectives, and that one must engage with real-world, concrete social issues. As for Spolsky’s argument, I think his litmus test of whether a theory of LPP is successful, i.e. its ability to explain individual language choices within broader community or social patterns, is extremely helpful in negotiating the ever-present tension between constrictive social structures and individual agency. In both cases, however, I am not sure that these insights, however helpful and accurate, constitute a theory *per se* of LPP as a discipline.

Instead, I think a number of important theories have emerged to explain various linguistic and social phenomena that are often categorized under the heading “language policy”. A review of the theories of relevance to this dissertation, e.g. language ideology, linguistic imperialism, safety zone theory and language policy mechanisms, will be addressed in the appropriate context later in this chapter. For now, let us turn to an overview of the various approaches to LPP analysis that have developed over the years.

Approaches to LPP Analysis

Efforts in the literature to construct overviews of LPP analysis use terms such as “approaches”, “perspectives”, “orientations”, “frameworks” and “models” fairly interchangeably. Perhaps another dissertation can examine to what extent these different terms reflect competing or contradictory understandings of language policies and their impact on language practice in society. I would argue that the multitude of terms does reflect the fact that no overarching, singular theory of LPP exists. In any event, I do not believe exact definitions of each are necessary for the purposes of this literature review. What is important to acknowledge is that these overviews distinguish among approaches to LPP analysis using different criteria. One set of overviews approaches the task as periodizations of the field. Others make distinctions among approaches to LPP analysis along epistemological lines, and are less concerned with matching shifts in theoretical orientation to time periods. Still others differentiate language policies based on the understanding of language overall underlying those policies, or which aspect of language the policies address. Although there are important correlations between how these

different overviews approach the field, I will take each in turn, beginning with the last category.

Hornberger (1994, 2006a) has developed a matrix that has become a standard starting point for understanding various domains and approaches to LPP. In her integrative framework to LPP, Hornberger draws from a number of foundational sources defining typologies, approaches and goals to construct an overview of language policy as a field. The typology starts with Kloss's (1968, 1969) distinction between status planning (i.e. the uses of a given language) and corpus planning (i.e. the lexicology, orthography and standardization of a language). In addition, Hornberger incorporates Cooper's (1989) third major typology, that of acquisition planning. She then divides each typology into two separate approaches to LPP, policy formation and the cultivation of language use. Finally, she works into both approaches Haugen's (1983) four goals of LPP. The goals of selection and codification are linked in Hornberger's framework to policy approaches to LPP. The goals of implementation and elaboration (i.e. the expansion of domains and registers of a given language) are aligned with LPP approaches concerned with cultivation of language.

While Hornberger's integrative framework is successful in tying together some thirty years of scholarship in LPP into one overview, it does not necessarily consider the more fundamental understanding of language that each typology, approach and goal in the framework implies. Ruiz (1984) looks at competing conceptions of language itself as his starting point in distinguishing among various orientations to LPP. In his groundbreaking work, Ruiz begins by defining orientations to LPP as language attitudes; that is, orientations reflect underlying assumptions about language and what it is good for

that drive differing approaches to language planning and policy. Ruiz argues that most efforts in LPP have conceived of language as a problem. Ruiz defines this orientation to LPP in two ways. The first flows from the work of applied linguists and their efforts to identify language problems in society and solve them through rational, scientifically based planning. This orientation overlaps in many ways with Hornberger's integrative framework. However, most references to Ruiz's language-as-problem orientation invoke his second definition of the language-as-problem orientation. Here, "problem" refers to dominant attitudes toward speakers of minority languages, in particular how social problems are argued to result from possessing a non-English heritage and/or presumed deficiencies in English.

By the time Ruiz's article appeared, a rich tradition of scholarship and struggle had emerged in the United States (and elsewhere) that countered the language-as-problem orientation to language policy by advocating for language as a right. Ruiz considers various interpretations of rights in the literature, from human rights as defined by international organizations and the right to use a native language, to the right to be free from linguistic discrimination. Ruiz raises important questions about the effectiveness of employing language-as-right orientations to language advocacy. One fundamental difficulty arises from determining whether language rights exist at the individual or collective level. Ruiz also considers the backlash often provoked by the political baggage perceived to surround much rights-related terminology (e.g. entitlement, compliance, etc.), and how that baggage can in fact impede efforts at expanding language rights.

Ruiz concludes his article by proposing a third orientation to LPP that furthers advocacy for language learning while avoiding the pitfalls he identifies with the

language-as-right orientation. For Ruiz, the resource approach alleviates tension between majority and minority language groups, and views the linguistic knowledge of minority language speakers as an asset to cultivate, not a deficit to redress. The language-as-resource orientation has been widely accepted as a fundamental and indispensable tool for language education advocacy (cf. Wiley, 1996; Valdés, et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that, in addition to positive attitudes towards LOTEs linked to the resource metaphor, Ruiz embeds in his definition of language resource questions of economic advancement, military preparedness and the benefits of an “enlightened leadership” in U.S. foreign policy (p. 27). Therefore, already in the first instantiation of the language-as-resource orientation to LPP we can identify various, I would argue competing, definitions of the orientation itself. In a basic way, this dissertation proposal turns on these very competing definitions of what languages (and their speakers) can—and should—be resources for.

Ricento (2000a; 2000b; 2006c) frames his overview of LPP and the various approaches employed in analyzing language policy as three broad periods since the end of World War II. While this framework is structured chronologically, Ricento considers each period in terms of its macro sociopolitical, epistemological and strategic characteristics. In the first period of “early work” (2000b, p. 197) from the 1950s through the early 1970s, Ricento defines the sociopolitical context in which LPP projects were undertaken as one of rapid decolonization and the construction of new nation states. This context coincided with the dominance of structuralism in the social sciences, which, when applied to linguistics, conceived of language as a discrete, systematic entity existing independently both of speakers and the social conditions in which they found

themselves. This led to LPP strategies that sought to identify specific language problems in newly emerging nation states and to use systematic studies of the languages spoken in those states to plan rational policy solutions. Those solutions often consisted of status planning to establish stable diglossia between the former colonial language, which was meant to serve as at least an official language of new states, and any number of community languages predating colonization. In the latter case, LPP projects often entailed corpus planning to standardize community and indigenous languages in terms of orthography, lexicology and elaboration in what were seen as efforts to modernize these languages. A final characteristic of this early period of work was an assumption on the part of applied linguists that their planning efforts were ideologically neutral.

The second period of LPP scholarship identified by Ricento begins in the early 1970s and lasts through the early 1980s. In socio-historical terms the starting point was recognition of the limitations, even the failure, of decolonization inasmuch as exploitative relationships existing between developing and rich nations were re-identified and denounced. Awareness of continuing inequality among nations coincided with developments in linguistics that began to question the autonomy of language from the social context in which it is used. Once that fundamental question had been posed, a number of foundational concepts in linguistics (e.g. native speaker, mother tongue, mono- and bilingualism, linguistic competence, etc.) came under increased scrutiny. The challenge to linguistics of greatest consequence for LPP concerned the notion of diglossia. Past efforts to establish distinct, ideologically neutral domains in post-colonial societies where colonial and native languages should coexist were criticized for ignoring the real social and power imbalances that accompanied proficiency (or lack thereof) of

one societal language versus another. In addition to consideration of the power dynamics associated with language, the assumption that language practice could be planned and implemented in a linear, top-down model came under fire. These criticisms took the form of assessing the role of attitudes and beliefs in shaping actual language practice, and how attitudes worked to confound language policies or programs.

The third and final period Ricento identifies begins in the early 1980s and carries us through to contemporary scholarship. He acknowledges that political and scholarly trends are still formative and thus difficult to characterize. But Ricento does define this third period based on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc; massive migration; repatriation of former colonies such as Hong Kong; efforts to form regional blocks like the European Union; and the multiple consequences of capitalist globalization. In terms of epistemological shifts that characterize this period, Ricento does not identify one theoretical stance as dominant. He includes in the titles to these sections (2000a; 2000b) the term post-modernism, which implies that it is the dominant scholarly standpoint of LPP research. Yet, in the actual discussion of this third period of LPP analysis, Ricento acknowledges the influence of critical, neo-Marxist, post-modern and post-structuralist social theory on the practice of LPP. The diversity of epistemology correlates to diversity in strategies for LPP analysis as Ricento describes it in these three texts. He reviews important constructs in LPP of linguistic human rights, language ecology, language shift and efforts to reverse it, linguistic imperialism and language ideology. (The latter two will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.) If there are overarching characteristics of this period of LPP analysis, they are the conviction that LPP is anything but ideologically neutral; that languages are practiced and lived in real-

world contexts, subject to all sorts of political, economic, cultural, and individual constraints; that the field of linguistics and the application of LPP are constructs from the West and often are insufficient for understanding, describing or predicting language practice elsewhere; and that the most effective way to approach language policy is from various disciplinary and methodological perspectives.

In his extremely influential book, *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Tollefson (1991) pursues an intellectual history of LPP that takes ideological distinctions as the starting point. He identifies two intellectual traditions, which he labels neoclassical and socio-historical, by using four criteria: the unit of analysis each uses; what role history plays in the analysis; which criteria are used for evaluation of language policies; and the role the researcher plays. While at first his differentiation of neoclassical and socio-historical approaches to LPP does align with specific periods of time, Tollefson's argument is that both approaches are still widely used in the design, implementation and analysis of language policies around the world.

Tollefson ascribes four tenets to neoclassical approaches to LPP. The first is that in order to understand society, one must investigate the individual and individual choices about language. Flowing from this is the second point that social, structural or historical differences result from the sum of individual practice, not from broader, indeed independent social forces. Third, neoclassical approaches to LPP assume that individual decisions about language are predictable and made freely. The fourth and final tenet is the methodological application of the first three, namely that the most appropriate unit of analysis for LPP research is the individual and individual decisions. As others have noted, Tollefson ascribes to the neoclassical position the belief that LPP is ideologically

neutral and rational. He maintains that the neoclassical approach to LPP is incapable of understanding how language communities form and dissolve; why some communities acquire multiple languages easily while others do not; and what mechanisms explain language shift over time. Instead, neoclassical research into LPP tends to consider individual motivations for learning (or not learning) language. Thus, the terrain of language learning is located in an individual's head and seen as a discrete, sequential process.

In contrast to neoclassical approaches to LPP, Tollefson describes socio-historical analyses of language planning. Of course, socio-historical approaches to LPP do not begin with the individual, but rather the social context in which individuals live. The goal of LPP from this approach for Tollefson is "to discover the historical and social pressures that lead to particular policies and plans that constrain individual choice" (1991, p. 32). From this perspective, then, LPP becomes but one terrain on which social battles between various segments of society are played out. If what motivates an individual to learn language is of primary concern to neoclassical approaches to LPP, then the historical factors shaping that motivation are at the center of socio-historical research on LPP. By definition, socio-historical approaches to LPP are not ideologically neutral, but rather take particular, committed positions. This distinction has two important consequences for research practice. The first is the basis for evaluation of concrete language policies. The primary criterion used to determine the effectiveness of these policies is less about ultimate linguistic attainment and more about the degree to which language policies contribute to or thwart social justice. The second consequence is the acknowledgement that researchers do not, in fact cannot, enter the research field

devoid of opinions and interests in the research. To the contrary, socio-historical approaches to LPP engage researchers' beliefs openly and how those beliefs shape the research and conclusions drawn.

As foundational as Tollefson's distinction between competing approaches to LPP has become, it has not gone without criticism. For example, Ricento & Hornberger (1996) charge Tollefson with constructing a "straw figure" argument out of neoclassical approaches to LPP against which he defines the preferred socio-historical standpoint. Wiley's responses (1996, 1999) are both less critical and more practical in acknowledging weaknesses in Tollefson's analysis while building on it with concrete suggestions for research practice. In the earlier article, Wiley elaborates on Tollefson's two categories by discussing the work of three researchers and where their scholarship would fit into Tollefson's categories. According to Wiley, the balance of Einar Haugen's work clearly adopts more of a neo-classical approach. This, however, does not mean that Haugen never considered social or historical implications of language planning. In contrast, Wiley assigns the work of Arnold Leibowitz to the socio-historical model of LPP analysis. While this is certainly the case (I will discuss Leibowitz's contributions further in the next section), it is also true that Leibowitz, a lawyer by trade, conducted many of his analyses on behalf of government agencies, such as the National Clearinghouse on Bilingual Education, and embraced a role for the federal government in redressing language problems, such as discrimination based on language use. Finally, Wiley locates the work of Heinz Kloss as having its feet planted firmly in both extremes of neo-classical and socio-historical traditions. What matters here is that there are important research traditions and theoretical insights to be gained from both traditions of

LPP research. In fact, Wiley (1999) makes the important point that it is Tollefson who labels certain researchers and their scholarship as “neoclassical,” not the researchers themselves. Thus, whatever pejorative sense the term has acquired, it is an interpretation of past LPP scholarship, not necessarily the original aims of the work itself.

A second important assessment by Wiley (1999) of Tollefson’s socio-historical approach to LPP analysis is a methodological one. While Wiley clearly endorses historical analyses of LPP, he argues that few language policy researchers have elaborated precisely what a method of historiography would entail for the study of language policies. Wiley’s proposal for such a method will be taken up in greater detail in the following chapter describing the methodology proposed for this dissertation.

LPP Typologies

My understanding of LPP typologies flows from their relationship to the methodology proposed for this dissertation. That is, Hornberger’s (1994, 2006a) use of typology in her integrative framework for LPP analysis reflects a specific, and different purpose in identifying types of LPP. There, the concern is differentiating among types of language policies based on which aspect of language they seek to influence (i.e. its place in society, as with status planning; its form, as with corpus planning; and how it is learned, as with acquisition planning). The typologies of LPP of greater concern here differentiate language policies based on their broader social impact in two ways: first, how policies reflect dominant social attitudes toward the speakers of the language they target; and how those affected groups themselves understand language policies. Even in the case of Heath (1976), which we will consider shortly, although she looks at status achievement of

colonial languages in the Americas, her final analysis is not based solely on *what* status English or Spanish had, but rather considers *how* they achieved it. This is a decidedly more contextualized approach to language policy interpretation than the formal typology reviewed earlier. This approach to LPP typology derives above all from Wiley (1999) and his elaboration on a method of comparative historical analysis of language policies.

The starting point for this review of typology is Kloss's (1977/1998) comparative framework for language policy analysis, as well as adaptations made to it by Macías & Wiley (1998), McCarty (2004) and Wiley (2002a). Kloss identifies three broad categories of language policies. The first are promotion-oriented policies, which official agencies (e.g. government, state, or agency authorities) use to support the learning of minority languages. Kloss identifies within promotion-oriented policies a subcategory of those policies that support minority languages for reasons of expediency. With such cases, the goal is not the expansion of proficiency in the minority language *per se*, but rather to support short-term accommodations to reach a separate, larger goal. The primary example of such expediency-oriented policies in the U.S. is the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (Wiley, 1999). Although instruction in the home language is endorsed, it is utilized primarily to facilitate transition to and proficiency in English. Second, Kloss identifies tolerance-oriented language policies, characterized by the lack of intervention by government authorities into minority language practice. Kloss's thesis about the history of language policies in the United States is that it is characterized primarily by tolerance-oriented language policies. The degree to which this is the case has since been revisited and challenged (cf. Wiley, 2000, 2002b). The third major typology of language policy proposed by Kloss is of restriction-oriented policies. Such

policies impose legal constraints on the use of language, as well as age limits on when a minority language may or may not be studied.

While Kloss's initial typology has since been widely employed in understanding historical language policies in the United States, his analysis focuses largely on the linguistic experiences of immigrants in this country. By leaving largely unexamined the history of Native Americans and African Americans, Kloss not only overestimates government preference for tolerance-oriented policies, but also leaves untreated the most consequential and violent aspect of U.S. language policy historically. Macías & Wiley (1998) correct that oversight by adding to Kloss's framework the category of repression-oriented policies. The distinction between restriction- and repression-oriented policies is that the former seek to constrain the practice of minority languages, while the latter aim to eradicate their existence altogether. Wiley (2002a) further amends Kloss's typology with the category of null policies. The distinction here between tolerance-oriented policies and null policies is one of recognition. Tolerance-oriented policies acknowledge that minority languages exist and serve in some cases as the medium of instruction in school settings. By contrast, null policies neither recognize the presence of minority languages nor the consequences of language variety in classroom settings where only the dominant language is in use. A further, and extremely important, addendum to Kloss's original typology of language policy concerns his focus solely on explicit policies enacted by state authorities (whether at the federal, state, or local level). Macías & Wiley (1998) and Wiley (2002a) identify this shortcoming, but maintain that Kloss's typology is still useful for analysis of covert or implicit language policies, as well. McCarty (2004) also builds on Kloss's typology by teasing out two different types of tolerance-oriented

policies. She distinguishes between expedient tolerance, where missionaries learned and used indigenous languages in North America to more effectively convert the Native population; and calculated tolerance, where authorities in the young United States recognized that English would spread more effectively as the dominant language were speakers of other language not coerced to learn it.

As suggested above, Heath (1976) develops a typology of language policy that, while concerned with status, focuses more on how languages achieve their status in society. Heath's typology derives from an historical comparative analysis of the role of Spanish and English in Mexico, Peru, and the colonies of what became the United States. Her focus is on the status each language achieved. Heath defines language status achievement as "the legitimization of a government's decisions regarding the acceptable language for those who are to carry out the political, economic, and social affairs of the political process" (p. 51). For Heath, investigating status achievement broadens the focus of past language policy study, which she argues looks exclusively at official government decision-making processes, to include multiple levels of decision-making and how each set of policy actors understands and acts on its decisions with regard to language use. Through a comparison of how Spain and England approached language policy formation and implementation, Heath sketches out a new typology for LPP analysis. The first distinction in her typology is between level and focus, where policy actors at various levels of authority (in this case, Spanish and English officials; colonial administrators in the respective colonies; and native or indigenous actors in each area) are identified along with potentially different language policy goals held by each. Based on her analysis of LPP in colonial Mexico, Peru and North America, Heath identifies two levels at which

Spanish and English language policy operated: the supra-polity, i.e. decisions emanating from the colonial power; and the local level, i.e. decisions of colonial administrators and groups representing indigenous populations. The second distinction in Heath's typology is between the formation and the configuration of language policy. The former term is applied by Heath to refer to Spain's highly centralized language policies that were debated, created and implemented as explicit language policies. The latter term Heath coins to capture the dynamic of English language policy. In this case, the process was decentralized inasmuch as England developed and implemented virtually no explicit language policies for its colonies. Instead, language policies—or better, language practice—were shaped by local actors interpreting and acting on official policy related to broader issues such as religion, economics and other social factors. Heath maintains that language policy thus derived from other official colonial policy. She goes on to define what she means by configuration: “Language policy configuration as defined here includes those decisions made at the supra-polity level in which the relative disposition of arrangements of socio-cultural parts allowed local agents to shape language policies” (p. 52).

While Heath's specific typology may be more appropriate specifically for investigations of language policy in colonial societies or in former colonies, her contributions are useful in at least two ways. First, her typology reflects an advance in methodological approaches to LPP analysis, which I will discuss further in the following chapter. Second, whether this was the intent of her typology or not, Heath moves beyond Kloss's approach to LPP analysis, which was more formal and restricted to explicit language policies and laws. In fact, Heath's typology in some ways foresees the

development of interpretive policy analysis (Yanow, 2000) in that she attempts to identify policy actors at varying levels of authority in society (i.e. not just formal representatives of the state) and how these actors appropriate policy (Levinson & Sutton, 2001), often in conflicting or contradictory ways.

Leibowitz (1969, 1971, 1976, 1980, 1984) advances language policy analysis in equally remarkable ways. The central contention behind his work is to him a “simple” one: “language is primarily a means of control” (1976, p. 449). Much like Heath (1976), Leibowitz shifts from a focus on explicit language policies to consider “the case when the government acts in an official way and designates a specific language requirement as a condition of participating in a given activity” (1976, p. 449). This approach leads to yet another LPP typology, which I will discuss shortly. It is necessary, however, to take a moment to appreciate the developments in LPP analysis Leibowitz makes, as well as the insight he offers, which foreshadow the elements central to the theoretical framework behind this research proposal.

It is remarkable to me the similarities in analytical approaches taken by Leibowitz (1971, 1984) and Lomawaima & McCarty (2006) and their safety zone theory.

Leibowitz argues with great clarity that policies to affect language practice emerge in direct relation to state and dominant attitudes towards language minority groups in the United States. While lengthy direct quotes can often be cumbersome, because Leibowitz’s work is relatively unknown in the field of LPP and because his words are so piercing, such a quote is worthwhile. For example, Leibowitz (1971) argues:

Further analysis of the record indicates that official acceptance or rejection of bilingualism in American¹ schools is dependent upon whether the group involved is considered politically and socially acceptable. The decisions to impose English as the exclusive language of instruction in the schools have reflected the popular attitudes toward the particular ethnic group and the degree of hostility evidenced toward that group's natural development. If the group is in some way (usually because of race, color or religion) viewed as irreconcilably alien to the prevailing concept of American culture, the United States has imposed harsh restrictions on its language practices; if not so viewed, study in the native language has gone largely unquestioned or even encouraged. As might be expected language restriction was only one limitation to be imposed. These language restrictions were always coupled with other discriminatory legislation and practices in other fields, including private indignities of various kinds, which made it clear that the issue was a broader one. To the minority group affected, this was very clear and, therefore, it was the act of imposition itself which created the reaction by the minority group rather than the substantive effects of the policy. (p. 4)

The connection to the safety zone of national identity is abundantly clear in this passage as Leibowitz links repressive language policies to racist and/or sectarian attitudes toward language minority groups and vice versa. In a later work, Leibowitz (1984) also

¹ Inasmuch the term "American" refers in fact to the land mass and those living on it from the top of Canada to the tip of Argentina, this is an inaccurate, albeit common, use of the term. While I use U.S. as a more accurate descriptor, I do not see the need in using [sic] or lengthy explanations of the use of language, which today may be considered inaccurate or inappropriate, in the quotes I have selected throughout this study.

foreshadows the notion of a safety zone of US national interests on which this proposal is more directly based. He writes:

These different points of view [on minority languages] have been debated throughout our history with U.S. policy choosing to emphasize one or the other as a function of economic needs, political stresses between the established classes and newcomers, and the different visions of America's strengths and weaknesses.

It is argued today with the same vehemence as the U.S. matures and again reviews its basic principles. (pp. 25-26)

Here, Leibowitz links even more directly questions of language practice with U.S. economic and political strength. While he does not take that next step in relating domestic language practice to the projection of U.S. power abroad, it is not a very big step to make and one that forms a central question guiding this research proposal.

Because Leibowitz understands language as a means for social control, he is able to see the connections between language policy, whether explicit or implicit, and its relation to other social issues. As such, it is perhaps more accurate to consider Leibowitz's approach to LPP analysis as one based on various domains (as opposed to typologies) in which policies are enacted that impact on language practice. When his focus is more specifically on language practice, Leibowitz (1976, 1980) considers three social domains, i.e. the public school system, regulations regarding citizenship and voting, and economic life in the U.S. Within each domain, he recounts how various laws, rules and regulations impact the practice of LOTE and the establishment of English-only practices. When Leibowitz moves to incorporate literacy into his analysis (1969, 1984), he identifies instead four domains in which to analyze language practice: 1) rules about

voting and holding public office; 2) education; 3) the law; and 4) regulations on business. Whether we consider Leibowitz's approach to LPP analysis as based on domains or as a typology, his major contribution to the field is showing concretely one way to consider language practice simultaneously as the result of dominant attitudes towards language minority groups; how language minorities themselves respond to such attitudes and the regulations that flow from them; and how language is intimately interwoven with much deeper questions of social power.

Ideology and Language

As Wiley (1999) argues, questions concerning ideology form a major component of historical analysis of language planning and policy. Therefore, some working definitions are needed before we look at specific ideologies related to language and language use. It is beyond the scope of this research proposal to trace the full development of the term ideology. However, it is important to identify the sources that form the understanding of the term as it is applied to this dissertation. In outlining a working definition of ideology, Tollefson (1991, 2006) draws from some foundational texts on understanding the concept, in particular the work of Gramsci, Fairclough, and Bourdieu. Tollefson identifies five aspects that contribute to the notion of ideology. The first is that ideology is composed of often-unconscious assumptions people hold that come to be seen as common sense and natural. Second, ideology does not simply appear from nowhere, but instead is tied to and depends on structures of power in society. Because ideology results in common sense assumptions about how the world should work, it serves to maintain existing social conditions and power relations. As such, ideology performs an inherently

conservative function, not in a limited political sense, but rather in that it leads to the conservation and reproduction of the *status quo*. Finally, ideology is not just about the ideas in people's head; it shapes people's behavior as well. In the interest of having an operational (read: concise) definition of ideology, the most useful I have found comes from Lippi-Green (2004): ideology is the "promotion of the needs and interests of a dominant group or class at the expense of marginalized groups by means of disinformation and misrepresentation of those marginalized groups" (p. 293).

As useful as these two approaches to ideology are, they still imagine a relatively one-way relationship between powerful elites in society, the dominant ideas in society they propagate, and their impact on the less powerful. In one sense, this correlates with the classical Marxist conception of ideology, namely that:

the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force in society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force... The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 64, emphasis in original)

In another sense, though, there is a nuance in this understanding of the roots and process of ideology that helps to address the more unidirectional conception of ideology introduced above. Whereas Tollefson (rightly) aims to root ideology in broader social forces (versus simply emerging from people's head), he relies on structuralism in linking ideas to social *structures*, which implies relatively fixed constraints that impede human

behavior. In contrast, Marxism roots ideology in *relationships* and does so in two senses: those among social groups; and those between social groups and material conditions in society. This link to relationships (versus structures) understands that these connections are anything but fixed and static; instead material and ideological relationships among social groups are deeply contested, even in the face of the power differentials inherent to class society. It is this conflict that drives concrete social practice, which has the potential to challenge, indeed change, dominant ideology in society. Marx describes this more dynamic approach to ideology in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, where he writes: “All social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice” (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 122, emphasis in original). I would argue that this privileging of social practice (versus ideology) as the starting point for scholarly research is again ascendant after a period of exhaustive analysis of discourse and the ideologies complicit in it. In the field of LPP, there are many examples of this return to practice. The example of greatest relevance to this discussion of ideology is Hornberger (2006b). While I would not consider her work as part of the classical Marxist tradition, her definitions of implementational and ideological spaces parallels the more nuanced definition of ideology I have presented here. Her primary argument is that, although dominant ideologies certainly work to constrain the implementational spaces available for the practice of language education, that very practice has the potential to work from the ground upwards to challenge and change dominant ideologies about language and what it is good for. It is this balanced, indeed dialectical, definition of ideology that I hope to integrate into this research proposal. Let us now turn to look at how ideology applies

more specifically to language; to how the modern nation-state has come to view language; to language and imperialism; and to the foreign language education profession in the United States.

Language Ideology

Wollard & Schieffelin (1994), writing at a time when the study of language ideology was still emergent, present a review of the diverse scholarship assessing the interplay between language and ideology. One interesting aspect to their review is that they do not state a comprehensive definition of language ideology. Instead, they cite three approaches and acknowledge that the discrepancies among them stem from underlying differences in how to define ideology overall. Those differences concern whether studies of language ideology employ the term “ideology” in neutral or critical ways. A second difference is where ideology is found, either in ideas people hold about language, or as reflected in their actual linguistic usage. Even without a single definition of language ideology, Woolard & Schieffelin trace the development of three strands of investigation. The first considers the ideological fallout of contact between languages and/or language varieties. The second constitutes a history of linguistics that traces attitudes towards and conceptions of language over time. The third strand of scholarship they identify investigates the relationship between ideology and specific linguistic structures in a given language. What these distinct trends of scholarship do share in common, however, is an assumption that “ideologies of language are significant for social as well as linguistic analysis because they are not only about language” (p. 55). This argument corresponds to

the socio-historical approach guiding this research proposal, namely that debates about language are rarely about language *per se*, but rather concern broader social questions.

A common understanding of language ideology with respect to language planning and policy is found in Spolsky (2004). As discussed above, Spolsky prefers the term language beliefs to language ideology, given the political baggage the latter carries. His distinction goes beyond this, however. For instance, Spolsky defines language beliefs as a consensus reached within a given speech community about what value to assign to the language varieties present in the community. Spolsky clarifies: "Put simply, language ideology is language policy with the manager left out, what people think should be done" (p. 14) with respect to language practice. What is useful about this notion of language ideology is that it links ideologies or beliefs immediately to policy and practice to form a coherent model for analysis. However, given the working definition of ideology outlined above, Spolsky's use of consensus in defining language ideology becomes problematic. Consensus implies a process where competing interests in a particular setting arrive at an agreement, however tenuous, to resolve the dispute at hand. It is precisely the *opposite* of consensus that in my opinion underlies the relationship among ideology, policy and practice. In almost all cases, it is not agreement about the nature of this relationship that drives developments in language practice, but rather divergence and conflict among various social actors about that relationship.

McGroarty (2002) moves toward a more dynamic approach to understanding language ideologies, although she does not necessarily use that label. While raising a concern that recent scholarship on language ideology has tended to be more descriptive than explanatory, she argues that one must include in an analysis of language ideology

additional factors such as cultural shifts, social structures and socio-political developments at the local level. For her then, language policies and debates about them reflect “core values” (p. 19) about other, broader social questions, such as equality, national unity, achievement, patriotism, etc. The strength of McGroarty’s conception of language ideologies is the recognition that their value orientations are not fixed, but rather shift over time as broader socio-political conditions shift.

Pennycook (2000, 2001) further develops the notion of language ideology by incorporating a more critical definition of ideology itself. He understands language ideologies as operating on two distinct levels. The first is tied up with more exploitative or oppressive definitions of ideology and how ruling elites use it to maintain their position in society. Dominant attitudes and beliefs about language serve the interests of those who currently hold power; in this sense, we return to Lippi-Green’s definition of ideology and how it propagates untruths about marginalized groups to ensure they remain marginalized. The second notion of language ideology that Pennycook discusses is somewhat more complicated. He argues that languages themselves are “carriers” of ideology and notes the example of English. As with any language, there is a system of ideologies and cultural assumptions built into English. As proficiency in English spreads across the globe (whether because it was imposed on colonies or via globalization, or whether it is embraced in post-colonial societies as one route to economic and social success), the ideological baggage in the language itself carries certain effects for those who learn it. Pennycook teases out this second definition of language ideology into a strong and weak version. The strong version (mirroring the strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) is that there are notions unique to English that profoundly affect those

who learn or acquire it. The weaker version of the definition of language ideology is both more nuanced and where Pennycook urges us to focus our attention. In contrast to analyzing the “structural power” of English, he suggests that we should rather concern ourselves with the “discursive effects” of English and how it is “imposed on, received by or appropriated by users of English around the world” (2000, p.108). This dual understanding of language ideology, i.e. that language is *an* instrument used by ruling elites (one of many, in fact) for maintaining social control, as well as *the* instrument of social control in the form of discourse, is critical to the sort of analysis proposed for this research project.

Most discussions of language ideology spend less time on definitions of the term, instead focusing on specific language ideologies and how they function in specific social settings. For example, Wiley (1999) applies the concept of language ideology to the United States and identifies two prevailing assumptions. The first is that English is, and always has been, the dominant language in the country. The second is a deeply held belief that monolingualism is not only a natural condition in society, but also that it is the ideal condition for society. By definition then, non-English languages and/or multilingual proficiency are seen ideologically in the United States as threatening. Wiley draws out these two dominant language ideologies in the U.S. based on four theories of linguistic assimilation first identified by Kloss (1971). Although based on his study of language in the United States, Kloss argues that these theories hold for many immigrant nations as well. The first ideology of assimilation holds that immigrants should sacrifice their language and waive their rights to practice that language as a form of payment for gaining entry to the host country. The second maintains that because immigrants stand to

prosper in the host country, or at least to fare much better than in the home country, they are then obligated to waive their rights to cultural or linguistic maintenance and instead to shift to the dominant language. Third, by insisting on language maintenance, language minority groups segregate themselves from the rest of society and in effect ensure that they do not progress socially in the host country. Finally, language minority maintenance represents a potential threat to national unity. Therefore language minority groups should adopt the dominant social language. These powerful language ideologies are certainly still with us today. As we will see, however, they do not function solely with relation to immigration, but also result from the linguistic and cultural assumptions built into the structure and function of the modern nation-state.

Monolingualism as the Language Ideology of the Nation-State

Because the phenomenon behind this research focuses on notions of national security and the nation-state more broadly, it is necessary to incorporate some of the literature on the rise of nationalism and the nation-state and their attendant language ideologies. May (2001) makes an invaluable contribution to the scholarship on this topic. The general theme of his argument is that the nation-state is at once central to the formation and validation of languages and to accelerating the process of language loss. May defends his use of the nation-state as a unit of analysis on several bases; the most relevant here is that along with the emergence of the nation-state came modern notions of linguistic and ethnic homogeneity. More specifically, a new ideology emerged equating the nation-state with an ethnically and linguistically homogenous population living within clearly defined borders, even though such an ideal has rarely, if ever, mapped with actual

communities and linguistic practice. For May, this disconnect between the ideology of homogenous nation-states and the reality of linguistically and ethnically diverse populations has posed a unique threat to minority communities. He quotes Dorian to emphasize the issue: "it is the concept of the nation-state coupled with its official standard language...that has in modern times poised the keenest threat to small [minority] communities" (Dorian, 1998, p. 15 as cited in May, 2001, p. 7). Coulmas argues the point in even more urgent terms: "the nation-state as it has evolved since the French Revolution is the natural enemy of minorities" (Coulmas, 1998, p. 67 as cited in May, 2001, p. 7).

May bridges several academic disciplines to trace the development of nationalism, the nation-state, and the ideology of monolingualism coupled to both. He divides his account into two broad camps, modernist and ethnicist approaches. While May does not claim there is a singular modernist position, he does argue that modernist approaches (two of which will be further discussed shortly) tend to downplay, even ignore notions of ethnicity in their definitions of nationalism. As such, although modernist accounts of the emergence of the nation-state and ideologies of linguistic and cultural homogeneity are generally correct, they are unable to account for how ethnicity as a concept continues to be a force for social organization and agitation. In contrast, May argues that ethnicist histories of nationalism and the nation-state foreground ethnicity as a unit of analysis, while avoiding the pitfall of traditional, what he calls primordial, notions of ethnicity as having existed since time immemorial. By keeping ethnicity at the heart of analysis of the nation-state, May aims to decouple "nation" from the "state" so as to make room in the modern state for linguistic and ethnic minorities. This is, of course, an

admirable goal. The trouble comes with May's definition of state, following Weber, as politically sovereign over a defined territory; having monopoly control of force; and having citizens loyal to it. While all this is true, what is missing is the notion that the state does not exist to represent all interests in society, but instead is an apparatus used to maintain the power of those who already have it. For this reason, modernist, indeed Marxist, explanations of the rise of nationalism and the modern nation-state are crucial for understanding why the nation-state remains so hostile to linguistic and ethnic diversity.

One of the most cited accounts of nationalism and the nation-state is Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (2006). Anderson defines the nation as an imagined community insofar as those who identify with one nation or another will never know the vast majority of their fellow nationals. Anderson pursues an explanation of what accounts for this sense of nation and the power it continues to have as a means of social organization. Limiting his focus primarily to Europe, he identifies three main factors: the emergence in the sixteenth century of print-capitalism; the Reformation and its vernacular challenge to the rule of Latin; and the expansion of vernacular languages in the administrative bureaucracies of absolute monarchies. All three factors worked in tandem to give increasing weight to vernaculars to replace Latin as the language of commerce, government and power. Anderson summarizes his argument thus: "nothing seemed to 'assemble' vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, created mechanically reproducible print languages capable of dissemination through the market" (p. 44). These print languages contributed to an early sense of nationalism in three ways. First, emerging linguistic boundaries were easily

translated into political boundaries as language increasingly became the marker to separate one nation from another. Second, the massive expansion in print and in literacy worked to standardize and “fix” the language such that one could imagine it rooted far back in time. This created the sense of nation as something stable and ancient that has always separated one group from another. And finally, this process created languages of power in two senses. Not only were the “larger” vernaculars in Europe the first to be put into print, but also the varieties of these new print languages mirrored those spoken by social elites. A final insight by Anderson is that this early process of the emergence of print languages and linguistic status differences occurred on a relatively unconscious level. Nevertheless, they unleashed an ideological process of establishing notions of nation, state, language and culture that deepened quickly as capitalism developed and served as a model for other cultural groups to emulate.

The work of Eric Hobsbawm (1962, 1987, 1990) is essential to any discussion of nationalism, the nation-state and monolingual ideologies. Hobsbawm (1990) defines the framework with which he has investigated nationalism. First, he adopts Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a principle envisioning the political and national unit as one. Second, Hobsbawm asserts that the nation is not ahistorical and fixed, but rather is modern, invented, and shifts with other political and cultural developments. Moreover, Hobsbawm identifies with the Marxist tradition that situates nationalism in political, technological and economic contexts. Finally, he acknowledges that there are dual, in fact competing, pressures on defining nationalism, one from above and one from below. Hobsbawm aims to view the issue from below, arguing that proclamations of national sentiment from above cannot be mistaken as the belief or practice of those below: “What

Herder thought about the *Volk* cannot be used for evidence of the thoughts of the Westphalian peasantry” (p. 48). One important consequence of this is his immediate acknowledgment that national identity is but one that ordinary people hold, neither dominant nor inconsequential. Furthermore, national identity from below shifts, often in quite short periods of time, given social and political developments. This approach to understanding nationalism seems to contradict May’s (2001) criticism of Hobsbawm for constructing a class deterministic sense of nationalism that excludes the concept of ethnicity altogether.

The structure of Hobsbawm’s analysis of nationalism distinguishes revolutionary (meaning the bourgeois revolutions of the 18th century), liberal and conservative definitions of the term and how they apply to the nation-state. To trace that entire discussion would take us beyond the scope of this research proposal. Instead, in his various treatments of nationalism we can identify two main summaries of the topic: ethnolinguistic nationalism and state nationalism. In the former case, Hobsbawm writes: “we are so used to an ethno-linguistic definition of nations that we forget that this was, essentially, invented in the later nineteenth century” (1987, p. 146). To be sure, Hobsbawm does associate this form of nationalism most closely with latter-day, conservative appropriations of the nationalist project. He discusses both large and small projects in this tradition at the end of the nineteenth century, for example the imposition of English in the United States in the ascendant Americanization movement, as well as the re-invention of Hebrew as a vernacular language ideologically bound to Zionism.

However, this does not mean that ethnicity and language played no role in earlier forms of nationalism and related conceptions of the nation-state. One important example

is revolutionary France. In theory, this perspective on nationalism held that the nation-state was tied to a distinct territory and a sovereign people. The trouble is that what constituted the “people” was rarely defined. Again adopting the view from below, Hobsbawm argues that the popular notion of the nation-state saw it as representing the common good against privilege and particular interests. In practice, however, Hobsbawm notes that even in these early stages linguistic and cultural heterogeneity was considered problematic. He argues: “there is little doubt that for most Jacobins a Frenchman who did not speak French was suspect, and that in practice the ethno-linguistic criterion of national was often accepted” (1990, p. 21). This does not assume a primordial, essentialist notion of nationality in this early period either, only that the intersection of nation, ethnicity and state was fluid. Hobsbawm continues: “In theory it was not the native use of the French language that made a person French—how could it when the Revolution itself spent so much of its time proving how few people in France actually used it?—but the willingness to acquire this, among the other liberties, laws and common characteristics of the free people of France” (p. 21)².

Irrespective of the period, ethnolinguistic nationalism was largely the invention of bourgeois classes emerging throughout Europe. Hobsbawm (1987) argues:

Linguistic nationalism was the creation of people who wrote and read, not of people who spoke. And the ‘national languages’ in which they discovered the essential character of their nations were, more often than not, artifacts, since they

² Wright (2004) cites data from the first language census conducted in 1794 in France documenting only 3 million people of the population of roughly 31 million spoke the Parisian variety that would emerge as “French”.

had to be compiled, standardized, homogenized and modernized for contemporary and modern use. (p. 147)

In an earlier work, Hobsbawm (1962) stresses that linking nationalism to the literate is not to assert that others in society held no notions of being “French” or “Russian”. He clarifies, however, that these earlier notions of Frenchness or Russianness tended to identify by religion. Furthermore, illiteracy for Hobsbawm presents no barrier in general to political consciousness. Instead, there is simply no evidence of modern sentiments of nationalism existing among ordinary people in the early period of the nation-state. As industrialization, urbanization and then mass migration developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, we begin to see modern nationalism working to fill the void left by upended traditional ways of life. Hobsbawm (1987) underscores this dynamic with a fascinating anecdote that the first president of what was to become Czechoslovakia signed the agreement to form a state uniting the two regions not in Prague or Bratislava, but in Pittsburgh where the Slovakian nationalist leadership was based (p. 154).

The second conception of nationalism spanning Hobsbawm’s scholarship on the topic is state nationalism. Precisely because categories like “nation” or “ethnicity” are historical and not fixed across time, more often than not the apparatus of the state worked to create the nation, not the other way around. Hobsbawm quotes Italian nationalist Massimo d’Azeglio to make his case: “We have made Italy, now it is time to make Italians” (1990, p. 44). Hobsbawm (1987) establishes the context in which the state intervened in the daily life of ordinary people in any number of fundamental, if modern ways. From the mail to the police to teachers to railway services, agents of the state seemed to be everywhere at once. As states came into conflict with one another, each

had to call on its citizens to defend itself against others. This required notions of nationhood and patriotism to engender a personal commitment to the state. Additionally, democracy required a new approach to social stability. On the one hand, traditional structures of feudal or religious fealty were displaced by the notion of free will and individual rights. A new ideology of unity based on nationalism helped to maintain social control. On the other, if citizens were indeed free individuals, they needed a common language to make interaction more efficient, as well as to allow for popular participation in civic matters. Furthermore, industrialization required a workforce with at least minimal literacy and numeracy skills. This demand led to mass elementary education, further boosting the emergence and dominance of a national language. Hobsbawm (1987) adds that public education had the additional advantage of working to instill values of citizenship, patriotism and nationalism in youth in extremely effective ways. He summarizes:

‘The nation’ was the new civic religion of states. It provided a cement which bonded all citizens to their state, a way to bring the nation-state directly to each citizen, and a counterweight to those who appealed to other loyalties over state loyalty—to religion, to nationality or ethnicity not identified with the state, perhaps above all to class. (p. 149)

And a single, national language was the vital element in this civic religion. In fact, as Hobsbawm argues, so important was language that it was transformed “into the primary condition of nationality” (p. 150). Finally, Hobsbawm stresses that state nationalism so defined functioned as a double-edged sword: just as it included some who lived within its borders and mobilized them along ethnolinguistic lines, it shut out others who either

did not belong, or chose not to belong, to the ideological nexus of the state. It is precisely this double-edged sword of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion that, in my opinion, explains the lasting hold of ethnicity as a powerful force rallying sentiment and practice today.

Before we turn to look at another language ideology that emerges from the modern nation-state, namely linguistic imperialism, it is important to pay more attention to what May (2001) labels ethnicist accounts of nationalism and the nation-state. In fact, May argues that there has been remarkably little investigation of these questions by applied linguists. He attributes this to strict academic divisions that prevent the sort of broad-based approach to research that makes May's work so interesting. Nevertheless, May acknowledges Fishman and his work on language, nationalism and ethnicity as one that develops an argument about their relationship quite distinct from the accounts presented above. Fishman's major work on the issue, *Language and Nationalism* (1972), is an effort to understand why ethnicity and ethnic identity continue to play a vital role in social organization in the modern world. Fishman insists that the will to ethnicity is not a throwback to romantic notions of "nation" and "a people" as they were defined in the nineteenth century. Instead, he insists the modernist project has been unable to account for or dispel what he calls "human longings" for ethnic identity, (Fishman et al., 1986, as cited in García, et al., 2006, p. 34). Fishman does recognize that ethnic identity is socially constructed and therefore situated in particular socio-historical contexts. He also concedes that one may identify with a number of varying ethnic identities. Still, ethnicity for Fishman remains above all a sociopsychological notion, and as such, emerges first

from people's hearts and heads, not the material or historical world in which they find themselves.

Linguistic Imperialism

Certainly, the norm of monolingualism is not the only language ideology to have emerged from the modern nation-state. Another of central importance to the conceptual framework in which the phenomenon behind this research proposal operates is the notion of linguistic imperialism and the debate that has grown up around it. In his book *Linguistic Imperialism*, Phillipson (1992) coins the notion by example of English and the role it plays in the post-colonial world. He defines linguistic imperialism as "the dominance of English...asserted and maintained by the establishment of continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages, (p. 47). Of course, the broader notion of imperialism is central to Phillipson's theory, and he takes some time to trace the theoretical debates about what imperialism means. He bases his understanding of imperialism on three key theoretical texts. The first two (Hobson and Lenin) amount to what Phillipson characterizes as economic definitions of imperialism. As a correction, Phillipson relies heavily on Galtung's conception of imperialism as six interconnected processes: economic, political, military, communicative (referring both to communications and transportation), cultural and social. Phillipson develops Galtung's category of cultural imperialism by extending from it the subcategories of scientific, media, educational and linguistic imperialism. Phillipson applies this theoretical basis by arguing that although formal colonialism has disappeared, the world is still characterized by significant power imbalances between the

rich nations of the Center and the poor nations of the Periphery. Proficiency in English, and the pressure internationally to acquire it, functions as a gatekeeper limiting access to the world stage. Center nations manipulate proficiency in English as one mechanism for maintaining their standing in the world. Phillipson investigates this dynamic in two ways. The first looks at U.S. and U.K. efforts to promote English internationally and the consequences of their policies for the developing world. The bulk of his analysis, however, considers the ideological baggage within the field of English language teaching internationally, in particular the way it constructs instrumental, intrinsic and functional notions of English.

Wright (2004) summarizes Phillipson's notion of linguistic imperialism while foreshadowing her own and other critiques of it. She characterizes his work as describing "postcolonialism as a process in which actual colonialism was replaced by virtual colonialism based on language and express[ing] clear disapproval of the role of English as a lingua franca...He concludes that globalization is a form of imperialism differentiated by the extent to which those dominated are hoodwinked into seeing some benefit to themselves [in knowing English] and do not rebel against the system" (p. 167). In addition to her criticism of an overly structural formulation of linguistic imperialism that considers those in Periphery countries who study English as "dupes" (p. 168), Wright's main critique of Phillipson is that he seems to argue for a form of linguistic nationalism to combat the pressure of English. Because Wright views national language policy as ineffective in a globalized world for effecting meaningful change in language practice, she considers Phillipson's solution to linguistic imperialism naïve, at best.

Additional critiques of linguistic imperialism take issue with the larger epistemological orientations on which this notion is based. For example, Canagarajah (1999) argues that linguistic imperialism is far too reductionist in its understanding of how users of the language in Periphery countries appropriate the language. In fact, Canagarajah rejects the Center-Periphery divide altogether by considering how varieties of English in postcolonial societies have developed as native languages in their own right, not simply the hangover from the days of British rule. In this sense, then, Canagarajah sees a role for English in postcolonial societies in usurping some of the power that Phillipson assigns to former colonial powers; indeed, he identifies possible routes for language to appropriate the forces of globalizations in democratizing, not just oppressive, ways.

Pennycook (2000, 2001) is also critical of the notion of linguistic imperialism. He does not dismiss the concept entirely, however, and recognizes that “if it is only used to map out ways in which English has been deliberately spread, and to show how such policies and practices are connected to larger global forces, it works” (2000, p. 114). The problem occurs, according to Pennycook, in that many people apply the term in an effort to understand the ideological fallout of the spread of English. This is where he argues that linguistic imperialism is too structural a construct; in fact, although Pennycook acknowledges Phillipson’s expanded definition of imperialism by borrowing from Galtung, he claims it is still too economic a notion. Therefore, Pennycook argues it is essential that we look at the uses of and assumptions about English in localized contexts to begin to map out in discursive terms what English means to its users. By taking this

more Foucauldian approach, Pennycook acknowledges that it is unlikely that the influence of English will wither away any time soon.

While I share to a certain extent the criticisms of linguistic imperialism raised by Canagarajah and Pennycook, particularly that nativized varieties of English in postcolonial societies do not fit into a contemporaneous analysis of imperialism, I believe that Phillipson's responses to this criticism confirms a different sort of weakness in his theoretical framework. In his contribution to Ricento's introduction to language planning and policy, Phillipson (2006) effectively retreats from the main assertion behind linguistic imperialism. While he still maintains that the concept describes "inequality, absences of a level linguistic playing field, unfair privileging of the use of one language and those who use it" (p. 357), he does not clearly identify to whom those privileges accrue. I would argue, however, that Phillipson's dilution of linguistic imperialism in the face of its critics goes back to an initial weakness in how he understood imperialism to begin with.

In his efforts to move beyond economic definitions of imperialism, Phillipson mistakes the cultural and social consequences of imperialism as the cause of inequality in the first place. To be sure, there is a dynamic relationship between the economic base of social inequality and the ideological, psychological and other consequences of it. But recognizing a dynamic, recursive relationship should not equate to denying its roots in material and historical circumstances. Wright (2004) alludes to this problem as she likens linguistic imperialism to a "virtual colonialism" (p. 167). She is correct in insisting that there is nothing virtual about how powerful nations impose themselves, both at home and abroad, and what the consequences of that imposition are in material as

much as social terms. In fact, once we have divorced social and ideological processes, like linguistic imperialism, from the material and historical conditions from which they arise, we in effect absolve those responsible for language inequality. This stands in full contradiction to socio-historical assumptions about language, i.e. that debates about language are rarely about language *per se* and more often about broader social issues. Phillipson's notion of linguistic imperialism tends to make the debate entirely about language itself. To be clear, my critique, and the efforts to trace it here, are not merely an effort to score political points or to "be right". Instead, the Marxist definition of imperialism, and where language fits into that, plays a central role in the conceptual framework behind this research proposal. So a few words about it are necessary.

Although the economic and social impact of colonialism lies at the heart of Marx and Engel's earliest analyses of capitalism (cf. Marx & Engels, 1848/2005 and D'Amato, 2006, pp. 140-159 for further discussion), the primary Marxist theorist of imperialism is Lenin. Phillipson's initial description of Lenin's contribution to the theory of imperialism is correct in that imperialism is not just about wealthy nations exploiting poor nations, but also the competition (political, economic and military) among rich nations over the world's resources that results from the development of capitalism. Where Phillipson misses the mark is to claim that Lenin only drew economic conclusions from that competition. Certainly, Lenin (1917/1997, 1986) roots international competition among rich nations in a particular stage of capitalism when the state increasingly plays a role in economic development and begins to take measures to defend the interests of "its" economic elite over those of other states. However, the consequences of this economic competition for national oppression in cultural, religious,

ethnic and linguistic terms are central to Lenin's understanding of imperialism. He identifies the development of ethnic and national chauvinism in powerful nations and the appeals governments make to working people to support "their" nations in international competition. He is also firm in his arguments that all oppressed nations have the right to determine their own fate—politically, economically, culturally and otherwise—even when working people in oppressed nations fall in line with local elites to the detriment of their own objective interests. With respect to language, for example, Lenin advocates for the rights of people in oppressed countries consumed by empire to receive education in their first language. However, this does always mean that those in oppressed countries fighting imperial rule should at every turn agitate for separate schools segregated by language (or by religion, gender, ethnicity or other social questions). Instead, Lenin recognizes two dynamics inherent to imperialism and capitalism: "the awakening of national life...and the creation of nation-states" on the one hand; and "the development and growing frequency of international intercourse...and the breakdown of national barriers" on the other" (1986, p. 20). This constant tension means that each point of conflict between powerful and oppressed nations must be assessed on its own terms in order to know how best to respond in (self-)defense of oppressed nations and peoples. But the intimate connection between economic and social struggle is without question, as he argues here: "imperialism means that capital has outgrown the framework of national states; it means that national oppression has been extended and heightened on a new historical foundation. Hence it follows that...we must *link* the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolutionary programme on the national question" (1986, p. 143, emphasis in original).

My second response to the concept of linguistic imperialism is not a critique, instead simply the repetition of my earlier assertion that it (along with virtually all scholarship on the fallout of monolingual ideologies of the nation-state) concerns the role of dominant and/or national languages in creating and maintaining inequality in the world. To be sure, this is an important topic. However, equally important in principle, as well as to the conceptual framework behind this research proposal, is what happens when minority languages find themselves caught up in the nexus of state power and the projection of that power abroad.

Language Ideologies and Foreign Language Education in the United States

As we would expect, the broader language ideologies of monolingualism in the United States and linguistic imperialism operate within the field of foreign language education in this country. In one sense, then, it can appear redundant to trace the impact of these larger language ideologies on one specific domain of education. In another sense, though, as the ideologies of monolingualism and linguistic imperialism pass through the prism of foreign language education (FLE) in the United States, they cast a unique light on the intersection education, language learning, and the nation-state, and thus deserve separate treatment. This discussion is organized in two parts: societal ideologies about FLE, and ideologies within the profession of FLE itself.

The primary histories of foreign language education (FLE) in the United States identify two societal ideological assumptions about the role of foreign language in education (Bernhardt, 1998; Watzke, 2003). The first asserts that FLE is essentially an elite project. From the earliest language programs in classical Greek and Latin to the

shift of FLE toward modern languages during the curricular reforms in secondary education at the turn of the 20th century, the study of foreign languages has been constructed and intended for those students who continue on to higher education. Watzke (2003) writes: “Foreign language represents the earliest and most traditional curricular link between the pre-college and college level” (p. xvii) and it continues to function as one of the primary curricular gatekeepers for entrance to four-year institutions of higher education. Ortega (1999) teases out in greater detail what is so elite about FLE in this country. She argues that we cannot understand the prestige of FLE without appreciating the denigration of minority languages. Ortega elaborates:

Bluntly put, monolingual native speakers of English are encouraged to study a foreign language during adolescence but are not expected to develop proficiency in it for actual use, whereas minority students are compelled to develop native-like academic proficiency in the majority language in very limited periods of time and often at the expense of their first language. (p. 246)

Reagan (2002) contributes to an understanding of the ideology of prestige surrounding FLE. He argues that the normal offerings in FL programs (e.g French, German, Latin and Spanish) reflect both a Eurocentric bias that can be found throughout the curriculum, as well as the power relationships that flow from FL students’ class backgrounds and attendant assumptions about what their educational attainment should be. Reagan adds that what makes the prestige of FLE so paradoxical is that it is so fantastically unsuccessful. The late start and short amount of time most U.S. students spend engaging in FLE ensures that the overall project fails. For Reagan, this only

underscores the dominant ideological assumption that FL competence for elite students is an optional extra. He writes:

Even among the best-educated persons in our society, competence in a second language is often seen as irrelevant, except in its limited role of serving to control and restrict access. The key to understanding the failure of foreign language education is in fact the assumption of monolingualism as the social norm. (p. 37)

Pavlenko (2003) also identifies what she calls a “pervasive double standard” that sees FLE as desirable for middle- and upper-class U.S. students while viewing minority language maintenance as threatening. Relying on Wiley (1998), she roots her argument in a thorough analysis of the hysteria against German-Americans at the outbreak of World War I. Her focus is not just how that hysteria effectively ended the tradition of bilingual German-English schooling in many parts of the U.S. and maintenance of the German language more broadly; instead, she ties her history of this backlash to lasting ideologies about FLE and its uses. Pavlenko recounts the emergence of four discourses in media, government and language professional sources that solidified an ideology of FLE that construes it as a luxury, but ultimately disposable, for middle-class and upper-class students, and as incompatible with U.S. identity for language minority students.

The second societal ideology of FLE that predominates in the United States reveals a profoundly instrumentalist notion of the value of FL competence. That is, where the study of foreign languages is promoted at all, it is construed as means to meeting another, by definition far more important end (Christian, 1999). Part of this is related to FLE as a gatekeeper for elite students who are university bound, as discussed above. But this ideology runs much more deeply than that, as evidenced by the two

histories of FLE. Watzke (2003) quotes Benjamin Franklin and his attitude that FLE was useful only in relation to broader curricular goals:

All intended for divinity school should be taught the Latin and Greek; for physic, Latin, Greek, and French; for lay, the Latin and French; merchants, the French, German and Spanish; and though all should not be compelled to learn Latin, Greek, or the modern foreign language...their English, arithmetic and other studies absolutely necessary being at the same time [should not be] neglected. (p. 4)

Bernhardt (1998) draws from another Franklin quote in which he views FL competency as a qualification “to pass thro’ and execute several Offices of civil life, with Advantage and Reputation to themselves and Country” (p. 41). In both cases, the argument roots current ideological assumptions about the utility of FLE in the origins of the country.

Ortega (1999) broadens the discussion to argue that the instrumentalist ideology of FLE is tied to notions of social mobility and economic advancement. This can be seen in many pitches on behalf of FL study that tout the career and economic benefits for skills in a second language, even though, as Reagan (2002) points out, so few students or their parents actually need multilingual skills in their work life.

An additional component to an instrumentalist ideology of FLE is its role not in personal social advancement, but in advancing national interests. Of course, this touches on the larger theme of this research proposal, so I expect to investigate this theme much more thoroughly in the discussion of my research findings. For now, there is just one point to make about the longevity of this ideology. Watzke (2003) notes that many commentators on FLE locate the language ideology connecting FLE and national

interests to the post-Sputnik era. However, he maintains that the first arguments construing FLE as good for national security actually run back to World War I, despite the furor surrounding German. Watzke cites two studies of the era that recall arguments advanced by FL professionals constructing “modern language study...as part of a fulfillment of the country’s patriotic duty for nation building through political and economic expansion, particularly within North and South America” (p. 32). Watzke maintains that Spanish language educators in particular were especially active and successful at marketing the uses of Spanish as the U.S. expanded its hegemony over Latin America. Watzke links this ideological maneuver to an explanation as to why Spanish in effect displaced Latin as the dominant language in the FL curriculum long before the growth in immigration from Spanish-speaking countries to the U.S.

In addition to these two societal ideologies about FLE in the United States, there are powerful language ideologies that run through the FLE profession as well. Again, some of these ideologies reflect and reinforce those already discussed. But the starting point for understanding professional ideologies about FLE start with the name of the field itself. Both Ortega (1999) and Reagan (2002) insist that the very fact that language education in the United States is professionally and academically divided among foreign language education (FLE), bilingual education (BLE) and English as a Second Language (ESL) betrays the double standard about who language education is intended for and to what end it is meant. This academic division in research and pedagogy results in segregated practice where FLE is limited only for monolingual English speakers, while BLE and ESL is left for minority language students. Phillips (2003) looks at this issue within FLE itself, in particular what messages language programs send by naming

themselves “foreign” versus “world” or “LOTE” language programs at the K-12 level of instruction.

Ortega identifies two additional language ideologies in the FLE profession. The first flows from notions of “nativeness” and standard language. In almost all instances, the “target language” of instruction is a highly idealized form of the second language based on the prestigious (i.e. academic, literary, urban, and/or official) variety. Especially because teaching methods have increasingly sought to create more natural contexts in which students can acquire the second language, FL educators send two highly contradictory messages: much, if not most, of the “natural” occurrences of the second language in its home culture does not correlate with the idealized variety presented in the FL classroom. Tied to this notion of nativeness in the second language are deeply held assumptions among FL educators about the ideal path of language learning. Ortega writes, “the preferred route to bilingualism is that of a monolingual speaker of an L1 learning the L2 from zero as an adult, and the ideal goal is eventually to be able to ‘pass for’ a monolingual speaker of the learned language” (p. 249). While Ortega, along with Valdés, et al. (2006) and Reagan (2002), recognize this as an idealized path to bilingualism, they also identify a key contradiction in practice to this ideal, namely that most FLE consists of merely passing two years of introductory instruction. They also concur that the expected FL student is a monolingual English speaker, but argue that this is increasingly not the case, as more heritage speakers enroll in FL programs both at secondary and tertiary levels. Ortega (1999) adds that the ideology of a standardized, native variety of the target language functions as a gatekeeper for minority FL students and educators who speak non-standard varieties of that language. A final

aspect compounding the effect of this professional language ideology is the structure of the vast majority of higher education programs. In most cases, professors in language departments are scholars of literature with little-to-no training in second language acquisition, who themselves see acquisition of literary, standard varieties of the second language as a prerequisite for advanced study of and participation in the language.

The second language ideology deeply embedded in the FL profession maintains that studying a foreign language is a politically, pedagogically, and intellectually neutral event (Ortega, 1999; Reagan, 2002). Part of this ideology flows from assumptions about which form of language education is meant for which segment of the population. As noted above, while bilingual education and English as a Second Language is seen as redressing the language deficiencies of language minority students, and thus connected to questions of race, immigration, even class, foreign language education assumes a target audience of monolingual English speakers part of the standard school curriculum. Ortega argues forcefully that most liberal FL scholarship attempts to adopt ideologically neutral positions by cloaking itself in “the rhetoric of excellence and a market-oriented view of education reform” (1999, p. 256). Reagan (2002) takes up a similar argument about what he calls technicist approaches to FLE that conceive of the profession as ideologically neutral. Ortega (1999) identifies three ways in which these attempts at neutrality manifest themselves. The first is the push for greater credentialing of FL educators. This has taken the form introducing new standardized tests as part of the general teacher credentialing process as well as insisting that study abroad be mandatory in FL teacher training so as to ensure more advanced levels of cultural and linguistic proficiency. The second is an effort to raise the prestige of FLE by fully embracing the standards

movement. Ortega argues the rapid spread of standards of proficiency have only deepened and codified many of the language ideologies about nativeness and standard language that have long existed in the profession. Finally, Ortega maintains that FLE seeks to find its neutrality in what she calls the “paralyzing focus on teaching methods” (p. 258). Constant focus on specific methods to teach the target language ignores the political and personal responsibility FL educators have to manage the myriad ideological and social issues surrounding FLE, some of which have been reviewed here.

Current Perspectives on Heritage Language Education (HLE)

As proposed in the introductory chapter, my aim in exploring the relationship between perceived national security concerns and language education policy is to foreground its impact on heritage language education (HLE) in general, and on higher education programs in Arabic in particular. Therefore, a review of definitions and debates within HLE constitutes an important part of the conceptual framework behind this research proposal. The discussion here is organized into three parts: definitions and debates about them in HLE; sociolinguistic and second language acquisition perspectives on HLE; and debates about the relationship between HLE and national security.

Definitions

The debates within the field of heritage language education (HLE) start with its very name. Wiley and Valdés (2000) and Wiley (2001, 2005a, b) cite concerns first raised by Baker and Jones (1998) that the term “heritage” is too oriented on past language use, rather than invoking current and future language practice in society. García (2005) underscores this point with an excerpt from interview data with a 17 year-old Dominican

student recently arrived in New York City. This young woman responds to the term “heritage language” thus:

¿Lengua de herencia?...Como algo viejo, mi bisabuela.

Heritage language?...As if something old, my great-grandmother.

(p. 601, translation in original)

Wiley (2001, 2005a, b) explores the issues surrounding the term by looking to international contexts with heritage language education programs. He notes that the term “heritage language” originated in Canada to refer to immigrant and First Nations languages. In contrast, in Australia and increasingly in the U.K. (cf. Baker & Jones, 1998), the term “community languages” has come into wider use. Besides its connection to present and future language use, Wiley endorses the term “community languages” because it looks to community members themselves as having a stake in the future of their language and a role to play in maintaining it. Wiley cites Corson to underscore this point: “[The term ‘community languages’] begins with people and their immediate reality. Above all, it allows them to become meaningfully involved in shaping their own futures through the school and other agencies in their community” (1999, p. 10, cited in Wiley, 2005b, p. 596). In addition to social justice orientations such as this, Wiley argues that engaging members of language minority communities is critical because language policy efforts that emanate from above with little input from the target language community are rarely, if ever successful. The term “community language” is seen then as a more accurate way to convey these ideas.

The second set of questions about definitions in HLE concerns which languages can be considered as heritage languages. In the United States, “heritage languages” is a

broad category that refers to a variety of languages other than English (Fishman, 2001; García, 2005; Wiley, 2001, 2005b). Fishman (2001) defines three categories of LOTEs in the United States that can be understood as heritage languages, namely indigenous, colonial, and immigrant languages. The second category may need a few words of explanation. Clearly, the non-English languages of empire, namely Spanish and French, are included in this category of colonial languages. Technically, Dutch would fall under this understanding of colonial languages in the U.S., although it constitutes a very small language group. But Fishman also considers other immigrant populations that established colonies in what became the United States, even if they did not necessarily have the backing of a foreign government. This understanding of colonial languages includes German, Swedish, Finnish and Welsh. Wiley (1999, 2005b) also adopts this tripartite typology of heritage languages, building on it in several ways. First, based on Ogbu (1978, 1991), he distinguishes voluntary and involuntary immigrant and refugee languages. Second, he recognizes that one language may fit into more than one of these categories. The primary example, of course, is Spanish: it was introduced in the western hemisphere as a colonial language; it was spoken by inhabitants of territories that became part of the United States by conquest; and of course it constitutes the largest immigrant language in the country. Finally, Wiley makes the important point that the categories that applied linguists attach to various language communities in the U.S. may not in fact correspond to how community members view their own language. This means that researchers must not only discuss these issues with caution, but also recognize that the social history of the many LOTEs in the U.S. vary dramatically. In short, “heritage” or “community” language is not a one-size-fits-all moniker.

The final debate over definitions in HLE flows from the second, namely *who* can be considered a heritage language speaker. Fishman (2001) approaches the question more from the standpoint of ethnic identity. For him, the person who identifies with ethnolinguistic groups in the U.S., even if that person has no proficiency in the ethnic language, can and should be considered a heritage language speaker. What matters are the person's familial and community links to the language and an ethnic identity that stems from them. This approach to defining heritage language speakers is especially potent for indigenous communities in the U.S. experiencing rapid language shift, and in some cases extinction. A definition of heritage language speakers that demands proficiency in languages which have either very few or no living speakers risks excluding communities who maintain powerful and meaningful ethnic identities. Valdés (2001) addresses the definition of heritage language speaker more from the standpoint of proficiency in the heritage language. Based on her foundational work (1981, 1992, 1995) reexamining researcher assumptions about societal bilingualism, Valdés (2001) elaborates a wholly different conception of bilingualism that accounts for the rich diversity in registers, domains, and skills that exist among heritage language speakers. As such, she insists that to be considered a heritage language speaker, one must have some level of proficiency in the language. Rooting her discussion more in the field of foreign language education, she defines the heritage language student as one "who is raised in a home where a non-English language is spoken, who speaks or at least understands the language, and who is to some degree bilingual in that language and English" (2001, p. 38).

Sociolinguistic and Second Language Acquisition Perspectives on HLE

There is any number of theoretical, pedagogical and programmatic issues that surround the field of heritage language education (HLE). The fast growing awareness of this component in language education makes a review of each issue impractical. I would argue, however, that the various issues can be categorized into two broad approaches to HLE, one based in sociolinguistics, the other in second language acquisition (SLA) theory. By making this distinction, I do not mean to imply that these two approaches are in competition with or contradict one another (the debates on terminology reviewed above notwithstanding). In fact, as we will see shortly with respect to SLA, the research agenda as argued by Valdés (2001, 2005) and Valdés, et. al (2006) is deeply influenced by the *socio-* side of sociolinguistics. Nevertheless, each approach does ask unique questions about HLE, so there is some merit in reviewing the two approaches to the field.

In addition to Fishman (2001) and his contributions to definitions in HLE, Roca (2003) urges educators to be cognizant of the impact societal factors have on language learning and outcomes, especially with respect to HLE. Wiley (2001, 2005b, 2007a, b), however, has made the most explicit arguments for approaching the issues that surround HLE from a sociolinguistic perspective. The overriding purpose in pursuing such questions is the impact they have on language learning, and by extension, maintenance of minority languages in the United States. The first contribution from sociolinguistics to apply to HLE concerns sociolects, i.e. particular differences among social and/or informal varieties that differ from the “school” variety of each language. The second notion is of language variation more broadly. HL students may be proficient in regional, rural, and/or stigmatized varieties that differ greatly from the standard variety of the heritage language.

Of concern here are not just linguistic aspects of this variation, such as differences in lexicology, orthography, syntax, etc., but also societal attitudes towards different varieties of the heritage language. These first two concepts from sociolinguistics are particularly important to address in light of the language ideologies in the FLE profession discussed earlier. The privileging in most FLE programs of standard, prestigious varieties as the target language can have dramatic and negative consequences for the HL student.

A second set of considerations from sociolinguistics that informs investigation of HLE addresses the function of language varieties the HL student may be familiar with. On the one hand is diglossia, which establishes formal distinctions between language varieties for different settings and to meet different linguistic needs. Arabic is an important example in two ways. One is the distinction between Modern Standard Arabic and the many regional varieties of Arabic in use throughout the Arab world. The other is the clear distinction between the classical Arabic of the Qur'an and spoken varieties in informal social settings (Rouchdy, 2002). Of course, the specific constellation of which language or variety is used in which setting varies from language to language. The point is that many HL students will bring first-hand knowledge of these distinctions with them to the classroom, and educators need to be aware of the meaning their students assign to these distinctions. A less formalized, but equally significant, aspect of this are bi- or multilingual settings in which two or more languages are used in a community at once to fulfill the same linguistic needs. The contact varieties of language that emerge from such settings, for example "Spanglish", present interesting challenges to HL students and educators alike. These contact varieties are often stigmatized, both within the language minority community and the language education profession. In addition, HL students are

often accustomed to code switching between the various languages present in their community, even if they are not fully proficient in all registers and domains of each language. However, the flexibility and versatility of HL speakers in contact varieties are often unwelcome in formal language education settings. Again, educators need to be aware of the role that various languages and varieties play in the communities in which their HL students live so as to understand the meaning and function of those languages for these students.

A final set of sociolinguistic approaches to HLE concerns questions of language planning and policy (LPP). This will be taken up in greater detail below with respect to debates about LPP, HLE and national security.

The approaches to HLE based on second language acquisition theory do not contradict the sociolinguistic perspective discussed above. Instead, they take such notions as their starting point for developing an understanding of how HL students acquire the target language, and which teaching methods best support that acquisition. A fundamental part of this approach is to undo mythical notions of what it means to be bilingual. Valdés (2001, 2005,) and Valdés, et al. (2006) argue that the traditional notion of bilingualism sees it as monolingualism doubled. That is, the ideal is of the individual who develops into a “balanced bilingual” with equal, native-like language skills in the two languages. In reality, very few individuals are able to attain the exact same experiences in more than one language or to encounter more than one language in every aspect of life, indeed to find a compelling *need* to use more than one language in every part of our daily lives. A more realistic notion of bilingualism is what Valdés labels the bilingual continuum, where real speakers in real-world contexts develop differing

proficiencies in the two languages based on the wide range of experiences with, exposure to and needs for the language that the individual has. Valdés expands this notion of the bilingual continuum to include the fact that where individuals fall on the continuum often changes throughout their lifetime. Moreover, she elaborates this continuum across generations based on the well-documented experience of language shift over time toward the dominant societal language.

In her most recent look at how SLA can impact heritage language instruction, Valdés (Valdés, et al., 2006) develops a typology to help understand the major paths of acquisition available to HL students in their family life that impacts their study in the FLE classroom. The conclusion Valdés draws from this typology is that, once the HL student enters the language classroom, rarely is the process of language learning one of “language acquisition” as defined by the traditional “balanced bilingual” model discussed above. Instead, language learning for the HL student comprises the acquisition of a second (or multiple) registers; dialects; literacy skills; or the acquisition (sometimes the re-acquisition) of incompletely acquired features of the second language. Valdés recognizes that once we demystify the balanced bilingual to account for the real linguistic competence and practice of HL students, we acknowledge a situation long in existence (if rarely appreciated) that virtually no group of HL students will be linguistically homogenous. Instead, HL students learn in our classrooms at various stages along the bilingual continuum. Valdés (Valdés et al., 2006) argues:

A theory of instruction supporting the development or reacquisition of a nondominant L1 for such learners will require an understanding of how and whether the implicit systems of speakers who have incompletely acquired the

heritage language, speakers whose heritage language has undergone attrition, and speakers of a heritage language that has undergone extensive change are alike or different. What needs to be explored is how these different systems—if they *are* different—might be reshaped by formal instruction. (p. 247)

Although Valdés raises many more questions than she answers about HL linguistic competence and its impact on pedagogy, it is abundantly clear that past FLE methods based on the needs of monolingual students are entirely insufficient to meet the diverse and pressing needs of HL students.

HLE, Language Policy, and National Security

Along with heightened awareness of the issues surrounding heritage language education (HLE) has come a growing debate both in the literature and at professional conferences as to the basis—epistemological, (socio-)linguistic, and political—on which this advocacy should take place. I have been witness to this debate, for example, at three language conferences sponsored in as many years. At the annual conference of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), held in Chicago in November 2004, the organization placed center stage its Year of Languages campaign, which was set to run throughout 2005. A major piece of that campaign was a panel on language policy headed by academics and administrators from the Defense Language Institute in Monterrey, California; Georgetown University; and the University of Hartford. The message of the first two panelists, as well as the ACTFL official who moderated it, was clear: 9/11 is the Sputnik of our generation, and ACTFL should do whatever is necessary to promote language education by taking advantage of this

historical moment of heightened awareness to international relations. The wholesale embrace of such an approach to foreign language education advocacy, indeed by the main professional organization in the United States for language education, unnerved many in the room, as evidenced by the pointed comments and questions that were put to the panelists during the discussion. These comments reflected a passionate call to keep the humanistic, affective and intercultural benefits of language learning at the heart of language education advocacy and policy development.

Additionally, Joy Kreeft Peyton (2006) of the Center for Applied Linguistics organized a panel at the Georgetown University Roundtable on Linguistics in March 2006, entitled “Heritage Languages in the United States: Reconstructing the ‘Resource’ Framework.” In the end, Peyton’s presentation at this conference was more an overview of current research and resources on the question of heritage language learning. Still, the suggestion of ‘reconstructing’ what has become a foundational concept in language planning and policy (see Hornberger, 2006a; Petrovic, 2005; Ricento, 2000, 2005; Tollefson, 1991; Valdés, et al., 2006; Wiley, 1996) reflects a greater scrutiny in the literature of the implications attendant to resource orientations to LPP.

Most recently, Richard Schmidt (2007) offered a highly polemical overview of FL education policy and its relationship to second language acquisition (SLA) at the latest conference of the American Association for Applied Linguistics. His plenary session reviewed much of the same information offered above. Schmidt, one of the foremost experts in SLA in the country, then tied this intersection of FL education and national security to fundamental tenets of SLA, e.g. motivation and acquisition; time to proficiency; materials and pedagogy, etc. Schmidt closed his session with this

provocative question: “Is foreign language education in this country being taken over by the same military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned us about 50 years ago?” His question reflected a strain of discussion and debate that ran throughout the conference over the course of four days.

In exploring this debate in the contemporary literature, it is all too easy to frame it as two well-defined poles arguing in opposition to one another. To be sure, there is a camp within the language education community that has consistently advocated for expanded language education in the United States in order to fulfill its economic, political and military needs (Brecht, 2007; Brecht & Ingold, 2002; Brecht & Rivers, 2000, 2002; Brecht & Walton, 2001; Edwards, 2004; Lambert, 1984a, b, 2001; Müller, 2002; National Foreign Language Center, 2002; O’Connell & Norwood, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005). Of course, the history of this argument and its impact on language learning is the general topic of this research proposal and will be the focus of much more discussion in my research findings. For now, suffice it to say that the contemporary expression of this argument is well defined. With references to the events of September 11, 2001 never too far away, this camp of language advocates envisions a critical role for language capacity in ensuring the future economic, military and political security of the United States. Brecht and Rivers (2002) go so far as to claim the existence of a language crisis in the United States, one that well designed policy can resolve. Brecht’s own words shed great light on what is really at stake for this group of language advocates: “Our motivation is national security, not to improve education necessarily” (cited in Hebel, 2002, p. A26).

Beyond this admittedly small segment within the language education community, however, responses to HLE and its relationship to national security are often unsure and contradictory. For example, Spolsky (2002) looks at the connection between HLE and national security from what he calls an ecological perspective. He reviews his model of LPP analysis, i.e. the intersection of language beliefs, language management and language practice. One might expect Spolsky to apply this model in a discussion of the language beliefs involved with attempts to use language management in support of national security. Instead, he takes a pragmatic approach³ and elaborates on the role HLE can play in meeting national security needs. Although Spolsky critiques the ultimate efficacy of these programs, e.g. the Navajo Code Talkers' work during World War II and the Army Specialized Training Program of the same era, his approach to analysis is effectively uncritical of past efforts to use minority languages and language learning for national needs.

Another contradictory argument is found in Kramersch (2005) and her history of the intersection between foreign language research and what she calls the "real worlds" of economic, cultural and national defense interests. She begins with an extremely insightful, critical approach to the ways in which linguists have found themselves entangled in these national interests. As her analysis turns to the post-9/11 context, however, her argument seems to change tack. Specifically:

[Recent national policy initiatives regarding foreign language] are still under construction, but they do raise the relation of knowledge and power in applied linguistics. No one would deny that it is the prerogative of a nation state to rally

³ Spolsky (2004) identifies himself as a "pragmatic liberal" (p. ix).

the expertise of its scientists for its national defense. After all, linguists have always served the interests of their country in times of war and much good has come out of it both for the theory and practice of language learning and teaching. But the current appropriation of academic knowledge by state power in the name of a security problem that is as ill-defined as the current one runs the risk of redefining what it means for an applied linguist to ‘respond to real-world’ problems. (p. 557)

There is a fundamental contradiction, however, at the heart of this statement: how can we at once scrutinize “the current appropriation of academic knowledge by state power” if “no one would deny that it is the prerogative of a nation state to rally the expertise of its scientists for its national defense?” If such a right is in fact undeniable, then it seems we are left with no means by which to evaluate what makes one appropriation of academic knowledge in the name of national defense reasonable and another risky.

The final example from the muddied waters where these debates tread takes us back to Reagan (2002) and his monograph on critical language awareness in the language classroom. The balance of his argument is both important and effective in acknowledging the profound impact of socio-historical factors such as race, class, and language variety on language learning. He is equally tireless in his calls for language educators to look critically at their own practice and the language (and other) ideologies that inform it. Because his argument is so deeply rooted in critical epistemologies, his discussion of heritage languages is all the more perplexing. Reagan refers more often to Less Commonly Taught Languages (LCTLs), but acknowledges that in the United States LCTLs and heritage language refer in many cases to the same languages. Nevertheless,

as he looks at LCTLs and their role in language education more broadly, Reagan (2002) refers to

the geopolitical aspect of language teaching and learning. In essence, it is in the best interest of the society to produce sufficient numbers of linguistically competent individuals to function in the various national and regional languages that are used in areas of national political, economic, and strategic concern. (p. 42)

He continues by referencing the events of September 11, 2001 and the languages that are most often seen as complicit in them, namely Arabic, Farsi, and Pashto. He adds his voice to the concerns that the lack of speakers in these languages in the U.S. is an urgent problem. Reagan states:

Our need to understand others in the world provides another justification for studying the less commonly taught languages, since the languages themselves play an essential role in *our* ability to understand the speech communities that use them. (p. 42, researcher emphasis)

What is remarkable here is that the sharpness of Reagan's earlier discussion of the impact that race, class, and language have on power dynamics in the language classroom dulls once when the conversation turns to heritage languages and national security. Now, apparently, we can identify in fact a set of undifferentiated interests—*our* interests—at play. Because "our" is not defined, we are left to wonder if the racial, class, and linguistic differences Reagan analyzes earlier are subordinated to macro national identities? Or does "our" simply refer to the dominant racial, ethnic and linguistic group of which Reagan was earlier so critical? What is clear from this discussion, though, is

that for Reagan, languages and language learning can play a vital role in helping “us” understand “them”.

I would argue that the greater share of commentary and scholarly work on HLE and national security can be found in these muddy waters reflecting an unsure mix of critical arguments and those that line up behind national interests. The point is not to “call out” individuals or their work, but rather to acknowledge that the discussion about HLE and national security is a deeply conflicted and contested one. Certainly, one overarching goal for this dissertation proposal is to articulate a consistent position in that debate and to contribute to clarifying its terms. However, to acknowledge conflicted responses to the HLE debate, and to the broader debate about the resource orientation to LPP, does not mean there are *no* principled and consistent arguments on various sides of the issue to be found. For example, Ricento (2005) frames his argument not by questioning the legitimacy of a resource framework overall, but rather the specific ways in which it has been employed by academics and governments alike throughout US history. He argues:

For a resources-oriented approach to gain any currency, hegemonic ideologies associated with the roles of non-English languages in national life would need to be unpacked and alternative interpretations of American identity would need to be legitimized. Academics who advocate promotion of linguistic diversity should examine the degree to which their professional discourses help maintain the *status quo*, or contribute to social change. (p. 350)

Ricento proceeds to outline the long history in the United States of engaging in language planning, whether explicitly or implicitly, from a resource perspective and to document

the negative consequences of such an approach. He concludes his article by examining the websites of several associations and institutions dedicated to the promotion of foreign and heritage language learning to identify how their current discourse employs in an uncritical way resource-type argumentation.

A more strident challenge still to language-as-resource approaches to LPP is to be found in a recent debate in the pages of *Language Policy*. Petrovic (2005) fires the opening shot by questioning the language-as-resource approach to LPP from a decidedly political perspective. He enumerates the events that have led to what he calls the conservative restoration of U.S. power. This reconsolidation of U.S. hegemony has occurred as much internationally, in both economic and political arenas, as domestically, by rolling back the gains won by past civil, social and labor movements. Specifically with respect to language education, this neo-conservative offensive takes the form of anti-bilingual education initiatives spearheaded by the English-Only movement. Within this context, Petrovic argues, a resource approach to LPP may indeed aim to counter neo-conservative attacks to language education. But because such an approach, by definition, also bases its advocacy on identifying with national economic and political needs, in effect it bolsters the same ideological framework that it claims to challenge. Petrovic reflects on what he labels a neo-liberal response to neo-conservative attacks:

The strategic appeal to the market mentality of the dominant group is a severe miscalculation since such an appeal can serve only to perpetuate the inequitable linguistic *status quo* driven by capitalism in the first place. The ostensible middle ground upon which the dominant group does not feel its power and control are threatened and which is presented in the language as resource orientation ignores

the fact that power remains with the dominant group. In this middle ground, language minorities are still answerable to the whims and fears of those in power.

(p. 405)

Interestingly, Petrovic echoes Ricento in that he also does not reject outright the potential for language-as-resource to be a useful orientation in general for LPP. It is the specific way in which resource-based arguments are employed in the ideological debates around language learning in the United States to which Petrovic objects.

In a direct reply to Petrovic's article, McGroarty (2006) addresses the usefulness of resource approaches to LPP from a different angle. In fact, she cedes any attempt to better define 'language-as-resource' as an orientation to LPP to Ruiz himself and approaches the question from both a moral and political perspective. McGroarty cites a standard text on general policy analysis to argue for language policy advocacy that employs a variety of rationales. Referencing the cyclical nature to policy discussions as they "spike" (p. 4) into and out of public discourse, McGroarty argues:

A logical implication for those who consider themselves pragmatists or political realists is that advocates for positive language-in-education policies must constantly articulate the value of bilingualism, and be able to do so in varied terms that respond to a protean environment of public discussion. (pp. 5-6).

Her argument immediately constructs a tension between political principle and political pragmatism. Instead of a method for developing a message regarding a given linguistic issue (here, language learning) and patiently winning others—be they academics, policy makers, elected officials, administrators, etc.—to it, we are urged to tailor our message to fit the prevailing winds of current political discourse. Here, in my opinion, we see the

logic as argued by Petrovic of neo-liberal responses to neo-conservative ideological assaults played out. Specifically: by accepting and adapting to a ‘protean’ policy environment—instead of challenging it directly—we end up strengthening it.

Certainly, the debate about HLE and national security has spilled over into a discussion about the Arabic language itself in the United States (Al-Batal, 2007; Allen, 2004, 2007; Wahba, Taha & England, 2006). Adding to the urgency of the discussion is the dramatic increase in enrollments in higher education programs in Arabic in the last decade. Allen (2004) cites a study conducted by the Modern Language Association (MLA) in 2002 that found a 92.5% increase in enrollments, from 5,505 to 10,596 students, between 1998 and 2002. Allen (2007) cites additional data from the MLA showing that since the 2002-2003 academic year, Arabic enrollments have doubled again each year. A second complicating factor to the discussion about Arabic as a heritage language and national security is the historical relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East. This topic will be explored further in the last part of this literature review on Orientalism in the U.S. and its critics. Allen (2007) argues clearly that there is no divorcing the study of Arabic in the U.S. from the larger historical and political context, and is doubtful that current higher education programs that receive funding from recent language education policies tied to national security will be able to resist the pressure to adapt their curriculum to a defense framework.

Orientalism and Anti-Arab racism

The following discussion on Orientalism, anti-Arab racism and scholarship is important for two reasons. The first results from my choice of heritage language to explore in terms

of the relationship between perceived national security concerns and language education policy. The second is an acknowledgement that because I am not Arab American and I do not speak Arabic, my role as a researcher is immediately complicated. Coming to terms with the history of non-Arab assessments of the Arab world, particularly of Arabs in the United States, is critical so as to avoid the historic pitfalls of Orientalist literature. To be sure, there are those Arab American scholars who argue that non-Arabs have no business whatsoever engaging in this discussion; because anti-Arab racism is so engrained in society, non-Arabs simply are not able to break out of that mindset (Salaita, 2006). I will take up this response to Orientalism more fully below.

For now, it is useful to identify the basis of my own approach to exploring the issues surrounding a language minority group to which I do not belong. That approach academically is informed by Ortega (2005) and her argument for adopting an ethical lens through which to view our goals for research on second language learning and teaching. This lens is composed of three assumptions: that the value of research should be assessed based on its social utility; that conducting value-free research is impossible; and that viewing similar issues from different epistemological viewpoints aids in fuller understanding of the issue. Overall, Ortega's approach is meant to foreground an explicit recognition that identifies for what and for whom it is meant.

While Ortega's argument is useful in terms of rethinking the ethics of second language research, it still leaves us with the important issue of Western scholarship about the Arab world, including the treatment of Arab immigrant communities. Wiley (2006) reminds us of the problem in defining social groups as units of analysis, especially in historical research. Traditional models of investigation, which often project modern

social relations and structures onto past contexts in their analysis, effectively define minority and less powerful groups in terms of the majority and the powerful. Rodinson (1981) looks at a similar question with respect to Arabs in particular. He raises important questions about whether it is possible to talk about an “Arab world” and an “Arab culture,” and argues for a much more nuanced and differentiated research agenda to appreciate the full breadth and depth of Arab experiences, both in the Middle East and in the Arab diaspora. Of course, appreciating the diversity of Arab experiences stands in thorough contradiction to the tradition of Orientalism in Western scholarship. The remainder of this discussion, meant to explore this scholarship, is organized around three parts: the first is a short account of the history of Western contact with and imagination of the Arab world; the second reviews Orientalism in the modern academy; and the third attempts a definition of anti-Arab racism in the United States today.

*Islam, the West, and the Rest*⁴

This discussion of the history of contact and conflict between the West and the Middle East is based primarily on Blaut (1993, 2000) and Lockman (2004). Lockman (2004) begins his history with how the Muslim world was imagined in medieval Europe. He cites the work of Richard Southern, an historian of medieval Europe, and the latter’s assertion that the period from the 8th to the early 12th century was the “age of ignorance” in Europe with respect to the Middle East and Islam. This ignorance was rooted primarily in the profound economic backwardness of Europe. Inasmuch as there was any knowledge of Islam at this time, it was considered just one more threat to Christendom,

⁴ This is taken from a chapter title in Lockman (2004).

existing side-by-side with the paganism in Norman, Slav and Magyar regions. The one exception to this age of ignorance theory was Muslim-ruled Spain. In striking contrast to European attitudes towards Islam yet to come, Lockman describes a period of hundreds of years of Muslim rule on the Iberian peninsula characterized by tolerance toward Christians and Jews in the region, understood as they were as “people of the book.” In addition, the intercultural exchange resulting from this tolerance combined with Arab traditions in mathematics, science, philosophy and literature to create a cultural heritage far in advance of the rest of Europe.

How the Middle East was imagined in Christendom changed radically with the advent of the first crusades in 1095. The “crusade” was twofold, in terms of reasserting Christian rule over what is considered the Holy Land and in terms of reconquering the Iberian peninsula. In the first case, the crusades failed; the region remained under Muslim rule until the British conquered Palestine and Jordan after World War I. In the second case, the crusades were not only successful in re-taking Iberia, but also in ushering in a new period of devastating religious intolerance and persecution. Lockman’s history of this era, however, focuses more on what the crusades meant in terms of Western understanding of the Muslim world. In his description of the first Latin translation of the Qur’an in 1143, Lockman writes:

The first efforts by western church scholars to acquire a more precise understanding of Islam were largely motivated by the kind of “know your enemy” attitude that often informed the field of Soviet studies in the United States during the Cold War: one had to understand the enemy’s ideology if one was to combat it effectively. (p. 29).

What was to be combated, though, according to Lockman was not necessarily the threat from the Muslim world from without, but rather worries over heresy from within the Christian world. Lockman's assessment of early translations of the Qur'an, biographies of Mohammed, and other Arabic language texts was that they served primarily to enforce ideological conformity within Christendom.

A second piece to early engagement with Arabic language texts in medieval Europe was the realization that the Middle East, and its Muslim and Jewish populations, was a region rich with intellectual, philosophical and scientific knowledge far in advance of Europe. The impact of this cultural and scientific heritage on Europe cannot be understated, Lockman argues. He cites Southern's assessment of the effect:

It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent to which these influences changed the outlook of learned Europeans in the half century after 1230. It is as if modern economists in the tradition of Alfred Marshall and Keynes were suddenly to start using the language of Karl Marx or liberal statesmen to start expressing themselves in the idiom of Lenin. (Southern, 1962, p. 24, cited in Lockman, 2004, p. 31).

One small way to gauge this impact is to appreciate how many words (and the domains of science and math in which they exist) in English are borrowed from Arabic, such as alcohol, algebra, algorithm, alkaline, etc. With respect to Islam in the Western imagination, what matters here is the divide that began to emerge in this time period, i.e. the 12th and 13th century, between Arabs, who hold great philosophical, scientific and cultural knowledge, and Muslims, who are bizarre, monstrous, and threatening. What underscored this division is that the Muslim world bordered directly on Christendom; that

is, the construction in the western world of Islam as a gathering threat held immensely greater ideological sway than notions of distant China or India and whatever differences they were perceived to constitute.

The rise of the Ottoman empire in the 15th century certainly solidified Western understanding of the Middle East as a burgeoning threat. Even though unsuccessful in some incursions, the Ottoman empire did advance as far into Europe as Vienna in 1529. In fact, because the Ottomans controlled a significant part of the Mediterranean region and according to Lockman identifies it as the most advanced and most powerful European state at the time. Again, in remarkable contrast to the negative images of the Ottoman empire (which was often synonymous with “Turks”, “Arabs”, or “Muslims”) was the remarkable linguistic and cultural autonomy afforded ethnic and national minorities—as long as they paid their taxes and tributes to the state. Lockman assigns to this time period the emergence of Orientalism in western scholarship. Blaut (1993; 2000) concurs in identifying the first formulations of the ideology of Oriental despotism. Several factors were at play in the development of Orientalism. The first is connected to the Renaissance, initiated in the 15th century. By reaching back into history to the ancient societies in Greece and Rome, Renaissance scholars challenged the unifying notion of the church and replaced it for the first time with the concept of Europe as a distinct geographic region with a distinct history and people. Of course, that distinction was often based on derogatory assessments of other cultures, primarily of Islam and the Middle East. The second part is in fact a sign of European political and economic weakness vis-à-vis the Middle East. Lockman (2004) and Blaut (1993) argue that European explorers had to set sail to the west because of the strength—economic,

political and military—of the Ottoman empire to their east. Far from a European miracle, or inherent qualities such as adventurousness or bravery in the European soul, the rise of Europe economically and politically in the 16th and 17th century is to be explained by the exploitation of peoples and resources in the Americas and Africa, which reinforced shifting economic and property relationships brought about by an emergent bourgeois class. Lockman underscores the weakness of Europe's starting point in this process. He argues that from 1500-1800 Asian societies set the terms of relations with European society, not the other way around. In addition, until 1800 China and Britain were roughly equal in economic terms and that it was the exploitation of the peoples and resources of the Americas and Africa that explains the meteoric rise of capitalism in Europe.

Notions of Orientalism and the Oriental despot are rooted in the political and social fallout of the rise of capitalism (Lockman, 2004). The Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the rise of the nation-state led to an ideology that saw European society as governed by laws enshrining individual rights. Moreover, notions of rationality, science and progress were seen as driving history forward. With respect to the rest of the world, Lockman (2004) and Blaut (1993, 2000) identify two important ideological trends. The first is the construction of Europe as a unique place with special qualities that explain its superiority over the rest of the world. Although this process began with the Renaissance, it was further articulated by Romantic movements in the arts and in scholarship that defined European history (and now European languages and ethnicities) as descending in an uninterrupted, direct line from ancient Roman and Greek societies. The second was the "Oriental despot" as an explanation of the inferiority of the east. Although the term "Oriental despotism" first appeared in Montesquieu's writings

about the Ottoman empire, the notion expanded to explain the backwardness, stagnation, and tyrannical nature ascribed indiscriminately to the Middle East and Asia. Lockman (2004) and Blaut (1993; 2000) remind us that whatever social advances occurred in Europe from the 16th century on were precisely not the result of some essential European quality, but instead of the interaction between Europe and “the rest” of the world.

Orientalist Scholarship and its Critics

Orientalism as a scholarly endeavor and later as a specific discipline in the Western academy descends from the era of European colonialism in the Middle East in the 18th and 19th century. The tradition is most closely linked with philology, the study of language in terms of historical comparisons between languages. Lockman (2004) understands this link between philology, Islam and the Middle East as a project in reductionism: the assumption was that the only tool one needed in order to understand Islam and the Middle East was knowledge of the language and philological methods. Because the focus of philology is historical analysis, the classical Arabic of the Qur’an was the preferred target of study. The consequence of this assumption is that, well into the 1950s in Europe and North America, grand proclamations about the contemporary Arab and Muslim world were made by scholars proficient only in classical Arabic and the study of Islam and its origins over 1000 years ago. This tunnel vision collapsing modern contexts in the Arab world with ancient ones mirrors in many ways the earlier reconstruction of modern notions of “Europe” that drew a direct line between it and ancient Greek and Roman societies (Blaut, 1993).

Lockman is careful to point out, and correctly so in my opinion, that not every Orientalist scholar was personally a racist or intimately complicit in the project of colonialism in the 19th century. Nevertheless, with European expansion and control of the Middle East, certain images and assumptions about Islam and Arabs emerged and were perpetuated in Orientalist scholarship. Part of these assumptions directly supported the colonial project, such as Kipling's infamous formulation of the "white man's burden," or images popular in Romantic literature of the veiled Muslim woman, oppressed and in need of liberation by enlightened outsiders (a condescension still with us today, of course). Whether or not Orientalist scholarship was directly involved in the project of empire, what emerges in the academy and beyond in the 19th century is a division of the world into civilizations, not just nations, states, or other organizational structures. The West was constructed as a unique civilization over and against a largely undifferentiated East. Rodinson (1987) best captures the development:

The Oriental may always have been characterized as a savage enemy, but during the Middle Ages, he was at least considered on the same level as his European counterpart. And, to the men of the Enlightenment, the ideologues of the French revolution, the Oriental was, for all his foreignness in appearance and dress above all a man like anyone else. In the nineteenth century, however, he became something quite separate, sealed off in his own specificity, yet worth of a kind of grudging admiration. This is the origin of the *homo islamicus*, a notion accepted even today. (p. 60).

Lockman (2004) and Blaut (1993) trace the development of Orientalism as a scholarly endeavor in the work of Renan, and his assertion that the Arab race is incapable of, even

hostile to, scientific thought; of Weber, both in terms of his counter posing of the “Protestant ethic” to other inferior ethics, and his introduction into the discussion of environmental explanations for European superiority and Oriental inferiority; of Marx and Engels, and their insufficient description of Asian economies (although both sources are careful to stress that Marx and Engels did not accept the racialized notions of the Oriental dominant at the time); among many others.

As the United States emerged as a world power at the turn of the 20th century, eventually displacing European powers after World War II as the dominant Western power, the U.S. academy continued traditions in Orientalist scholarship Lockman identifies in Europe, namely those scholars who considered their work in service of U.S. empire, as well as those scholars who considered themselves sympathetic to Arabs and Muslims, but who nevertheless operated uncritically within an Orientalist framework. Because the tradition of Orientalism in the U.S academy is strongest in the 1950s and 1960s and is intimately caught up with the very language education programs on which this research proposal is based, I will save further discussion of the key Orientalists of that era, such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, for a later chapter.

The history of Orientalism in the academy is not just about the derogatory notions of the Middle East, Islam and Arabs. The critique of this tradition is most often ascribed to Edward Said’s 1978 publication, *Orientalism*. Lockman (2004) points out, however, that a critique of Orientalist scholarship had already begun when Said’s now (in)famous book was published. Several trends existed in these earlier critiques of Orientalism, each correlating to shifts in the political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s. One strand, which Lockman labels the “Cold War liberal” approach, sought to harness modern methods of

research and knowledge production in order to get a more accurate view of the Middle East and its populations. While this meant directly challenging the chauvinistic assumptions of Orientalism, such liberal approaches also aligned fairly neatly with dominant geopolitical needs of the U.S. government. A second challenge to Orientalism resulted from the application of dependency theory, both in its Marxist and nationalist incantations, to the Middle East as a way to explain the power imbalances between it and the west. The emergence of second-wave feminism as a social and then later an academic movement also led to a reassessment of Orientalist scholarship through a gendered lens. Lockman argues, however, that these various critiques of Orientalism, whatever their merit, were effectively obscured once Said's work appeared.

The focus of *Orientalism* is not just the academic discipline, but instead an entire way of thinking that imagines the Orient in a particular way. Said defines the Orient as the "world of Islam," and he argues that Orientalism is primarily about a worldview that establishes and counter poses the Orient from the Occident as two discrete, different civilizations. Said does identify, from the 18th century onward, the emergence of the institution of Orientalism, which often served as a voice of authority about what the Orient was. Said writes:

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (1978/1994, p. 3).

Already in the introduction to his work, Said makes explicit his intention to apply the philosophical and analytical categories advanced by Foucault to the specific topic of Orientalism. For Said, Orientalism is above all a discourse, that is, a specific form of knowledge that brings with it its own analytical tools, categories, premises, assumptions, rules and claims for what is “true.” To be clear, Said draws from Foucault; he does not apply Foucauldian analysis mechanically. Said engages in a grand tour of Western literary and scholarly history to argue his case about Orientalism. In fact, his work has been criticized by otherwise sympathetic scholars that *Orientalism* is so grand in scope that it often feels like a string of examples that back up Said’s case versus a systematic and rigorous analysis of data (Lockman, 2004). Nevertheless, Said reviews texts and events ranging from western travelers, scientists, authors, artists, officials, religious pilgrims, scholars and others to argue that Orientalism is a system of knowledge about the Middle East and the Muslim world. Said makes the point that not every work he assigns to Orientalist knowledge was the result of open chauvinism. Instead, the very meaning of discourse, of systems of knowledge, is that people are complicit in it even when they are otherwise sympathetic to their subjects. It is in fact that very Western sense of *objective* knowledge of *subjects*, as Foucault first argued it, which is the problem.

Anti-Arab Racism Today

Said’s work contributed immensely to a fundamental rethinking of scholarship in two ways. In the more limited context of Middle East studies, *Orientalism* serves as a dividing line between two different approaches to understanding Islam and the Arab

world in the west. In a broader sense, *Orientalism* is central piece in the spread of poststructuralism and postmodernism as epistemologies in academics. (One small sign of this impact is the fact that I first read excerpts from Said's work in a graduate program in German literature and linguistics.) Despite the influence of this work, we are still left with the question of how best to characterize images and treatment of Arabs and Muslims in the west, particularly in the United States. In making sense of the contemporary context, Said's critical appraisal of Orientalism is lacking in several ways. Part of this, indeed the larger part, is the poststructural basis on which Said's argument is structured. It is beyond the scope of this research proposal to launch into a review and critique of competing epistemologies in academics, but I will rely on Lockman (2004) and his remarkable intellectual history of Orientalism to make my point. Lockman reviews the main critiques of *Orientalism*, in addition to offering an appraisal of poststructuralism and its influence on the text. Lockman writes: "poststructuralism rejected all philosophical, theoretical and historical approaches which assumed the existence of some "real" essence or foundation from which representations were derived and as reflections of which they could be adequately explained" (p. 203). Part of this rejection, of course, is the correct instinct to argue against essentialist notions about cultures, civilizations, etc. However, anti-essentialism was conflated with anti-materialism, meaning that poststructuralism challenges, even denies, the very existence of historical and "real" factors. With the proverbial baby thrown out with the bath water Said embarks on a journey that is remarkably ahistorical, considering that it is meant to be a history of Orientalist thought. More important still, if negative images of Arabs and Muslims are

simply discursive, then we are hamstrung in response to very real, structural, concrete and devastating abuses of Arabs and Muslims, as will be further discussed below.

If Orientalism is insufficient as a category to understand derogatory images and treatment of Arabs, Muslism and those assumed to be such, then we are left wanting for a better analytical tool. Salaita (2006) begins his analysis of anti-Arab racism in the United States with a series of definition that help us identify alternative analytical tools. He includes an explanation of why the term Orientalism is insufficient for his analysis. One part of it is the baggage that now accompanies the term thirty years on from Said's critique. Not only is the term unfamiliar to those outside of academics (i.e. the vast majority of the population), but also the many debates about the merits of Said's work makes such a term too complicated. The more significant part of Salaita's explanation about why he does not use the term Orientalism is that it largely refers to western images of Arabs in the Arab world. Salaita insists that the experiences of Arabs and Arab Americans in the United States require a more local, contextualized referent. Salaita then considers two additional choices, Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism. The former for Salaita is also fairly nebulous, implying merely fear of Islam. He argues that negative responses to and actions against Muslims and Arab Americans are rooted in something greater than just fear. In addition, Islamophobia does not help in understanding the treatment of non-Muslim Arab Americans, who constitute the majority of the community in the United States. Moreover, Salaita argues that racism performs a very unique function in the United States. Unfortunately, Salaita's ahistorical definition of racism leads him to argue the existence of a white supremacy implicating virtually all white persons in the U.S. This analysis not only argues (incorrectly) the existence of racist

ideology before the actual occurrence of and need for racist actions or institutions like slavery, but it also reinforces the pessimism inherent to identity politics that only those who experience a particular form of oppression have the wherewithal, indeed the right, to combat it (Smith, 1994). Such ahistorical and nihilistic approaches to oppression render us effectively powerless in challenging that oppression at all. Despite the faulty analysis of the roots of racism in the United States, I do endorse Salaita's use of the term anti-Arab racism as a way to understand contemporary treatment, both in images and experiences, of Arabs, Muslims, and those assumed to be such in this country. His definition is long, but it accurately reflects the breadth of the phenomenon he is describing. Salaita (2006) uses the term anti-Arab racism

generally to mean acts of physical violence against Arabs based not on chance but largely (or exclusively) on the ethnicity of the victim; moments of ethnic discrimination in schools, civil institutions, and the workplace; the Othering of Arabs based on essentialized or biologically determined ideology; the totalization and dehumanization of Arabs by continually referring to them as terrorists; the marginalization of Arabs as it is informed by exclusionary conceptions of Americanness; the taunting of Arabs with epithets such as *sand nigger*, *dune coon*, *camel jockey*, *towelhead*, and *raghead*; the profiling of Arabs based on name, religions, or country of origin; and the elimination of civil liberties based on distrust of the entire group rather than on the individuals within that group who may merit suspicion. In short, the redirection of classic American racism at a non-White ethnic group whose origins lie in an area of the world marked for

colonization by the United States and whose residents are therefore dehumanize for the sake political expediency. (pp. 12-13)

I would argue that without such a definition of anti-Arab racism, we are unable to come to terms with the devastating experiences to which Arab Americans, Muslims, and those assumed to be such have been subjected, especially since September 11, 2001.

Review of Theoretical Framework

The purpose of the above literature review has been to elaborate on the issues that I consider part of the conceptual framework within which the research phenomenon and my questions about it operate. To review, that research phenomenon concerns the role that perceived national security concerns have played in the formation and implementation of federal language education policies (LEPs) in the United States. Of particular concern are the implications of this relationship for heritage language speakers. To better understand the interplay between perceived national security concerns and LEPs, this study focuses on the case of federally funded higher education programs in Arabic. The research questions I formulated to better understand this phenomenon are:

- 1) How have perceived national security concerns influenced historically the formation and implementation of federal language education policies in the United States? And;
- 2) What have been the implications of that influence for heritage language learners, particularly in the context of higher education programs in Arabic funded by federal language education policies?

In addition to the concepts reviewed above, two recent contributions to the theory of language planning and policy constitute the theoretical framework I used to address these research questions.

The first is the theory of the safety zone of national identity and interests developed by Lomawaima and McCarty (2006). As defined earlier, safety zone theory is an attempt to explain the factors contributing to and the meanings of shifts in policy over time, not just to describe them. Lomawaima and McCarty write:

Forging beyond the metaphor of policy shifts as “the swings of a pendulum,” we view federal Indian policy as a sociocultural (and therefore ideological) process in which federal authorities *appropriate* policy to serve particular interests and goals. (p. xxiii, emphasis in original)

Later, they define safety zone theory as an account of “an ongoing struggle over cultural difference and its perceived threat, or benefit, to a sense of shared American identity” (p. 6). Lomawaima and McCarty adopt three analytical perspectives in order to assess this struggle with respect to American Indian language practice, namely federal policy, local institutional practices, and individual experiences of policy in these institutions. As the authors summarize their research findings and offer their conclusions, they make reference to what seem like contradictory federal Indian policies that at times support, at others repress Native language use. Lomawaima and McCarty interpret this seeming contradiction thus:

We have argued that these policies are not contradictory at all but are highly consistent with federal goals to define and delimit a safety zone—physical, social, intellectual, and affective domains in which certain differences are deemed

allowable or safe, while others are marked off as threatening to the interests of the nation-state and therefore proscribed. (p. 168)

Driving this analysis are much broader questions about the prospects for cultural and linguistic diversity. They ask: “Can linguistic and cultural diversity be promoted and maintained without concomitant economic, political and social marginalization of historically oppressed groups? Can the truly dangerous forces of standardization be resisted and transformed?” (p. xxiv). Certainly, their research findings are offered as a resounding yes to both questions.

The central premises behind safety zone theory impact the theoretical framework for this research in several ways. First, the primary use of safety zone theory is in delimiting the ideological boundaries of the debate. The starting point was at the broadest level, namely in identifying the borders of the safety zone by exploring what was considered safe, and what was considered threatening. In other words, how did policy-relevant actors use notions of safety and threat to define “national security”? Moreover, by working with notions of the threats and benefits often ascribed to minority language practice, I began to ask who benefited from, and who was threatened by Arabic language practice in the U.S.? Because I was also concerned with language policy, two related questions flowed immediately from the first set: who promoted Arabic use and who limited it in the U.S.? Those questions helped me to sketch out the issues operating at the ideological level in terms of defining a safety zone with respect to the practice of Arabic. A second way in which safety zone theory adds to the theoretical framework for this research is in identifying data sources that reveal where this phenomenon of the safety zone can be found in the real world. Lomawaima and McCarty discuss the

analytical perspectives of federal policy, institutional practice and individual experiences that they use in their research; further detail on this topic will be addressed in the following chapter.

The third impact of safety zone theory on the theoretical framework for this research is in my opinion the most important. It drives the decision not simply to look at the historical relationship between perceived national security concerns and federal language education policies, but to try to understand that relationship from the perspective of heritage language groups. Not only is this a missing perspective in the limited extant scholarship on this topic; but also the current array of federal LEPs for “critical” languages raises important debates that will have a significant impact on heritage language communities in the U.S. Therefore, understanding the implications of this relationship historically for heritage language groups is both urgent and useful. In addition, this commitment to explore the historical relationship between perceived national security concerns and federal LEPs in terms of its impact on heritage language groups explains why Arab Americans are identified as a distinct interpretive community in the following chapter discussing methodology. Without identifying Arab Americans explicitly, the study ran the risk of forgetting that not only was Arabic a “targeted” language, but also that Arab Americans had (and have) their own role to play in shaping, contesting, appropriating and implementing language policies. In addition, by not making their agency with respect to these issues explicit, it would have been easy to fall into the same trap Reagan (2002) seems to have done of conceiving of “our” interests over and against “theirs” with respect to national security.

Finally, safety zone theory informs the theoretical framework for this research in an admittedly idealistic manner. Just as Lomawaima and McCarty ask the “big” questions about possibilities for expanding societal multilingualism and resisting standardization, I have a “big” question of my own. Is it possible to imagine language policies that support heritage languages that do not endorse empire? Can we imagine—and realize—language education because of the intrinsic benefits that accompany multilingual competence? If not, why not? If so, then how and where do we get started? My efforts to address these questions are offered in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

The second development in theories of LPP that contributes to my theoretical framework is the expanded model of LPP proposed by Shohamy (2006). Her model is based on an understanding of what she calls open versus closed notions of language. The latter are the ideological assumptions discussed earlier in this literature review, namely that one nation must have only one language, and that there is only one standard, “correct” way to use a language. Shohamy argues that such conceptions of language contribute to state authorities’ attempts to use language as a mechanism for social control. Shohamy dedicates the second part of her book to exploring these various mechanisms as manifested in rules and regulations about language; language education and related policies; language tests which construct language as a gatekeeper for entrance to various institutions; the linguistic landscape in an area as evidenced by public and private signage and other visual markers; and the ideologies, myths, propaganda and coercion employed by the state and its agents with respect to language. Shohamy situates these language mechanisms as structures that mediate between language ideology and language practice.

She explains that this is not a unidirectional relationship moving from ideology via mechanisms to determine practice. Instead, practice can work upwards to challenge specific mechanisms and in so doing change dominant ideologies. The goal for this model of LPP analysis is to call for:

a critical view of language policy to show how it leads to actual practices promoting political ideologies of the nation-state that perpetuate language purity, create language hierarchies, marginalize and exclude groups, and thus lead to the violation of personal rights and undemocratic principles. (p. xvii)

In fact, Shohamy makes direct mention at several points in her book of the current debates about language and national security in the U.S., although the primary location in which she elaborates her model of ideology, mechanisms and practice is Israel and the conflicts among Hebrew, Yiddish, Arabic, and immigrant languages in that country.

Before describing how Shohamy's model for LPP analysis influences my theoretical framework, it is important to acknowledge an important way in which it does not. A central tenet of Shohamy's argument is that language policy is found in many more places, in fact in more consequential places, than in formal language policies enforced by the state. While I wholeheartedly agree with this assertion, I do need to concede that for this research proposal I am looking at formal language education policy and its impact on language learning. This does not mean, however, that the balance of her model has no application to my work.

In fact, Shohamy's notion of language policy mechanisms is particularly useful for analysis of U.S. language education policies. The federal government in the U.S. has historically been restricted in terms of what policies it can mandate on public educational

institutions. Therefore, in most cases the federal government designs a given policy and mandates that a particular agency, in this case the U.S. Office of Education and its later incarnation after 1979 as the Department of Education (ED), implement that policy. In this aspect, there is top-down language planning and policy insofar as ideological debates shape the policies that ED administers. However, because ED in most cases is not authorized to impose these policies on schools and universities, such policies come to life only to the extent that local educational institutions apply for them. In other words, actual policy implementation by default is bottom-up in that schools and universities must apply for, compete for and carry out federal most federal language policies. Shohamy's notion of language policy mechanisms best captures this fairly unique education policy context.

The second, and more important, influence of Shohamy's model for LPP analysis on my theoretical framework is that she insists on a prominent role of the nation-state in employing language mechanisms to defend and expand certain interests over and above others. In this, her assessment of the state is more critical than most, and is more in line with the arguments about the state and its (mis)use of language as I framed them above. The final influence of Shohamy's expanded model of LPP analysis my theoretical framework is tied to the "big" questions I mentioned above. On the one hand, Shohamy is clear that language policy mechanisms themselves are not necessarily the problem, but rather the end to which they are used. That is, as critically oriented as her analysis is, Shohamy still sees a role for language policy, both formal and informal, in making positive contributions to more socially just language practice. This is an important corrective to the more nihilistic conclusions that postmodern readings of LPP often draw.

On the other, Shohamy makes a passionate argument on the potential to cast the learning of minority languages in an intrinsically positive light. She argues:

Since each life can only accomplish some small part of the human potential we can benefit from the full range of human achievement and capacity only if we live in close association with people who have taken other paths. To attempt to impose uniformity is to condemn ourselves to narrower and poorer lives. It is therefore the multiplicity and totality of different languages and views of languages that contribute best to the wealth and existence of democratic states, originating from the very differences. (p. 150)

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Approach

Before discussing the research design of this study, it is helpful to review the phenomenon of interest to this dissertation and the research questions I formulated to better understand it. The issue is the role that perceived national security concerns have played in the formation and implementation of federal language education policies (LEPs) in the United States. Of particular concern are the implications of this relationship for heritage language speakers. To better understand the interplay between perceived national security concerns and LEPs, this study focuses on the case of federally funded higher education programs in Arabic. The research questions I formulated to better understand this phenomenon are:

- 1) How have perceived national security concerns influenced historically the formation and implementation of federal language education policies in the United States? And;
- 2) What have been the implications of that influence for heritage language learners, particularly in the context of higher education programs in Arabic funded by federal language education policies?

There are two characteristics of these questions that suggested qualitative research methods would be the most effective in addressing them. On the one hand, the aim was to explore complex processes related to policy formation and how policy is understood by those affected by it. On the other, of particular interest to me were the gaps between

stated goals of federal language education policies and how those policies are interpreted in practice (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

The qualitative approach I used to address my research questions is adapted from Yanow (2000) and her method of interpretive policy analysis. Yanow counter poses this method to traditional policy analysis that evaluates policy by weighing the costs against the benefits involved in policy implementation. Yanow agrees that policy analysis is about values, but she works from a different meaning of the term. She defines interpretive policy analysis as a shift in the discussion:

from values as a set of costs, benefits, and choice points to focus on values, beliefs, and feelings as a set of meanings, and from a view of human behavior as, ideally, instrumentally and technically rational to human action as expressive (of meaning). (p. ix)

Yanow elaborates on interpretive policy analysis as a method that focuses on the meaningfulness of human action. The goal is to comprehend underlying intentions that explain how policy actors and stakeholders respond to policy in context. Yanow asks: “What are *their* conceptual boxes (not the analyst’s or the decision maker’s alone)? How did *they* make sense of the situation?” (p. 23, emphasis in original). Additionally, interpretive policy analysis considers artifacts related to policy as texts that have authors (creators) and readers (the public, groups targeted by policy, etc). She stresses that this process of text creation and interpretation occurs in specific social and cultural contexts. Finally, this approach to policy analysis seeks to explain, not just describe, the reasoning used by policy actors and stakeholders engaged with the policy.

Yanow enumerates five steps in conducting interpretive policy analysis as follows:

- 1) Identify communities of meaning/interpretation/speech/practice that are relevant to the policy issue under analysis.
- 2) Identify the artifacts (language, objects, acts) that are significant carriers of meaning for a given policy issue, as perceived by policy-relevant actors and interpretive communities.
- 3) Identify the specific meanings being communicated through specific artifacts and their entailments (in thought, speech, and act).
- 4) Identify the points of conflict that reflect different interpretations by different communities.
- 5) Show implications of different meanings/interpretations of policy formation and/or action. (p. 22¹)

Interpretive policy analysis employs a number of conventional methods of data collection in pursuing the five steps listed above. Those methods include: document analysis, (although Yanow prefers the term artifact analysis so as to include other symbolic objects beyond actual texts); interviews and focus groups with policy-relevant actors; and participant observation.

Wiley (1999, 2006) provides a useful bridge between a general approach to interpretive policy analysis as Yanow defines it and analysis of language policy in particular. The focus here is conducting interpretive analysis of historical language

¹ I have adapted the order of this list of five steps to interpretive policy analysis to reflect the list given on pp. 30-31. Here, Yanow lists the first three steps only, and in the order I have used above. This adaptation strikes me as more logical than that given on p. 22, which starts by identifying policy artifacts before identifying interpretive communities.

policies. Wiley ties together a number of critical issues in sociolinguistics and historiography to identify a general constellation for comparative historical analysis of language policy. The starting point is three LPP typologies first defined by Heath (1976), Kloss (1998), and Leibowitz (1969, 1971, 1976, 1980, 1984), discussed in the literature review from the previous chapter. To reiterate the point made in that discussion, these typologies refer specifically to how language policies target and impact minority language practice. Building from these typologies, Wiley (1999) suggests five additional considerations for comparative historical analysis of language policy, some of which move beyond the scope this study. Two of them, however, are immediately relevant to this discussion. The first is the role of ideology in the formation, implementation and interpretation of language policy. Wiley discusses the ideology of monolingualism in the United States as an example, but certainly this approach applies to other language ideologies. The second is the benefit of cross-group comparison. The example Wiley offers is of comparing the experiences with language policy of various language minority groups in the U.S. A primary example of comparative historical analysis is Wiley (2000) and his reassessment of Kloss's linguistic tolerance hypothesis. Wiley organizes the discussion around the question of monolingual language ideologies, but then recounts the history of how that ideology has played out differently for various minority language groups in this country. As a final word about interpretive policy analysis, and particularly comparative historical language policy analysis, I turn to Heath (1976), a central source for the analysis in Wiley (1999). Her study of status achievement in New World colonies provides excellent guidance in striking the right balance in a research design between the historical and the linguistic. Heath (1976) writes:

The sociolinguist who turns to history must neither over-emphasize language in the milieu of empire and colony nor lose language in the grand context in which all decisions regarding the indigenous of the New World were made. For many of its adherents, the sociology of language is expressed in Joshua Fishman's statement that "the *sociolinguistic* facts-of-life are coterminous with the *sociolinguistic* facts of life," and historical dimensions must, in spite of the number and complexity of variables involved, reflect the *sociolinguistic* facts as completely as possible. (pp. 55-56; emphasis in original)

The Case

As stated above, the phenomenon this dissertation investigates is the role played by perceived national security concerns in the formation and implementation of federal language education policies (LEPs) in the United States. Three immediate questions about this phenomenon presented themselves as I designed the study. The first was where in society do we see that relationship played out? The theoretical framework I discussed at the end of the last chapter offered a rationale as to why I was most interested in this relationship in terms of its implications for heritage language speakers. The second question pertained to fixing on a particular case. I have indicated elsewhere that the case I investigated entails higher education programs in Arabic funded by federal LEPs explicitly linked to national security. There are several explanations that justified my choice of this case. The first flows from the preliminary research I had already conducted on the topic, which suggested that most federal LEPs explicitly linked to national security have targeted higher education. It is important to acknowledge an

immediate limitation with this choice. The vast majority of enrollments in language programs historically have been (and are) at the secondary level, not in higher education (Watzke, 2003). However, because I was interested in a subset of language education, namely that portion directly impacted by federal LEPs, the logical choice was to look at the level of education those policies most directly target, which is tertiary education. The second explanation for my choice of case related to the selection of Arabic as the heritage language to explore. As I suggest in the review of literature on Orientalism and its critics, the experiences of Arab Americans, Muslims (and those assumed to be such) stand out as particularly contested ones, especially since the end of World War II. As Stake (1994) has argued, it is often from atypical cases that we can learn the most about a given social phenomenon. That is, by explicitly investigating what I would argue is the most contested heritage language (next to Spanish) in the United States, we stand to learn a great deal about the implications of the relationship between national security and language education policy. A final word concerns the type of case study this design adopted. Again, I relied on Stake (1994) for insight. He contrasts intrinsic with instrumental interests in identifying cases and conducting studies of them. In the former instance, the purpose is to design a study that reveals as much information as possible about the case itself, independent of the broader context in which that case exists. In the latter instance, the aim is to explore a case with the intention either of providing greater insight into a broader social phenomenon, or to refine theories about that social phenomenon. The goals of this research related to both instrumental interests. On the one hand, I wanted to better understand the implications of the relationship between perceived national security concerns and federal LEPs, i.e. the big question of what

happens when minority languages are employed in the projection of state power abroad. On the other, I aimed to intervene in theoretical and scholarly debates about that relationship.

The third and final question regarding the case under investigation here was which specific time boundaries to put around it. The starting point of higher education programs in Arabic tied to national security was easy to identify. The first generation of policies supporting foreign language programs starts with Title VI of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958. As will be discussed in later chapters, in 1980 Title VI was incorporated into the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended. Moreover, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays act [F-H]) initiated another line of funding for foreign language programs at the tertiary level. A third policy from this period is the International Education Act of 1966, which included programs for language education. Although the policy was authorized, Congress never allocated funding for any of its programs. Because debates about federal support for language education continued with relative consistency from 1958 onward, deciding on the end date for my analysis was considerably trickier. For example, it was not until the end of the Cold War with the demise of the USSR and the Gulf War of 1991 that a second generation of language policies tied to national security emerged. The first example from this period is the National Security Education Act, which funds the National Security Education Program (NSEP) and its Flagship Programs. The second example is the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) of 2006, which aims to bring the myriad federal programs for language education under one organizational umbrella. Both policies are currently

undergoing rapid development and support a wide array of language education policies at various levels of education throughout the country.

Ultimately, I decided to focus solely on the first generation of federal LEPs tied to national security, i.e. the period from 1958-1991, and even more specifically on Title VI of the NDEA itself. I based that decision to limit the historical analysis to this period—and to this legislation specifically—on several considerations. The first was a more practical concern: Title VI and F-H channeled most of their funding of higher education programs to what are now known as National Resource Centers (NRCs). NRCs are organized around particular regions of the world, provide organizational and academic leadership in interdisciplinary study of each region, and lead outreach activities to engage the communities in which the NRCs are located. In each case, language instruction is a major focus of NRCs. Currently, there are seventeen NRCs dedicated to study of the Middle East (see Appendix A for a list). By contrast, the higher education programs funded by the NSEP are entirely independent of the NRCs. Therefore, to include NSEP-funded programs would have broadened the pool of potential research sites and participants too wide for one dissertation. More important still is that the programs initiated by the NSEP and elaborated by the NSLI are currently undergoing rapid change. Thus, the policy environment and the concrete practice of these programs are too fluid to have been manageable for a dissertation project.

Furthermore, among this first generation of federal LEPs tied to national security, I chose to focus on the NDEA and its Title VI programs for language development. Part of that decision was also tied to manageability in executing a dissertation project in a reasonable amount of time. Another consideration, however, is that F-H programs fund

overseas study of the target language. Had I included F-H programs and participants in the analysis, I would have broadened the scope of the study beyond domestic consequences of language education programs tied to national security. Ideally, by limiting my focus to one of the first generation programs, e.g. Title VI of the NDEA, I was able to accomplish two goals: 1) to conduct a manageable research project; and 2) to gain enough experience in the field of Arabic as a heritage language and federal LEPs motivated by national security so as to generate a rich research agenda for several years to come.

Finally, I have been questioned at conference presentations of this research as to why I excluded government-run language schools, such as the Defense Language Institute (DLI) or the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), from my analysis. It is true that both of these programs (and others) began and matured during the period from 1958-1991. However, I chose to exclude those programs because the relationship between them and the stated goal of bolstering national security is, frankly, less interesting. A program funded by the Department of Defense or the Department of State (as the DLI and the FSI are, respectively) that lies outside of the academy yet is directly connected to the military and diplomatic apparatus of the U.S. government provides little analytical room to understand the impact of notions of national security on the practice of language education. In short, students who enroll at the DLI or the FSI know precisely the specialized purpose for which their language study is structured. The far more interesting, and the socially more consequential, situation concerns students in general academic environments who choose to study language as part of their academic career, but find themselves involved in programs tied to national security concerns. This is

precisely the situation with Title VI programs across the country, whether those programs are housed at private or public universities.

Interpretive Communities

In addition to the general approach to interpretive policy analysis as outlined by Yanow (2000), I drew on specific exemplars of comparative historical policy analysis (Baugh, 2000; Heath, 1976; Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) for guidance in identifying data sources and potential participants. For example, Heath (1976) develops an interactive approach to identify the specific interpretive communities in her comparative analysis of colonial language policy. She investigates “the linkages between the policy formulation/implementation and attitudes held by three societal groups: the political elites making policies, local agents influencing, interpreting, reformulating, and carrying out policy, and the target population responding,” (p. 56). Lomawaima and McCarty (2006) identify similar units of analysis in their work by exploring federal policy towards Native language use, local institutional practices, and individual experiences of policy in these institutions. Baugh (2000) does not identify policy-relevant actors as explicitly as the first two exemplars. However, his history of the conflicts in policy and practice related to Ebonics in the United States weaves together the words and deeds of political elites; academics in the field; interest and advocacy groups at both the national and local level; and of course the “targeted” population, namely African American students.

These three approaches to defining policy-relevant actors and affected groups helped me identify key players and stakeholders in the policies referenced in my research questions. They were²:

- 1) policy elites, e.g. elected officials, representatives of federal agencies, and spokespersons for interest groups related to language learning in the United States, and the role they play in forming and implementing federal LEPs tied to national security;
- 2) university actors, e.g. representatives of specific institutions of higher education in the administration of and instruction in Arabic language programs funded by federal LEPs tied to national security, and how they appropriate these policies;
- 3) the heritage language population, e.g. Arab Americans both as students and professionals in higher education programs in Arabic, as well as representatives of advocacy groups for Arab and Muslim Americans, and how they appropriate these policies.

This process of identifying three distinct interpretive communities was very educational for me. On the one hand, I had taken enough away from my research methods coursework to know not to expect to find one common interpretation of Title VI programs in Arabic for each community. In other words, I expected to find competing interpretations of these programs within and across these communities. What I did not anticipate when identifying specific interpretive communities was that one person would play multiple roles across these communities in the course of his or her career. On the one hand, this situation confirms just how small the world of Arabic instruction in the

² The names I used to refer to each community are adapted from Heath (1976).

United States is. On the other, it made the analysis perhaps more difficult, but certainly more interesting.

Data Sources I: Documents and Secondary Literature

Yanow (2000) compiles a list of data sources to be found among interpretive communities related to a policy under review. Under the category of written sources, she discusses media accounts as a means of establishing background to the policy, as well as helping to identify policy-relevant actors. Other written sources include agency documents (e.g. newsletters, annual reports, memos, correspondence, meeting protocols, notes, etc.) and government documents (formal policy documents, transcripts from hearings, reports, surveys, etc.). Additionally, Baugh (2000), Heath (1976), Lomawaima and McCarty (2006) are also instructive in terms of linking Yanow's general approach to language policy analysis in particular. Source types found in these studies include legislative decisions, private correspondence among policy-relevant actors, memoirs of policy-relevant actors, as well as archival records and life histories such as biographies and autobiographies. Political and editorial cartoons also figure into Baugh's history of the controversies around Ebonics.

In mapping this assortment of data sources for document analysis against the interpretive communities identified earlier, I was able to identify the following document data sources. Table 1 below presents these data sources aligned to the interpretive community of most relevance. It is followed by a discussion of which specific documents sources I collected.

Table 1

Document sources for each interpretive community

<u>Interpretive Community</u>	<u>Document type</u>
Policy elites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal policy documents • Congressional documents • Policy briefs by interest groups • Newsletters of interest groups • Opinion pieces written for media • Correspondence • Program evaluation reports • Surveys and other studies • Secondary sources in other scholarly research
University actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional documents • Policy briefs by representatives of institutions of higher education • Opinion pieces written for media • Correspondence • Secondary sources in other scholarly research
Heritage language community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional documents • Policy briefs by advocacy groups • Newsletters of advocacy groups • Opinion pieces written for media • Surveys and other studies conducted by advocacy groups • Secondary sources in other scholarly research

The following paragraphs discuss strategies I used to locate specific documents of each type listed in table 1 and offers examples of specific documents I found and analyzed. Using Lexis-Nexis Congressional, as well as bound indices in the Government Documents section of the Hayden Library at Arizona State University, I located formal policy documents in several sources. The bound volume *United States Statutes at Large*

contains the original versions of all bills and statutes that Congress has passed, organized by the Congressional session number and year. Efforts to digitize Congressional records have not reached far enough back in the past to affect records for bills such as the NDEA, which was passed in 1958. However, several of its reauthorizations are in fact saved as portable document files (.pdfs), available through Lexis-Nexis Congressional.

In addition to formal policy documents, I used the Congressional Index Service (CIS) to locate several types of Congressional documents. Again, because digitization efforts have only converted documents roughly from the 1980s onward, in most cases the CIS indexing system led me to microfilms and microfiches of policy-relevant documents. I read and analyzed hearings reports containing testimony given to subcommittees and committees of both houses of Congress. Later CIS reports fortunately offer much more specific indexing of who testified, on behalf of which organization or institution they testified, and on which individual microfilm or microfiche their testimony could be found. I used these indices to identify policy-relevant actors from each of the three interpretive communities described above. Moreover, "testimony" for such hearings may be given in person in a question-and-answer format with committee members; it may be read from a prepared statement; it may take the form of a written statement simply entered into the record; or any combination thereof. My analysis considered all three types of testimony. In addition to hearings, however, the CIS turned up formal reports prepared by these Congressional committees, which summarized their findings based on testimony along with the minority views formally registered dissenting legislators on the committee. An important note about this route of data collection is that I uncovered another specific language policy, the short-lived Ethnic Heritage Studies

Program (EHSP), authorized in 1974. In later discussion about the EHSP, I frame it as a counterpoint to the rationales employed to pass and reauthorize Title VI over the years. Finally, in using this approach to data collection among Congressional documents, I located documents with salient data relevant to each of the three interpretive communities identified above.

My second approach to data collection entailed searches for relevant documents in the popular media, such as the *New York Times*, and the prominent news magazines of the era, such as *Life*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *Newsweek*, among others. This search was far less productive than that for Congressional documents; the NDEA registered in limited terms in these publications, and specific considerations of Title VI were virtually absent. In the end, I found relevant data among the popular media based on references to them in other data sources, particularly in the Modern Language Association's *The FL Program Bulletin*, about which more follows shortly.

The third approach to data collection I took was to search within the bulletins and other publications of relevant advocacy and interest groups. Examples of such included the *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association (PMLA)*, which not only turned up secondary scholarly sources on Title VI, but also reprints of relevant speeches given at MLA annual meetings over the years. The latter I treated as first-person interpretations by policy-relevant actors, given that these policy makers and implementers had long since passed away and therefore could not be considered for interviews. Among these speeches were data relevant to only the first two interpretive communities; there were none given by Arab Americans or representatives of Arab American organizations. Other examples of such organizational publications included the *Middle East Studies*

Association Bulletin; *Al-Arabiyya*, the journal of the American Association of Teachers of Arabic; and above all, *The Linguistic Reporter (LR)*, the now-defunct newsletter of the Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL). The *LR* proved to be a veritable goldmine of information, and I am most grateful to the interview participant who first referred me to the publication. For reasons I am not aware of, CAL stopped publication of the *LR* in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the publication in effect comprises a fascinating history of applied linguistics in the United States (e.g. it contains short, groundbreaking, but most likely long forgotten pieces by the likes of Einar Haugen, Bernard Spolsky, Walt Wolfram, among many others). Most relevant to this study, it served an auditing function in terms of reporting year-on-year how much Title VI received in funding and how that money was spent on its various programs.

The fourth approach to data collection I used for this study took me to several archives. The first I visited were the Rockefeller Archives Center (RAC) near Tarrytown, NY, and the archives of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, now housed in a special collections library at Columbia University in New York City. The documents I collected there included: grants; correspondence between the foundations and grantees; and copies of reports, news clippings, studies and other opinion pieces collected and archived at the time. With respect to the RAC, because the Rockefeller Foundation funded the MLA's Foreign Language Program, I also found copies of that program's regular bulletin, *The FL Program Bulletin*. Unfortunately, there was not a complete set of the bulletins, and it was not a periodical directed toward institutional libraries. Thus, while I found fascinating information in the bulletin about FLE prior to the NDEA and Title VI, it was impossible to conduct as thorough an analysis of that bulletin as I was

able to with CAL's *LR*, for example. I also visited the U.S. Department of Education (ED) numerous times to go through their records on Title VI programs for Arabic. Ed McDermott, ED's current program office for Title VI Middle East centers, was immensely helpful and understanding. Nevertheless, the records themselves have been purged periodically over the years with moves from one office space to the other. Therefore, I did not find anywhere near the extent of documents I thought I would when I arrived. Still, I was able to find the following documents types: program evaluations; limited data on Title VI centers and fellowship awardees; correspondence among ED officials and also between ED officials and Title VI center representatives; ED-produced brochures advertising grant competitions and various Title VI programs; samples of grant application forms; news clippings and other documents commenting on Title VI that ED officials chose to archive; a separate file on the scandal over the Title VI Middle East center at the University of Arizona and accusations against it in the early 1980s of systematic anti-Semitism; and documents used to coach ED officials in preparation for Congressional hearings on Title VI funding and re-authorization.

One development that offered great potential as a data source for this project is the new database sponsored by the ED's International Education Program Service. The database, the International Resource Information System (see <http://ieps-iris.org/iris/ieps/irishome.cfm>), provides detailed information on institutional and individual grant awardees for the many international education programs currently sponsored by ED. ED developed this database partly in response to Congressional criticism that the agency has not been consistent enough in gathering data on awardees of their grants and to what end grant funding has gone. Certainly, when Ed McDermott first

brought the database to my attention in January 2008, I was thrilled to find a potential data source that might fill in some of the quantitative data I could not find in ED's files on Title VI, e.g. names and demographic data on Title VI language and area studies fellowship awardees; or electronic and/or scanned copies of National Resource Center (NRC) grant applications. Mr. McDermott stressed that the database was still under development; even as of this writing, records on fellowship awardees for Arabic and/or Middle East NRC grants archived on this database only go back to 1985 and 2000, respectively. This database will surely prove to be extremely valuable as its records are expanded or to those projects focusing on current policies and the programs they fund. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it did not prove as useful as I had hoped.

As stated above, my original research plan anticipated much more thorough records to be housed at ED, both in terms of amount and quality of the data. Fortunately, *The Linguistic Reporter* made up for much the data that otherwise would have gone missing. I should also disclose here, however, that my original research plan also anticipated spending more time at specific Title VI centers to find data for their centers, including enrollments in Arabic programs over the years, demographics of their students, university-produced documents advertising the program, etc. This assumption speaks to my own ignorance on the topic at the outset of this study. The reality is that the federal government required very little record keeping for the first decades of Title VI; therefore, there are few records to be found, either at ED or at Title VI centers with some of the quantitative and descriptive information I expected to find. Moreover, ED rarely inquired as to the ethnic background of its fellowship awardees or home languages other than English they may have spoken. This absence of data—more precisely, an invisibility of

ethnicity and heritage language proficiency—forms one of the most salient themes in my analysis. I will explore this topic more thoroughly in the findings chapter.

It is important to single out a certain type of data source which each of these approaches to data collection uncovered. Of course, I found all sorts of quantitative data on Title VI and the programs it funded, as well as reports and evaluations of these programs. And I found any number of scholarly articles and opinion pieces written about Title VI. However, I also found—and found most useful—what I am calling first-person perspectives on Title VI and the programs it supported. By this I am referring to direct testimony in front of Congress in which policy-relevant actors gave their own opinions, or at least those that their respective organizations authorized them to say. I also include in this type of data source the reprinted speeches I referred to above, in which key policy players are allowed to share their own thoughts on Title VI or on the relationship between government funding and the academy more generally. This sort of data was of particular use to me in establishing insider perspectives on the topic, seeing as the principle actors who first shaped and defined Title VI, or who initiated the first programs for Arabic, are no longer alive. Therefore, I treated these first-person perspectives as ancillaries to the interview data I collected, which I describe in the next section.

Finally, I augmented these approaches to data collection with archival searches for secondary literature covering two main areas. The first was, of course, Title VI and the issue of government funding for language education. The second was a separate body of literature on the history of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East. This latter set of data proved invaluable in process of triangulating the themes emerging from the primary sources and the interview analysis.

Data Sources II: Interviews

Semi-structured interviews (Merriam, 1998; Seidman, 2005) with representatives of each of the interpretive communities identified above comprised another important data source. Previous experience conducting qualitative research involving interviews had stressed to me that semi-structured interviews are the most effective for maintaining the balance between an interview entirely driven by the researcher and one entirely driven by the participant. While my aim was to develop a level of rapport with my participants such that they felt comfortable enough to hold a genuine conversation, the interview was also structured enough to ensure that the research questions I formulated were addressed. Semi-structured interviews provided enough continuity in the questions I posed to participants to allow for within- and cross-case analysis. At the same time, this type of research interview challenged me as a researcher to listen attentively for insights and ideas offered from my participants, which in several cases lead me to rethink or reframe my understanding of the case altogether.

Seidman (2005) develops a specific approach to interviewing that entails conducting three separate interviews with research participants. The first develops a thorough life history of the participant. The second interview focuses on the specific details of the experiences under investigation. The third interview encourages the participant to reflect on the meanings of those details he or she described in the second interview. Participant time constraints, coupled with the travel necessary to meet with many of the participants, precluded conducting three interviews with each participant. However, the interview protocols (see Appendix C) I developed attempted to mirror the structure Seidman describes. In the end, I was able to conduct 10 separate interviews

with 13 participants (see table 2 below for an overview). I exchanged a series of emails with a fourteenth participant who would not agree to a full interview. And by sheer coincidence, while I was examining ED files on my first visit there, another director of a Title VI Middle East center joined me in going through the files. While our hours-long conversation was not structured around the interview protocol I used with the other participants, I learned a great deal from this director about Title VI and its history of funding Arabic programs. Therefore, I feel comfortable including this conversation as a data source, if for no other reason that she provided me much insider information that led me to rethink my research design overall.

My original research design specified that I would interview between five and seven representatives of each interpretive community, therefore calling for between 15 and 21 interview participants. In the end, I was able to conduct 10 separate interviews with 13 participants, and augment that data with email exchanges and field notes from an informal conversation. While this number fell short of the lower end of my original design, the revelation of the multiple roles that individuals had played over the course of their career did produce multiple insights that I could categorize using my framework of these three interpretive communities.

Table 2 below provides more information about the interview participants in this study. As stated above, in most cases, the participants have played many distinct roles in their career in Arabic language education. I have represented that diversity by indicating on the table with an 'X' the multiple roles each has played. Moreover, there was relative gender balance among the interview participants (seven females; eight males). In keeping with the intention of the research design stated above to foreground as much as

possible Arab American interpretations of the topic, one-third of interview participants were Arab American³. It is also important to disclose that I had to conduct two of the interviews over the phone using Skype. In both cases, the participants' schedules were too busy to allow for me to fly out and meet with them on the short notice they gave me as to their availability. To be sure, the quality of the data was certainly impacted by conducting the interview in person, which speaks to my inexperience as a researcher as much as the context of the interview itself. On the one hand, these interviews were considerably shorter than the others (each around 30 minutes, compared to 60-110 minutes for the others). And on the other, I was not able to establish the kind of rapport that would allow for a more interesting (and in terms of research, more useful) conversation as I feel I did with the other participants. Finally, interview participants who were or had been connected with a National Resource Center came from four distinct centers. Some explanation as to why this is follows table 2.

³ That rate was over 50% of the total number of interview requests (48) I sent to policy-relevant actors I had identified.

For now, I will offer two final considerations of the interview data. The first relates to how I report that data in the findings chapter. The array of X's on the map describing the participants makes clear just how small the world of Arabic language education is in the United States. Therefore, maintaining the anonymity of participants, as I assured them I would, became extremely difficult. I hope that the information provided in the table below, coupled with the few words I will use to frame the excerpts from the interview data I report in that chapter, will be enough to help the reader understand the value of the insights based on the role the participant played. In addition, I have identified each participant by the number corresponding to table 2 so the reader can refer back and gain more insight as to the participant's background. Beyond those measures, however, I was not able to contextualize the interview data with fuller descriptions of the participants and their background because anyone with even the remotest connection to Arabic in the U.S. would easily identify them. I acknowledge that this detracts from my analysis, but honoring my commitment to my participants is simply more important.

Second, after conducting thorough analysis of the document and interview data I collected for this study, I believe that the former produced far more ample and far richer data than the latter. Part of this conclusion I believe stems from the simple idea of quantity: to have had a similar amount of interview data as that collected from documents would have required many more interviews than even my original research design had identified. In addition, I was extremely fortunate to be granted time on the calendar of some of the giants in Arabic education in the U.S. and those with a decades-long involvement with Title VI and the programs it funded. However, because the bill is in

Table 2

Map of interview participants, the interpretive communities to which they belong(ed), their gender, and language heritage

Participant	Gender*	Policy Elite		University actors			Heritage language community			Language*** spoken, where learned			
		Lobby/ Hill	Research/ implement.	Which NRC**	NRC admin.	Arabic instructor	Former student	Prof. groups	Civil Rights	Arab Am.	At home	Communi- ity	Formal educ.
1	M			1	X					X	A, E	A, E	A, F
2	F		X							X	Ar, T, A, E	A, F	E, G
3	M		X		X		X				E	E	F, A
4	F			2		X	X		X		E	E	F, S, R, A, T
5	M							X			E	E	F, L
6	M								X		A	A	E
7	F	X							X		E	E	F
8	M			2		X				X	A	A	E
9	F			3	X						E, H, P	E	Slavic
10	M			3	X	X	X			X	A	A	n/a
11	M			2	X	X					E	E	A
12	M	X									E	E	S
13	F	X									E	E	S
14	F			4	X		X		X		E	E	F, S, T
15	F			4	X		X				E	E	A Fa

Notes. *Gender: F=Female; M=Male; **Which NRC: I approached participants from just four National Resource Centers; the number indicates with which one the participant was/is affiliated; ***Languages: A=Arabic; Ar=Armenian; E=English; F=French; Fa=Farsi/Persian; G=German; H=Hungarian; L=Latin; P=Polish; R=Russian; S=Spanish; T=Turkish

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fact 50 years old, it was obviously not possible to speak with the key players originally involved. Archival records certainly helped fill that gap; nevertheless, the emic perspective I aimed for with the interview data did suffer. Finally, the most compelling explanation for the imbalance between the two data types will actually serve to set up my next studies on the broader phenomenon of interest to this dissertation. That is, there was a distinct tension in the interviews between focusing our discussion on Title VI and the far more controversial and urgent debates around second-generation policies such as the NSEP and the NSLI. As a result, our conversations tended to flow back and forth between these topics. The remarkable insights these participants offered me with respect to the latter policies will be crucial to future studies I intend to conduct; however they also took me beyond the scope of the immediate aims of the dissertations. I therefore had to set aside portions of the interview data I collected.

Cross-case analysis and the National Resource Centers

As mentioned above in the discussion on the document data sources, my original design called for more research at four specific Title VI Middle East centers. The purpose was to compare documents, such as enrollment reports, locally produced brochures or other documents to recruit students to Title- VI programs, etc., across four separate cases, in addition to comparing the insider perspectives offered by interview participants connected to each center. I had identified two Title VI centers at private universities and two at public universities. I also tried to ensure regional diversity and eventually identified two centers in the East, one in the Midwest and one in the Southwest. Also, I had based my decision on these four particular centers by choosing two at universities

that had long-standing Arabic programs predating Title VI legislation, and two that used Title VI funding as seed money to establish Arabic language programs. Corresponding to the numbers used in table 2 above, those centers' characteristics are: 1) a private university in the Northeast with an Arabic program pre-dating Title VI; 2) a public university in the Midwest with an Arabic program initiated with Title VI as seed money; 3) a private university in the Northeast with an Arabic program pre-dating Title VI; and 4) a public university in the Southwest with an Arabic program initiated with Title VI as seed money.

Once I began the research itself, however, it quickly became clear that many universities did not keep a wealth of documents about their Title VI programs. Most information they had was included in grant applications for Title VI funding, meaning I could find some of the data of interest to me in ED archives. Moreover, the Title VI centers in most cases simply used ED-produced brochures to announce and advertise Title VI programs, making extended visits and research on-site of little value (at great expense). Therefore, I was able to maintain this "cross-case" approach only insofar as interview participants were distributed across four campuses with Title VI centers. A final word about this unrealized effort is that the fourth campus I had chosen changed over the course of the study. The main factor forcing that change is that at the campus I had first identified, a public university in the Southwest with a Title VI for the Middle East created after Title VI was passed, no one agreed to participate in the study. In addition, I described the chance meeting with a Title VI director while reviewing ED documents in Washington, DC. That meeting, coupled with willingness of others on that center's campus to participate in the study, encouraged me to switch my focus. In many

ways, though, this campus mirrored my original intentions: it is also a public university with a Title VI center for the Middle East founded after Title VI was created, and it is also in the Southwest.

Limitations and Ethical Considerations

There are several limitations to the study reported here. The first I have already mentioned, in that there is a gap between the largest FLE enrollments in the United States, i.e. at the secondary level, and where the majority of federal efforts and monies have been spent, i.e. at the tertiary level. The practice of language education with the most meaningful social consequences is arguably where the most language students are to be found. However, because I was interested in the role played by federal language education policy, I accepted the narrower impact these policies have as an inherent limitation to my research. In addition, because the focus of my research was historical, efforts to find the insider perspective on policy debates and practice became more difficult. For instance, I obviously could not conduct observations of past programs. Nevertheless, I tried to account for this limitation by seeking out representatives of each interpretive community whom I could interview for an insider's perspective on Title VI. Moreover, I tried to include a more emic perspective on Title VI by identifying data sources that went beyond official policy documents (for example, transcripts of Congressional testimony). By including data sources from local agents charged with implementing federal policy, as well as documents and artifacts produced by populations directly affected by federal policy, the goal was to foreground insider perspectives, particularly those of Arab Americans with respect to federal LEPs.

The third issue was essentially an ethical one, and by far the most important of the three discussed here. As acknowledged in the introduction to this dissertation, there was an ethical conflict inherent to arguing for an “instrumental” case study of Arabic so as to shed light on broader issues. As the discussion on Orientalism in the previous chapter seeks to make clear, Arab Americans—their experiences, history, culture, language, etc.—have been “used” in such ways all too often in the past. This history complicated my efforts in designing this study in two specific ways. The first concerned the choice of topic overall. Based on my own political commitments, I have argued that the urgent issues of war and contested immigration to the U.S. demand principled and committed responses, as much in scholarship as in other ways. It would not have been possible for me to dedicate the amount of time required by doctoral studies and a dissertation were they not somehow related to better understanding and responding to these issues. One space in society where questions of war, immigration and schooling intersect is federal language education policy targeting Arabic. Therefore, my interest in this particular case was not simply academic, but deeply committed politically. The second complication related to my position as a researcher inasmuch as I am not Arab American, and I do not speak Arabic. While I do not believe my outsider status disqualified me from researching issues surrounding Arabic as a heritage language, I recognized from the outset that the burden was on me throughout this project—i.e. from inception, to implementation and reporting—to ensure that Arab American voices spoke for themselves as much as possible in this work. I do not pretend to have entered into this project without preconceived notions about the topic at hand; at the same time, I have tried to state as

clearly as I can throughout the project my intention to conduct research that is as unbiased as possible in *design* while thoroughly committed politically in its *purpose*.

Data Analysis and Verifying Conclusions

The starting point in discussing data analysis procedures is to disclose my own position on what constitutes knowledge and its place in the world. Part of this stance deals as well with what it means to make warranted claims about truth, if such claims are even possible to begin with. Especially because ideology and conflicts over it play such a central role to the conceptual framework of this study, it becomes even more problematic to make arguments about objective facts and warranted truth claims. Lockman (2004) provides great insight in navigating this issue. In the introduction to his intellectual history of Orientalism in the United States, Lockman acknowledges that histories of the Middle East are social constructions, based on scholarly interpretations influenced by socio-historical forces and individual researcher bias. Still, Lockman defends notions of facts and the possibility for truth claims. He argues that to concede that knowledge is a social construct:

is not necessarily to argue that facts mean absolutely nothing or that all the different stories one could tell about reality are equally true or valid. Even as we recognize that how we interpret reality is not the simple outcome of direct and unmediated observation...we are entitled to establish, and demand adherence to, what we might call community standards of truth, broadly agreed-upon ways of selecting and treating relevant data and of making, supporting and challenging

arguments, as well as procedures for avoiding gross distortion, not to mention fabrication. (p. 5)

As will hopefully become clear in my conclusions to this dissertation, Lockman's notions of community standards of truth and of calls on community members adhere to them played a central role in my own efforts to make sense of the data I collected.

Turning to the methods literature, Morrow and Smith (2000) summarize a variety of approaches to data analysis that reflect varying assumptions about knowledge and its reliability. Their summary of Miles and Huberman's systematic approach to data analysis is closest to my own assumptions about knowledge and how it is constructed and verified. They write in their summary:

Miles and Huberman's (1994) approach is founded in realist assumptions about reality and knowledge. It assumes that reality exists independent of one's interpretations, and that dependable knowledge claims, including claims of causality, can be made from systematically gathered and analyzed data. At the same time, participant meanings and contextual effects must be taken into account. (p. 206)

Maxwell (2004) draws similar conclusions about Miles and Huberman's work in his overview of critical realist approaches to qualitative research. While Maxwell is more concerned than I am here with the ability of qualitative research to make claims of causality, his discussion of critical realism is still relevant to my research and overlaps in important ways with my own assumptions about knowledge and making warranted truth claims. Most relevant to my research are Maxwell's insistence that social and psychological processes can in fact be observed. Moreover, the context in which these

processes take place is anything but “ an extraneous variable.” Instead, as Maxwell argues, context is intrinsically involved with the causal processes that drive actors to behave in one way or another.

This realist position is at the heart of the systematic approach to data analysis that I employed in this project. This approach enumerates three interrelated steps to data management: data reduction, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The primary method for data reduction is coding the data based on pre-formed and emergent categories. One benefit to the systematic approach to data analysis is that it acknowledges that researchers engage in investigation with an existing set of concepts and assumptions. Morrow and Smith (2000) argue that the systematic approach in fact requires a more explicit conceptual framework leading to deductive analysis than is typical of most qualitative research. I agree and believe it is both valuable and honest to acknowledge that I already had a set of concepts and assumptions with which I understood foreign and heritage language education. These assumptions served to form the first set of categories I used to code the data. I performed a second round of data reduction by identifying emergent themes. I displayed these themes (28 of them) in Microsoft Word tables with three columns. The first included a coding system I developed to identify the specific data source from which the data came (e.g. “AN 9” in reference to the initials of the interview participant in interview #9; or “RAC 4” for document #4 I collected from the Rockefeller Archives Center, etc.). The second column contained a direct excerpt from the data source relevant to the theme, including the page number from the original document or the line number from the transcript. The third column provided space for me to write

memos to myself about the excerpt, to identify connections to other data or other themes, or to record other pertinent information that would help me save time during the write up by not having to return to the original data source itself. I used these tables with the 28 themes I had identified to sketch out an outline for writing up the research findings.

Those initial themes are listed below in table 3.

Table 3

Themes emerging from first round of data analysis

Number	Theme
1	Factoids for narrative history of Title VI
2	U.S. as world leader
3	Homogenous FLE
4	When HLLs are mentioned at all
5	What ordinary people think of FLE
6	A different kind of melting pot
7	Metaphors
8	Threats
9	Developing mutual understanding
10	FLES
11	Factoids about other government-sponsored FLE programs
12	Safety/security
13	Who controls FLE programs?
14	What explains who is to blame?
15	NDEA and the Middle East
16	Vietnam & student unrest
17	Gap between national interest and the national budget
18	We get it and they don't
19	Having a seat at the table—does it really matter?
20	University obligations
21	Ethnic Heritage Studies Program
22	What will it take to improve FLE?
23	Blowback on the curriculum
24	Gendered virginity, purity & innocence
25	Terrorology
26	US/Middle East love-hate relationship
27	Race, class, gender and FLE
28	Historical info on U.S. policy in the Middle East

As I actually began to write, I then conducted a third round of data reduction. I reviewed the categories outlined above to identify more salient and specific themes across them. This round of coding resulted in a final list of codes referring to eight themes and the sub-categories within them. These final codes, listed below in table 4, provided the basis for writing up the findings of the research. A sample from these tables is reproduced in Appendix D.

Table 4

Final list of codes

Category	Item
1. World leadership	Common sense leadership Passive leadership Leadership as benign power Leadership as responsibility Burden University responsibility FL educators' responsibility Self-interest & leadership Enlightened self-interest Selfish self-interest
2. Attitudes towards FLE	Ascribed to ordinary people Professed by ordinary people Elitism: We get it; they don't Assumption of homogenous FLL population
3. Uses of FLE	To facilitate U.S. power In service of U.S. power To influence U.S. power To promote understanding To promote U.S. power & understanding To resolve domestic problems
4. HL speakers/learners	Invisibility of HLs HLE and usefulness For mutual understanding For ethnic pride/esteem For improving FLE

	For supporting U.S. interests
	HLs under control
	HLs and exclusion
	Americanization / Melting Pot and HLs
5. Gendered explanations	Gendered weakness
	Gendered excuses for ineffective FLE
6. Threat	Resistance as threat
	Ethnic consciousness as threat
	Cold war ideology as threat
	Progressive Education as threat
	Students as threat
	Federal control as threat
	War as threat
	Homogeneity as threat
7. Explanations for ineffective FLE in the U.S.	State of the profession
	Progressive Education
	Americanization
	Student demands
	Budgetary & Financial
	Capitalism and war
8. Security defined	Geopolitical security
	Economic security
	Social justice and human rights as security
	Domestic security

Memo writing played an important role in ongoing data analysis besides that described above with respect to the data displays. I maintained two separate composition notebooks throughout the data collection phase, one for interviews and one for document analysis. During each interview, I drew T-charts on a page of the notebook to record important notes on one side and to list questions for follow-up on the other. The notebook for document analysis was also divided into two parts. In some instances, I was not able to photocopy documents I used as data sources; therefore I used the left-hand

page of the notebook to record the actual data. On the right-hand page, I recorded notes, memos and questions for follow-up and for later analysis.

Other examples of the data displays, in addition to tables I mentioned earlier, are found throughout this dissertation. They include participant maps providing me a snapshot of whom I interviewed and relevant data about them; summary tables based on the wealth of demographic data I collected about Arabic and the Arab American community in the United States; and tables to collate data regarding decades of Title VI funding for summer language institutes, research projects, etc. In each case, reducing and displaying the data visually was extremely helpful to me in identifying patterns in the data over time.

The third and final aspect of Miles and Huberman's systematic approach I employed in this study concerns drawing and verifying conclusions. The various data displays I created were instrumental in helping me to draw conclusions, frame my narrative for the write up, and to verify the conclusions I had made. This process, of course, is central to establishing the validity of my findings. I have argued that one strength of the systematic approach is its insistence that there is a reality beyond one's interpretations of or discourse about reality. If that is indeed the case, then I needed to be able to establish that my claims about that reality were valid. The threats to validity in historical research stem above all from researcher bias, rather than the effect of researcher intervention into the field (Maxwell, 2005). Nevertheless, using data displays to draw and verify conclusions was one important step in accounting for researcher bias. By arranging codes and themes from the various data sources, I was able to compare and contrast those themes against each data source. This process of triangulation was central

to ensuring the claims I make in this dissertation are indeed warranted based on the data. The process of triangulation was aided by the structure I had adopted from Heath (1976) in terms of identifying policy-relevant actors. By collecting data from sources related to policy elites, local agents and target populations, I could check the themes that emerged from each set against one another, both in an effort to find disconfirming evidence, but also to identify divergent and competing interests in language policy practices to meet national security needs.

The final aspect about verifying my conclusions involved consulting an entirely separate set of data. I turned to a number of histories of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East and compared the interpretations of that history found in the primary data sources (both document and interview) and in the themes emerging from those sources. To be sure, my intention was not to hold these secondary histories as the “truth” against which to square the “opinions” found in the primary sources. Instead, to return to Lockman (2004) and his approach to history, acknowledging that interpretations of historical events in fact vary among historical actors “is not necessarily to argue that facts mean absolutely nothing or that all the different stories one could tell about reality are equally true or valid,” (p. 5). The balance of the many histories of U.S. actions in the Middle East has indeed constructed the “community standards of truth” that Lockman envisions. This allowed me to use these historical accounts as one more source against which to triangulate the conclusions I drew based on the primary sources of documents and interviews.

Finally, as I learned throughout the course of this research, Title VI had little if any impact on identifying and encouraging participation in its programs by heritage

speakers of Arabic (beyond helping to bring Arab scholars from their home countries to U.S. institutions of higher education). Again, this invisibility forms a major theme of analysis that I will discuss in greater detail in a later chapter. Here, however, I was able to add these secondary sources on the history of U.S. intervention in the Middle East to my efforts to foreground Arab and Arab American interpretations of this history.

Organization

The following two chapters present background on central topics related to this study. Chapter 4 reviews the history of the Arabic language and the Arab American community in the United States. It also recounts historical efforts to maintain Arabic in the U.S. and briefly touches on contemporary efforts of language maintenance. Chapter 5 offers a narrative history of the language educational policy central to this study, i.e. Title VI of the NDEA.

CHAPTER 4
BACKGROUND ON ARABIC AS A HERITAGE LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Introduction

As stated above, the purpose of this chapter is to offer background on the Arabic language and the Arab American community in the United States. This background contributes to better understanding how the history of Title VI programs unfolded and the extent of the impact those programs had on Arabic language practice in the U.S. However, there are immediate challenges to acknowledge in any effort to recount the history of the language and those who speak it in this country. First, Arabic is not native to one particular country, but rather to a region of over 20 sovereign states and contested territories. Even within many of these states, it is not the case that their respective populations speak one standard form of Arabic. Instead, regional and dialectal varieties of Arabic add to a standardized form of the language, creating a rich set of *Arabics*. The linguistic richness in the Arab world has translated in the U.S. into a long-term debate among Arabic educators as to which form of the language, if any, to privilege as the target of instruction. Additionally, Arabic is the classical language of Islam. Therefore, another set of hundreds of millions of people across the world speak and engage with Arabic, even if they do not acquire it natively or use it for purposes beyond worship. Finally, in spite of this connection between Arabic and Islam, many speakers of Arabic are not themselves Muslim; in the U.S., for example, the vast majority of Arab Americans is Christian (Arab American Institute, 2006). Thus, the multi-national, multi-

dialectal, multi-faith characteristics of Arabic indicate that there can be no single Arabic identity either in the United States or in the Arab world. In short, the language means many different things to many different people. Honoring this linguistic and cultural diversity in an overview of the language in the U.S. is therefore a challenging, albeit necessary, task—especially for a researcher who is himself not Arab American.

In spite of these challenges, this chapter aims to present an overview of the Arabic language in the United States. Drawing on archival research and statistical analysis, the chapter first discusses the history of immigration from the Arab world to the United States. The chapter then turns to past efforts at Arabic language maintenance. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the number of Arabic speakers during the historical period on which this dissertation focuses. The research behind this chapter included sources and findings about the contemporary status of the language and those who speak it. I have left a small number of references of the current picture here, but will return to the topic at greater length in the epilogue to this dissertation.

Immigration Patterns

Arab contact with what was later called the Americas far predates European contact. Al-Sherif al-Idrisi, an Arab geographer living on the Iberian peninsula, sailed from Lisbon in the 8th century and is reported to have landed in South America (Elkholy, 1969). The first Arab to reach North America may have been Ilyas El Mousili, a Chaldean priest who landed in 1688 and spent 15 years roaming among settlements he came across and documenting life in them (Younis, 1969). Beyond this initial contact, significant numbers of Arabic speakers did not arrive in the American colonies until the advent of

the Atlantic slave trade. Austin (1984) estimates that of the 180,000 Africans enslaved and brought to the colonies between 1700 and 1770, some 10% were Muslim. Not only were many African Muslim slaves literate in Arabic, but they also spoke Arabic as a sort of *lingua franca* to communicate with fellow slaves. Slave owners often intentionally forced slaves from different regions together, relying on the diversity of languages among their slaves to keep them isolated and weak. However, many Muslim slaves began to communicate in Arabic in response to such divide-and-conquer tactics (Austin, 1984, 1997; Diouf, 1998; Lepore, 2002).

Sustained immigration from the Arab world did not begin, however, until the late 19th century. Various histories of Arab immigration to the United States identify different trends and “waves” in this process. For some, there were only two distinct waves of immigration; others identify five distinct periods (c.f. Elkholy, 1969; Naff, 1983; Rouchdy, 1992, 2002; Suleiman, 1999¹). The first Arab immigrants came from what was then called Greater Syria. At this time, Greater Syria was under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire and enjoyed a good deal of autonomy, as did many territories that comprised the empire. In fact, the largest cities in Greater Syria, Tripoli and Beirut, were fairly prosperous areas. Thus, argues Naff (1994), Greater Syria was not necessarily a place from which to flee. In an earlier work, Naff (1983) identifies the Philadelphia International Exposition of 1876 as an initial draw for the first Syrian tradesmen to come to the United States. Their positive descriptions of the U.S. encouraged their families to join them. Thus began the first wave of Arab immigration to this country.

¹ While the difference in these histories may at first seem to be attributable to the 35-year gap in their publication, it is interesting to note that Suleiman (1999) is the one that argues there have only been two distinct waves of Arab immigration, using World War II as the line of demarcation.

Elkholy (1969) tells the story of this initial period a bit differently. In his account, the first group of immigrant merchants was joined by large numbers of formally uneducated peasants from the Syrian countryside. The former group of merchants maintained much of their middle class status in the U.S. and remained in large cities in the Northeast and Midwest. However the latter group of peasants, about 50% of the total, did not fare as well. By the time of the Depression they migrated further to the South and Southwest in search of work. Both groups of immigrants in this first wave, however, shared one characteristic in common, i.e. they were Christian. They arrived in relatively small numbers, by the hundreds, in the 1880s. This number increased to thousands per year, until 1913 when some 9,000 Syrians entered the U.S. Arab immigration fell sharply with the advent of World War I and the attendant anti-immigrant hysteria that swept the country. The Immigration Act of 1924 codified this panic in terms of strict immigration quotas set for specific countries and regions, essentially slamming the door on immigrants from Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America (Naff, 1983).

Immigration from the Arab world did not increase in any substantial way until after World War II. Departing from (at least formally) independent nation-states, this set of immigrants was in general wealthier and more elite. The purpose for immigration was education, and for many the initial intention was to return home to contribute to the development of their newly independent countries. But as the political situation in the Middle East deteriorated, above all with the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent expulsion of some 750,000 Palestinians from their land, many Arab immigrants simply stayed in the U.S. Two additional factors—one a “pull” factor, the other a “push” factor—led to a rapid increase in emigration from the Arab world after

World War II. The first was the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which relaxed the quota system and shifted the basis for immigration to the U.S. in fundamental ways. The second was the defeat of Arab nations to Israel in the 1967 Six Days War (Naff, 1983, 1994; Suleiman, 1999).

This second wave of Arab immigration was very different from that of past generations. As stated above, Arab immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after World War II tended to be formally educated members of the professional classes in their home countries. Along with education, however, many Arabs of this generation brought with them familiarity, even proficiency, in English (Kayyali, 2006). Moreover, the second set of Arab immigrants was increasingly Muslim, by almost a 2-1 ratio as compared with Christian Arab immigrants. And finally, the second wave of immigration originated from many different countries in the Arab world, not just Lebanon (formerly Greater Syria). Naff (1983) documents that between 1948 and 1979, a total of 216,000 Arabs immigrated to the United States. Of them, 142,000 arrived after 1967. Of the total number, 44,000 were from Egypt. A total of 126,000 emigrated from Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, but the vast majority of these were Palestinian refugees. Only 9,200 of the total number for this time period were listed explicitly as Palestinian. Table 5 below presents more specific data on immigration from the Middle East to the United States, based on U.S. Census data reported in 1981. I have included each country from the Middle East listed on this census report, both to provide an overview of the region in general, but also to highlight the limited census data available. The six countries listed in table 5 are the only six in the Middle East reported, although they are categorized on this report under Asia.

Table 5

Country of birth of immigrants from the Middle East, 1951-1979

<u>Country of birth</u>	<u>1951-1960</u>	<u>1961-1970</u>	<u>1971-1979</u>
Iran	25,000	10,400	35,800
Iraq	1,400	6,400	20,900
Israel	8,600	12,900	23,000
Jordan	5,100	14,000	25,600
Lebanon	3,200	7,500	29,800
Turkey	2,400	6,800	16,500

Note. From “Twentieth United States Census”, U.S. Census Bureau, 1981, p. 88, retrieved April 12, 2008 from <http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1981-03.pdf>

Some scholars identify subsequent waves of Arab immigration, each triggered by specific economic and political crises in the Middle East: the Lebanese Civil War from 1975-1990; the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; and the first and second Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003-present, respectively) and the 12 years of sanctions and regular U.S.-led bombing campaigns against Iraq in between (Haddad, 2004; Kulczycki & Lobo, 2001; Kumar, 2007; Rouchdy, 2002). Whether or not one makes a clear separation between distinct post-World War II waves of Arab immigration to the United States, there are two social characteristics that distinguish many who immigrated after 1967 from earlier groups. Not only did Muslim Arabs constitute the largest proportion of this group, but also they brought with them a revived sense of pride and identity based on their faith. The reinvigoration of Islam accelerated greatly in the last decades of the 20th century in response to increasing Western and Israeli incursions into the affairs of the Arab world. However, greater pride and faith in Islam was not the only shift among later Arab immigrants. Pan-Arabism as a secular, nationalist set of politics reached its zenith in the Arab world between 1967 and the first Gulf War.

Despite the diversity of source countries from which Arabs emigrated, there was a growing tendency once in the United States to identify as Arab Americans, not just Egyptian-Americans, Lebanese-Americans or any other set of hyphenated national identities (Kulczycki & Lobo, 2001; Naff, 1983; Suleiman, 1999).

Status of Arabic in Source Countries

The introduction to this chapter acknowledges the diversity of the Arabic language in the United States as a result of the dialectal variety that Arabs have brought with them from their respective home countries. Another aspect of the diversity of Arabic relates to the language in the source countries, as well. *Fusha*, the classical Arabic of literature and the Qur'an, has developed into what is known as Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). In the contemporary Arab world, MSA is the language of education, media, and government and business interaction. However, MSA is very distinct from spoken varieties of Arabic. This division between the language of education, media, commercial, and/or governmental contexts on the one hand, and a distinct language of community and home life on the other, is known as diglossia. The stability of this diglossic division in Arab daily life between standard and vernacular Arabic means that many Arabs are already "bilingual" in that they can move back and forth between the two forms of the language as required by specific social contexts and communicative needs (Rouchdy, 2002).

The regional varieties of Arabic can be classified into four main categories: Egyptian Arabic (including Egypt and the Sudan); Levantine Arabic (including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Palestinians in Israel); Iraqi or Gulf Arabic; and North African Arabic (the region known in Arabic as the Maghreb). Shiri (forthcoming) likens

the differences among these four major varieties of Arabic to romance languages such as Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, Romanian, etc. Although each language derives from Latin, they are not mutually intelligible, meaning speakers of each respective language cannot necessarily understand each other. The same can be said of Arabic: although the language originated on the Arabian Peninsula, it spread with the Islamic Conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries as far west as the Iberian peninsula and as far east as China. Consequently, the language has developed through contact with other languages indigenous to these regions, ultimately producing multiple, distinct varieties. Finally, while none of these varieties is officially recognized as a standard form of the language across the Middle East, Egyptian Arabic is considered the most widely understood variety due to the long-standing entertainment and movie industry and its popularity across the Arab world. With the advent of satellite television and major news organizations such as Al Jazeera (based in Doha, Qatar) and Al Arabiya (based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates), it remains to be seen what effect these broadcasters may have on the language itself.

In addition to the linguistic diversity of Arabic, there exists significant linguistic and ethnic diversity within the Arab world itself. Rouchdy (2002) and Haddad (2004) remind us of the many indigenous ethnic and linguistic minorities in the region, including (but not limited to) Kurds, Armenians, Berbers, Assyrians, Chechens, Turcomans, and Circassians. To this list one must also add the diversity represented by immigrants brought (mainly) to the Gulf States as “guest workers” to service these rapidly expanding economies. Consequently not all immigrants from the Arab world have themselves indeed been Arab. Finally, we must also consider ex-colonial languages, above all

French and English, and the role they continue to play in media, culture and schooling in post-colonial Arab countries. Nevertheless, the dominance of Arabic in these source countries does shape the linguistic skill set that non-Arabs bring with them upon immigrating to the U.S. The converse of this dynamic of Arabic dominance over non-Arabic languages in the source countries affects Arab immigrants as well. They have left behind a context in which their language and culture are dominant and now enter into a social situation in which their language and culture are now the minority (Suleiman, 1999).

Historical Language Shift & Efforts at Language Maintenance

Understanding the different patterns of Arab immigration to the United States is an important part of understanding the history of the Arabic language in this country. Arab Americans' experience of assimilation into the U.S. mainstream has looked very similar to that of other immigrant groups. Specifically, by the third generation, English becomes the dominant language. Moreover, by the third generation a distinct American identity, or at least a distinct Arab American identity, develops such that Arab Americans begin to see themselves as different from recent Arab immigrants (Abraham & Abraham, 1983). Despite these similarities in assimilation patterns between Arabs and other immigrant groups, two specific characteristics of the first wave of Arab immigration to the U.S. served only to accelerate the integration process. Early Arab immigrants were predominantly Christian and tradesmen, and they quickly established themselves as what Naff (1994) calls "peddlers" (p. 29). While the Christianity of this group was distinct from the Catholicism and mainline Protestantism dominant in the U.S., it did not

necessarily serve as a mechanism by which to exclude Arabs from the U.S. mainstream in the same way in which opponents of Islam target Muslims today. For example, Sawaie and Fishman (1985) acknowledge that the religious traditions of Eastern-rite Christianity continued for many years in Arab churches. However, due to the lack of priests well trained in Arabic and Syriac, the languages used in these rites, English quickly became the language of worship.

Moreover, the economic role that Arabs of this period played as merchants meant that they had a powerful extrinsic motivation to learn English. One effect of this motivation can be seen in the Arab media. By 1920 there were over 120 periodicals targeted to Arab Americans, each associated with a particular Christian sect or with Islam. They often were short-lived enterprises. While earlier publications used classical Arabic, already by the 1910s the language of these publications was shifting to English. The only publications that lasted any substantial length of time were those such as *The Syrian World* that were published either exclusively or predominantly in English. By 1930, almost all of these publications were defunct (Naff, 1983; Sawaie, 1992; Sawaie & Fishman, 1985).

Compounding this rapid language shift from Arabic to English among first-wave Arab immigrants was the general atmosphere of Americanization that accompanied World War I. The need to establish a distinct American identity among diverse immigrant groups in the U.S. population simply overwhelmed attempts to maintain the Arabic language, even at the level of private family life. Naff (1983) writes: "Attempts to teach Arabic to children at home and in private schools competed unsuccessfully with the Americanization process" (p. 19). Rapid language shift to English was not lost on the

Arab American community. A debate ensued (in English) in the pages of *The Syrian World* magazine in 1928 about the best way to address the loss of Arabic in the community. Clara Bishara (1928/1978) writes in the letters column that Arabic is an asset to the community, “language being the most potent factor in race solidarity” (p. 84). She argues that Arabic should be in every case the language used at home, and that parents should send their children for private Arabic lessons in the same way they send their children for music lessons. Her opinion was not necessarily shared by all in the Arab American community, as evidenced by a second letter by Ruby Nakfoor (1928/1978, pp. 84-85). Here, the author, herself a high school student, recounts an unsuccessful attempt in Lansing, Michigan to create an Arabic language school. Her conclusion is that each family should decide for itself how it wishes to use and maintain Arabic.

Gregory Orfalea, in his foundational history of Arab Americans, captures in moving terms what the loss of Arabic entailed. He writes:

It was for this generation...the most Americanized of all, that Arabic was a tongue whispered in warmth or shouted when a glass was broken at the dinner table. It was not the language that made friends or secured work, and it certainly was not useful in assembling a field rifle in the army. (1988, p. 107, as cited in Rouchdy, 1992, p. 18)

Arab Americans of this first wave of immigration had already learned the lesson that status and success came in English. Despite this pressure, Kloss (1977/1998) reports that in 1940 Arabic was the thirteenth-largest language other than English in the United States in terms of number of speakers.

Efforts to maintain and cultivate Arabic changed in significant ways after World War II. Two factors help to explain this development. The first is a reflection of the shift in immigration itself as discussed above (Rouchdy, 2002). If political and economic developments in the Middle East were leading to a revival of Islam on the one hand and to secular pan-Arabism on the other, it is logical then that Arabs in the United States would also seek to retain, cultivate and pass on an Arab identity to their children. The second factor has to do with changes in the United States. The Civil Rights movement encouraged a number of oppressed groups in the U.S. to organize and demand greater visibility and rights. Arab Americans were just as much a part of this process as African Americans and Latinos, even if the latter groups' experiences are better documented. Both factors help to explain why Arab Americans paid greater attention to maintaining Arabic from the late 1960s on.

These efforts took place in two primary locations. The first was in Arab American places of worship, both Christian and Muslim. Churches and masajid² increasingly integrated language and culture lessons into traditional religious classes (Naff, 1983). Beyond religious institutions, Arabic was most visible in the media and in community schools. In Sawaie's (1992) and Sawaie and Fishman's (1985) surveys of Arabic language maintenance efforts conducted in the early 1980s, they focused their analysis on Arab American communities in 14 states, including the District of Columbia. They found 12 periodicals, 11 radio and television programs, 38 religious programs teaching Arabic and 12 schools that used Arabic either exclusively or extensively.

² The term masjid (pl. masjid) is preferred by many Muslims in reference to their place of worship, as opposed to the standard term in English, mosque.

Post-World War II Arabic language maintenance efforts, coupled with increased immigration from the Arab world over the same period of time, led to a considerable growth in the number of Arabic speakers. Kloss (1977/1998) and Fishman, et al. (1986) report that in 1970 there were a total of 193,520 speakers of Arabic in the U.S. Of that total, 73,657 were first-generation immigrants, meaning those speakers born in the Arab world who had immigrated to the U.S. Second-generation speakers, those born in the U.S. with parents born abroad, comprised 94,093 of that total. The remaining 25,766 were third-generation speakers of the language. This dramatic fall in the number of speakers by the third generation fits the overall pattern of language shift among immigrants to the U.S. Nevertheless, the total number of Arabic speakers in 1970 still represents a considerable pool of linguistic expertise.

An important, and often overlooked, aspect of Arabic in the United States concerns the efforts of the U.S. government itself in promoting the language. A small piece of this story flows from the passage of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. This act, originally incorporated as Title VII into the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, functioned as a major catalyst for funding bilingual education programs across the U.S. In cities with high concentrations of Arabic-speaking students, for example in Dearborn, Michigan, these monies helped establish bilingual Arabic-English programs (Sawaie & Fishman, 1985). A larger component of government spending earmarked for education in Arabic was tied up with national defense concerns. McCarus (1992) details the long history after World War II of government and private organizations, such as the Defense Language Institute, the Foreign Service Institute and the naval language school (now called the National Defense University) in Anacostia, Washington, DC, and their

Arabic language programs. Of course, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 provided an enormous stimulus for expanding Arabic language programs and is the primary focus of this dissertation. Chapter 5 goes into further detail on the history of the NDEA and its Title VI programs in language development. I will say here that Arabic was not the only beneficiary of this bill. But the monies did help to establish important traditions in higher education in Arabic language instruction.

It appears that Mohammed Sawaie and Joshua Fishman conducted the last major study of Arabic language maintenance efforts in the United States. Their work dates from the early 1980s (Sawaie, 1992; Sawaie & Fishman, 1985). They based their findings on a survey distributed in late 1981 and early 1982 to 443 addresses of individuals or community organizations involved with Arabic media or Arabic language programs. Their conclusions about the fate of Arabic in the U.S. are not particularly positive. They argue that Arabic is likely to go the way of most immigrant languages. Specifically, by the 3rd generation English will have supplanted Arabic as the language of communication among Arab Americans. While there is no reason to doubt that Arab Americans' linguistic practice should vary from that of any other language group in the U.S., one must caution that Sawaie and Fishman do not take into account in their discussion either the presence of newly-arrived Arab immigrants or the fact that Arabic is the native language for over 300 million people in the Arab world.

Kulczycki and Lobo (2001) report that in spite of the growing visibility and political presence of Arab Americans, there is still too little scholarship that describes or makes sense of their socio-economic or linguistic characteristics. Their article draws a comparison of 1980 and 1990 census data in an effort to fill in the gap in scholarship

about Arab Americans. Some of their findings speak at once to successful educational attainment and rapid language shift to English among Arab Americans. They cite census data showing that in 1990, 83% percent of Arab Americans reported strong English skills. Furthermore, among U.S.-born Arab Americans, 97% reported strong English skills (compared to 94% of all U.S. citizens and residents counted that year). This figure represents a 10% gain from the 1980 census. Finally, the authors cite 1990 census data showing that at that time 87% of immigrant Arabs continued speaking another language at home, likely Arabic. This figure stands in contrast to 16% of U.S.-born Arab Americans who spoke another language at home. These last two figures are perhaps the most important, because they do account for the continued immigration from the Arab world and the impact this might have on Arabic language maintenance in the U.S. It would seem then, at least 25 years ago, that despite the presence of newly arrived immigrants who maintain their language, only a tiny minority of U.S.-born Arab Americans used Arabic at home. These findings are largely corroborated by 2000 Census data, despite the 38% increase in Arabic speakers reported above. Of the 614,582 speakers of Arabic identified, 88% reported speaking English “very well” or “well”. A mere 2% reported not speaking English at all. Thus despite increased immigration in the 1990s from the Arab world, English continues to be the dominant language for the community overall (Brittingham & de la Cruz, 2005).

Rouchdy (2002) presents data that both confirm and confound this experience. Her work was based on interviews and observations in the Detroit area, where Arab Americans constitute a significant part of the population. Given the qualitative nature of this research, it is understandable that Rouchdy does not present numbers with her

findings. Nevertheless, in one of the largest concentrations of Arab Americans in the U.S., Rouchdy found a full continuum of linguistic competence in Arabic among her participants. At one extreme of this continuum were those who spoke Arabic exclusively and who had developed a pidginized form of English for use in their limited interactions with English-only speakers. At the other extreme of the continuum were those who spoke English exclusively, but who maintained a very limited vocabulary in Arabic, mostly related to food, family or curse words. Ranging between these two extremes were speakers who had developed skills in both Arabic and English to differing degrees of proficiency. It is these participants' speech that Rouchdy analyzes most precisely. She uncovers a high degree of borrowing, code-switching and interference in their speech. Rouchdy uses these findings to refute a common assumption that languages as divergent as English and Arabic do not allow for borrowing, code-switching or interference. She argues that it is the social context (i.e. of Arabic-speaking immigrants in an English-dominant society) that shapes linguistic practice, not the underlying code or grammar of any given language.

Despite the varying degrees of multilingual proficiency among Arab Americans in the Detroit area in which Rouchdy conducted her research, she argues that Arabic continues to play a vital role for all in the community. She supports this argument by drawing a parallel between Arabic and Spanish in the U.S. In both cases, there is the continuous arrival of native speakers of the language. And in both cases, large numbers in the community at least claim that the ethnic language is their first language. Rouchdy argues that Arabic, especially the standardized, classical variety of Arabic, acts as an important source of identity construction among Arab Americans. Some of the cultural

and political reasons for the reinvigoration of Arab and Arab American identity were discussed above in general terms. Here, however, Rouchdy links that process to language—not necessarily language proficiency, but connection to the language at all.

She writes:

The idea of an ideal language is always there, hanging permanently on the horizon. This ideal of the Arabic language is what we refer to as the standard or classical Arabic language. It is this aspect of Arabic that acts as a unifying force among all speakers of the language. It is a common denominator that is bringing Arabic speakers together, whether in the Arab world or among ethnic groups in the Diaspora. It is an expression of identity. (2002, p. 143)

Rouchdy makes the important point that the effect of borrowing, code-switching and interference between spoken Arabic in the U.S. and English creates an ethnic language of contact between the two (or better, between English and the dialectal varieties of Arabic in the U.S.) that is distinct both from the Arabics of other parts of the Diaspora and the Arabics used in the Arab world itself.

Finally, Rouchdy (2002) offers results from a survey she conducted with students of Arabic at Wayne State University. 77 of the 79 respondents stated that Arabic was important to them. Moreover, 38% reported they were studying Arabic (MSA) for reasons of ethnic identity, while another 34% reported interest in studying Arabic because of their religious affiliation. These numbers seem to support Rouchdy's argument that Arabic, especially standardized Arabic, plays a vital role in Arab American identity construction no matter the actual degree of attrition of language skills among Arab Americans themselves.

Organization

This chapter has presented historical and statistical background on the Arabic language and those who speak it in the United States. The purpose of this background is to better understand the extent of the impact of Title VI language programs on Arabic as a heritage language. The following chapter presents a narrative history of Title VI and the variety of programs it has funded over the last 50 years. From there, this dissertation presents the research findings based on my analysis of the data collected and offers a discussion of what those findings mean, especially in light of the background on Arabic and the Arab American community presented here. Throughout this chapter, I have included a few references to the current standing of Arabic as a heritage language in the U.S. Certainly, those references foreshadow a much larger discussion on the topic. I will return to that discussion in the epilogue to this dissertation.

CHAPTER 5

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON TITLE VI LEGISLATION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the history of Title VI. While some context will be provided, a more extensive analysis of the themes related to this history will be reported in subsequent chapters based on the findings of this research. However, to ease the reading (and writing) of that analysis, it is useful to explicate a basic narrative of the federal language policy at the center of this study.

Language learning before Sputnik

Many contemporary references to Title VI and the myriad programs it has funded over the last 50 years often explain the passage of the larger bill in which the policy was created, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), in the same way. In most cases, they explain the NDEA as a direct consequence of the launching of the first Soviet sputnik on October 4, 1957. As will be discussed shortly, this opening shot of the space race certainly provided an opportune political moment in which to push for education and language legislation under the rubric of national security. Still, this equation of “Sputnik + burgeoning Cold War = National Defense Education Act” is overly simplistic and neglects important developments in language education in the United States from the 1940s onward. Thus a short detour describing these developments ante-sputnik is necessary.

In fact, there are three distinct developments in language education in the 1940s and 1950s in the United States that shaped what would become the NDEA and its Title VI programs. First, efforts to harness language education to U.S. defense and foreign

policy began before World War II and grew exponentially as the U.S. entered the conflict. Second, major foundations provided millions of dollars in grants to programs such as the Modern Language Association's (MLA) Foreign Language Program to study and promote foreign language education. Finally, there was a bottom-up movement to re-introduce foreign language instruction in elementary schools across the country. The extent to which these developments were related is the subject of debate and will be explored in a later chapter. For now, let us take each in turn.

The best-known development in language education in the U.S. during World War II is the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). The ASTP is widely recognized as laying the groundwork for fundamental changes in the nature of language education in this country. Modeled on the American Council of Learned Societies' Intensive Language Program (Doyle, 1943), the ASTP structured its curriculum with a laser-like focus on oral/aural proficiency in the target language. In a description of the program entitled "Language Teaching Goes to War" from the April 3, 1943 issue of *School and Society*, Charles Rumford Walker provides a glimpse into the ASTP classroom. Students receive instruction from a trained linguist working in tandem with a native speaker of the target language. The latter serves as a model of native pronunciation, which, along with memorization of basic vocabulary, comprises the bulk of in-class time. Walker (1943) elaborates on the role of the native speaker:

Later, he talks and is questioned and tells stories—just as if he were a Japanese prisoner or a Malay farmer or a Swahili chieftain, and the students were members of an American naval or military expedition. Which is often just what they will be not long after the course is over. (p. 370)

Walker further describes one instance of assessing this goal of oral/aural proficiency:

After six weeks of an intensive course in spoken Japanese an official sprang the following test. Without warning he entered the class. "You are now in the Solomons," he explained, "and have just captured a bunch of Jap prisoners. You are to question one of them. The native speaker will act as your prisoner. Go ahead!" (p. 371)

Walker concludes his description of the curriculum in terms of its impact on student engagement in the process of language learning. He writes:

What strikes one about this new American adventure in language learning is the morale of students. It's as high as that of pre-flight cadets, and for the same reason: There is a consuming purpose behind the assignment; the men know why they are studying. Also, the presence of native speakers gives a dramatic sense of reality. "I'm actually talking to an Arab, a Jap, or a Russian. Not my professor, but a native who will answer back in his own language."...Last summer the boys at the University of Pennsylvania took their Moroccan on a tour of Philadelphia, explaining the mysteries of Independence Hall and of an American night club to him in Arabic. (p. 372)

This positive effect was the result, according to Walker's account, of 15 hours of in-class instruction, augmented by another 20 hours or more per week to individual study.

Officially launched on December 18, 1942, the ASTP was designed to produce rapid development of foreign language capacity among U.S. armed forces as they engaged in World War II. There are some discrepancies in histories of the program as to how quickly it unfolded. For example, Gumperz (1970) documents that within nine

months of U.S. entry into the war, eighteen colleges and universities had established ASTP curricula to train some 2,000 servicemen. According to her account, the program grew extremely quickly, such that within one year 15,000 servicemen received ASTP training at 57 institutions. Spolsky (2002) cites somewhat different numbers, suggesting that the program reached the 15,000-participant mark much more quickly and was undertaken at 58 colleges and universities. Irrespective of the small difference in accounting, the program was short-lived: the War Department terminated the program in April 1944.

McCarus (1992) describes the impact the ASTP had specifically on Arabic studies in the United States as nothing short of a “revolution,” (p. 208). Not only did the program’s focus on oral/aural proficiency begin the shift away from almost exclusive study of classical Arabic, but also that it produced a cadre of Arabists who went on to hold important positions in academia, government and business. More generally, the ASTP marked the first direct federal intervention into foreign language education; however, the wartime climate served to limit any sort of debate about potential consequences of that relationship between government and academia (Gumperz, 1970). Spolsky (2002) also acknowledges the impact of a perceived national emergency in jump-starting the program, but maintains that overall the ASTP had little discernable impact on actual U.S. language capacity. Although the ASTP was successful for the universities in terms of feeding them students who otherwise may have been lost to the war effort, Spolsky argues that the program was actually of little value in bringing significant number of servicemen to proficiency in any language.

The ASTP was the first government program directly connected to higher education foreign language programs; however, the program was certainly not the first time that foreign language education had found itself subordinated to national security or foreign policy concerns. For example, Watzke (2003) and Herman (2002) document the extent to which a section of Spanish language educators in the first years after World War I consciously promoted Spanish studies as part of expanding U.S. influence in the hemisphere. Moreover, in reaction to the anti-German hysteria whipped up during World War I, this same group of Spanish educators positioned learning the language as a patriotic act. Herman quotes Lawrence A. Wilkins, who in 1919 was president of the American Association of Spanish Teachers and the director of modern language programs for New York City schools:

“[T]eachers of Spanish comprehend clearly that theirs is in essence a patriotic duty at all times...They have also the vision to see...an America stretching from our own land to the utmost bounds of Patagonia, Pan-America, a spiritual union of the English-, Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking peoples of twenty independent republics. (Wilkins, 1919, p. 37 as cited in Herman, 2002, p. 14)

Furthermore, the first bulletin for the Modern Language Association’s Foreign Language Program suggests that this connection between U.S. foreign policy goals and Spanish language instruction lasted well into the 1940s. In one report on foreign language programs in elementary schools, the Foreign Language Program staff write: “...during the 1940s the hemispheric solidarity policy of the State Department stimulated the introduction of Spanish in schools of a considerable number of cities and towns,” (“FLs in Elementary Schools”, 1954, p. 3).

In addition to government influence on foreign language education before and during World War II, major private foundations played a critical role in the post-war years promoting foreign language study. In the period between 1952 and 1964, for example, the Ford Foundation spent a total of \$138 million on international programs, about half of which went to grants focusing on international education. The Rockefeller Foundation, for its part, spent some \$5 million on international education grants; the Carnegie Corporation of New York added another \$4 million over the same period (Gumperz, 1970). Of course, not all of this money was spent on foreign language programs *per se*; but certainly a fraction of this funding impacted language study.

Although the Rockefeller Foundation spent far less overall on international education programs, its grants were instrumental in supporting the MLA's Foreign Language Program. The program was first funded in the early 1950s to conduct a variety of studies to assess the state of foreign language education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education in the United States. The program formally ended in 1966 with the founding of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL). The foundation awarded subsequent grants to convene a number of important conferences throughout the 1950s on promoting foreign language study, in particular the less commonly taught languages (LCTLs). Perhaps most consequentially, Rockefeller monies contributed to the salaries of Kenneth W. Mildenberger and William R. Parker of the Foreign Language Program. These men would play crucial roles both in designing Title VI in the original National Defense Education Act, as well as administering it from the U.S. Office of Education in the program's initial years.

For the convenience of constructing an historical narrative in this chapter, I have separated out direct federal support for language learning, e.g. the ASTP, from the foundation support in the pre-sputnik period. However, this separation was not always in fact practiced. A full discussion of this history would move us beyond the scope of this study. Still, it is important to acknowledge that government funding for international and language education sometimes took a detour through the major foundations mentioned above. Amy Newhall (2006), in citing one history of this relationship, frames this more complex relationship in perhaps the sharpest terms:

The Office of Strategic Services recruited many anthropologists, social scientists, and linguists, sometimes without regard to their personal politics; among them could be found a few prominent Marxists. They helped develop an intelligence system, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. After the war... this partnership metamorphosed; although the agencies remained units of the government, some elements were transferred to universities, among them the OSS's Soviet Division, which moved to Columbia University. Federal funding of these and other transplants was sometimes laundered through supporting grants from private foundations such as Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller because program administrators were anxious that the government not "be involved publicly in developing area studies...to allay suspicions that such programs were little more than an 'intelligence agency.'" (p. 207)

Several of the histories, including the one Newhall cites, focus on the nexus between covert government funding and international or area studies writ large during the Cold

War. Another study will need to look more closely at the impact of this relationship on language programs in particular.

The third pre-sputnik development in foreign language education in the U.S. concerns the enormous expansion of language programs at the elementary school level. Commonly known as Foreign Language in the Elementary Schools (FLES), these language programs sprouted up in primary schools all across the country in the immediate post-war period. An MLA Foreign Language Program bulletin from 1956 documents that in the 1940s fewer than 5,000 elementary school students learned foreign languages; by the early 1960s, however, those numbers had skyrocketed. Between 1950-1952 there were FLES programs in place in 51 communities across the country. In the next year, another 66 communities added FLES programs. By 1954, there were 145 communities in 33 states plus the District of Columbia (D.C.) serving 145,643 children. In 1955, those numbers rose yet again: 271,617 pupils in 1977 schools (1833 public and 94 private, largely Catholic schools) in 357 communities in 44 states plus D.C. By 1961, some 8,000 school systems had FLES programs in place across the country educating over 1 million children ("FLs in Elementary Schools", 1954; "FLES", 1956; Parker, 1961). Certainly, when compared to the 28 million children enrolled in public elementary schools in 1961, these numbers were modest at best; but when contrasted to enrollments pre-World War II, and given that there was no coordinating organization, agency or network driving these FLES programs, these numbers are impressive indeed. Parker (1961) describes one experience in San Francisco, which gives a sense of the energy behind FLES programs. In early 1957, San Francisco public schools publicized a new program to establish 20 after-school classes in French and Spanish—to which 6,000

children applied for admission! In most cases, the languages offered in FLES programs were Spanish, French, German, Italian and Latin (in that order of enrollment, as well). The primary exception were programs in Catholic schools, which tended to offer whichever heritage language was predominant in the parish, e.g. Polish, Lithuanian, Slovak, etc. ("FLES", 1956).

One common explanation for the rapid growth in FLES programs in this period is found across multiple documents from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation archives, as well as in several articles and re-prints of speeches given at conferences published in journals such as the *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association (PMLA)*. Namely, it is claimed that the public supported foreign language education because it was increasingly aware of the role the U.S. played internationally and understood that foreign language proficiency was instrumental to effective execution of that role. As prevalent as this explanation is in these documents, it must be acknowledged that many of them were penned by a fairly small cadre of language experts: either by Mildenerger or Parker, of the MLA's Foreign Language Program; or by their close associates, most of whom would later move into the U.S. Office of Education to administer the NDEA and its Title VI programs. One example of this argumentation comes from Parker's study, *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*. Later described as "the legislator's Bible" (Derthick, 1959, p. 48) due to its influence on the initial Title VI legislation, Parker's text (1961) underscores this point:

Without national prompting or planning, the phenomenon which language teachers fondly call "FLES"...has truly sprung up from the grass roots. Two facts and one man are largely responsible for this trend. The first fact is a growing

awareness that, because of America's present role in the world, more American children need to acquire early some understanding of foreign cultures, preferably through the medium of a foreign language... (pp. 18-19)

In none of these explanations, however, are there any references to surveys, interviews, conversations, observations, or any other empirical data to support the assertion that public support for foreign language education was tied to awareness of growing U.S. influence internationally. Even when reference was made to journalistic accounts, the evidence is lacking. For example, in another forum, Parker (1956) makes reference to a *Newsweek* report to support his argument. Yet nowhere in the brief *Newsweek* article itself is the connection between popular support for foreign language education and awareness of U.S. actions abroad actually made; it simply reports growing FLES enrollments in the later 1950s in a brief 300-word piece ("Boom in Tongues", 1954). Therefore, we must treat this common interpretation of "grass roots" support for FLES cautiously. The rapid expansion in FLES programs in the first twenty years after World War II certainly suggests broad public support for the study of foreign languages; we must acknowledge, however, that after 50 years' time, a fuller, more accurate understanding of that support may be unattainable.

Sputnik, Eisenhower and the NDEA

These three developments in foreign language education intersected with a number of political developments in the mid 1950s that both explain and complicate the overwhelming support in 1958 for the passage of the National Defense Education Act and its Title VI programs in language development. Initially, in fact, two political

undercurrents at the time worked to preclude federal intervention into education. The first was tied to ongoing debates over federal financing of school construction. Enrollments in the K-12 system were increasing rapidly, and there were many calls for federal aid to finance school construction. These calls provoked an immediate concern of government financing of public schooling. This concern related both to the lack of a constitutional basis for federal responsibility for education, but also to fears that parochial schools would expect assistance, thus challenging the notion of separation between church and state. This debate was reflected, for example, in the platform on which Dwight D. Eisenhower ran for president in 1952, and again in 1956, in which he rejected outright any federal support for public education (Clowse, 1981).

During Eisenhower's first term in office, of course, the Supreme Court handed down its *Brown v Board of Education* ruling, which many Congressmen used to sharpen their arguments against federal intervention into public schooling. For example, in the spring of 1956, 101 Congressmen issued the Southern Manifesto, registering their absolute rejection of racial integration by any means, let alone by federal intervention. Not only were the signatories of this manifesto almost exclusively Democrats, but among them were two Democrats from Alabama, Sen. Lester Hill and Rep. Carl Hill, who two short years later became the central players driving passage of the National Defense Education Act (Clowse, 1981; Ruther, 1994). The tension over desegregation came to a head in the standoff over integration in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957. Eisenhower, who had served as president of Columbia University from 1948 until his first presidency began in 1953, reflected on the significance of the situation in his diaries. He wrote: "No single event has so disturbed the domestic scene in many years" (cited in Clowse, 1981,

p. 5). Yet he, along with many in Congress, was committed to keeping the federal government out of local public schools.

These two undercurrents shifted direction, however, in the wake of a single event: the launch of the first Soviet sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957. In one instance, the Soviets' technological advance—and the threat it seemed to present—dominated political discussion in the United States. In an interview on October 5, Senator Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington, characterized the successful launch as a “devastating blow” to the country. He called on Eisenhower to proclaim a “week of shame and danger” in response (Clowse, 1981, p. 8). As Clowse (1981) eloquently described it: “The rubric *national security*, which had mushroomed like the cloud of a nuclear blast and enveloped one after another aspect of national life, seemed destined to affect the drive for federal aid to education” (p. 12; emphasis in original). She goes on to cite a *Newsweek* cover from that era, which captured the mood of the time. The banner read, “Mortal Challenge: Are We Up to It?” followed by a caption that linked a number of issues to this challenge: “A World at Stake—In Science, Education, Diplomacy, Economics, Defense” (p. 17). Clowse (1981) continues with a fascinating excerpt from the magazine's opening editorial that week:

[The editors'] peroration concluded: To every civilization, at some moment in its existence, the mortal challenge comes. Now Red Russia's dictatorship has thrust such a challenge upon the West. The challenge is not simply military; it is total—intellectual, spiritual, and material. To survive, the free world, led by the United States, must respond in kind. Amid a clamor of alarm and self-criticism, America is preparing to shoulder this burden of great historical responsibilities. Technical

problems, which were long the province of isolated specialist, have become the concern of the whole citizenry. (p. 18)

The ensuing panic over the sputnik increasingly focused on accusations that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets due to substandard education, from kindergarten through university. Clowse (1981) describes a cohort of Congressmen, lobbyists and government officials who stressed that the U.S. was profoundly behind the Soviets in education, and that therefore educational reform was now a matter of national security. She characterizes their efforts as “adding to the general mood of irrationality” (p. 13).

Specifically, if the Soviets represented the principle enemy abroad, then the principle enemy at home had become Progressive Education and its guiding tenet that education should be relevant to students and their lives. As Clowse describes it: “Preoccupied with the loyalty issue in the early cold war years, the educational establishment in the country seemed almost blind to the fact that many critics considered Progressive Education as dangerous to the cold war effort as the risk of subversion” (pp. 28-29). Many political actors took their turn in sending the Progressive Education goat up the mountain. Kenneth Mildenerger, of the MLA’s Foreign Language Program, cited it as one explanation for the lack of foreign language capacity in the U.S. (*Scholarship and Loan Program*, 1958). Eisenhower himself took a turn at explaining the weak U.S. position in the burgeoning Cold War in terms of the damage Progressive Education had caused. He warned:

They [educators, parents and students] must be induced to abandon the educational path that, rather blindly, they have been following as a result of John Dewey’s teachings...when he (or his followers) went freewheeling into the realm

of basic education, they, in my opinion, did a great disservice to the American public. (cited in Spring, 1989, p. 100)

The “disservice” to which he refers was no small matter; speaking later to a meeting of the National Education Association, Eisenhower elaborated on his concerns. He argued, “Our schools are strongpoints in our National Defense...more important than Nike batteries, more necessary than our warning nets, and more powerful than the energy of the atom” (cited in Clowse, 1981, p. 27).

If reforming public education was now framed as a central pillar of U.S. Cold War strategy, then there was still the hangover of years of segregationist politics to contend with. On the one hand was the sticky issue of the United States posturing as “leader of the free world” when Jim Crow still reigned *de facto*, if no longer *de jure*, throughout the country. More specifically, though, for nearly a decade the political undercurrents of separation of church and state and segregationism had drowned multiple attempts to enact federal aid for public education. The logic of national security emerged as a convenient opportunity to justify the sort of funding now considered essential to improving all levels of education—while avoiding the political third rail of federally-imposed desegregation. Senator Lester Hill of Alabama, one of the signatories of the Southern Manifesto cited earlier, stepped forward to help prevent any form of federal aid from taking on the illusion of desegregation. Clowse (1981) recounts:

Senator Hill was also acutely sensitive to the prevailing fears in Alabama and throughout the South over school desegregation. He knew, therefore, that in the 1958 session [of Congress], any educational-aid plan he might sponsor should not seem to be part of that explosive situation. He notified his staff from the start to

use the national-security emphasis to assist, if possible, all levels of education.

He ordered them to draft titles, however, that would be technically free of latency as desegregation weapons. Hill was hopeful that a bill directed toward national-defense needs might well succeed in steering a course “between the Scylla of race and the Charybdis of religion.” (p. 67)

The general climate of Cold War panic, and the specific explanation of U.S. weakness resulting from substandard education, quickly became common themes in political discourse at the time. They also became the most politically expedient means by which to push for greater federal intervention into the K-16 system. The political calculus was clear to many, including Eisenhower. For example, in one exchange with Marion Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the president had remarked: “Anything you could hook on the defense situation would get by” (cited in Clowse, 1981, p. 53).

This logic can be seen in numerous exchanges in the hundreds of pages of public testimony regarding the National Defense Education Act recorded in 1958. In fact, the extent to which the national security rationale supporting language education had become obvious, indeed common-sensical, can be seen in the following exchange between Senator Gordon L. Allot, Republican of Colorado, and Archibald T. MacAllister, the Director of the Department of Modern Languages at Princeton University. Allot seemed unimpressed with the tenor of MacAllister’s testimony. MacAllister had argued that language education had been “under attack” for over 25 years in an attempt to “taint nationalist thinking with internationalistic ideas,” (*Science and Education for National Defense*, 1958, p. 722). After MacAllister’s formal comments, Allot prodded him:

The Russians have 500 students of Hindustani. We have none. Yet at stake are 400 million people, whether they go for communism or whether they go the free way. Does that general concept or thinking strike any response in you? (*Science and Education for National Defense*, 1958, p. 722).

Joanna Slater (2007), in her history of Title VI that accompanies the recent evaluation of the program conducted by the National Research Council, cites two additional excerpts from the mass of testimony on the NDEA that reveal the national security logic behind the bill. She writes:

One representative described his shock upon discovering that only five American diplomats working in Arabic-speaking countries were fluent in the language (the comparable figure for the Soviet Union, he claimed, was 300). Another representative shared this frustration but went on to note that, “even though we train these individuals in foreign languages under this bill, there is nothing in the bill that can compel them to go to Lebanon or any other territory or country on the face of the earth after they have learned that foreign language.” (p. 271)

Moreover, comments by James McCaskill, the lobbyist for the National Education Association at the time, reflected the cynicism driving support for the NDEA. He remarked in the winter of 1958: “The bill’s best hope is that the Russians will shoot off something else” (cited in Clowse, 1981, p. 77). Finally, Newhall (2006) cites an oral history of the NDEA from 1958 in which Stewart McClure, clerk of the Senate Committee on Labor, Education and Public Welfare, claims credit for coining the title of the bill. His explanation further underscores the cynicism of the moment, lamenting it simultaneously:

I invented that god-awful title: The National Defense Education Act. If there are any words less compatible, really, intellectually, with the purposes of education—it's not to defend the country; it's to defend the mind and develop the human spirit, not to build cannons and battleships. It was a horrible title, but it worked. It worked. How could you attack it? (p. 203)

In spite of these overt connections between education and national security, which seemed to be gathering momentum every day, there were still a few voices of dissent to be heard in opposition to the NDEA or any other sort of federal intervention into public schooling. If by 1958 it was now too risky to base that opposition openly on resistance to desegregation, then Congressmen increasingly framed their opposition in more general anti-federalist terms (Valenti, 1959). Strom Thurmond, Democrat of South Carolina, revived earlier criticisms of Progressive Education and deplored the student financial aid authorized by NDEA, claiming it would lead to “the destruction of individual initiative” (cited Valenti, 1959, p. 194). Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, went so far as to link his opposition to the historical work, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. He argued that bills such as the NDEA would destroy the American way of life. Senator William Jenner, Republican of Indiana, framed his opposition in a particularly sharp way:

I do not want the federal government ever to put its clammy hand on the free educational system of this country, because if it does, it will be delving into the home and the church and local government, and no good can come of it. (cited in Valenti, 1959, p. 194)

Similar views were expressed in the House, as well. Three Republican Congressmen signed the official minority views report on the NDEA, in which they rejected outright the notion that weaknesses in U.S. education were a result of under-funding. Not only did states provide sufficient funding, but the Congressmen also “found ample evidence that able young people who wish to go to college find ways to go to college” (H.R. Rep. No. 85-2157, 1958, p. 42). They continued:

The philosophy of this bill, like so many others, apparently seems to have altered a famous and good saying: “God helps those who help themselves” by adding: “The Government helps all others.” (p. 42)

Evidence is presented here from both houses of Congress as to these debates, but the balance of the evidence in the data I collected suggests that resistance to the NDEA based on rejecting federal control of education was deeper in the House; the rubric of national security was more persuasive in the Senate in terms of quieting debate and garnering support for the bill (Clowse, 1981).

Congress did ultimately pass the NDEA, of course; however, this opposition impacted the bill in three distinct ways. First, a subsection in the opening title of the bill states explicitly that the NDEA in no way authorized or encouraged any direct federal control of education. Second, the majority of student financial aid authorized in the legislation was in the form of loans, not fellowships or grants (although there were examples of the latter as well). Finally, Congress intended the bill to be a temporary response to the emergency posed by sputnik and other Cold War challenges, not to be a permanent federal source of categorical aid (Ruther, 1994).

A final note about the debates over the original passage of the NDEA was that they rarely took up directly any aspect of the Title VI programs for language development. As Lawrence Derthick (1959), then the U.S. Commissioner for Education, explained to the 1958 annual meeting of the Modern Language Association:

I want instead to state a fact that constitutes for you an unprecedented opportunity and challenge. That fact is that Title VI of the Education Act had a charmed life. Its wording never got substantially modified at any point. It is the *only* one of the ten titles in the Act which rode serenely through all the hearings, all the debates, without real opposition. And that's not all the story. Actually, it aroused so much enthusiasm, so much real concern, that the Congress *wrote into* some of the other titles various provisions for the improvement of foreign language teaching! (p. 50; emphasis in original)

The many histories of Title VI and the NDEA put forward several, perhaps competing, explanations for this "charmed life." For example, Gumperz (1970) explains what she calls the "conspicuous silence" (p. 50) on Title VI in terms of money. The amount of money allocated for its programs was fairly modest in comparison to the total budget for the NDEA, and therefore debate centered on the costlier aspects of the bill. Rutherford (1994) adds that the history of private foundation funding likely worked against Title VI in its original authorization. Congressmen simply assumed that this generous funding would continue. (In fact, the major foundations drastically curtailed their funding of international and language education grants by the mid 1960s.) These two explanations seem to complicate Derthick's claim that Title VI enjoyed enthusiastic support in Congress. Nevertheless, what is consistent among histories of Title VI written by

international education and language experts is that without the work of the MLA, its Foreign Language Program, and in particular the efforts of the program's leadership, Mildenberger and Parker, Title VI would likely have never existed in the first place (see Lambert, 1993; Mead, 1984; Scarfo, 1997). In fact, the same can be said of much of the NDEA. To underscore a point made earlier, although the panicked response to the sputnik launch provided the political moment to advocate a bill of this nature, much of the groundwork for the ten titles of the NDEA had been developed previous to the bill's passage. As Clowse (1981) puts it: "Every component of the future NDEA had been considered separately long before the Russians shocked American by their achievements in the fall of 1957" (p. 49).

The Structure of the NDEA and of Title VI

Congress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in August of 1958; President Eisenhower signed the bill into law on September 2, 1958, a mere eleven months after the sputnik panic began. The NDEA was composed of ten titles authorizing student loans; student fellowships; federal aid for science, mathematics and foreign language instruction; federal funding for guidance, counseling and increased testing to identify the most able students and encourage them to pursue higher education; and federal funding for vocational education. The opening title of the bill established Congressional findings in support of the bill, as well as its overall intent. Section 101 of this title reads in part:

The Congress hereby finds and declared that the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and technical skills of its young

men and women. The present emergency demands that additional and more adequate educational opportunities be made available...The Congress reaffirms the principle and declares that the States and local communities have and must retain control over and primary responsibility for public education. The national interest requires, however, that the Federal Government give assistance to education for programs which are important to our defense. (National Defense Education Act, 1958, p. 1581)

Title VI of the NDEA was itself divided into two main parts: Part A focused on programs at the higher education level; Part B focused on programs for the K-12 system. Taken together, both parts authorized four basic activities: the establishment of language and area centers at colleges and universities; the funding of modern foreign language fellowships; the funding of research on improving foreign language instruction and the creation of instructional materials; and the establishment of language institutes for professional and language development programs for teachers (National Defense Education Act, 1958). Finally, although the scope of Title VI programs changed over the years, the initial focus of this portion of the NDEA was on language instruction specifically (Brecht & Rivers, 2000; Scarfo, 1997).

The text of Section 601a describes the legislative intent behind the language and area studies centers, namely that the primary target for instruction was the less commonly taught languages (LCTLs). The section stipulated that centers would only be funded if they met the two following criteria: "1) individuals in such language are needed by the Federal Government or by business, industry, or education in the United States; and 2) that adequate instruction in such language is not readily available in the United States"

(National Defense Education Act, 1958, p. 1593). Moreover, Section 601b established fellowships for advanced language study, but these fellowships were more targeted than those funded by Title IV of the NDEA. In the latter case, students were free to apply for fellowships to study any language of their choice; under Section 601b of Title VI, however, fellowships were awarded only for advanced study of critical languages (Dieckhoff, 1965). In the initial version of Title VI, the list of critical languages was indeed quite short. Legislators simply adopted the list created by the American Council of Learned Societies. That list separated six primary languages, i.e. Arabic, Chinese, Hindi-Urdu, Japanese, Portuguese and Russian, from a list of 18 languages of “secondary priority,” and a third list of 59 “additional” critical languages (Scarfo, 1997). Fellowship recipients were expected to use their knowledge of critical languages gained through Title VI programs in pursuit of careers in public service. In particular, fellowship recipients were encouraged to take academic positions and continue to teach the language they had learned. Nevertheless, the bill gave the U.S. Commissioner of Education broad latitude to define which careers qualified as “public service” (National Defense Education Act, 1958, p. 1594). Section 602 described the focus of research to be conducted with Title VI funds, with a particular emphasis on materials development and investigation of novel methods of foreign language instruction. Section 611 of Part B established summer language institutes, whose primary purpose was to bring together teachers from the K-12 system and train them on the new materials and pedagogies developed by the research projects funded by Section 602 as described earlier (National Defense Education Act, 1958).

The following list represents the extent of programs funded by the first allocations made to the NDEA in 1958: 19 language and area centers, 171 fellowships, and 20 research projects for a total of \$3.5 million dollars for Part A; and 16 summer language institutes for an additional \$1.5 million for Part B. While both the number of programs and the amount allocated to them would grow rapidly throughout the 1960s, we can see from these numbers part of Gumperz' claim that the modest funding allocated to Title VI helps explain why this portion of the NDEA perhaps passed through Congress with little discussion or debate.

Title VI at its Peak: 1958-1968

The first decade of the NDEA represents not just the foundation of Title VI programs, but also its development into a mainstay of international studies in the United States. In fact, these first years of Title VI transformed the program from a temporary response to a specific emergency into what was widely considered a national resource.

A press release from the U.S. Office of Education marking the first ten years of Title VI gives a sense of the program's rapid development. The press release was reworked for an article in the October, 1968 issue of *Linguistic Reporter*, the newsletter of the Center for Applied Linguistics. It documents that the number of language and area centers funded by Title VI rose between 1959 and 1968 from 19 to 106. Student enrollment, both undergraduate and graduate, increased over the same period from 8,600 to 76,000. Overall, federal funding for all Title VI centers and summer institutes amounted to over \$27 million in the first ten years of the program. A similar pattern of growth can be seen in the fellowship program sponsored by Title VI. From the first 171

fellowships awarded in 1959, the number allotted in the 1968-1969 academic year rose to 580, paid for with \$6.8 million of funding (“National Defense Education Act, Title VI,” 1968). Moreover, Mead (1984) describes the impact of the summer language institutes in this period. He reports that from 1958 to 1968, Title VI sponsored 587 summer institutes that “retrained an estimated one third of the primary- and secondary-school language teachers then in service—approximately thirty thousand” (p. 346; see also Dieckhoff, 1965). Moreover, Mead praises the institutes for the innovative pedagogy and materials they used. In particular, he notes that the target language was also the medium of instruction in most instances, which was a novel approach to language instruction at the time.

The NDEA and its Title VI programs for language development enjoyed three reauthorizations between 1958 and 1964. In fact, Title VI funding doubled in that period of time (Ruther, 1994). For the academic year (AY) 1960-1961, 27 centers were funded in addition to the original 19, adding \$1.58 million in funding. In the following year, funding for Part A of Title VI hit the \$8 million mark with the addition of one center for Russian and five for Latin American language and area studies. The expansion of Title VI funding for Spanish and Latin American studies coincided with President Kennedy’s hemispheric foreign policy, known as the Alliance for Progress (Ruther, 1994). Funding continued to increase throughout the 1960s for Title VI programs: \$13 million for AY 1965-1966, peaking at \$18 million in AY 1967-1968 to fund 98 centers at 62 institutions of higher education across the country (Gumperz, 1970). The recent National Research Council (NRC) report on Title VI converts overall Title VI funding to inflation-adjusted dollars as of 2006, which helps to give a better sense of the impact this funding had. For

the period from 1958 to 1968, Title VI funding increased from roughly \$22 million to around \$80 million per year (O'Connell & Norwood, 2007, p. 33).

Funding for Middle East language and area studies centers enjoyed the same sort of growth in the first decade of Title VI. But as the figures show, Middle East centers were never the primary target for funding. In its first authorization, though, Title VI seemed poised to fund Middle East centers, and as an extension the study of Arabic, in a fairly substantial way. The first round of allocations produced: \$1.4 million for study of Middle Eastern languages that funded 83 fellowships in the first year; sixteen more in the second year; ten language and area centers, 5 of which were initiated in the second year; and around 20 research projects. Another \$1 million were allocated for development of language teaching materials, with a further \$300,000 budgeted for 1961, the third year of the original legislation. Finally, the original Title VI funded a Middle East languages conference that led to eight research contracts (part of the 20 cited above), and an additional 12 projects that received funding in the second authorization of the program in 1961.

A table in U.S. Department of Education archives dated July 1968 documents the increase in funding for Title VI centers for the Middle East, and its relation to overall language and area center funding. From this table we can see how support for Middle East centers ultimately waned in the initial years of Title VI. For the period 1959-1967, Title VI allocated \$4.34 million to fund a total of 12 Middle East centers. This represented 13% of overall language and area studies center funding over the period and placed Middle East centers the fifth-most funded out of eight regions identified by Title VI center funding (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1968).

Title VI funded a limited number of summer institutes for Arabic (or any other language of the Middle East) of the sort that brought K-12 language educators together for professional and language development programs. In addition, Title VI sponsored series of summer programs for intensive study of the language aimed at both undergraduate and graduate students. For example, in 1957 the Ford Foundation had awarded a grant to a series of universities in 1957 to establish the Inter-University Program. The program taught both Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and several regional varieties of the language in summer programs housed at the participating universities. Upon passage of the NDEA in 1958, Title VI augmented funding for this program. Moreover, in 1964 Portland State University used Title VI funds to establish an intensive summer program in Egyptian Arabic at the American University in Cairo. In 1967 that program became the Center for Advanced Study of Arabic (CASA). The CASA program was originally a joint venture among the American University in Cairo (AUC); two University of California campuses, Berkeley and Los Angeles; the University of Chicago; Harvard University; the University of Michigan; Portland State; and Princeton University. The program expanded Portland State's initial summer program to include a full academic year of study at AUC. Over time, CASA came to be recognized as one of the most important contributions of Title VI to Arabic studies in the United States (see McCarus, 1992 for further discussion of the history of CASA).

The first decade of the NDEA certainly represented the high point in its language development programs (Mead, 1984). Adding to the impact of the NDEA at this time, Congress passed two additional policies supporting international education and language study. The first, the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act (more commonly

known as the Fulbright-Hays Act), was passed in 1961 and authorized a number of programs to pursue language study abroad (Scarfo, 1997). In addition, in 1966 Congress passed the International Education Act (IEA). What distinguishes the IEA from the NDEA, and to a certain degree from the Fulbright-Hays act, as well, is that there was no reference in the policy to national security as a rationale for passing the bill. Instead, the IEA authorized programs to develop cross-cultural understanding and global awareness among U.S. students. Interestingly, no funding was ever allocated to the IEA, although many of its programs would eventually be rolled into reauthorizations of the NDEA in the early 1970s (see Vestal, 1994 for a complete history of the IEA). Nevertheless, taken together, these three policies constitute the most prominent action taken by Congress to impact international and language education. As Ruther (1994) puts it: "Combined with strong support from private foundations and the regularization of the Fulbright-Hays programs, these were heady times for faculty and institutions of higher education involved in foreign languages, area studies, technical assistance and cultural or educational exchange" (p. 253). However, these heady times were to fade quickly as the 1960s drew to a close, and as the conflict in Vietnam imposed a series of critical questions as to just what precisely U. S. "leadership" in the world meant.

Title VI Budget Battles: 1968-1971

Although the NDEA was reauthorized in 1968 for another four years, a battle ensued over the program in terms of actual allocations.¹ President Nixon submitted a budget to Congress in 1970 that sought to eliminate all funding for Title VI and its related

¹ Any analysis of federal policy in the United States must account for two stages of the policy, i.e. the authorization process and the text of the policy itself; and the allocation process, when actual funding is (or more often is not) earmarked to fund the authorized legislation.

programs, effectively nullifying the reauthorization two years previously. Scarfo (1997) describes two aspects to Nixon's argument to cut funding. First, Nixon claimed that war spending and Johnson's Great Society programs had effectively emptied federal coffers. Second, Title VI only covered roughly 10% of the budget for university-based language and area studies centers; therefore to cut funding outright to the program would not cause too drastic a hardship for the universities.

While simple accounting certainly played a role in motivating Nixon's effort to de-fund Title VI, the broader context of growing resistance to the Vietnam War and U.S. foreign policy goals in general must also be considered. In fact, three interrelated trends led to deep pessimism about programs such as Title VI. The first was directly related to U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the growing resistance in the U.S. to the war, especially after the Tet Offensive in January 1968. Second, and connected to this anti-war sentiment, students and academics became increasingly aware of how federal agencies manipulated many technical aid and assistance programs housed at universities to advance U.S. foreign policy interests. Examples of such covert action included the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) use of a Vietnamese studies program at Michigan State University; and the revelation that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was funding a Vietnamese studies program at Southern Illinois University and using it as a "cover for some of its agents" (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970d, p. 302*). In the latter case, the revelation of USAID involvement on campus led to a two-day student occupation of the Vietnamese studies program to protest the agency's presence on campus and to call for future student participation in reviewing all technical assistance contracts awarded to the university

(*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970d*). Of course, many of these suspicions and isolated revelations of covert government involvement in academia were later confirmed in the Church Committee Report of 1976, which found that academics at over 100 institutions of higher education had direct links to CIA funding, most often completely unbeknownst to anyone else in the institution (Newhall, 2006; U.S. Senate, 1976). Finally, as students grew more active in resisting the war and the misuse of academic programs for foreign policy goals, pressure mounted on university administrations to democratize campuses more generally. This often meant ensuring that students had a greater say in the design of their program of study. In many instances, these three developments were referenced during Congressional hearings on Title VI funding to describe a growing resistance to foreign language learning overall. A striking example of this interpretation is the testimony given in 1970 by Stanley Specter, then the Director of the Office of International Studies at Washington University, St. Louis. He maintained:

Gentlemen and Madame, we hear strident calls today from the radical left to abandon our international and area programs because they are instruments of the American "new imperialism." I urge you to give answer to the so-called New Left and the New Left Isolationism by reaffirming our commitment to international understanding, goodwill, intellectual and technical cooperation. I urge you to encourage the tens of thousands of Americans who devote their lives and energies to create a better national, international and world environment through painstaking study, difficult and often dangerous travel and undertakings, and through the proper rearing of our young to an understanding of their place and

role in this world. I urge that you make it possible, as it is within your power and authority to do so, for our nation to retain its lead in studying and understanding foreign cultures and to hold its place of enlightened responsibility on this globe.

(Office of Education Appropriations, FY 71, 1970b, pp. 283-284)

One result of this message was that many members of Congress grew reluctant to allocate financial aid to what were seen as rebellious and ungrateful students. In the end, two of Nixon's closest advisors, Henry Kissinger and Daniel Moynihan, intervened directly and helped urge members of Congress to fund Title VI for the year (Newhall, 2006; Scarfo, 1997). This temporary reprieve, however, did not fully erase the concerns of the time. Ruther (1994) captures well how this second period in the history of Title VI legislation ended. She writes:

The general mood of the country on foreign policy clearly affected the legislative mood, as did the national economy. By the end of the period, the nation was in no mood to assume "global leadership" if it meant more Vietnams. The economy was in a seemingly unstoppable inflationary spiral. Neither set of national forces augured well for international education programs. (p. 322)

Title VI Reoriented: 1972-1991

Title VI reauthorization became more systematized in this third period of the policy's history. Hines (2001) describes the program thus: "By the middle 1970s, Title VI could be characterized as a modest but stable program," (p. 8). Part of this systematization included gathering the multitude of federal policies related to education and treating them collectively, instead of as separate bills, in what came to be called the "educational

amendments.” In the 1972 educational amendments, Title VI reauthorization added language to broaden the scope of the policy beyond specialist training and to fund undergraduate language study (Hines, 2001). Part of understanding this expansion connects back to the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966. As discussed above, the law was authorized but never funded; later sessions of Congress resolved this problem simply by adapting the language of Title VI to reflect the legislative intent of the IEA. A major goal of the latter bill was to broaden the impact of federal funding for international and language education, as opposed to targeting advanced specialist training in a limited number of languages. As a consequence, the 1972 reauthorization of Title VI now included an undergraduate grant program for language study as well (Ruther, 1994; Slater, 2007). Budget concerns at the time worked against increasing institutional funding under the NDEA. As a compromise, Congress increased student financial aid in the form of loans. In addition, the definition of public service, which had always been an expectation for Title VI fellowship awardees, was broadened far beyond past expectations to teach the language. Finally, to help garner support for Title VI in tight budget times, a new rationale for the program emerged that framed its language and area studies centers as national resources (Ruther, 1994; Slater, 2007). (In fact, the 1980 reauthorization formally changed the name of these centers from “language and area studies centers” to “National Resource Centers.”) A corollary to the national resource rationale for continued funding for Title VI was the public impact that supporters of the policy ascribed to it. This public impact was framed in terms of *domestic* benefits of the program. On the one hand, international and language study was argued to lead to greater appreciation for pluralism and for ethnic diversity in the United States. On the

other, supporters of Title VI cited the extent to which fellowships had increased minority students' participation in higher education (Ruther, 1994).

In the 1976 reauthorization, Congress added a new Section 603 to Title VI. This section authorized programs to promote "citizenship education." In his description of this addition, Scarfo (1997) writes: "This program was to promote a general awareness of and education about global issues of 'pressing domestic consequence'" (p. 25), quoting a part of the policy itself. Congress did not fund Section 603 until 1979; ultimately it struck the section from Title VI entirely and rolled it into the 1980 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. As part of the ESEA, this program would eventually become the Foreign Language Assistance Program (Slater, 2007). Ruther (1994) adds more insight into the delay of funding this program. She writes:

The new section was nearly scuttled by legislators upset over a highly publicized curriculum unit on multicultural studies that reputedly showed an Eskimo family leaving an elder on the ice to die. Section 603 narrowly escaped the association with such intolerable "secular humanism." (p. 347)

This suspicion of Title VI and its educational goals resulted in extended budget battles over funding throughout the 1970s. One important consequence of these battles is that subsequent allocations cut the total number of centers by one-half, while at the same time the scope of Title VI actually expanded. In addition to the undergraduate grant programs mentioned above, Congress approved Western Europe as a region of study for Title VI centers. In effect, then, there was less money to cover a greater number of mandates (Scarfo, 1997). Turning again to the 2006-constant dollars from the NRC report, we can

see the effect of the budget battles: from the high point in 1968 of roughly \$80 million for Title VI programs, funding dropped to between \$45 and \$50 million for most of the 1970s and well into the 1980s (O'Connell & Norwood, 2007, p. 33). Despite this drastic cut in funding from 1968 on, there were at least two positive developments with respect to Title VI funding in this period. First, as the numbers indicate, the amount allocated at least stabilized over this period. And second, Congress implemented the three-year grant competition cycle, still in place today, so that institutions competing for grants could better plan their applications for and use of Title VI funding (Scarfo, 1997).

By the time of the 1980 reauthorization, an entirely new rationale to support Title VI had emerged. Now, national security concerns were downplayed while the role Title VI could play in ensuring U.S. economic competitiveness was stressed. Slater (2007) ascribes most of the credit for advancing this rationale to Senator Paul Simon, Democrat of Illinois, whose aim was to ensure the permanency for Title VI funding by linking the program's benefits to economic competitiveness. This rationale was expressed most directly in a new Part B in Title VI legislation, which authorized Centers for International Business Education and Research (CIBERs). Another means by which to ensure permanency for Title VI funding was to include the program in the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965. Thus, the National Defense Education Act of 1958 officially sunset as federal law in 1980; several of its titles, as amended, were incorporated into the ESEA or, as in the case of Title VI, into the HEA. Additional changes to Title VI in its 1980 reauthorization included removing the teaching or public service requirements for fellowship recipients. This change was in line with the role Title VI was meant to play in boosting U.S. business: this goal would be harder to achieve if fellowship recipients were

made to teach or take a public service job first, instead of entering the business world upon graduation. Moreover, the 1980 reauthorization built greater stability into Title VI and funding for it by establishing of a six-year reauthorization cycle. In addition, an advisory board was established to oversee the quality of Title VI programs. Although this board was later cut, it has reemerged as the central sticking point to Title VI reauthorization today. Many policy-relevant actors are concerned that the advisory board will play a policing role and curtail academic freedom in Title VI centers (Newhall, 2006). Finally, the criteria used to award Title VI center grants changed in the 1980 reauthorization. Over the course of the policy's development, Congress developed criteria for awarding grants so as to ensure greater geographic and regional balance. The 1980 reauthorization made this criterion secondary, and instead, stressed greater accountability for excellence among Title VI centers (Slater, 2007). Congress again reauthorized Title VI in 1986, in which the only major amendment was the addition of the Language Resource Centers (LRCs) (Slater, 2007). Currently, the only such center for Middle Eastern languages, the National Middle East Language Resource Center, is housed at Brigham Young University. What had not changed in the 1986 reauthorization was the economic rationale for the legislation. As one interview participant for this study put it: "So through the 80s what I started arguing was that Toyota was the Sputnik of the 80s, and what we should tie ourselves to—and what Congress was buying—was economic competitiveness" (Participant 12, transcript 9, lines 224-226). Title VI went through two additional reauthorizations in 1992 and 1998. Finally, as mentioned above, debate still continues over what was slated to be its 2004 reauthorization.

Slater (2007), in her opening remarks on Title VI, provides an overview of the legislation and its 50-year history. She writes:

Despite nearly a half-century of legislative adjustments, the fundamental rationales for the programs have changed little since the decade after their inception. The original goals of providing linguistic and international expertise to serve the national interest and global understanding endure. So too does the original *mechanism* selected to serve that goal, that is, working with institutions of higher education. (p. 267; emphasis in original)

She continues, citing Ruther (2002):

Overall, the legislative history of the TVI program reveals how something that started as “a planned response to a national emergency” gradually became a “focus of national resources for...understanding and managing interdependence, trade, security and other international issues.” (Ruther, 2002, p. 134 as cited in Slater, 2007, p. 268)

In addition, Brecht and Rivers (2000) summarize the history of Title VI by framing it in terms of a series of historical debates. They identify six of them: 1) whether the primary focus of Title VI should be language or area study; 2) whether funding should privilege less commonly taught languages or the traditional languages, i.e Spanish, French, German and Italian; 3) whether the goal of Title VI program should be to produce specialized knowledge for advanced scholars or generalized knowledge for wider segments of higher education students; 4) whether subsequent Title VI funding should work to maintain the expertise already developed or to expand it; 5) whether Title VI centers should be organized around world regions or around themes of study; and 6)

whether the primary target for Title VI funding should be at the higher education or K-12 levels.

Despite the consistency that Slater and Ruther ascribe to the history of Title VI and the programs it supported, and in addition to the long-standing debates that Brecht and Rivers use to summarize Title VI's history, a closer analysis that employs the theoretical framework enumerated in Chapter 3 reveals a deeper set of debates about the use(s) of Title VI programs, particularly those related to the Middle East and to the study of Arabic, and what policy-relevant actors made of those debates. Certainly, this narrative history of the policy has foreshadowed several of the debates discussed below. It is to these debates that this dissertation now turns.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS

Permit me in closing to make one final observation: the NDEA has the word 'defense' in its title, but the needs involved here are broader than that word suggests.

--From the prepared statement by the President of Columbia University
(*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971, 1970b, p. 1339*)

As the excerpt above from Congressional testimony suggests, the meaning and interpretations of Title VI in its 50 years have moved far beyond the concept of defense. The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of my research as to how policy-relevant actors have understood Title VI, its impact on Arabic language instruction, and its impact on Arabic as a heritage language more broadly. Several considerations influence the structure of this chapter. In the interest of contributing to the validity of the findings and conclusions I draw, I am relying on an "audit trail" of sorts that links the conceptual framework, research questions and findings. As such, I begin by presenting findings that relate directly to the first research question; the chapter concludes with findings that relate to the second research question. Moreover, I have applied Shohamy's (2006) approach to analysis that considers both top-down and bottom-up interpretations of specific language policy mechanisms. Therefore, I begin the chapter with findings that reflect top-down understandings of the issue at hand, and follow them with bottom-up interpretations. I should mention that this approach to the findings created itself; in other words, during data reduction and analysis, I did not intend to structure the data in this way. However, the themes and issues in the data seemed to emerge in this way. This experience underscores to me the extent to which this chapter wrote itself: there was a

logic in the data themselves that made the structure of this chapter almost obvious. These considerations helped me to organize this chapter in the following way:

- Multiple definitions of national security: four distinct interpretations of security operated in the data, including geopolitical, economic, domestic and social justice and/or human rights approaches to understanding security;
- The “common sense” of language education in the national interest: Title VI-relevant policy actors employed, whether implicitly or explicitly, common sense in their deliberations of the topic. This common sense was either applied to discussion of the status of the United States in the world, or to the role that foreign language education can (and should) play in maintaining that status, or to both;
- Responsibility: policy-relevant actors described what they perceived as the United States’ responsibilities in the world, and academic and university responsibility with respect to the position of the U.S. internationally;
- Uses of foreign language education: policy-relevant actors identified a number of ends for foreign language education, ranging from the facilitation of U.S. power abroad, to tempering international conflict and having a direct influence on U.S. policy, to fostering mutual understanding;
- U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East: a separate set of data sources, i.e. secondary historical literature, forms the basis of this narrative section of the chapter tracing U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East, principally from World War II onward;

- Popular attitudes toward foreign language education: the data showed a consistent trend of Title VI-relevant policy actors ascribing attitudes toward foreign language education to the general public with little or no empirical evidence to justify their assertions. In fact, the little empirical evidence that did exist contradicted many of the assumptions these policy-relevant actors made;
- Bottom-up interpretations of “threat”: when Title VI-relevant policy actors considered Title VI from their position as appropriators of the policy, they identified an entirely different set of threats from those discussed in the first theme with respect to U.S. national security or the national interest;
- Title VI impact on Arabic heritage language education: the chapter then turns to the second research question to look more closely at the mixed impact of Title VI, and the national security motivations behind it, on Arabic language instruction, including Arabic as a heritage language;
- Title VI impact on heritage language overall: the chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the data concerning the impact of Title VI on heritage language education overall, in particular the salience of *absent* data.

Moreover, while I have made every effort to let the data “speak for themselves,” I have integrated discussion of the findings as I report them. I made this choice, versus separating discussion in a final section, primarily to help the flow of the chapter. In chapter 7, I address in greater detail my conclusions based on these findings; I also enumerate the implications for the larger phenomenon in which this dissertation is interested, namely language education advocacy motivated by national security concerns and the consequences of such for heritage language education.

Definitions of “National Security”

The starting point in this discussion is to sketch out the boundaries of the safety zone. To recall the questions about these boundaries I raised earlier in the discussion of my theoretical framework:

1. How did the concept of “national security” function to determine what was safe and what was threatening?
2. How did policy-relevant actors define “national security” in their discussions and deliberations over Title VI and the language programs it funded?
3. How did policy-relevant actors apply those definitions in promoting or limiting the practice of Arabic, through formal language education policies such as Title VI?
4. How did those definitions of national security identify who benefits from and who is threatened by Arabic in the United States.

While the concept of national defense or national security was central to the formulation, implementation and development of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) and Title VI, the data make clear that the concept of “national security” meant very different things to the many individuals and organizations involved with the policy itself.

However, I found only one effort to develop an explicit, working definition of “security”—in data spanning 40 years of debates about Title VI and language education.

Certainly, as I will address shortly, there were multiple examples referencing one understanding of security or the other within arguments advocating foreign language education. Nevertheless in virtually every instance, what “security” meant was simply taken for granted and left to others (including this researcher) to interpret. To

foreshadow future discussion, these assumptions, i.e. the deference to “common-sense” in discussions of security and education, would emerge as a dominant theme in the data.

For now, let us consider the singular effort to define security in discussions of Title VI and language education. It is found in a broad assessment of Title VI at the turn of the century, presenting a history of the legislation and how it can remain relevant to 21st century concerns (Brecht & Rivers, 2000). Given the rarity of explicit definitions of security, it is worthwhile quoting the authors at length. They write:

For our definition of national security, we take the terms of reference of the Clinton administration’s October 1998 white paper on the subject, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, which embraces the three principal goals for national security articulated in its 1996 predecessor, *A National Security of Enlargement and Engagement*. Those goals are enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy. *Security* depends on effective action in many areas, including diplomacy, international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation and management of weapons of mass destruction, international law enforcement, the environment, terrorism, major theater warfare and other military operations, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space missile defense, emergency preparedness, and the projection of power overseas. *Prosperity* involves access to foreign markets, an open trading system, effective export strategies and advocacy, secure energy sources, and sustainable development abroad, among other things. Finally, *democracy* depends on assisting emerging democracies, adhering to universal human rights and

democratic principles, and promoting humanitarian activities. (pp. 1-2; emphasis in original)

Brecht and Rivers' definition does align with others I found in the data and would therefore seem to present three useful categories around which to structure my analysis. In fact, I did try to adopt this definition as a basis to review the other data and analyze operational (if also tacit) definitions of security within them. Two issues arose, leading me to reformulate their definitions. On the one hand, by the late 1960s and the early 1970s, some advocates of legislation such as Title VI began to frame the uses of these policies specifically in terms of restoring order to a U.S. society beset by student upheaval and struggles for racial equality and against the Vietnam war. In other words, security was increasingly redefined in terms of *domestic security* needs. In addition, what Brecht and Rivers (2000) call prosperity was more frequently labeled by others as *economic security*. Therefore, I expanded on Brecht and Rivers' categories to identify four distinct definitions of security operating in the data: geopolitical security, including issues that Brecht and Rivers enumerate above with respect to military, diplomatic, and political concerns; economic security, referring more to U.S. industrial and economic interests, rather than equitable income distribution, living wages, etc.; domestic security, above all in the sense of law and order; and security defined in terms of social justice and human rights. I will discuss each in turn. However, I reiterate here that in most cases these definitions were not explicit in the data, but rather embedded in a broader discussion of foreign language education or education.

It is not a particularly groundbreaking finding that among the data related to the NDEA and its Title VI language programs, geopolitical definitions of national security

comprised the most salient theme. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to look at examples of how security understood as a function of diplomacy, military preparedness and managing international conflict framed the terms of language education advocacy. Geopolitical definitions of security seemed to range on a continuum from overt identification with the Cold War and maintenance of U.S. dominance in that struggle at one extreme, to framing language education as a means of mediating conflict and ensuring peaceful resolutions at the other. An example that I would situate closer to the former extreme comes from a 1961 text written by Theodore Huebener, then the director of Foreign Languages for New York City schools. Huebener (1961) considers foreign language education on a broader scale than simply Title VI legislation. Nevertheless, it represents one of the most salient examples of geopolitical definitions of national security that operated in many discussions of Title VI more specifically. The preface to the text states:

Unless immediate and drastic action is taken, our country will not be able to compete with its formidable and efficient rivals. It will, in fact, lose its prestige and power as a world leader. Russia concentrates on foreign language training because, to Communism, language is a weapon, a tool for infiltration and subversion. Many small countries, as well, have language programs vastly superior to the United States. Dr. Huebener not only shows these and other weaknesses in our language training but also offers concrete proposals on how to meet the challenge of one world with many tongues, that will be of inestimable value to educators and parents who realize that Johnny *must* learn foreign languages if we are to continue to present the United States as the leader of the free world. (pp. ii)

The editors of this text clearly frame national security in Cold War terms as a struggle for power between the United States, which they describe as woefully unprepared in terms of foreign language competency, and the Soviet Union. What is noteworthy about this framing of national security, as well, is that it foretells that the actual battleground of the Cold War was neither in the U.S. nor in the U.S.S.R., but rather in “small countries,” i.e. in the developing world, as each of the two powers fought for hegemony.

Perhaps the most explicit connection made between the NDEA and its Title VI language programs, and more overt geopolitical definitions of national security can be found in a speech that Lawrence Derthick gave to the Modern Language Association (MLA) at its 1958 annual meeting. President Eisenhower had just signed the NDEA into law four months earlier. Derthick, then the U.S. Commissioner of Education, would be the first federal administrator of the NDEA, including Title VI, as its programs were set to start the following January. Derthick offered these comments on the NDEA in the closing speech to the MLA convention that winter:

All of us are confronted with new and enlarged responsibilities—with new opportunity to work harder and in closer cooperation to meet the needs of a new era. All of us are wondering how, individually and collectively, we can do our part to implement the goal of this new Act—defense of our nation against every enemy of body, mind, or spirit that time may bring. This is a challenge to the patriotism of all of us—and especially to members of associations like yours...It was not, believe me, a rhetorical or promotional stunt, when the Congress decided to call Public Law 85-864 the National *Defense* Education Act. It was a way of

saying that language teachers, among others, have an important patriotic duty to perform. (Derthick, 1959, p. 51; emphasis in original)

Not only does Derthick's emphasis on defending the nation against all enemies fit with more overt geopolitical definitions of security in terms of military, diplomatic and political concerns. But his comments also make explicit the role that language educators have in bolstering that defense

A final example that best represents geopolitical definitions of security in overt terms comes from a written statement entered into the Congressional record on behalf of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS). My research revealed (although was not able to deduce an explanation for) the fact the AAS operated virtually alone as an area studies organization in decades of Congressional hearings and debates over Title VI. From its first authorization onward, Title VI identified many categories of regional and area studies, including Sino-Soviet, Eastern European, East Asian, Middle East and African studies.¹ Still, the AAS appears in the Congressional Index Service the most frequently (almost exclusively, in fact) among area studies organizations in decades of Title VI policy deliberations. The following AAS statement is but one example of that advocacy and was entered into the Congressional record in March 1970:

The United States became a world power almost by accident, little more than a decade ago...There remains a danger that instead of adjusting adequately to the changed circumstances which have thrust the United States into the center of the world arena we will fail to provide the essential component of that involvement: an informed public, and a corps of trained professionals...The United States now

¹ Latin America was not added as an area funded by Title VI until the 1960s. Western Europe was added in the 1970s.

plays an important role in virtually every part of the globe. Its wealth and its manpower are heavily invested abroad. Nearly 80 per cent of the Federal budget is spent on matters arising out of our relations with the rest of the world... We have so far been willing to pay for it. But we have not been willing to protect it, or to provide the essential basis for sound use of our wealth and power. That can come only from a continuous flow of trained citizens whose professional concerns are centered on the problems of foreign areas in which the United States is now so deeply involved. It is simple common sense, as well as a safeguard to the democratic process, to provide this vital component in some reasonable proportion to the scale of our country's international role... American assistance abroad is not merely altruism, but grows directly from American self-interest. If the international role of the United States is to be effective, however, it must be based on enlightened self-interest. (*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971, 1970a, pp. 1329-1330*)

As with the first excerpt from the data offered above, this statement by the AAS foreshadows several other themes that emerged as salient in the data. In this context I will limit my discussion to one comment. The AAS framed its support for Title VI, i.e. in overt geopolitical terms of maintaining U.S. "wealth and power," at precisely the moment, i.e. the early 1970s, when skepticism of government funded research in the face of the Vietnam War was peaking.

To be sure, however, such geopolitical definitions of security have not always taken on such overt references to U.S. competition with the Soviet Union or to U.S. wealth and power, as do the first examples presented above. Instead, I would situate

another set of geopolitical definitions at the other end of the continuum I described earlier. That is, while the policy-relevant actors I will cite still conceive of security in geopolitical terms, they posit language education as one means by which to temper conflict. We can see this understanding of geopolitical definitions of national security, for example, in the testimony of Kenneth W. Mildenberger in Congressional hearings on the original authorization of the NDEA and Title VI. Mildenberger, then still the director of the MLA's Foreign Language Program, stated:

Although it is a commonplace that the United States now occupies a position of world leadership, it is still not sufficiently recognized that in order to meet, on a basis of mutual understanding and cooperation, not only the diplomats and military men but also the common people of the other nations of the globe, the United States does not yet have nearly enough persons adequately trained in the languages. (*Scholarship and Loan Program*, 1958, p. 1824)

William Parker, another prominent figure in the history of Title VI, adopted a similar approach to defining security. In his booklet *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*, he writes:

But given an atmosphere of global tension, which is the atmosphere in which we live today, it would seem that no nation, particularly not a nation with frightening power and enviable wealth, can long "get by" without even trying to talk the other fellow's language. One language makes a wall; it takes two to make a gate. That is why Americans, praying for peace and seeking an increase in international understanding, now often discuss foreign language study as a means to these ends. (Parker, 1961, p. 103)

Two additional examples come from the early 1970s, a period of turmoil for federal funding of international and language education. The first is taken from a letter from Neil M. Bowers, professor of geography at the University of Hawaii, addressed to Senator Hiram L. Fong, Republican of Hawaii. Bowers, who was also an intelligence officer for the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner to the CIA) in World War II, expresses his support for Title VI thus:

I am also concerned because while we hope for a world of peace, a country must also be prepared for defense...To me, continuation of the NDEA program also has a strong and vital relation to national defense, and represents an area in which we can easily fall behind. Cutting the program can result in long-range consequences which will not immediately be evident. (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970c, p. 298*)

The second example from this era is located in an internal memorandum in the U.S. Department of Education (ED) files on Title VI. The document, entitled "Questions for 1971 Appropriations Hearings: NDEA Language and Area Centers" and dated January 1971, is directed to the Commissioner of Education. The document was meant to help the Commissioner prepare for his testimony to Congressional committees responsible for allocating new funding for Title VI. The document contains a list of questions that ED staffers anticipated the committee members would pose to the Commissioner during his testimony, along with talking points and suggested answers. In response to one question directly linking public frustration over the Vietnam War to continued funding, the suggested answer reads:

In our attempt to train the Vietnamese to carry on the war using American equipment in the “pacification” effort, such understanding is crucial. Insufficient understanding of language and culture hurts us at every level, from combat soldier to the high-level advisor.

What each of these four examples shares in common is a definition of security that clearly invokes military, diplomatic and political concerns, thus placing them in what I have defined as geopolitical notions of security. What distinguishes them, however, from the first set of examples above is that they position foreign language education (and in the last example, area studies more broadly) as a means by which to develop the sort of international understanding that may prevent or temper conflict along such military, diplomatic or political lines. While these goals may not be as aggressive as the explicit calls to defend U.S. wealth and power, it is still clear that both sets of excerpts from the data conceive of security in very similar ways: namely, that the United States should use its position of power in the world to maintain stability through military, diplomatic, and political channels.

As the previous chapter presenting the history of Title VI recounted, advocacy for the policy and its language education programs shifted in the 1970s. Advocates increasingly framed their support for Title VI in terms of the benefits the program held for bolstering U.S. economic competitiveness in a world where Germany and Japan had become industrial powerhouses challenging the U.S. position. Therefore, we again should not be surprised that these arguments took a further step by framing “security” in economic terms. One example of this shift in orientation is found in the testimony given to Congress by John S. Badeau, then director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia

University. Appearing before a House subcommittee on education appropriations in March 1971, he stated:

The United States will certainly continue to be deeply involved in world affairs. However, the forms of American involvement are changing and will increasingly be in the field of cultural, economic and commercial activities and less in military, defense, and Government-sponsored technical assistance programs. It is precisely because of this that it is essential to the American world position to have a continued supply of people trained in the language, culture, and comprehension of important foreign areas and available both to Government and to private agencies...American petroleum interests in Libya are important and the fact that the oil companies have on their staff Americans trained in Middle East studies and languages now is, more than ever, an asset to them. (*Office of Education and Related Agencies*, 1971a, p. 83)

Here, Badeau counter poses military and defense concerns to economic and commercial concerns, and argues that the latter are now of paramount concern. While this definition of security in economic terms grew more common in the 1970s, Badeau's words remain somewhat unique among the data collected for this study in that he mentions a specific economic concern, i.e. U.S. petroleum interests in Libya. The remainder of his testimony describes the Middle East studies program at Columbia he administered and the extent to which business representatives increasingly called on the expertise on the region that center had developed.

As mentioned in the previous chapter on the history of Title VI, some policy analysts have argued that Senator Paul Simon, Democrat of Illinois, deserves the most

credit for shifting advocacy for Title VI to economic terms. Simon would prove to be one of the most prominent Congressional actors to support federal funding for international and language education programs. In fact, in 1980 he released a book on the subject, entitled *The Tongue-Tied American: Confronting the Foreign Language Crisis*, which was updated and released in a paperback edition 12 years later. The scope of the book is broad and considers the benefits of more effective foreign language education in terms of security, culture, the economy, improved education overall, etc. However, the introduction work certainly frames the security Simon calls for in predominantly economic terms. Simon (1992) writes:

This language inattention threatens our national security interests; the adverse impact on the nation's economy is immense...For two decades after World War II the United States remained dominant economically as it once was militarily. Military dominance diminished dramatically when the Soviets exploded a nuclear weapon; in an instant the world's military balance had shifted. The Soviet's first space flight, dubbed Sputnik, had military implications. But in the world of economics no bombs exploded and no Sputniks ascended. We sold to countries who came to us. We sent a few sales representatives abroad, but our products were in demand; if someone could not speak English, we secured an interpreter or denied that potential customer the "privilege" of buying from us. The nearest thing to a nuclear bomb or a Sputnik in the economic field was the 1972 oil embargo by Arab nations. Days of dollar dominance and easy sales were over. Our response to our decline in economic power has been anemic or blundering.

We have not responded as we did to Sputnik, with an accelerated program of our own. (pp. 5-6)

As with Badeau's testimony, Simon distinguishes geopolitical security from economic security and argues that economic concerns have been overlooked for too long.

Simon (1992) goes on to tell a story about the Nova, an ill-fated car model produced by General Motors' Chevrolet division. (This story has since become part of the folklore in language education advocacy. Many people I spoke to both in the context of this study as well as informally about my work know this story. I considered it "urban legend," frankly, until I found it in writing in Simon's book.) Simon recalls that General Motors had to pull the Nova off the market in Latin America when it was first introduced. "Nova," when pronounced in Spanish, turned out to be *no va*, which Simon translates as "it doesn't go" (p. 6). Simon argues that once General Motors had re-branded the car as the *Caribe*, it began to sell again. More importantly, he uses this story to underscore the risks to economic security that U.S. incompetence in foreign languages represented.

Cars as metaphors for economic security also appear in the interview data. One participant associated with a language advocacy organization recalled his efforts to garner support for Title VI in the 1980s. He said:

So through the 80s what I started arguing was that Toyota was the Sputnik of the 80s, and what we should tie ourselves to—and what Congress was buying—was economic competitiveness. (Participant 12, transcript 9, lines 224-226).

Similar to Simon's introductory comments cited above, this participant also invokes the sputnik moment, underscoring the political expediency that moment created by looking for parallel symbolic moments thirty years later.

For analytical purposes I have separated out geopolitical from economic definitions of security at play in the data collected for this study. It is important to acknowledge, however, that in many instances both themes were collapsed together. One example of such is this excerpt from an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* written by James R. Killian and entered into the Congressional record in 1963. Senator Howard W. Cannon, Democrat of Nevada, refers to the article during his comments before a Senate subcommittee on education. Cannon read this excerpt:

The issues are profoundly important not only to our national security and world position but also to the Nation's general welfare, its economic growth, the utilization of its human resources, and the integrity and strength of its system of higher education.

He continued with the following paragraph of the article:

As a research-oriented society, we have the possibility of—in fact, we may now be in the midst of—a great creative thrust in which the energies of our people will find a new measure of release and our power as a nation will be raised to a new level of benignity. (*Education Legislation*, 1963, p. 1260)

A second example of this common connection made between geopolitical and economic definitions is actually a stark critique thereof. In his address to the 1969 annual meeting of the MLA, Henry Nash Smith took up the broad issue of government funding of many MLA research contracts. In specific reference to the MLA's Foreign Language Program, which laid the groundwork for Title VI of the NDEA, Smith argued:

I have already indicated that the undertaking has depended heavily on support from foundations and the Federal government. To say this much is to say that its

motivation has been in part political. It is hard to believe that Federal funds would have been made available if many Congressmen had not believed that the Program served a “national interest” defined almost explicitly as American economic and even political penetration of foreign countries. The National Defense Education Act, dating from 1958, which is the basis of most current contracts of the MLA with the government, presupposes a concept of “defense” which has only slightly less reactionary connotations. Furthermore, some members for the MLA have urged support for the Program by relating it to the role of the United States as leader of the free world against Communism. It is understandable that bombast of this kind would lead critics to perceive the Program as essentially an adjunct to American cold-war diplomacy. (Smith, 1970, p. 420)

Smith’s comments, although an overall criticism of what he perceives to have motivated the passage of Title VI in the first place, underscore the extent to which geopolitical and economic definitions of security operated in the data. This conflation of geopolitical and economic definitions of security is noteworthy for two reasons. First is the frequency with which geopolitical and economic definitions of national security occurred together in the data. Second, I mention it here so as to establish a reference point for the discussion later of the data found in secondary sources recounting the history of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East. Those sources document the extent to which geopolitical and economic notions of security account for that history in equal proportions.

The third definition of security that was prominent in the data also emerged during the period of the 1970s. Recall from the previous chapter that student upheavals, coupled with struggles for racial equality and against the Vietnam War, had changed the atmosphere in Congress considerably. One example of this change is that Congressional representatives and those testifying before them began to frame the role that language education could play in terms of ensuring greater security at home. A portion of the evidence of this argument stems from testimony regarding Title VI. Another set of evidence relates to an additional education policy, the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program (EHSP), which Congress passed in 1974. Both sets of evidence help to sketch out the boundaries of a safety zone that increasingly framed language education in terms of domestic security.

The first example of defining security in domestic terms is perhaps the most sympathetic to the issues that the movements of the 1960s raised. It comes from testimony given to a House appropriations subcommittee in March 1971. Wesley W. Posvar, the Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, explicitly connected the international concerns surrounding the original NDEA to the domestic concerns of the day. He stated:

At the time of enactment of the original NDEA, in 1958, Federal support for these studies was an outgrowth of our confrontation with the Soviet Union. The east-west conflict has abated in intensity...But what imbues the language and area study programs with special significance today is the advent of a new era of diplomacy, one which is characterized by a whole range of apparently domestic problems that can be dealt with effectively only on an international basis...There

are no major issues that confront American society which do not have an international or a comparative dimension to them. Problems of ethnicity, racism, urbanization, overpopulation, environmental pollution and the information explosion are not indigenous to this, or any single, country. (*Office of Education and Related Agencies*, 1971b, pp. 90-91)

It is not entirely clear from the excerpt what Posvar means by distinguishing “problems” of ethnicity from those of racism, but based on the remaining testimony, he seems to be referring to *conflicts* over ethnicity, not necessarily to ethnic *consciousness* as the problem itself. That, coupled with his acknowledgement of racism as a problem, leads me to consider his comments more sympathetic to the movements of the day.

Other instances of defining security in domestic terms were not so sympathetic. Again we find the AAS taking an active role in Title VI deliberations. A letter from William Theodore de Bary, president of the AAS at the time, to Senator Warren Magnuson, Democrat of Washington and then chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee with oversight of Title VI funds, was entered into the Congressional record. De Bary wrote:

The trained resources developed by the NDEA program are of value not only to our international relations but also in relation to our *domestic ethnic problems*. So-called “black studies,” Latin American and “Third World” studies, such as would be embraced in the proposed ethnic heritages program of Representative Pucinski, can only be built up on the basis of scholarly studies in the cultures minority groups are drawn from—African, Asian, Latin American and European. Not to develop them on this sound scholarly basis entails the grave risk of racial

nationalism and politicization perverting the legitimate concern of minority groups for their own cultures. (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970e*, p. 328; emphasis in original)

De Bary not only raises the specter of domestic ethnic problems as a threat in general, but also the consequences of ethnic studies programs that are not sufficiently academic or scholarly. His comments also illustrate the degree to which discussions of various language and education policies overlapped with one another at the time.

The “ethnic heritages program” to which de Bary refers was formally titled the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program (EHSP). As de Bary’s comments indicate, Representative Roman Pucinski, Democrat of Illinois, was the primary sponsor of the bill, whose goal was to develop materials and curricula, for use at the K-12 level, that engaged the study of diverse ethnic groups in the United States. As described in the previous chapter, by the early 1970s various education policies were grouped together and considered at once as “educational amendments.” This helps explain why testimony about Title VI from this time often includes reference to one or the other education bill. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider here the definitions of domestic security operating in Congressional testimony about the EHSP.

One example of such definitions is found in a written statement that the Republican State Nationalities Council of Illinois entered into the Congressional record in 1970. The document described the Council as:

composed mostly of 2nd and 3rd generation descendants of the various nationalities, [and] unreservedly they espouse the ideals of freedom and justice that has made our beloved United States a sanctuary from the oppression that they

and their ancestors had suffered... There is concurrence in the belief that the development of these cultures will gather momentum in not only counter acting the dissenting groups who are striving to destroy our freedom and institutions, but will engulf them in pointing out the merits of supporting the rights they are trying to destroy. The silent majority can be voluble in setting the proper pace and direction. The heritage and culture of the various ethnic groups furthers respect not only for law and order but likewise for individuals. Without respect there is no love thy neighbor. Which course we direct for this generation will guide our nation and the world. (*H.R. 14910: Ethnic Heritage Studies Centers*, 1970, p. 289)

From this excerpt it is not entirely clear precisely to which “dissenting groups” the Council refers. However, Stanley A. Richards, the director of the Council, was present at the House hearings and read the Council’s statement into the record. During the question-and-answer period afterward, he offered this clarification: “Certain racial groups have brought chaos to our campuses with demands for studies without basis and to the exclusion of others. I feel certain that the ethnic groups I represent are entitled to some basic help” (*H.R. 14910: Ethnic Heritage Studies Centers*, 1970, p. 290) in the form of the EHSP. As with de Bary’s testimony cited above, Richards and the Council he directs frame ethnic studies as a means by which to bolster domestic security threatened by racial conflict and/or consciousness.

The fourth definition of security operating in the data takes an entirely different approach to conceiving of safety and threat. Upon first reading of much the data I collected in this research, it seemed that this approach to defining security was in fact the most salient across the multiple data sources. Take, for example, this excerpt from an

article that Kenneth Mildenberger (1960) wrote about the impact of the NDEA on African area studies. In a section of the article entitled “Language Development and the Cold War,” Mildenberger maintains:

American responsibility is to secure continued freedom of the new African nations as they emerge onto an international scene of somber and ominous crisis. To do this, we must establish mutual respect and understanding. Fundamental to this task is the achievement of effective communication. (p. 20)

Calling for the development of effective communication skills to establish respect for other cultures and to ensure their freedom as they emerge from colonialism certainly implies a social justice or human rights basis for defining security. What complicates this implication, however, is that Mildenberger continues in the following paragraph to cite quantitative data describing Soviet efforts to develop capacity in multiple African languages. He also compares the extent of Soviet radio broadcasts in African languages (including Arabic) to those of the U.S., primarily its Voice of America program. In both cases, he laments how far behind the United States is. In essence, a *complete* reading of his argument brings us right back to Cold War competition embedded in the geopolitical definition of security that we began with.

A second example that complicates the attempt to identify a definition of security in human rights or social justice terms pre-dates Title VI. But because it is found in a speech by William Parker, who would go on to be a primary figure in the development of the first Title VI legislation, his comments are worth considering. Parker addressed an audience at Middlebury College in a speech he called “The Language Curtain.” The

second paragraph begins with what clearly suggests his efforts to define security in social justice terms:

Let me state at once my theme and my deep personal conviction: that, by not lifting the Language Curtain which she has lowered on her shores since the time of the first World War, America persists in imperiling her international commitments and weakening her influence as a promoter of world peace and understanding. (Parker, 1953, p. 1)

Later, however, Parker makes explicit his intention to reference the Iron Curtain with his metaphor of the Language Curtain. He continues:

By indulging our linguistic and cultural isolationism long after we have abandoned political isolationism, we seem to others a nation of good intentions paving the road to an atomic hell...In the very period that saw Russia emerge as a threat to world peace, American educators, with the tacit consent of the American people, began lowering here a Language Curtain that has inhibited our knowing the minds and hearts of either our enemies or our friends. (Parker, 1953, pp. 1-2)

As in the case of Mildenerger's article on African studies, we quickly are brought back not just to geopolitical definitions of security with the reference to the Soviet Union and the metaphorical Iron Curtain of division and conflict. But we are also reminded of one devastating consequence should that security devolve, namely nuclear annihilation.

Therefore, it would be easy to cherry pick mere portions of the data cited above, ignore what follows it, and thus be able to marshal an immense amount of data indicating social justice definitions of security. To approach the data in this manner, however, would be to misconstrue them. Therefore, we must treat with a good deal of caution the many

instances in which policy-relevant actors discuss the benefits of Title VI in terms of developing mutual understanding and the social justice definitions of security they connote.

To treat the topic carefully is not to suggest, however, that there are *no* instances of social justice or human rights definitions of security operating in the data. One example is found in the report issued by President Carter's commission on foreign language and international education, which he convened in 1979. The report, entitled *Strength through Wisdom*, reads in part:

Paralleling our professional language needs, foreign language instruction at any level should be a humanistic pursuit intended to sensitize students to other cultures, to the relativity of values, to appreciation of similarities among peoples and respect for the differences among them. It is axiomatic—and the first step to international consciousness—that once another language is mastered it is no longer foreign, once another culture is understood it is no longer alien. (“Strength through Wisdom,” 1980, p. 19)

In following the call for caution in analyzing the data, however, it is important to contextualize this excerpt from the *Strength through Wisdom* report. Namely, the balance of the report calls for vast increases in federal support for language and international education to bolster U.S. economic competitiveness.

Social justice and human rights definitions of security were very prominent in the interview data, however. One example is taken from the discussion with the same participant described above, a veteran of language education advocacy in Washington, DC. In response to my question about how he got involved in advocacy for language

education, he explains a recent effort to win support for federal policies by taking Congressional staff to visit a program in the greater Washington area funded by the Foreign Language Assistance Program (FLAP). He recalled:

Languages, I don't have much language skill at all, but I, why I'm in it and why I love it, was coming back from taking four Senate appropriation committee staff out to see some programs at Prince George's County and on the way back, it's dawning on them that this language stuff is useful in terms of communication, but it's *phenomenal* in terms of tolerance, appreciation and understanding of other people and thinking, you know, *[laughs]* this is where I belong. This is right!

(Participant 12, transcript 9, lines 110-114)

A second example references a metaphor from the Bible and its connection to Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat from Arkansas and a co-sponsor of the other primary federal policy supporting language and international education from this era, the Mutual Cultural and Educational Exchange Act of 1961 (commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act [F-H]). Fulbright is often quoted as saying he hoped his act would help to “turn swords into plowshares.” One interview participant, a former Title VI director, referenced this quote, although she maintains that it is an approach to understanding security that may be outdated. She said:

I mean even with all the beautiful quotes from Fulbright in the world and you know...I mean he has that simple one, “It's nice if we could know them rather than kill them?” You know, that kind of thing? That doesn't sort of—that's definitely a voice of the past. (Participant 14, transcript 7, lines 106-109)

The notion of security, then, took on four very distinct meanings to the Title VI-relevant policy actors represented in document and interview data. In most cases, the data did not reflect attempts to define explicitly what security meant to each policy-relevant actor. Instead, notions of security were implied or assumed, and embedded in a larger discussion of foreign language education and its uses for the United States. As mentioned earlier, assumptions and common sense would emerge as a robust theme in the data. The following section looks more thoroughly at the sorts of assumptions that Title VI-relevant actors built into their understanding of “common sense.”

Common Sense

By far the most salient theme that emerged in the data analysis relates to the idea of common sense. From Congressional testimony and archival records to emails with participants and the interviews themselves, many Title VI-relevant actors categorized as common sense the position of the United States in the world, the influence it exerts abroad, and the relationship that language education has in shaping or maintaining that position. For many, the status of the U.S. as world leader was taken for granted, unquestioned, and functioned as the assumed background to the deliberations or discussions about Title VI and the Arabic programs it funded. Rarely, if ever, did policy-relevant actors address historically the process by which the United States took on this role; only rarely was there any discussion of a political climate in which the U.S. might not occupy this prominent position. Even among those critical of U.S. foreign policy, or the manner in which education and language policies, in their estimation, have been subordinated to U.S. foreign policy goals, there was evidence of this assumption about

the United States' position in the world and the role it plays. There are multiple ways in which this common sense presents itself in the data. However, I begin this section of the findings by identifying what the data did *not* say.

I began this chapter by stating that in only one data source of the many I collected spanning some 40 years of deliberations about Title VI did policy-relevant actors explicitly define what they meant by concepts such as national security or "the national interest." I would argue that this lack of explicit definitions is itself data, evidence of this notion of common sense. For the vast majority of policy-relevant actors, whose ideas, words, opinions, and insights are contained in the data I consulted for this study, they assumed that those listening to them or reading their words understood what was meant by terms like security and the national interest.

However, this common sense was most jarring to me, especially as a novice researcher, in the *experience* of the interviews themselves. To be sure, I entered into this project feeling confident about my academic and political background in the conceptual framework associated with the topic of this dissertation. However, I felt equally *unconfident* as a researcher, unsure of which next steps to take in the process of this study, etc. I have tried to keep that awareness fairly prominent in my thoughts as I have conducted this study. As an example, I went to great lengths both to frame questions for the interview protocols that were as neutral and non-leading as possible, and to present them in such a way during the interviews themselves. In every interview but two, this neutrality played out in a very curious way. For example, towards the beginning of these interviews, when both the participant and I were trying to establish some rapport with one

another,² the participants often hesitated or indicated through pauses and/or body language that they were choosing their words with some caution. This was particularly the case among those participants who raised specific criticisms or concerns about Title VI, or any of the current policy efforts to support language education in the name of national security. I understood this hesitation, at least in part, as an assumption the participants had made that I was personally in favor of national security motivations for foreign language education. Moreover, once I began to pose questions relating less to the participants' personal experiences with Title VI and more to their interpretations of the policy; or once I asked specifically about the role of national security in framing language education policies in the United States, the interviews felt much different to me. It seems that many participants understood those questions as indicative of my own criticism of national security rationales for language education. In several instances, it literally felt like we had taken a deep breath together and now we could *really* start talking about the topics at hand.

Again, because I was adopting a fairly self-conscious approach to this project as a novice researcher, I was taken aback at having these opinions ascribed to me. I spent a good deal of time trying to make sense of the experience. For each interview, I dressed in a very professional, perhaps even conservative, way. Of course, I am neither Arab American nor Muslim. On multiple occasions I mentioned my studies at Georgetown during the "icebreaker" conversation before the interview formally began (many of my participants were located in Washington, DC, so idle chat about why I had lived there was a frequent *entrée*). Did this constellation of circumstances aid my participants in

² I did not know any of the participants either professionally or personally prior to this study, although I was put in touch with two of them through close friends.

making this assumption? Obviously, had I asked leading questions, my opinions would have been clear to all. However, if I had dressed differently, say, worn jeans, a *keffiyah*, or carried a book bag with political pins on them, would I have been read differently? Had I been Arab American or Muslim, would my participants have made very different assumptions? Had I not mentioned my studies at Georgetown, an elite university that is (in)famous for its intimate connections with the U.S. defense and military apparatus, would that have led to other conclusions? My deliberations led to me, as well, to an entirely different set of questions, namely: does this experience in fact have anything to do at all with me as an individual asking specific questions? Or is it related to the fact that the participants and I all live in the heart of a world power that sees itself and acts like one? Are these assumptions simply the fall-out of living in such a society—that support of U.S. (foreign) policy is taken for granted until proven otherwise?

These questions are impossible to answer, of course, but they do flavor the data these interviews provided. What compounds this experience is the response I often received to one of my interview questions. At some point in each interview, I asked a variation of the question, “What do you think accounts for the fact that in virtually each case the U.S. has framed language education programs in terms of national security?” In almost each instance, the question left the participant a bit flummoxed. Responses included: “that’s a good question,” “you’re asking the right question, but I don’t have an answer,” or simple silence as the participant gathered his or her thoughts. Invariably their response would drift back to the topic that Congress only seems willing to allocate funds for educational programs when defense and economic competitiveness are involved. But their responses suggested to me that I was asking a question that simply isn’t often

asked—not because it was impolitic to do so, but rather because everyone *just knows* that Congress only cares about national defense and economic competitiveness.

I should also state that I conducted most of the interviews before I began systematic analysis of the document data I had collected; in fact, I conducted many of the interviews long before I had finished collecting the document data. This idea of common sense—of shared assumptions that we all agree on the larger role the U.S. plays in the world (even if we argue about this or that particular (mis)adventure in which the U.S. engages) and this experience of having been read so consistently by my participants—was already a theme I had recorded in my interview notes. It was, therefore, to my great surprise that in the document data spanning some forty years, this notion of common sense would appear so prominently among the data, and that so little disconfirming evidence on this question would present itself.

Let us turn to consider some examples from the data itself. In some cases, I will repeat excerpts that I referred to above because different portions of those excerpts are immediately relevant here. The first example does, in fact, take us back to the words of Kenneth Mildenberger that I cited above. But his comments, part of testimony he gave during the original authorization hearings on the NDEA, help verify this theme of common sense. He stated:

Although it is a commonplace that the United States now occupies a position of world leadership, it is still not sufficiently recognized that in order to meet, on a basis of mutual understanding and cooperation, not only the diplomats and military men but also the common people of the other nations of the globe, the

United States does not yet have nearly enough persons adequately trained in the languages. (*Scholarship and Loan Program*, 1958, p. 1824)

If U.S. influence internationally was by 1958 commonplace, as Mildenberger claims, then the role of foreign language education in aiding that influence was not. The 1979 report by President Carter's commission on foreign language and international education, however, asserts that both ideas are in fact obvious. The summary of that report, entitled *Strength through Wisdom*, reads in part:

Our vital interests are impaired by the fatuous notion that our competence in other languages is irrelevant. Indeed, it is precisely because of this nation's responsibilities and opportunities as a major power and as a symbol of ideals to which many of the world's people aspire that foreign languages, as a key to unlock the mysteries of other customs and cultures, can no longer be viewed as an educational or civic luxury. ("Strength through Wisdom," 1980, p. 12)

Undefined here (or at any point in the entire report) are "our...interests" and "ideals", although it is claimed that many around the world admire them.

When ideas and aspirations were not being ascribed to the world's population, they were ascribed at least to the U.S. population. Speaking on behalf of the public represents a distinct theme with respect to attitudes to foreign language education, to which I will return later in this chapter. Here, however, one excerpt from the data fits more closely to this theme of common sense understandings of U.S. world leadership. It is taken from an address that Senator John Brademas, Democrat of Indiana, gave to the MLA in 1962. Brademas was one of the most consistent early supporters of the NDEA,

in fact of many federal programs supporting international and language education. On this occasion, he stated:

In the last several years...the American people have come to understand more clearly than ever before the great importance to our country, in terms of national security if for no other reason, and there are other reasons, of developing and maintaining a reservoir of persons skilled in the knowledge of modern foreign languages. Even a man of little political sensitivity could not fail, a few days ago, to have appreciated the immense impact of the few words spoken in Spanish by Mrs. Kennedy during the President's visit to Latin America. (Brademas, 1962, p. 28)

The role that foreign language education plays in bolstering U.S. security is presented here as so obvious that anyone, even the politically inept, could understand it. The final example of the common sense understanding of U.S. world leadership and the role that language education plays in maintaining it actually comes from a critique of the relationship between the two at all. The excerpt is from an article written by Charles Hackett for *The Linguistic Reporter* in 1959, in which he states:

In one sense, we can easily say that it is to the national interest for us to have a constantly replenished minimum stock of people who actively and fluently control foreign languages—so many who know Spanish, so many for Hindustani, and so on. This is a bit like the policy of certain fishes. The ling, a relative of the cod, may in the course of a lifetime lay as many as 28,000,000 eggs, as a way of guaranteeing that at least two of them will survive the vicissitudes of early fish life and grow to adulthood. Just so, we could flatly insist on exposing every

young American to one or another language through many years of schooling, hoping that the rate of mortality would be sufficiently low to maintain the necessary minimum stock of experts in all the important foreign languages. This way of thinking replaces people by numbers, and strikes me as thoroughly reprehensible. (Hackett, 1959, p. 5)

Although Hackett is challenging the assumptions about U.S. interests and the role that foreign language education can or should play in bolstering them, his comments in fact suggest the degree to which these assumptions were widely held.

While it was generally assumed that the U.S. played a leading role in the post-war world and that there was an obvious part for foreign language education to play in maintaining the nation's position, there were certainly different characterizations of what U.S. world leadership meant more precisely. A fairly common characterization of this leadership framed it as passive, indeed accidental. An early example of this understanding is found in a report on foreign language education in the U.S. in the inaugural issue of the *The FL Program Bulletin*, the newsletter of the MLA's Foreign Language Program. In it, Foreign Language Program staff write:

After the war, as America was thrust into the role of leadership in a contracting world, the public became convinced of the importance of learning to communicate with other peoples, but leaders in American education seemed unaware of the new relevance of foreign language study. ("FLs in the U.S.", 1954, p. 2)

Franz Michael, the director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, expressed a similar sentiment regarding the U.S. passively assuming world

leadership responsibilities. Testifying before a House appropriations committee, he stated:

A comparatively small amount of financial support under the Title VI program has been a far-reaching impact on the American educational scene and on the American ability to deal with its new and inescapable responsibilities. At the end of World War II, when the United States was forced to assume a leading role in the development of a peaceful pluralist world, our educational program in high schools and colleges was little prepared for the task of developing an American citizenry equipped to understand and deal with the complexities of world problems. Today, cultural contact and exchange with the rest of the world is still one of the most essential means of contributing to a peaceful international world in a complex and dangerous period. (*Office of Education and Related Agencies*, 1971c, p. 388)

In both cases, these policy-relevant actors suggest not just passivity, but one begrudged by the United States as it adopted its new role. A final example of characterizing in passive terms the U.S. assumption of world leadership takes the notion one step further. It is from a letter submitted by the AAS and entered into the Congressional record in 1971. Earlier I discussed a more complete excerpt from the letter, but the opening to that excerpt is relevant to this discussion. It states:

The United States became a world power almost by accident, little more than a decade ago... There remains a danger that instead of adjusting adequately to the changed circumstances which have thrust the United States into the center of the world arena we will fail to provide the essential component of that involvement:

an informed public, and a corps of trained professionals. (*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971, 1970a*, pp. 1329)

Here, the position of the United States in the world is framed as accidental, and thereby construes an informed public and competent professional class almost as self-defense.

Policy-relevant actors more often characterized their understanding of U.S. world leadership in active terms. These characterizations ranged from portraying that leadership as a benign power to acknowledging U.S. interests in its actions abroad, but arguing that the U.S. should carry out those actions in an enlightened way. I presented excerpts from the following data in different contexts above, but again they are worth repeating here as they verify this particular finding. The first comes from the article by James R. Killian in *The Atlantic Monthly*, to which Sen. Cannon referred during hearings on Title VI in 1963. He read:

The issues are profoundly important not only to our national security and world position but also to the Nation's general welfare, its economic growth, the utilization of its human resources, and the integrity and strength of its system of higher education. As a research-oriented society, we have the possibility of—in fact, we may now be in the midst of—a great creative thrust in which the energies of our people will find a new measure of release and our power as a nation will be raised to a new level of benignity. (*Education Legislation, 1963*, p. 1260)

A similar understanding of the peaceful application of U.S. world leadership is found in William Parker's influential booklet *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*. He attributes the following quote to Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota:

As a nation we find ourselves deplorably unprepared linguistically, either to defend ourselves in the event of a Third World War, or to exercise the full force of our leadership in the building of a peaceful world. The sad fact is, while we are trying to win friends all over the globe, we can't communicate with three-fourths of the world's population in their native tongue. (cited in Parker, 1961, p. 110)

Besides framing U.S. power as benign, other policy-relevant actors acknowledged that the U.S. should act in its own interests in wielding power. For example, the same letter by the AAS referenced earlier reads:

It is simple common sense, as well as a safeguard to the democratic process, to provide this vital component in some reasonable proportion to the scale of our country's international role...American assistance abroad is not merely altruism, but grows directly from American self-interest. If the international role of the United States is to be effective, however, it must be based on enlightened self-interest. (*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971*, 1970a, pp. 1329-1330)

The most consistent set of evidence disconfirming assertions about the role that foreign language competency could play in maintaining the United States' position in the world concerns funding. While much of the data, including the excerpts presented above, make the case that the U.S. plays a particular role in the world, and that greater foreign language capacity is central to aiding that role, several Title VI-relevant policy actors argued that programs such as Title VI were poorly funded, so much so that it impeded the program's effectiveness. An important part of this theme is represented by the 1970 budget battle, discussed in chapter 5, in which President Nixon presented a budget to Congress that cut all funding from Title VI. Even though the program survived overall,

center funding was effectively cut in half from amounts allocated in the 1960s and has never recovered. Interview participants, however, presented this disconfirming evidence in fairly sharp terms. One example comes from my conversation with the director of a Title VI Middle East center, in which he stated:

It's the most stupidly run thing I've ever seen. For the cost of one FA-22 attack fighter, a plane designed to achieve air superiority over the Soviet air force, which you may have noticed disappeared over 20 years ago, which costs, runs between, depending on who you believe, the Pentagon, or whether you believe the GAO, runs from over \$100-\$200 to over \$300 million. You could double the funding of Title VI, Fulbright-Hays, everything we do in international education, that the federal government does. One goddamn miserable, already obsolete, will-never-be-needed airplane of which we're going to build, you could double the cost...And this is not just Arabic. This is every language. This is every Fulbright program. The entirety of Fulbright-Hays and Title VI. I mean, if that's not just completely mindless priorities, I don't know what is. One FA-22! One single example, it's a wonderful airplane, go on their website and read about the FA-22. They try to shoot it down and these MIG airplanes flying in the back, we have F-15s, F-16s. The best planes in the U.S. arsenal. They can't even see it when they see it. It's a wonderful airplane. It's a toy beyond compare. And there won't be an air force that can match it for 50 years, by which time it will be rusting in the sands of Arizona. But we're going to build hundreds of them, and we're not spending any money on...Our funding for these things has gone down as far as

money I have access to. It's insane! It's absolutely insane. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 345-361)

He continued by contrasting federal funding to what universities spend on programs such as Title VI:

The university is spending hundreds of times what the government spends on area studies. Even the language instruction part of it, we're spending scores, tens of times as much as the federal government. You'd think it would be a priority. Obviously it's more of a priority for us than it is for them. So if I had any complaint, it's that they don't give us enough money. I mean if it's important. Obviously they think an FA-22 is more important. Or a bridge to nowhere in Alaska, or tax cuts for the already obscenely wealthy. Fine, that's a national priority. I'm not the Congress. And I'm not the president. I'm just a lowly professor. But obviously they don't think it's very important. They don't want to know what people think, and they don't want to learn how to talk to them. And they don't want to have a State Department that has language capability or officers who know that the guy is yelling, "Be careful, there's a bomb there!" That's their choice. They want to let our kids, I mean these are people I've taught in many cases. They want my students to be killed for no reason, and they want people I've taught who work in government to be more vulnerable, that's their decision. They're probably ignorant of the consequences of their decision, but they have to live with those. I know those are the wrong priorities. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 413-427)

In addition, the Arabic expert from a national language research and advocacy organization referred to the same contradiction in our conversation. At first, she requested that I not include her comments in my analysis, but then said that because she had made these statements publicly, I could include them. She recalled:

I'm sorry. It's *not* that expensive to do this. Just give us the money of the wings of the B-2 bombers!...I stood up in the Interagency Language Roundtable and said, "Can't you just give us the money for one of the wings of a B-2 bomber!" We'd probably solve the language problems today! (Participant 2, transcript 3, lines 241-249)

Sen. Simon refers to the same contradiction in the opening chapter of his book *The Tongue-Tied American*. He writes:

While it continues to be relatively easy to get appropriations for bombers and submarines and nuclear weapons, we move much less swiftly, if at all, on measures that contribute to real security—a world of adequate communications and cultural understanding, which together could eliminate, or dramatically reduce the need for those bombers and submarines and nuclear weapons. In 1977, Navy Lieutenant Howell Conway Ziegler, assigned as a U.N. military observer in the Middle East, averted a confrontation by speaking to both sides in Hebrew and Arabic. But how few we have encouraged to develop that type of knowledge. (Simon, 1992, p. 7)

The gap between direct military spending and allocations for language and international programs such as Title VI challenge much of the data discussed above, which position

foreign language competency as a central aspect of maintaining U.S. leadership in the world.

Responsibility

In addition to these characterizations of U.S. world leadership, policy-relevant actors enumerated various responsibilities that flowed from the United States' position. Some framed U.S. leadership as a responsibility or duty. The first example of this perspective pre-dates passage of the NDEA, but nevertheless helps establish the scope of what U.S. responsibilities internationally entailed. The comments cited below come from a speech given by Earl J. McGrath, then the U.S. Commissioner of Education. In his address, entitled "Language Study and World Affairs," to the 35th Annual Meeting of the Central States Modern Language Teachers Association, he stated:

Our leadership in the United Nations Organization, our efforts through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to join free nations in resisting totalitarian aggression, our intellectual and cultural activities in connection with UNESCO, our technical assistance under Point 4 and the Mutual Security Agency, our work in the Organization of American States, our Fulbright program for the exchange of teachers and students—all these activities and a host of others like them make our position of international responsibility and leadership abundantly clear.

(McGrath, 1952, p. 3)

President Johnson elevated U.S. responsibilities to a particularly crucial level, i.e. as a direct option to war, in a special message he sent to Congress on February 2, 1966. The message was entered into the Congressional record in the context of deliberations over a

number of bills relating to international education, including Title VI, and health programs that would allocate U.S. aid abroad. In his message, Johnson wrote:

We would be shortsighted to confine our vision to this Nation's shorelines. The same rewards we count at home will flow from sharing in a worldwide effort to rid mankind of this slavery of ignorance and the scourge of disease. We bear a special role in this liberating mission. Our resources will be wasted in defending freedom's frontiers if we neglect the spirit that makes men want to be free. Half a century ago, the philosopher William James declared that mankind must seek a "moral equivalent of war."...Only when people know about—and care about—each other will nations learn to live together in harmony. (H. Doc. 89-375, 1966, p. 2)

The "moral equivalent to war" to which Johnson refers in his message to Congress is particularly interesting in light of his comments during the original Congressional responses to the sputnik panic a decade earlier. In November 1957, merely a month after the Soviets' successful launch, Johnson was still a senator and chair of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Clowse (1981) recalls his opening comments at one committee hearing. She describes:

During a visit to the president on November 6 [1957], Johnson admitted that the Democrats were vulnerable to blame should the hearings reveal government negligence in assuring strategic superiority...Johnson gaveled the hearings to order on November 25, drawling, "We meet today in the atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor." The Democratic presidential aspirant saw to it that the entire proceedings were conducted in an atmosphere of extremity. He concluded the

hearings by proclaiming in a burst of cold war rhetoric, “We are in a race for survival, and we intend to win that race.” (p. 59)

A decade later, however, Johnson had reframed that race entirely, both in term of U.S. responsibilities to the rest of world and in terms of finding morally acceptable alternatives to armed conflict.

Further evidence of how policy-relevant actors framed U.S. world leadership in terms of responsibilities returns us to the letter, discussed earlier, by William Theodore de Bary, then AAS president. He addressed the April 1970 letter to Sen. Magnuson during Congressional deliberations over Title VI funding. With respect to U.S. responsibilities, de Bary writes:

Other governments realize this need and subsidize such [language and area] studies heavily. The U.S., with heavy responsibilities abroad whether in peacetime or war, cannot afford to lag behind. Even a curtailment of direct involvement abroad creates a still greater need for competent handling of our relations with people no longer so directly dependent on us militarily, but all the more dependent on us for informed sympathy, understanding and cooperation.

(Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970e, p. 327)

Additional policy-relevant actors portrayed U.S. responsibilities to the international community in a specifically negative way, some going so far as to label them a burden. For example, Sen. Brademas, in his 1962 speech to the MLA cited above, maintained the following:

My thesis is a simple one and it is this: in a world more troubled than man has ever known, and with the United States more burdened with responsibility for

leadership than ever before, the American university community, indeed the American educational community generally, has a crucial contribution to make in supplying that leadership, and the university community is *not now doing enough*.

(Brademas, 1962, p. 28; emphasis in original)

Marjorie Johnston, a member of the inner circle to which I referred in chapter 5, of MLA Foreign Language Program staff members who went on to the U.S. Office of Education to administer the first incarnation of the NDEA and its Title VI programs, addressed the MLA some six months later. Her comments take up similar themes to those of Sen.

Brademas. She stated:

In the short span of years since Kipling wrote that "East is East and West is West,/And never the twain shall meet" we have witnessed the meeting of East and West. We have become enmeshed in the resulting tangle of dissident philosophies, and who can predict the eventual outcome? The United States, having long wavered between a desire to stay home and be let alone and a missionary zeal to spread liberty throughout the world, now has shouldered massive responsibilities for reconciling and fulfilling the hopes of men everywhere. These responsibilities are as complex and demanding at home as they are in the community of nations and no segment of American life can escape a deep involvement in international events. We are therefore greatly preoccupied with attempts to redefine our American goals. From whatever viewpoint we consider our interests, whether individual or national, freedom and world understanding top the list. (Johnston, 1963, p. 11)

Not only do these last two excerpts describe the heavy responsibilities the U.S. assumed as a world leader, but they also suggest a corollary responsibility among academics and the nation's universities.

Additional policy-relevant actors framed their understanding of responsibility in a similar way. For example, the president of Columbia University contributed to the Congressional deliberations over Title VI funding during the 1970 budget battle. In a letter dated March 13, 1970 and addressed to Congressman Daniel J. Flood, Democrat of Pennsylvania, he asks—and answers as to—who is most responsible for ensuring academic competence in language and areas studies. He writes:

I do not need to labor the point that we as a nation, in our public life as well as in our scholarly institutions, must have many highly trained people competent to understand and interpret developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and at a time when the Soviet Union has now followed our lead and established an Institute on the United States with several hundred trained researchers, it is ironic that we are moving in the opposite direction. I ask myself: whose responsibility is it in this society to see that this academic and public need is met? I think the answer must be that the responsibility has to be shared by the universities, the Federal Government, foundations business and private donors.

(Office of Education Appropriations, 1970b, p. 1338)

The two administrators of Middle East Title VI centers I interviewed for this study also expressed that universities, and the academic community in general, bear a special responsibility in maintaining sufficient intellectual and linguistic competencies related to the United States' position in the world. The first, a center director, is Arab American

and has been associated with several Title VI centers over the course of the participant's career. The second, an assistant director, has experience only with the center this participant administered at the time of our interview. In the first case, the participant stated:

We're deeply implicated and involved in the Middle East. We need to know more about the Middle East. So, from the point of view of pedagogy and education and our mission, we see it, most of us see it as vital to teach more about the Middle East, especially the languages of the Middle East...So that's the first thing. Second thing, there is a national need. I mean, because the government needs people, because the army needs people, because the intelligence groups need people. There's a national need. Now, it's not for us to say, you know, we should be occupying Iraq, or we should be doing what we do in our foreign policy. It's a national need. There's a need for these people. I mean, it's our responsibility to respond to that. As citizens you can then do what you want to do. People who learn Arabic can take jobs or not take jobs. People who teach Arabic can have political positions or not. All of us feel that where there is this need, it is our job to try and fill it. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 315-327).

The participant continued shortly thereafter:

That's because universities understand there's a national need and because everybody sees, "Hey maybe we better know more about his part of the world where we have lots, 100,000 soldiers!" Duh! It's a no-brainer. (Participant 1 transcript 1, lines 339-341)

What is interesting about this administrator's comments is the shifting referents for the pronoun "we." At first, it seems as if "we" means all Americans. But as he continues, "we" seems to be restricted to scholars of Middle East studies and/or Arabic. At only one point, however, does he qualify who the "we" are by limiting his ascription of beliefs to "most of us." The remaining uses of "we" seem to speak on behalf of all academics in this field, and what this participant claims their understanding to be of the responsibilities they carry in light of U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

The second administrator interviewed was more specific in describing the responsibilities academics have. The participant's comments were situated in the context of discussing the expectations placed on Title VI centers in light of the policy's stated goals. The participant responded:

I mean we take the mandate seriously, let me put it that way. You know, maybe we could be doing more, but you also have to remember, you know, our center for example, I'm one person...And we do a lot, but we're a little center, you know, but we do take the mandate seriously and so we do try to have programming, you know, that deals in one way or another with these issues. And of course, a lot of the speakers we bring to campus, you know, talk about U.S. foreign policy and national security issues, *[laughs]* I have to say though usually from a more critical perspective, um, but we're still discussing it, everything's on the plate. You know, it's not all medieval Islam stuff. *[laughs]* (Participant 9, transcript 8, lines 150-160)

Document data collected for this study drilled down the level of responsibility all the way to that of foreign language educators specifically. I cited the following excerpt

from a speech to the MLA in 1958 earlier in the context of definitions of security.

However, it also speaks to how Title VI policy actors often ascribed to foreign language educators specific responsibilities related to the United States' position in the world.

Lawrence Derthick, then the U.S. Commissioner of Education and the first commissioner to administer Title VI, framed those responsibilities in a particularly patriotic way. He stated:

All of us are confronted with new and enlarged responsibilities—with new opportunity to work harder and in closer cooperation to meet the needs of a new era. All of us are wondering how, individually and collectively, we can do our part to implement the goal of this new Act—defense of our nation against every enemy of body, mind, or spirit that time may bring. This is a challenge to the patriotism of all of us—and especially to members of associations like yours...It was not, believe me, a rhetorical or promotional stunt, when the Congress decided to call Public Law 85-864 the National *Defense* Education Act. It was a way of saying that language teachers, among others, have an important patriotic duty to perform. I know that you will perform it with credit to yourselves and in harmony with the highest ideals of the good teacher dedicated to our profession and to our country. (Derthick, 1959, p. 51; emphasis in original)

Derthick's comments lead us into the next salient theme that operated in the data, namely the role that foreign language education could (or should) play in meeting these very responsibilities tied the United States' position as world leader.

The Uses of Foreign Language Education

Thus far, my discussion of research findings has focused on a broad ideological level of how Title VI policy actors understood notions of national security, the position of the United States in the world, and a number of responsibilities that they saw resulting from that position. Another set of themes emerging from the data address how these policy-relevant actors understood foreign language education as either meeting or confounding U.S. needs related to its world position or to national security. This next section of findings offers several interpretations of the role that foreign language education could (or should) play.

The first of these interpretations framed foreign language education as a tool with which to facilitate U.S. power abroad. Many of the excerpts presented earlier in the discussion about various definitions of national security certainly speak to this idea of foreign language education as one means by which to further U.S. power. In addition to those, however, are several other excerpts that span the period of analysis of this dissertation. For example, Dieckhoff (1965) quotes President Eisenhower and the very direct connection he made between the usefulness of foreign language education in bolstering U.S. interests. Eisenhower said: "The American people generally are deficient in foreign languages, particularly those of the emerging nations in Asia, Africa and the Near East. It is important to our national security that such deficiencies be promptly overcome" (cited in Dieckhoff, 1965, p. 11).

Three further examples were entered into the Congressional record during budget battle in 1970-71. The first excerpt is from a letter by Harlan Cleveland, then the

president of the University of Hawaii, to Senator Hiram Fong, Republican of Hawaii.

Cleveland writes:

Historically, Americans have been renowned—if that’s the proper term—and sometimes ridiculed for their ignorance of the world around them. Such ignorance did indeed become incongruous as America became more deeply involved in the international affairs of the twentieth century... There maybe [sic] a tendency to think that now that the Vietnam War is winding down, Americans will not be so involved in Asia as they have been. In my own thinking, nothing could be farther from the truth. We can hope that Americans will not be so involved in war, or in unilateral action, as they have recently been. But as the war diminishes there will be an even greater need for American educated about Asia—Americans who know the languages and cultures of Asian nations, Americans who have had the opportunity to travel and study there in preparation for national and international responsibilities... (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970b, pp. 290-291*)

The second example comes from an article by William Jones in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* that was entered into the Congressional record in April 1970. Jones quotes a speech given in 1966 by John K. Fairbank, a Sinologist at Harvard University, and his comments about U.S. incompetence about Southeast Asia. Jones quotes the following from Fairbank’s speech:

Not only have we been caught with our pants down, but with our pants off... We have this terrific fire power, and we tear things up. But we don’t know what the people are saying... It’s absolutely incredible to me that the American academic

community has responded so slowly to such a clear need. The net result is a scandal. (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY71, 1970d, p. 301*)

The third example from this era is taken from written testimony submitted to a Senate subcommittee on education. The comments were written by Lea E. Williams, then the director of the East Asia Language and Area Center at Brown University, and entered into the Congressional record on May 4, 1970. Williams wrote:

The assumption by the United States of international leadership in the postwar years required that training in language and area studies be continued and made more mature... Today, the United States has achieved paramouncy in the study of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In terms of both quality and quantity, American institutions are at the top... No one would be foolish enough to argue that scholarly expertise is a panacea to cure political ills and meet military demands, but it is hardly bold to suggest that the perspective of scholarship can lend strength to the policy-making process. (*Higher Education Amendments of 1970, Part 1, 1970, pp. 604-605*)

Finally, Lockman³ (2004) speaks to this issue as well in his history of Middle East studies in the United States. He identifies the extent to which knowledge produced in the academy was deemed useful only insofar as it was “policy-relevant.” He elaborates:

In this sense, while what quickly came to be called “area studies” certainly had some older roots, it is nonetheless plausible to regard the Second World War as

³ I treat Lockman’s work in two ways. One is as a secondary source of data about the history of U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East. Here, however, I consider his insights more as a research participant. I approached Lockman for an interview, but he declined. However, he was director of the Middle East Studies Association, still sits on its board, and is a board member of the Middle East Research & Information Project, organizations I consider relevant to my research design. In addition, he is currently the director of a Title VI center for Middle East language and area studies.

the midwife of this approach to producing policy-relevant knowledge. As one prominent US government official would later put it, “the first great center of area studies...[was] the Office of Strategic Services”—the wartime forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. But if the Second World War was the midwife of area studies, it was the Cold war and decolonization which enabled area studies to get off the ground and flourish in the United States. As the United States began to act like a global superpower, which political, economic, military interests and commitments around the globe, and the Cold War got under way, government officials and academic leaders became ever more concerned about the shortage of people who were trained in foreign languages and had some expertise on parts of the world which were now regarded as key fronts in the Cold War and crucial areas of instability. (pp. 122-123)

These final two excerpts from the data tie into a related theme about the uses of foreign language education for bolstering or furthering U.S interests and its position in the world. Specifically, Williams writes that “no one would be foolish enough” to believe that scholarship might serve to temper or prevent political conflict. Yet precisely this function of scholarship influencing U.S. policy occupied a significant space among the data. For example, the same letter submitted by the AAS and referenced above addresses the influence of scholarship on U.S. policy. It reads:

All educational programs have both a measurable and an intangible benefit...It is more difficult to judge whether crises would have happened if the government had lacked a coterie of experts or an informed public, or the costs of a war averted because a better understanding of the situation was available. It is of course true

that the Federal Government already supports a large intelligence arm, in various forms, but a range of opinions and perspectives is necessary to produce a balanced judgement [sic]. Too often the only voices have been those of the CIA, or of Defense or State. The universities will continue to train area experts to staff these government bodies, but it is important that they also preserve an independent base of knowledge and a range of opinion. (*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971, 1970a, pp. 1334-35*)

One implication of this statement is that not only should universities maintain intellectual independence from the government and its intelligence agencies, but also that this independence can produce the sort of “coterie of experts” that can offer informed opinion about the “costs of war.”

Another example of the role ascribed to scholarship in influencing U.S. policy comes from testimony given by Robert Ward of the Center for International Studies at Stanford University before a House committee on education in 1979. He maintained:

You can go back, if you will, to the history of the Second World War and now it seems reasonably clear in terms of recent scholarship that had we been better informed about domestic Japanese politics at that time, not that the war with Japan would have been avoidable, but given sufficient information, our chances of postponing it, which is certainly advantageous, would have been appreciable. The same thing is clearly true of the Korean war. We simply were so ignorant of developments within China with respect to China’s national interests and political sentiments at that time that we stumbled into a war that was quite easily

avoidable. I will not even comment on Vietnam in this context. (*Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, Part 10*, 1979, p. 12)

Note that the academic scholarship to which Ward refers is not described as having been able to prevent war or temper conflict altogether, but rather either to have postponed it or to have avoided U.S. missteps in executing armed conflict.

Senator Paul Simon, in his monograph *The Tongue-Tied American*, does ascribe this ability to foreign language competency of being able to prevent war or temper conflict and otherwise directly influence U.S. policy. In the introduction to his work, he writes:

During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, our military had only forty-five linguists with any knowledge at all of Iraqi dialect—and only five of them were trained in intelligence. International understanding is a fundamental component of national security. Perhaps war would not have been necessary if we had communicated more effectively with the Iraqis in the months preceding the conflict. (Simon, 1992, p. x)

He adds, later in the first chapter:

While it continues to be relatively easy to get appropriations for bombers and submarines and nuclear weapons, we move much less swiftly, if at all, on measures that contribute to real security—a world of adequate communications and cultural understanding, which together could eliminate, or dramatically reduce the need for those bombers and submarines and nuclear weapons. In 1977, Navy Lieutenant Howell Conway Ziegler, assigned as a U.N. military observer in the Middle East, averted a confrontation by speaking to both sides in Hebrew and

Arabic. But how few we have encouraged to develop that type of knowledge. (p. 7)

In a similar way, this hope for influencing the execution of U.S. policy was a prominent theme in the interview I conducted with three representatives of a leading Arab American civil rights organization. In this case, the issue was less directly foreign language education. Instead, as was stressed to me throughout the interview, these representatives focused their comments more on the role of culturally competent advocacy and the role that culturally appropriate knowledge about the Middle East and Arab Americans could play in influencing the execution of U.S. leadership. Of the three representatives, only one was Arab American himself. A lawyer by training, his role in the organization is to conduct outreach and education for government law enforcement agencies, such as the CIA and the FBI. In a lively conversation with the four of us seated around the table together, this participant argued the following:

I work with FBI recruitment units, and I've heard it from them in the African American community, Latinos, the Native American community, that whole thing, you're betraying your people, you're selling out to the Man, you're going to be spying on the mosques, you're going to be selling your Arab brethren and so forth. Those are also the same people who disagree with us even sitting around the table with [FBI] Director Mueller or the Attorney General or whoever. We would rather be engaged with these...you're going to get a lot more done, you don't have to agree, but at least sit at the table. As opposed to carrying a picket sign across the street, chanting some bad rhyme. (Participant 6, transcript 5, lines 543-550)

This notion of linguistic and scholarly knowledge influencing U.S. policy and its position as a world leader was also the subject of many comments given in the presidential addresses held before annual meetings of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and reprinted in its bulletin. Richard T. Antoun gave the address in 1983, and his comments present a much more troubled and complicated understanding of what role linguistic and scholarly knowledge might play in shaping U.S. policy and its execution. In his speech, he stated:

Our role as scholars compels us to study ethnic groups and minorities, their problems of identity, and the painful issues of fragmentation and national integration, as well as the patterns of elite control...And yet we know that our scholarship will be perverted and used against the very people who require protection. Should we refrain from such research? Should we conduct it and publish on a selected basis only that part that is "less political?" Should we make such research available only to those individuals or groups whom we consider free of Machiavellian intent?...Just as clearly, there are problems with the ascetic position, the position of extreme rigor, withdrawal, and self-denial...Social control, insofar as it describes the wellsprings of society, involves practically every interest area...As scholars in the Middle East Studies Association you have a special responsibility to exercise your rights as citizens. You do have expertise. You do have important things to say about an area of the world that is a focus of national interest. Write your congressman and express your views. (Antoun, 1984, pp. 8-9)

Here, Antoun seems to side with expressing scholarly expertise as citizens, rather than as academics, so as to influence U.S. policy. In the same address two years earlier, Nikki R. Keddie took up similar themes, although she was much more skeptical about whatever influence linguistic and scholarly knowledge may in fact have. She said:

This leads to one of the most difficult questions, which, as noted, has renewed importance in the country's current political climate: the resurgence of the secret agencies of the U.S. government, which can hardly fail to be felt in such a sensitive area as Middle East studies... The most direct issue... is the direct and knowing use of academics by the CIA and other partly secret agencies to gather data, especially abroad. I know several academics who worked for the CIA either full time or as informants, usually in the belief that they could influence U.S. policy. I do not know one who thinks he did influence that policy in any important way. (Keddie, 1982, p. 7)

Clearly, then, there is no consensus in the data as to the degree to which linguistic, culturally competent and scholarly information might directly impact U.S. policy as it executes its role as a world leader.

Nevertheless, another set of data speaks to policy-relevant actors' beliefs in the ability for foreign language knowledge and education to promote mutual understanding in general, even if that understanding is not tied directly to more pacific execution of U.S. policy. An early example of this position is found in Mildenerger's testimony before Congress regarding the original authorization of the NDEA and Title VI. In his testimony, he stated:

I do not see how the United States can play a responsible role as a world leader unless we have vast numbers of American citizens who have not only the proficiency in foreign language, but also the attitudes which go with the learning of a foreign language, the appreciation of other peoples, that they are people like us, that because they speak a foreign language they are not funny; they are just other people and have a different mode of communication. I think this is one of the very essential results of a good course in foreign languages, a development of attitudes toward other people. So I believe if our people in the future are going to play their roles in the United States, which is to be a world leader, then we should have far more study of foreign languages and better study of foreign languages.

(*Scholarship and Loan Program*, 1958, p. 1816)

Additional examples of the role ascribed to foreign language education of promoting understanding are found in Parker's *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*. The pamphlet enjoyed three editions and was first commissioned in the 1950s by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The primary argument that Parker carries throughout the pamphlet is the ability for foreign language competencies to promote understanding in the world. Some examples from the text should help to document his case. For example:

UNESCO's interest in foreign languages is hardly surprising, for the common sense of mankind recognizes that inability to communicate readily through the medium of language is a barrier to international understanding—and hence to peace. How much of a barrier is one question; what can be done about it is another. (Parker, 1961, p. 1)

And later, Parker argues:

But given an atmosphere of global tension, which is the atmosphere in which we live today, it would seem that no nation, particularly not a nation with frightening power and enviable wealth, can long “get by” without even trying to talk the other fellow’s language. One language makes a wall; it takes two to make a gate. That is why Americans, praying for peace and seeking an increase in international understanding, now often discuss foreign language study as a means to these ends.

(p. 103)

A final example comes from the report produced by President Carter’s 1979 commission to study foreign language and international education. The report’s title, *Strength through Wisdom*, alone speaks to this theme of language education as promoting understanding. Indeed, this is one of the reports most prominent themes, even as it addresses other goals for foreign language and international education, such as economic competitiveness and national security. With respect to the theme under discussion here, however, the report reads:

Paralleling our professional language needs, foreign language instruction at any level should be a humanistic pursuit intended to sensitize students to other cultures, to the relativity of values, to appreciation of similarities among peoples and respect for the differences among them. It is axiomatic—and the first step to international consciousness—that once another language is mastered it is no longer foreign, once another culture is understood it is no longer alien. (“Strength through Wisdom,” 1980, p. 19).

Finally, just as we saw with conceptions of national security that merged geopolitical and economic definitions together, in many instances the uses ascribed to foreign language education were combined as well. In particular, many policy-relevant actors argued its usefulness both in terms of facilitating U.S. policy and power, and in promoting greater understanding. I have cited in different contexts several excerpts from the data that bring these two uses together. Therefore, I will list here only one longer excerpt. I do this for a particular reason, namely that the confluence of these two understandings of foreign language education occurs in an address to the MLA in which the speaker purposefully sets out to critique the impact of government sponsorship of foreign language programs in the LCTLs. Henry Nash Smith gave this speech, part of which I cited earlier in a different discussion, at the 1969 MLA convention. While Smith clearly registers his deep concerns about government impact, indeed control, over academic programs, he still holds onto the multiple uses of foreign language education. The excerpt indeed is lengthy, but in many ways captures many of the tensions and competing interpretations of government policies to fund language education that operate in the data. Smith argued:

It is hard to believe that Federal funds would have been made available if many Congressmen had not believed that the Program served a “national interest” defined almost explicitly as American economic and even political penetration of foreign countries. The National Defense Education Act, dating from 1958, which is the basis of most current contracts of the MLA with the government, presupposes a concept of “defense” which has only slightly less reactionary connotations. Furthermore, some members for the MLA have urged support for the [MLA’s Foreign Language] Program by relating it to the role of the United

States as leader of the free world against Communism. It is understandable that bombast of this kind would lead critics to perceive the Program as essentially an adjunct to American cold-war diplomacy. Nevertheless, this view strikes me as an oversimplification. The true ethos of the Foreign Language Program is not represented accurately by what Congressmen may have said or even by occasional echoes of Congressional rhetoric in the statements of spokesmen for the MLA. It is expressed rather in the carefully considered statements of William R. Parker, the man who actually directed the Program in its formative years. He consistently advocated the study of languages as a part of liberal education and as a means of fostering international understanding and goodwill. If Parker be thought a victim of false consciousness, a self-deluded innocent, his vindication can be found in the concrete results of the Program; for the improvement of instruction and the increase in enrollments in courses in the major European languages—long included in curricula on cultural grounds—completely overshadow the study and teaching of the exotic languages that are of interest primarily from the standpoint of imperialist expansion. The possibility, even the certainty that the Foreign Language Program may contribute in some measure to a foreign policy we disapprove of does not seem to me to mean that the MLA should abandon it. The scriptural command, “come ye out from among them,...and touch not the unclean thing,” while it voices a universal longing to be free of guilt, presupposes an eschatological situation in which politics has ceased to be relevant because all institutions have become meaningless. The inglorious liberalism I advocate holds that all political activity involves some degree of guilt.

Absolute purity is unattainable; but to fail of perfection is not necessarily to accept total corruption....I would refuse to belong to an organization that supported research in biological warfare or counter-insurgency; and by giving rein to an inherently morbid imagination I can conceive that the preparation of an Albanian or a Vietnamese grammar might be a contribution to the training of CIA operatives for underground work in the Balkans or Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, I believe that the goal of fostering the study of languages in an intensely ethnocentric society warrants the risk. (Smith, 1970, p. 420)

Nash's words speak to the tensions that surround many discussions in the data about the usefulness of foreign language education.

As described above, implied or assumed in many of those discussions was what U.S. foreign policy was—or should be. Rarely, however, did Title VI-relevant policy actors take up specific actions or conflicts that resulted from U.S. foreign policy, in the Middle East or anywhere else. The only exception to that generally was U.S. policy towards Vietnam during the U.S. war against that country. Because U.S. foreign policy and its position in the world were referred to in almost every instance in the abstract, I consulted a different set of data sources that speak to U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in the concrete. The following section presents a narrative of what that history looked like. I will return to this data and the results of triangulating it against the primary-source data in chapter 7 when I present my conclusions based on the findings. For now, let us look briefly at the data recounting U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Middle East: "As Easy as Rolling Off a Log"

In turning to a discussion of the secondary literature detailing the history of U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East, it is helpful to recall the role I envisioned for this data in my research design. In the discussion of methods in chapter 3, I made two claims about the purpose of consulting secondary literature on the history of U.S. interactions with the Middle East. On the one hand, my aim was not to set up the primary data as a straw figure of "opinions," just to knock it down with the "truth" in the historical literature. On the other hand, I relied on the approach taken by Lockman (2004) to making warranted claims based on historiography. Namely, we can adopt the intellectually and epistemologically honest position and recognize the contested nature of "fact" in any history; however, this does not mean that we can concoct any reading of history we like and consider it valid. Indeed, as Lockman argues, there are community standards of truth that emerge over time as historical accounts confirm (or contradict and clarify) each other. It is this approach that I take in analyzing the balance of histories of U.S. foreign policy and its aims in the Middle East.

In fact, Rashid Khalidi (2004) brings his latest work, *Resurrecting Empire*, with precisely this call to honor history in contemporary discussions of U.S. policy towards the Middle East that. In his introduction, entitled "The Perils of Ignoring History," Khalidi argues that not just post-9/11 discussions, but most public debate about the Middle East and the United States' relationship with it has taken place in an historical vacuum. Instead of correcting this oversight by enumerating one or the other Western incursion in the region, Khalidi begins with the Middle Eastern perspective. He describes what the Middle East looked like on balance before the West arrived *en masse* at the turn

of the 20th century. Khalidi describes a region in which several countries were transitioning to parliamentary democracies, particularly Tunisia and Egypt. Even in the Ottoman Empire, which ruled a vast portion of the region, the process of establishing democratic structures had begun in 1839, culminating in the passage of a constitution in 1876. Khalidi argues that a single event, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, interrupted this transition and explains most fully how that process came undone.

Nevertheless, Khalidi stresses that the Middle East was the last region in the world to be fully colonized by the West. He offers two explanations: the first, a “stubborn resistance,” (p. 78) both in the form of popular resistance, but also the resistance of the Ottoman state, a formidable power; the second, that the Middle East’s proximity to Europe meant easier access for Western powers, and therefore more direct and more frequent competition among them in fighting over the spoils of the region. Khalidi outlines two competing processes once Western powers advanced on the region by the early twentieth century: on the one hand, indigenous elites and professional classes who looked to constitutional systems of the U.K., France, and the U.S. for political inspiration; and on the other, the encroaching Austro-Hungarian and Romanov empires, which fought any efforts, either at home or in the region, toward the establishment of democratic states. As France and the U.K. worked their way into the region by the end of World War I, they adopted a schizophrenic policy:

Beacons of freedom and constitutional democracy, and constantly removing barriers to suffrage and expanding rights of the individual at home, these same states conquered and ruled over the peoples of much of the earth without the

slightest reference to the liberal principles that animated their own systems of government. (Khalidi, 2004, p. 16)

In fact, Khalidi argues that the United States' late arrival in the Middle East actually fomented widespread support for and admiration of the country among many Middle Easterners. He writes:

From the nineteenth century until at least the middle of the twentieth, the United States was in fact viewed quite positively in the Middle East as a non- or anti-colonial power, as having no imperialistic design on the region, and as having engaged primarily in benevolent activities there such as education and health care. Beyond this, the United States was often seen as a beacon of hope for those aspiring to democracy and freedom from foreign control. (pp. 30-31)

Yet by 1953, the United States had through its own actions in the Middle East lost much of that support. Khalidi explains this change in opinion as resulting from U.S. backing of the partition of Palestine in 1947-48; for establishing several military bases in the region; for supporting the U.K. in the region; and for its covert CIA operation that overthrew the democratically elected prime minister of Iran in 1953. What explains these actions by the United States? It is beyond the scope of Khalidi's book to answer that question. Let us then turn to other histories of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East to better understand how the country went from being considered a "beacon of hope" to a latter day imperialist power, what Tariq Ali has called "the mother of all fundamentalisms" (2002, p. xiii).

It is undisputed in the secondary literature I consulted detailing the history of U.S. foreign policy that the United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful

nation in the world. One could measure this stature in a variety of ways, from military capacity to economic dominance to political capital and influence around the world. The primary data discussed earlier reflected various interpretations of this power, i.e. whether international chaos and conflict compelled the United States into such a position, or whether U.S. assumption of world leadership had been accidental. Several secondary sources tell this story considerably differently. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, for example, in their exhaustive, 700-page history of U.S. foreign policy in the first nine years after World War II, are quite clear on their understanding of how conscious and active the U.S. was in the immediate post-war years. They write:

Surrounded by this vast upheaval [i.e. post-war chaos and popular uprisings], the United States found itself immeasurably enriched, and, without rival, the strongest nation on the globe. It emerged from the war self-conscious of its new strength and confident of its ability to direct world reconstruction along lines compatible with its goals. And these objectives, carefully formulated during the war⁴, were deceptively simple: Essentially, the United States' aim was to restructure the world so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere. On this there was absolute unanimity among the American leaders, and it was around this core that they elaborated their policies and programs. (Kolko & Kolko, 1972, pp. 1-2)

Gabriel Kolko (1969) takes up this question in an earlier work, although the context of his discussion is the Vietnam War, not the immediate post-war years. Nevertheless, his insights into the functioning of U.S. foreign policy are still relevant here. He argues:

⁴ See Kolko (1968) for the companion piece to Kolko and Kolko 1969. The former work is a 600-page history and analysis of U.S. foreign policy goals during World War II.

We can only comprehend Vietnam in the larger context of the relations of the United States to the Third World, removing from our analytic framework superfluous notions of capriciousness, accident and chance as the causal elements in American foreign and military policy. (p. xi)

He continues more specifically about the policy process:

But the fact that a ruling class makes its policies operate, even when the mass of society ceases to endorse them, and that the voluntaristic and occasionally enforced social goals benefit individuals rather than all of society, is a central reality most analysts perpetually exclude from a descriptive explanation of American society...[T]he facts reinforce the point that not a mythical “military-industrial” complex but civilian authority and civilian-defined goals are the sources of American foreign and military policy—and the American malaise. (pp. xii-xiii)

A related question that surfaced regularly in the document and interview data reported above was whether U.S. national interests, indeed its security, were best defined in geopolitical or economic terms, or a combination thereof. Again, the secondary literature addresses these same questions with equal frequency. For example, Achcar (2004) frames the rise of the U.S. as a world power by looking at political and economic questions simultaneously. In particular, he examines how the Truman administration exploited the Open Door policy, ostensibly an economic policy calling for free trade among cooperating nations, to ensure greater economic *and* political influence around the globe. Smith (1949) also takes the approach of seeing political and economic goals as one process. He counter poses whatever efforts the U.S. had to make in order to exert

influence abroad to those of the Soviet Union. In the former case, because the U.S. is not directly challenging the fundamental status quo of the world economic and political system, it can present its aims—and achieve them—more easily. He argues:

America truly possesses the whip-hand over the world. For America, becoming “imperialist” is as easy as rolling off a log. With this preponderance of power, and most of the rest of the world in a crisis of scarcity, there need be no crude conquests; they can be carried out gently, invisibly, by the almost surreptitious means of wealth, by investments that bring silent control, and by aid-grants accompanied by polite hints regarding the direction of the receiving nation’s policy. (p. 93)

Sidney Lens (1971/2003), in his sweeping history of U.S. imperialism from the founding of the nation to its stalemate⁵ in the Vietnam War, also explains post-war U.S. foreign policy in terms of wedding economic and political goals together. His discussion focuses more on the United States’ political aims for foreign aid and technical assistance, especially in rebuilding Europe after World War II. According to his analysis, the U.S. had two goals: one, to ensure that U.S. corporations and business interests were first in line to win contracts (e.g. via Marshall Plan funds) to rebuild whole swaths of worn-torn Europe; and two, to supply enough direct assistance to prevent the sort of revolutionary upheavals that accompanied the end of World War I. Lens argues: “An ounce of prevention against revolution, in other words, was worth a pound of cure” (p. 308). In sum, Kolko and Kolko (1972) capture most succinctly the balancing act the U.S. had to perform among military, political and economic aims for its foreign policy. They write:

⁵ Lens’s work was originally published in 1971, i.e. before U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

The United States' military power and technology were no less formidable than its economic resources, but the manner in which to apply them, and the areas of the world to which they were relevant, it had to balance against larger economic priorities and domestic political constraints. (p. 6)

This unity between geopolitical and economic goals is underscored by a review of specific U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East after World War II.

Kolko and Kolko (1972) remind us that in spite of the moniker "Cold War," direct military conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. never took place. Instead, the genuine battlefields of what they call "cold peace" (p. 6) spread that conflict across the globe. In many ways, the Middle East was among the earliest and most consistent sites of that conflict. The major impetus leading to such consistent conflict in the Middle East was oil—not necessarily for direct U.S. consumption, but rather to ensure U.S. control over the region's supplies and therefore over the international market (Lockman, 2004). As Achcar (2004) describes it: "The Middle East and its oil became one of the central issues around which the Cold War would take shape" (p. 12). Lockman (2004) confirms this assessment of the general U.S. approach to the Middle East. He asserts that of lesser concern to the U.S. was direct Soviet intervention in the region, but instead that restless Arab populations would align themselves with the U.S.S.R. He writes:

Across the Middle East, new social and political forces emerged after 1945 to challenge the old elites and demand reform. Among them were pro-Soviet communist parties, but much more important and popular were radical nationalist movements and independent groups of young army officers determined to free their countries from lingering foreign control and chart a new course toward

development and greater social justice...Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and their successors, knew that there was little prospect of the Soviet army invading the region and seizing the oil fields. They also understood that growing unrest and instability in the Middle East were caused not by communist agitation and Moscow's orders, but by widespread poverty and social inequality and by resentment over continued Western political and economic domination. Many U.S. officials even felt that moderate social and political reform was necessary if communist-led revolutions were to be prevented. (pp. 116-117)

U.S. interests in gaining greater control over Middle East oil led to the first major conflict in the post-war era: pitting the U.S. against an old power in the region, the U.K., which it aimed to displace; and another global power, the U.S.S.R, which had its own designs on the region. During the war, Iran's ruler, Reza Shah, seemed likely to side with Germany. The U.K. and the U.S.S.R. used that threat to send in troops and occupy the country in 1941. The U.S. sent its own troops once it had entered the war. In fact, all three allied powers agreed to withdraw their troops upon conclusion of the war and to leave existing oil concessions in place. That agreement changed in practice once the war ended. The U.S. and the U.K. did withdraw their troops in 1946, but the Soviets left theirs in the north and encouraged Azerbaijani nationalists to secede from Iran. Not only did the U.S.S.R. claim that the region had historically belonged to Russia, but also they sought a new oil contract with the pro-Soviet regime they installed (Kolko & Kolko, 1972; Lens, 1971/2003). Under U.S. pressure, however, the Soviets ultimately withdrew their troops and the oil deal fell through. Within a year, Washington was supplying millions of dollars in aid to the Iranian army—which was then run by a U.S. general

(Lens, 1971/2003). By 1953, when the CIA overthrew the Mussadiq government, the U.S. controlled over 40% of Iranian oil. Lens (1971/2003) sums up this opening shot of the Cold War, played out as it was in the Middle East. He writes: “What the Russians failed to achieve with their occupation, the Americans achieved through dollars, advisers and military support for a *coup d'état*” (p. 341).

Douglas Little (2002), in his history of American Orientalism, takes more of an ideological, versus a material, approach to analyzing U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East in the immediate post-war years. On the one hand, he understands U.S. actions in the region as a function of the U.S. having inherited a British mindset of Orientalism along with the territories it took over after displacing the U.K. On the other, Little builds his history on historical documents written by members of the Truman administration. His argument is that Orientalist ideologies facilitated a more aggressive U.S. approach to asserting its power in the region. For example, he describes the response of Truman administration officials to a psychological profile of the “typical Arab” that the CIA had produced in 1949. He writes:

Adolf Berle, a Democratic Party insider who served in Truman’s kitchen cabinet, remarked privately during the summer of 1952 that this well-documented psychological profile of instability extended to non-Arab Muslims such as the Iranians as well. “Fanatic Mohammedan nationalism” seemed about to sweep away the shah of Iran, opening the door to a “Communist takeover” in Tehran, Berle confided in his diary on August 13. There was a very real danger, he concluded gloomily, “that the Russians would be on the Persian Gulf by Christmas.” (pp. 26-27)

Kolko and Kolko (1972) also generalize about the primary motivations driving U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East in the immediate post-war period. As their history takes a materialist, indeed Marxist approach, they draw somewhat different conclusions than Little. Instead, they couch initial U.S. actions in terms of a broader U.S. strategy for the region. They write:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-October [1946] decided that the loss of Iran to Russia, even “by means other than war,” would gravely affect American power in Saudi Arabia and the entire region, profoundly influencing the material and economic conditions in which a war between the nations might be fought.

Defined in these terms, with Saudi Arabia described in an earlier State Department analysis as “...a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history,” that the United States would actively intervene everywhere in the region was a foregone conclusion. For the logic of a domino theory of closely interdependent states is that one must prevent any and all from falling, making interests in one nation contingent on the control or stability of the rest. (p. 242)

In fact, the “active intervention everywhere in the region” to which Kolko and Kolko refer was first codified in what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Formally, the Truman Doctrine developed in direct response to post-war conflicts in Greece and Turkey. Truman proclaimed: “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (cited in Little, 2002, p. 123). Congress quickly showed its approval for the policy by appropriating \$400 million for anti-communist forces in both countries. Little

(2002) describes how the Truman administration quickly broadened the scope of the Truman Doctrine. By June 1947 it had proposed what would become the Marshall Plan, which effectively rebuilt war-torn Western Europe. Moreover, on July 25, 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act, which established both the National Security Council, an advisory group to the president, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Achcar (2004) contextualizes the Truman Doctrine in broader U.S. foreign policy and economic goals, particularly in the Middle East. He describes the March 12, 1947 proclamation of the Truman Doctrine as:

...the first public formulation of the policy of “containment” of communism. As Daniel Yergin points out in his monumental history of the oil industry, an agreement was signed that very same day integrating Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony into the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) formed by Socal and Texaco. This agreement created the consortium of four U.S. oil companies that would share the exploitation of Saudi oil among themselves. (p. 12)

Events in the Middle East spanning the next three decades would not only put the Truman Doctrine to the test, but would lead to a reformulation that rationalized even greater direct U.S. intervention in the region.

In fact, conflict in the Middle East would become one of the main international focal points for President Eisenhower in both his administrations. Evidence of this is Eisenhower’s reworking of the Truman Doctrine. If Truman’s proclamation established U.S. intentions to defend any country it felt were under communist threat, either from within or without, then Eisenhower focused that attention on the Middle East in particular. As Lens (1971/2003) describes it:

Thus it was that on January 5, 1957, in an address to Congress, Eisenhower proclaimed protection for fourteen countries in the Middle East, covering 5 million square miles of territory and embracing a population of 125 million. Without consulting any of them he offered military assistance, economic grants, and the use of America's own armed forces, if so requested, "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." With this Eisenhower Doctrine, Washington sought to take from the faltering hands of British and French imperialism a sphere of influence for itself. Henceforth, it hoped, the Middle East would become an American bailiwick, the Mediterranean an American lake. (pp. 392-393)

Eisenhower's preoccupations with the Middle East and the intentions of his new "doctrine" were shaped by a series of conflicts in the region from the start of his first term. Before Eisenhower came into office, in 1951, Mohammad Mussadiq was elected prime minister of Iran by a wide margin (Blum, 2005). Lens (1971/2003) describes him as a "fervent nationalist, but non-Communist" (p. 388). Mussadiq assumed control of a nation whose oil reserves were entirely allocated to foreign concerns according to this ratio: 40% to British concerns, 40% to U.S. concerns, and the rest to Royal Dutch Shell and a French corporation. Mussadiq intended to use that wealth for the Iranian people, 80% of whom lived at a subsistence level off the land (Lens, 1971/2003). Mussadiq's first action as prime minister was to nationalize British oil concerns, effectively annulling their concessions contracts with Iran. The oil companies organized a boycott of Iranian oil, and, by the time Eisenhower entered office, he and his advisers had deemed the threat of further nationalizations too risky, both for Iran and for the region. The CIA

intervened, forcibly removing the Mussadiq government. The coup placed the Shah back in power. Moreover, the CIA provided the Shah's government with information on nationalist and communist activists, against which the new regime unleashed two and half decades of attacks, which ended only with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Achcar, 2004; Blum, 2005; Kolko & Kolko, 1972; Lens, 1971/2003; Little, 2002; Lockman, 2004; Poya 1987/2002).

The second threat leading to proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine emerged on the other side of the region in Egypt. In 1952, nationalist army officers organized a *coup d'état* and overthrew the monarchy, which had been backed by the British. Two years later, one of the main actors in that coup, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, assumed power and began to implement his vision of pan-Arab nationalism. Nasser's vision for the region, often referred to as Nasserism, proved to be a major rallying point for a left-wing, secular, Arab nationalist movement that would dominate the region for several decades. In 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which Anglo-French concerns had previously administered. At first, the U.K. and France saw an opportunity to invade the Sinai Peninsula and reassert some of their waning authority. They, along with Israel, began to organize just such an invasion. The Soviet Union threatened to respond on two fronts, one in Eastern Europe, but also by backing the Nasser government. The Eisenhower administration put pressure on its European allies to call off their invasion. In doing so, it succeeded in meeting several goals: first, it further isolated the British and French from regions they used to control; second, it prevented conflict with the Soviet Union and helped to keep their troops out of the region; and finally, the U.S. was able to

position itself as a defender of Arab sovereignty (Achcar, 2004; Kolko & Kolko, 1972; Lens, 1971/2003; Little, 2002; Lockman, 2004)

The latter success was of critical importance to the Eisenhower administration. It was in the process of establishing a NATO-like defense structure for the Middle East. The plan, called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), would unite Turkey, Iran, the U.K, Pakistan and Iraq into a common defense structure, under U.S. leadership. Egypt was not originally part of this treaty, but Eisenhower hoped that by warding off British and French incursions on the Sinai, the U.S. would be more successful in establishing the CENTO (Lens, 1972/2003). Ultimately, the Eisenhower administration faltered on both counts: the CENTO never got off the ground; and Nasser and his pan-Arab vision for the Middle East would quickly emerge as what Khalidi (2004) calls the United States' "primary *bête noir* in the Middle East" (p. 41). Achcar (2004) elaborates on the threat Nasser seemed to pose:

Nasser's nationalism, with its dual perspective of defending Egyptian sovereignty and promoting Pan-Arab unity, proved inherently irreconcilable with the U.S. drive for hegemony. Nasser rejected Washington's offers of economic and military aid because of U.S. conditions that would have infringed on Egypt's independence. (p. 13)

Moreover, Little (2002) describes Eisenhower's reaction to the Suez crisis thus:

Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal during the summer of 1956 reinforced Eisenhower's belief that the Arabs were irrational, resentful, and dangerous to Western interests... When Eisenhower sent U.S. marines to Lebanon two years later to shore up a pro-American regime besieged by pro-Nasser dissidents, he

reminded the National Security Council (NSC) that “the underlying Arab thinking” remained deeply rooted in “violence, emotion and ignorance.” As his term drew to a close, Ike complained that Nasser and like-minded nationalists were little more than oriental despots. “If you go and live with these Arabs, you will find that they simply cannot understand our ideas of freedom or human dignity,” he told the NSC in June 1959. (pp. 26-27)

Within a year’s time, Eisenhower would develop a military and political strategy, the Eisenhower Doctrine, according to which the U.S. would act alone in ensuring the security of the region.

In fact, the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine would occur before the year was out. The CIA had intervened in the 1957 presidential elections in Lebanon by funneling money to Camille Chamoun’s campaign. Once Chamoun won the election, the Eisenhower administration approached him about agreeing to the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Chamoun acquiesced, thereby alienating whole sections of the Lebanese population, along with other Arab governments, most notably Egypt and Syria. The Chamoun government came under increasing fire from pro-Nasser Lebanese activists. Lockman (2004) describes the nature of Eisenhower’s concerns about the gathering threats against the Chamoun government. He writes, referring at times to the official text of the Eisenhower Doctrine:

Eisenhower and his advisors knew very well that the pro-American president of Lebanon was not the innocent victim of “overt armed aggression” instigated by “International Communism.” Rather, he was being challenged by fellow Lebanese who wanted political reform, backed by other Arabs who wanted

Lebanon to align itself with what they saw as Arab interests and not the Cold War interests of the United States. (p. 120)

Ultimately, Eisenhower took decisive action. In July 1958, he sent in 10,000 marines, backed up by 35,000 sailors from the Sixth Fleet off the Lebanese coast, to shore up the Chamoun government (Cole, 2005; Lens, 1971/2003; Lockman, 2004; Quigley, 2003).

That same month, Colonel 'Abdul Karim Kassem overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and established a republican government. Within nine months, CIA director Allen Dulles was advising Congress that Iraqi communists were on the verge of taking over the country, claiming the situation was now "the most dangerous in the world today" (cited in Blum, 2005, p. 172). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designed an invasion of the country in collaboration with Turkey; however, Soviet pressure prevented its execution. By 1960, the U.S. began funding Kurdish separatists in the north of the country, with the CIA plotting Kassem's assassination. In February 1962, Kassem conducted an interview with *Le Monde* newspaper, in which he claimed that Washington had sent him a cable with threats of retaliation if he did not conform to U.S. policy goals. Within several days of the interview's publication, supporters of the Ba'athist Party lead a *coup d'état* and overthrow the Kassem government. Just as in the case of Iran, the CIA provided a list of nationalist and communist activists, whom the new Ba'athist regime promptly murdered in the thousands. It was later revealed that the CIA and the U.K. had engineered the coup. The Ba'athists lost power shortly thereafter to a pro-Nasser government. But by 1968, they were back in power by means of another U.S.-led *coup d'état* (Ali, 2003; Blum, 2005; Khalidi, 2004; Lens, 1971/2003).

Blum (2005) continues the story of U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East by documenting Nixon administration funding in the early 1970s for Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq, helping to destabilize the country. In addition, the U.S. repeatedly sent CIA operatives and military paratroopers into South Yemen between 1979-1984, a country that U.S. allies North Yemen and Saudi Arabia declared had fallen into Soviet orbit. Moreover, as civil war raged in Lebanon from 1975 onward, U.S. marines were part of an international force under U.N. administration during the conflict. Still, the 1960s represent the high point of frequent direct U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Part of this tapering off has to do with the Vietnam War, both because of the immense resources it required; but also because of a backlash in popular opinion against overt U.S. intervention anywhere in the world once the U.S. had left Saigon in defeat in 1975. A second factor leading to a tapering of direct U.S. intervention in the Middle East was its increasing reliance on Israel as a partner in the region. As the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* described it in an editorial from September 30, 1951: "Therefore, strengthening Israel helps the Western powers maintain equilibrium and stability in the Middle East. Israel is to be the watchdog" (cited in Selfa, 2002, p. 30, and Marshall, 1989, p. 77). Particularly from 1967 on, when Israel quickly routed a coalition of Arab armies in the Six Days War, the U.S. worked with its closest ally in the region, by means of general aid, military aid, arms shipments and training, to help bolster U.S. political and economic interests (Achcar, 2004). This situation remained fairly consistent—even in the face of the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent U.S. hostage crisis there (Poya, 1987/2002)—until the first President Bush sent in troops to Kuwait and Iraq in 1991.

Lockman (2004) summarizes the overall approach which U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican, employed with respect to the Middle East. He identifies six primary categories by which the U.S. effected its policy in the region. The first included maintaining military bases throughout the region; the second by maintaining a permanent naval force. President Carter codified both of these strategies in the wake of the Iranian Revolution with the creation of the Rapid Deployment Forces, known since 1983 as U.S. Central Command or CENTCOM. Furthermore, the U.S. used military and intelligence support to friendly Middle Eastern governments in the form of training, arms, aid and advising. It actively built anti-Soviet alliances, even if shifting political events led to multiple tergiversations along the way. The final two strategies the U.S. employed to execute its strategy toward the Middle East included covert action, examples of which are described above; and lastly, general aid.

To conclude this section of findings with respect to U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East, several sources serve to contextualize U.S. action in the region. The first is taken from a broader discussion about the rise of the United States as a world power after World War II. Lens (1971/2003) writes:

The quarrel with the Soviet Union—it cannot be affirmed too often—was not the *cause* of America's imperial policy, but an *effect* of it...What was at stake was the imposition of a Pax Americana, and those who opposed it, whether Communists or "neutralists," leftists or rightists, dictators or saints, would be the butts of American ire if they continued opposition. Pax Americana—more properly, global imperialism—unfolded from the inner logic of America's new status. There were no *a priori* plans or blueprints, simply an impulse that guided

the policy makers...Under Pax Americana, Uncle Sam organized the great powers into a consortium dedicated to a certain economic way of life, the open door, and developed a military machine to uphold the status quo against revolutions and revolutionaries. (pp. 349-350)

In fact, Achcar (2004) takes this perspective a further step in arguing that what made U.S. policy effective in maintaining “Pax Americana” was that it sought a path to hegemony that did *not* require direct colonial control over nations and regions in its sphere of influence.

Two final excerpts from the data help to summarize the impact that this history of U.S. policy and intervention in the region had on Middle East perceptions of the U.S. In her presidential address at MESA’s 1990 meeting, Yvonne Haddad characterized Middle East perceptions of this history as anger. But she framed her comments, as well, as a call to scholars to keep this perspective at the heart of their research. Haddad (1991) maintains:

To dismiss the influence of indiscriminate American support of the state of Israel on Muslim rage in the Middle East is quite disingenuous. It is also irresponsible to disregard what has happened since the end of the 1950s and the ways in which those events have been perceived. How can one study the literature produced in the last forty years and not recognize Middle East anger at United States policy, which acknowledges Jewish nationalism as a legitimate expression of Jewish identity, but rejects Arab and Islamic nationalism as illegitimate and a threat to U.S. interests? How can a scholar disregard forty-five years of American attempts to control the Middle East and the fact that Muslim literature despises

what is perceived as American hypocrisy in supporting and using Islam when it is a matter of U.S. interest in combating communists (as in the case of Afghanistan) and turning readily against Islam when it is seen as an impediment to these interests (as in the case of Iran)? (p. 6)

Finally, as this section began with a discussion of Khalidi (2004), it is fitting that it should end with it, as well. Like Haddad, he brings the experience of U.S. policy and intervention back to the level of Middle Eastern perspectives on this history:

As a result of these and many other episodes, and as its power in the world and in the Middle East expanded during and after the Cold War, in the eyes of many in the region the United States has gradually changed over the past few decades. It went from being considered a benevolent, disinterested outsider to something quite different: a power with massive presence in the Middle East, a broad range of interests there and objectives not always compatible with those of the people of the region. The gap in perceptions is wide on this score: Americans still tend to regard their country as benevolent and disinterested, as acting in the world only for the highest purposes or in self-defense. While most Middle Easterners for the first century and a half of American involvement with their region shared this view, they no longer do. (p. 35)

Taken together, then, the balance of histories of U.S. policy toward and intervention in the Middle East describe U.S. action as conscious, targeted, purposeful and in many instances not in alignment with the interests of those living in the region. Moreover, they contextualize those actions as meeting both the United States' geopolitical and economic concerns. The final excerpts offered here look at the question from the perspective of

Arabs and Muslims in the region, i.e. from the bottom up. The chapter now continues in this vein by considering bottom-up interpretations of national security and its relationship to foreign language education and Arabic in particular.

Popular Attitudes Toward Foreign Language Education: Ascribed and Professed

The following section of research findings serves to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up interpretations of the uses of language education, in particular in bolstering national security concerns. I drew attention in the previous chapter to the tendency among advocates for Title VI to refer to popular support for expanded language education in order to justify their advocacy. Frequently among the data, policy-relevant actors would invoke the American public and ascribe to them an attitude towards foreign language education that linked it to United States' new stature in the world. In that chapter, I highlighted one example, in which Parker (1953) refers to an article in *Newsweek* to support his argument that public support for FLES programs is due to Americans' awareness of U.S. international leadership. In fact, there is no mention in that *Newsweek* article explaining the growth of FLES programs in any way, let alone as Parker later described it. This ascription of beliefs to "the American people" absent any empirical evidence is but one example that occurred in the data.

In discussing this example in the previous chapter, I also mentioned that a small circle of language experts penned many similar arguments. These experts, including Mildenberger, Johnston and Parker, started their work with the MLA's Foreign Language Program and would eventually move into the U.S. Office of Education to administer the first Title VI programs. Therefore, the first set of examples of this ascription of popular

support for foreign language education pre-dates Title VI. However, given the continuity between the MLA's Foreign Language Program and the first years of Title VI, these comments still help to document how members of this inner circle framed popular support for foreign language education. The first example takes us back to an early issue of *The FL Program Bulletin* and an article assessing foreign languages in the United States. The article reads, in part:

After the war, as America was thrust into the role of leadership in a contracting world, the public became convinced of the importance of learning to communicate with other peoples, but leaders in American education seemed unaware of the new relevance of foreign language study. ("FLs in the U.S," 1954, p. 2)

Moreover, in a November 1955 speech Mildenerger gave to the Wisconsin Association of Foreign Language Teachers, he maintained:

We are now in an era of unprecedented need for American citizens who can speak and comprehend modern foreign tongues, and each day the need grows more acute. Our nation's political, military, and educational leaders are aware of this and they are going on record for more and *better* language study. The public is aware of it, and they need only encouragement to get behind an enlarged program in our schools. (Mildenerger, 1955, p. 1; emphasis in original)

Later in the same speech, Mildenerger begins to address the basis on which he makes claims as to what "the public" wanted with respect to language education. He states:

The first quality of professionalism I would call: *attention and devotion to the needs of American society*...This too should be the fountainhead of the foreign

language profession specifically. To learn the needs of American society we must turn, not to faculty smokers nor to rationalized objectives of language study listed in venerable text books, but to *American society*...Now what kind of language study is it that American society wants? The answer is easy. We have yet to meet a representative of any phase of American society who would not like to see more *functional* instruction in the foreign language. To be specific, they want first, effective training in speaking and comprehending the foreign tongue, and second, clearer understanding of the foreign people—their daily lives, their hopes, beliefs, aspirations. Our society is grasping the fact that our nation has assumed tremendous world responsibilities in an age when scientific developments make next door neighbors of all the peoples of the Earth...Obviously, these goals must be based upon on the needs of American society. (Mildenberger, 1955, p. 2; emphasis in original)

Mildenberger bases his claims both on the needs stated by foreign language professionals, as well as “representatives of [each] phase of American society.” This represents one of the few examples in the data I collected to justify claims as to public attitudes based on any concrete evidence—although that evidence was in the form of conversations with the leadership of various civil, political, professional, religious and military organizations.

More typical were examples like the speech Sen. Brademas gave to the MLA in 1962. I cited a portion of this speech earlier, but in this context it is helpful to revisit it. Brademas (1962) stated:

In the last several years...the American people have come to understand more clearly than ever before the great importance to our country, in terms of national security if for no other reason, and there are other reasons, of developing and maintaining a reservoir of persons skilled in the knowledge of modern foreign languages. Even a man of little political sensitivity could not fail, a few days ago, to have appreciated the immense impact of the few words spoken in Spanish by Mrs. Kennedy during the President's visit to Latin America. (p. 28)

These examples document a set of data in which policy-relevant actors ascribed a set of positive attitudes to ordinary people to support expanded foreign language education tied to the United States' new role in the world.

By contrast, a second set of data also engages in ascribing attitudes to the general public about foreign language education and its relationship to U.S. foreign policy. In this case, however, these policy-relevant actors and scholars claimed that public ignorance, indeed resistance, to foreign language education impeded efforts taken both by the government and within the academy to improve foreign language competencies. The most dramatic example is found in Congressional testimony during the stormy days in 1970 of Title VI budget battles and growing opposition to the Vietnam War. Stanley Spector, director of the Office International Studies at Washington University, St. Louis, gave the following testimony to a Senate education subcommittee. He stated:

These are not projects [e.g. Title VI centers] that once "seeded" create their own increasing income. And because they are not necessarily responsive to the immediate needs of the communities around them they cannot often obtain continued local support. The farmer of Missouri may be interested in research on

drug control or new strains of corn, but he cannot easily see what language and area study has to do with this, even though it is clear that the control of drugs is an international problem requiring international agreement and action. (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY 71, 1970b, p. 282*)

He continued, in direct reference to growing opposition to the Vietnam War:

Gentlemen and Madame, we hear strident calls today from the radical left to abandon our international and area programs because they are instruments of the American "new imperialism." I urge you to give answer to the so-called New Left and the New Left Isolationism by reaffirming our commitment to international understanding, goodwill, intellectual and technical cooperation. I urge you to encourage the tens of thousands of Americans who devote their lives and energies to create a better national, international and world environment through painstaking study, difficult and often dangerous travel and undertakings, and through the proper rearing of our young to an understanding of their place and role in this world. I urge that you make it possible, as it is within your power and authority to do so, for our nation to retain its lead in studying and understanding foreign cultures and to hold its place of enlightened responsibility on this globe.

(*Office of Education Appropriations, FY 71, 1970b, p. 283-84*)

Further evidence from this period takes us back to an article about foreign language competency that ran in the March 16, 1970 issue of the *Chronicle of Education*. Part of the article, written by William Jones, quotes David Marr, an historian of Vietnam at Cornell University. As the article broaches the question of waning student support for language education, it reads in part:

“My own hypothesis,” says Mr. Marr, “is that many students today feel that Americans just don’t belong in Vietnam in any way, shape or form—even as scholars. Given the fact that a lot of students are alienated from the war, they want to avoid tangling themselves in the rat’s nest. There’s a feeling that it’s a very loaded subject.” (*Office of Education Appropriations, FY 71, 1970d, p. 305*)

The ascription of negative popular attitudes toward foreign language education also takes place in two of the histories of Title VI cited frequently in the previous chapter. In a discussion, for example, of why the federal government delayed in funding language and area studies, Gumperz (1970) adds a third reason to that discussed earlier. In addition to debates about the separation of church and state, and the brewing conflict over desegregation, Gumperz suggests:

It is likely that the failure of proponents of foreign area studies to obtain federal support in the early fifties was related not merely to an inhospitable climate of public opinion, but to the absence of a strong organization structure representing international interests within education that could mobilize political support... (p. 30).

Gumperz does not offer any empirical support for this conclusion. Moreover, it contradicts the assertions of the inner circle of the MLA’s Foreign Language Program at the time in their explanations for the popularity of FLES programs. Ruther (1994) makes similar assertions to explain in part why Congress passed the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966 but, in fact, never allocated any funding for it, rendering it defunct. Recall that that the stated goals of the IEA made no mention of issues tied to national security or economic competitiveness, but rather framed the purpose of the bill and its programs as

developing greater understanding among people in the U.S. for the rest of the world. In explaining its failure, Ruther (1994) states:

With the IEA in the mid-60s, legislative policy confirmed higher education as deserving on-going support to maintain institutional capacity to meet the nation's foreign security and humanitarian goal through expertise and knowledge generation as well as citizen education. Lack of funding indicated that the IEA had overreached the national will on such a sweeping role for international education. (p. 411)

Ruther's suggestion is that Congress tried to accomplish more than the public was willing to support with respect to language and international education in the name of mutual understanding and peace.

Related to this tendency to ascribe a set of attitudes towards foreign language education to ordinary people while offering (little or) no empirical evidence to justify such an ascription, many policy-relevant actors described popular attitudes by contrasting them specifically to those held by experts and specialists. Perhaps the most noteworthy example of this is an article that ran in a 1953 issue of the MLA's *The FL Program Bulletin*.⁶ The article, to which Mildenerger (1955) referred and which I cited above, is titled "Opinions Worth Hearing," and presents 76 quotes of prominent Americans as to why they support greater foreign language competency. What makes this article stand out is that it specifically excluded foreign language professionals from the pool of prominent voices "worth hearing." The introduction to the list of quotes states:

⁶ This issue of the *FL Program Bulletin* was missing in the Rockefeller Archives Center folders I examined. However, a typewritten copy of the article was archived, along with a note explaining it was meant for publication in the *Bulletin*. As I could not ascertain the issue number or page numbers of the published version, I have referenced this article as unpublished raw data.

The more than 10,000 college and university teachers of modern foreign languages, and the much larger number of elementary and secondary school foreign language teachers, are naturally convinced of the practical and cultural values of knowing a second language. They constitute a considerable body of patriotic and well-educated Americans, but you may choose to write them off as prejudiced witnesses, representing “vested interests.” Whose opinions on this subject, then, would you read with respect?...The opinions quoted below...may be worth your listening to, for they come from well informed and prominent people in all walks of life, from newspapers in all parts of the country, and from nationally important organizations. (“Opinions worth hearing”, 1953, p. 1)

Following these opening remarks are 18 pages of type-written quotes attributed to generals and admirals; CEOs; presidents of organizations such as the Girl Scouts of America, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the National Congress of Parents and Teachers; newspaper editorial boards; presidential advisers, a Secretary of State, and various Congressional representatives; academics and university administrators; religious leaders, including the president of the Mormon Church; and media personalities and authors.

This experience of counter-posing popular attitudes towards foreign language education to those held by professionals or experts was particularly salient in the interview data. In most cases, the Title VI-relevant policy actors I interviewed made such comments in response to a particular question I had posed. I had asked the participants to describe the circumstances under which we might see language education policies that

were not necessarily tied to perceived national security concerns. What follows is a series of excerpts from the interview data documenting several participants' responses.

One of the interview participants raised this contrast in particularly sharp terms. As part of her response to my question, she stated:

I don't know what to say about learning languages generally, because it's something that I enjoy. And for people, I'd like to think that people understood that learning a language gives you access to people and places that you would never be able to have access to otherwise. But *you and I* know that. And the fact is, there are an awful lot of people who really could care less. They're not interested in the things that make us just sit up and bark. They could care less. Wouldn't it be cool to talk to somebody else? "I'm gonna speak English, and if they don't, tough!" (Participant 4, transcript 2, lines 454-460)

Further emphasizing the point, she continued by describing a video recording of interviews with grade school students of Arabic that she had recently seen. She recalled:

I just saw a really interesting series of taped oral interviews of K-12 students. No, it was like K-8, getting English....They were doing Arabic language interviews and somebody said, somebody said, actually, one of these kids, they're in a big Arab American community, and there is Arabic in the school system there, and there is a lot of excitement about it. And one of the kids, you know, they had selected these kids to be taped, and one of the kids said to [the question], "What's your favorite class?" "Oh, English." And they said, "Why?" "Oh, because everybody speaks English." I just thought, oh god! Oh god! Oh! And you know if only one kid out of the 24 I saw said it, you know, how many others were

thinkin' it? And you could tell that he was one of those kids who just goes ahead and says it no matter what. (Participant 4, transcript 2, lines 485-493)

Another interview participant responded to the same question by framing popular attitudes to foreign language education in much broader terms. In the larger context from which this excerpt is taken, however, she continues to distinguish between specialists or experts who understand the need for foreign language education, and why the general population does not. In response to my question "Why do you think [language education] policies get more support when they're tied to national security?" she said:

Because we're a war-making country. *[laughs]* Let me put it this way. I think the U.S. has never really ever seen itself, because it lives on this side of the Atlantic and Pacific, we are a very self-sufficient country in many ways...There's this strong sense of isolationism. I mean, people beat our doors down to come here, rather than us going over there. The only reason we go over there are for some very specific reasons, in addition to hege *[pause]* It's a need for oil, it's a need for cheap labor, it's a need for that kind of thing. But we're really not interested in other societies. Because they're interested in us! So what's the point of us ever really necessarily learning to? And we border on two countries on two continents. One is Spanish-speaking and even then we're getting overwhelmed with everybody coming over here. And the other is bilingual, and you can get by, and the French is not a big deal. So unlike the Europeans, where you go a few miles and you have to deal with another language, we don't have to do that...And the only time we ever are forced to confront this issue is when a Sputnik happens, or we get sucked into WWII. And now this whole sort of whatever terror, war on

terror, or whatever you want to call it. So to me it's a very simple answer: it's the need, the absolute need is not there. And we're a very need-based, I mean, when you're a capitalistic country, you only respond to that which is beneficial you. (Participant 2, transcript 3, lines 330-345)

The final set of excerpts from the interview data suggests a similar division between how specialists understand the benefits of foreign language competency and how everyone else does. To be sure, these excerpts broach the topic in a less direct way, although I believe the implication is just as relevant. As indicated in the chapter methods, I designed an interview protocol that asked several questions about the life history of each participant in addition to their professional insights on Title VI and Arabic. It came as no surprise that each interview participant spoke about their fascination for language, language learning, and their passion for teaching or studying the language. One typical example is from the interview I conducted with the Arabic expert at a national research and advocacy organization. He learned Arabic as a college student after he joined a classmate for an Arabic language class at a local Islamic center. I asked him what explained his lifelong dedication to language learning and education. He replied:

You know, it's funny. I've always been sort of, I think I have a good ability in languages. I like memorizing things and to learn a language you have to literally memorize a lot of words, a lot of collocations, at the very beginning at least, well, throughout the language learning process, and I've always been good at that sort of thing. And I think that was part of it, that I had the kind of mentality that, and I was told, as were my colleagues who were Peace Corps volunteers, that we were

looking, this was the beginning of the Vietnam War, and we were looking for a way out of American society which we held in contempt. Which were very strong words at the time for me. But when I look back, it's probably true. And so, just looking for something different, something that, because this society did not, I was not in favor of what was going on here, and what we were engaged in in Vietnam. I didn't try to avoid the draft in any way, although I did ultimately avoid it. I think, just wanting to learn about other people. When I travel I don't go to look, even though I do some of it, I don't go there primarily to look at monuments. I go there to learn about the people, and it's just a tremendous learning experience. To learn another language you can really look at the people through their eyes when you speak to them in their language. So that's what I enjoyed the most, and that's why I've stayed with it, instead of pursuing a career in international affairs. (Participant 3, transcript 4, lines 58-73)

Later in the interview, after we had spent a good deal of time discussing the challenges associated with language education advocacy, I returned to his comments about his own enjoyment of language learning. I asked him, if he took to the language so immediately and completely, then why did he not think others might have a similar response to Arabic, or any foreign language? He responded:

I think I'm a bit different. I never thought that Arabic would lead to what I'm doing now. I did it because it was a very rewarding experience. People were excited when I spoke Arabic to them. And I just enjoyed it. (Participant 3, transcript 4, lines 294-296)

Later, once I turned off the recorder, he returned to this particular point as I was gathering my things to leave. He said:

There is so little support or attention paid to language learning, that if national security motives are what it takes to get funding, then so be it. Until Americans understand how learning language, learning culture, opens up your world, there won't be broader support. You know, in the United States, when you meet somebody for the first time, the first question is, "What do you do?" In France, it's, "What's your philosophy?" (Participant 3, field notes)

His comments suggest that, although there may be this self-selected layer of individuals who are different, who come to understand the intrinsic or cultural values of language education, this is not the case for most Americans. And until that changes, language advocates will need to rely on instrumental or extrinsic rationales for language education policies and funding.

Of course, the only way to resolve analytically this counter-posting of expert attitudes versus those of ordinary people towards foreign language education would be to marshal empirical evidence as to what non-specialists believe about the uses and benefits of competency in additional languages. While I did not conduct an exhaustive search for such data in particular, I did find multiple references to just one survey study of popular attitudes towards foreign language education. In 1979 President Carter's commission on international and language education commissioned the University of Michigan to conduct the survey. The September 1979 issue of *The Linguistic Reporter* summarizes the survey findings. The report was based on a press conference run by Peter A. Eddy, then the director of Foreign Language Education at the Center for Applied Linguistics,

who also worked on the survey. The article reports that the survey was based on 962 responses. The survey found that only 6% of respondents spoke a language other than English (LOTE) at home as a child. 40% of respondents claimed to be “familiar” with at least one LOTE. 30% of respondents cited having studied a LOTE in high school, the vast majority of which was in Spanish, French and German. With respect to LCTLs, the article reports: “A very small percentage were familiar with Latin, and less than 1.5% of the population were familiar with Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, or Russian (combined)” (“Foreign languages study”, 1979, p. 2). However, over 75% of those who had studied a LOTE in high school found that study worthwhile. 90% of respondents believed that secondary schools should offer foreign language study; 47% believe that such study should be required. Comparable figures for elementary level study were as follows: 75% of respondents believed elementary programs should offer language study; 40% believed it should be required. The *Linguistic Reporter* article summarized the study as follows: “The survey results indicate that although the vast majority of Americans have virtually no knowledge of foreign languages, they have a positive attitude toward language study” (“Foreign languages study”, 1979, p. 11).

One complicated reference to this study is found in Sen. Simon’s monograph, *The Tongue-Tied American*. Simon (1992) dedicates the fourth chapter of his book to exploring the tradition of chauvinism in the United States towards immigrants and their languages. He argues that this history explains the fact that English has become so predominant in a country comprised of native peoples for whom English is not their traditional language; and immigrants, for whom in the majority of cases English is also not their traditional language. Simon situates this discussion historically, but then

concludes the chapter by referring to the findings of the University of Michigan study. Simon explains the study as hope for the future; however, he does not account for how a society as riddled with chauvinism as he describes it earlier in the chapter could simultaneously produce such positive attitudes toward foreign language study as those found in the University of Michigan study.

Among the data I collected for this study, the Michigan study and the article “Opinions Worth Hearing” are the only empirical evidence (whether quantitative or qualitative) that is marshaled to verify the many assertions of public attitudes toward foreign language education in the United States. As I stated earlier, I did not conduct an exhaustive search for other empirical studies of this question, primarily because it is a question that lies outside the scope of my study. Nevertheless, the findings of the Michigan survey in particular provide a useful link to a discussion of bottom-up interpretations of Title VI and the language programs it supported.

Bottom-up Interpretations of Threat

As I stated in the opening of this chapter, during my analysis of the data there seemed to be two tendencies in how Title VI-relevant policy actors defined the boundaries of the safety zone. Up to this point, I have presented data that speak largely to top-down interpretations of these boundaries and their impact on foreign language education. By this I do not mean that I have only focused on actors from the “policy elite” interpretive community; indeed, I have presented data from each of the three interpretive communities. Nevertheless, the data have tended to focus on one of two contexts that I would consider top-down in nature. On the one hand, I found much of the data presented

thus far in Congressional testimony, where one could easily justify the themes I have mentioned in terms of the context. In other words, it is not especially surprising that Title VI-relevant actors would frame issues of national security and language education using top-down notions of “the national interest” when they sit before Congress advocating for authorizing legislation and/or funding. On the other hand, a significant amount of data presented thus far has been taken from speeches given by government representatives at one or the other conference. Again, we should not be surprised that federal actors would discuss the themes of interest here in top-down terms, seeing as they are directly representing the state through their job and position at these particular functions and meetings.

But to restrict an analysis of Title VI and its impact on Arabic language instruction simply to a unidirectional reading of the data would be cut out another, equally compelling set of interpretations. This second set of data refers to Title VI-relevant policy actors who consider its impact from the bottom-up, i.e. from their perspective as those who receive, appropriate and enact the policy itself. To be sure, the themes that have emerged from this perspective do not necessarily line up as a neat and tidy counterpart to the themes I have presented thus far. Indeed, it is among this data pertaining to bottom-up interpretations of Title VI that I identified a considerable amount of disconfirming evidence that challenge the major themes in the data.

The first of these themes operates at a broad, ideological level. It addresses how Title VI-relevant actors considered Cold War ideology as a threat to effectively carrying out Middle East studies, Arabic instruction being a part of that. The most salient examples of this theme are found in two separate MESA presidential addresses. It is

important to note that for a period of four years in the early 1980s, and then again in the early 1990s, each presidential address took up some aspect of academic freedom, scholarly independence, government funding of research and the uses it makes of that research, and professional ethics. It strikes me as significant that invited plenary speakers of the primary scholarly organization for Middle East studies in North America felt it necessary to return to such similar themes for several years on end. For example, Kemal H. Karpat, in his 1985 MESA address, commented on the impact of Cold War conflicts on scholarship on the Middle East. He identifies the threat on two levels: for specific research projects, but also for the profession as a whole. Karpat (1986) remarked:

My second point deals with academic freedom and ethics. The Middle East is torn by political dissension stemming from the area's unsettled national and international problems and this has, unfortunately, come to be reflected in the scholarly endeavor within our own area. One problem is that some colleagues, having accepted (for whatever reason) one or the other of the competing points of view, then espouse the chosen view with missionary fervor, vehemently opposing other scholars who hold differing views in ways that bode ill for the future of scholarship in the field...Another even more crucial problem is the development of confidential, contractual relationships between some Middle East scholars and various government agencies—notably intelligence...What makes it so vital that this problem be addressed is the threat the existence of such relationships poses to the viability of the entire field of Middle East studies...Fortunately, we have seen that the work produced through these hidden subsidies is often qualitatively inferior to work of the same kind produced by scholars who have chosen the

subject out of sheer intellectual interest and scholarly dedication... Whatever good may come from intelligence-financed studies or conferences, it is likely to remain insignificant in relation to the long-range and lasting damage done to the field as a whole in making it dangerous or impossible for *bona fide* scholars to work in the Middle East, where the information vital to their research is to be found, and in making all findings suspect. The greed and ambition of one or two of our colleagues thus may injure us all and destroy our chosen field of research. (pp. 3-4)

Haddad (1991) begins her 1990 MESA address with an ironic remark about the impact of Cold War ideology on the field. She recalled:

I remember having a conversation with a colleague about career paths. He said that he thought by the end of the seventies that his career was at a dead end, when suddenly in the eighties he had two books published and was on the “chicken and peas” circuit lecturing about the Middle East. He reflected that if someone were tracking his achievements he should have a stamp engraved on his forehead reading “Made by Khomeini.” Now we may be beginning to see new career paths mapped out in the desert. Perhaps we will have a new generation of scholars with a stamp on their foreheads saying “Made by Saddam.” (p. 1-2)

Although her speech was published in July 1991, she gave the address in the months before the first Gulf War in early 1991. She continued, though, to draw an even closer connection between Cold War attitudes and scholarship on the Middle East. In doing so, she redefines what the threat might be in a humorous, if also cynical way. She commented:

Many of the so-called experts on the Middle East are creatures of the cold war who have been trained to construct models and prototypes, analyze the potential threat of the enemy, outline the various options and strategies, predict potential consequences, and manipulate the process that would serve America's interests. The real threat for many in the business might actually be the possibility that peace could break out. (p. 2)

A far more salient theme in the data from bottom-up interpretations of Title VI operated at a more concrete level, namely the threat that policy-relevant actors saw in federal control over the program. For many, the threat was that federal control would lead to federal meddling at a number of levels.

I referenced this perceived threat of federal control in the narrative history of Title VI in the previous chapter. I return to this theme here, relying on different data, because the nature of that threat seems different. In the former case, the threat of federal control over education spanned two, what I believe can be characterized as conservative issues: the first is an ideologically committed resistance to big government and/or federal programs of any kind; the second used the specter of federal control as a cover for resistance to desegregation. A cursory look at those who registered their rejection most loudly at the time, for example Sen. Thurmond and Sen. Goldwater, underscore this point. However, the theme to which I refer here, i.e. federal control seen as a threat to higher education, seemed to be motivated by other concerns. The most salient among them is that along with federal funding would come federal influence on the curriculum in Title VI programs or their scope. An example of such concerns is found in an early assessment of the Title VI concept of language and area studies that appeared in the

October 1961 issue of *The Linguistic Reporter*. Written by Donald Bigelow, then in charge of the division of the U.S. Office of Education that oversaw Title VI centers, the article stresses that there has been no evidence of federal meddling with language and area studies centers. Bigelow (1961) writes:

But, additionally, the NDEA is significant because it is the first major instance of federal funds being used for instructional purposes in the humanities and the social sciences in higher education, and this without a single charge of federal interference after two full years of operation at thirty colleges and universities. (p. 1)

He continues by identifying two distinct sets of interests, e.g. national interests and those of higher education. He writes:

While in the case of NDEA Centers there is no evidence that the national interest and the purposes of American higher education have been in conflict, the future of language and area studies will require a more orderly development than in the past to avoid possible conflict among the universities themselves. (p. 3)

This claim of non-interference is contradicted by John Dieckhoff, of the University of Michigan, in his 1965 assessment of the MLA's Foreign Language Program and the Title VI policy that took much inspiration from it. He describes a segment of scholars who objected to what they understood as federal curricular control:

In 1959 a council of twelve leading Romance scholars protested to the Chief of the Language Development Program, USOE, what seemed to them the intent of the administration of NDEA "to prescribe rigidly, by direct curricular requirements or by the content of compulsory national testing programs, the

means by which improvement of teaching is to be accomplished.” (Dieckhoff, 1965, p. 14)

He continues, in reference to a fellow scholar at the University of Michigan:

Harold Orlans observes, for example, that “Their wish for greater federal aid has blinded many educators to the very real dangers: (1) that academic values and objectives will be surrendered to those of a business enterprise or the more important goals of a nation, and (2) that some form of political control will, indeed, follow federal aid. Not merely opposing, but the stronger step of refusing to participate in undesirable federal programs is, at times, necessary to manifest and, thus, to maintain an institution’s independence.” (p. 14)

It is important to acknowledge a peculiar way in which Dieckhoff (1965) frames the threat that some academics perceived as attendant to federal funding for higher education language programs. He makes reference to a limerick that one university president employed to describe universities that were accepting large federal grants. Dieckhoff writes:

Clark Kerr, President of the University of California attributes to what he calls “federal grant universities” the attitude ascribed to

...a young lady from Kent
 Who said that she knew what it meant
 When men took her to dine,
 Gave her cocktails and wine;
 She knew what it meant—but she went.

The modern language teaching profession may be said to have taken the same attitude. They knew what it meant and they went and they liked it. (p. 14)

Gumperz (1970) also reports similar data that indicate the gendering of the perceived threat of federal control. She writes:

But this argument [about the uses of area studies to meet the national interest] raised opposition in many academic quarters. Some feared that such programs could easily become “the chambermaids of politics,” providing an opportunity for “bending science” to “motives that are extrascientific and even anti-scientific in character” (Chanman, 1948, p. 34). A less intense but more widespread fear was that foreign area studies would confine themselves, with government support, to the study of current events without lasting benefit to liberal education. (p. 26)

A final example of this gendered reading of federal control of higher education language and area studies programs uses the notion of feminine purity to characterize what refraining from accepting federal funds would look like. It is found in a speech that Richard Ohmann gave to the MLA Standing Committees meeting of March 1968. He offered a broad assessment of the MLA’s Foreign Language Program and subsequent federal grants, including Title VI grants, which the MLA had accepted. Ohmann (1968) clarified:

Again, it would be easy, given the enormous exercise of American influence abroad, to portray the Foreign Language Program as an internationalist venture, with savory or unsavory implications depending on one’s attitude toward American power. Plainly, this sort of issue hovers round the MLA’s lobbying for the National Defense Education Act....Each of these disinterested uses of money

or influence is an economic, a social and a political act. Let me be clear about the point of this argument: I am not contending that the Association has acted deviously, or served as lackey to reactionary elements, or sold out to the industrial-military complex, or otherwise jeopardized its chastity. I am only saying that politics and social issues are ubiquitous, that there is no hiding from them...But if virginity is not achievable, innocence is: innocence in the sense which opposes it to knowledge, especially knowledge of good and evil...Our politics are tacit now, and very likely confused. Nothing but good can accrue from making them explicit and consistent. (p. 989)

To be clear: I have just cited all three uses of this gendered framing of how some academics perceived federal funding of language and area centers as a threat (although several secondary sources reference Dieckhoff's citation of the limerick). Therefore, it would be inaccurate to characterize this as a particularly robust or salient theme among the data. Nevertheless, the equation of federal control and corruption with prostitution or feminized subordination—or the converse, the equation of above-board practice with chastity and virginity—certainly stand out among the data relating to bottom-up interpretations of the threat posed by federal control of higher education.

Another interesting, albeit limited, expression of this theme of the threat posed by federal funding and control of higher education relates very specifically to language education in particular. It is found again in Dieckhoff (1965) and his assessment of the first few years of the Title VI program. He cites several scholars who reacted specifically to the new approaches to language teaching, i.e. the audio-lingual method, that Title VI programs were encouraged to adopt. (We will recall from the narrative history of Title

VI in the last chapter that the audio-lingual method of language instruction was the formal name given to the methods described in the Army Specialized Training Program and refined, in part, through the studies of novel language pedagogy and materials funded by a section of Title VI.) Dieckhoff summarizes the arguments against the audio-lingual approach: “Some teachers are opposed to audio-lingual teaching on principle. They regard it as a desertion from the humanistic values of language study” (p. 27). Dieckhoff later elaborates on the opposition to this approach to language teaching, seeming to side with the position:

Sometimes advocates of the audio-lingual approach to language education seem not to claim too much but to ask too little, defining objectives of language education too exclusively in terms of audio-lingual skills. In their consciousness of a shrinking globe, they ask (in the national interest) for an “adequate number of Americans with ability to communicate face to face with the people of any major nation,” and do not always go on to ask for more than ability to converse. Surely this is too little. We need not only “an adequate number” of people who can communicate face to face, who can listen and speak. We also need people who can read and write. Especially we need people who have read and understood. What they have read and understood will have an important bearing on what they hear and say and write. (p. 30)

It is important to qualify this particular framing of the threat that some quarters of the academy ascribed to federal control of higher education language education programs. Several secondary sources (e.g. Gumperz, 1970; Watzke, 2003) contextualize this argument and others similar to it more in terms of territorial squabbles versus principled

concerns about federal meddling. Specifically, because Title VI only funded critical language instruction and research, some scholars in the “big” languages, including in English departments, felt snubbed. Gumperz (1970) makes reference to this attitude once language and area studies had achieved some status on campus. She writes:

The changed status of foreign area instruction—from suspicious innovation to a standard part of the social science-humanities curriculum in the major universities—is reflected in the fact that these associations [MLA, area studies groups, etc.] publicly supported federal aid to academic foreign area instruction only in 1965, in the hearings concerning the International Education Act. Until that point, however, the attempt to gain federal support for these programs had been carried out through very different ancillary organizations. (pp. 38-39)

The perception of the threat of federal control via funding for Title VI and related programs was a particularly acute theme among the data sources related to Middle East studies programs. Earlier, I discussed the data, primarily from speeches given at MESA conferences, which take up broader Cold War ideology and the impact that Title VI-relevant actors claimed it had on Middle East studies. The issue of federal control of the scholarship coming out of Middle East studies was directly raised in another MESA presidential address. Nikki Keddie, in her 1981 address, not only discusses her concerns, but also offers a series of recommendations of how to make the relationship between federal programs and scholarship more transparent. Keddie (1982) begins by asking:

First, how might our field make better use of money? And second, are there actual or potential problems of unwonted influence on our professional or unprofessional

activities exercised by foreign governments, our own government, or private corporations and their lobbies? (p. 1)

She continues, by offering a series of measures to guide federally funded research:

There should, however, be guidelines, such as:

- No strings attached, beyond, say, the subject matter of an endowed chair;
- No unwritten pressures and interference;
- No secret research or reports; and
- The observance of standard academic procedures and promotion, with no discrimination by religion, sex, national origin, or viewpoint.... (p. 6)

She concludes by stating that, even if departments and institutions were to follow these guidelines, the threats remain:

Concerning the above matters, one frequently voiced complaint from my respondents was that sources of funding are rarely openly stated and explained, whether one speaks of a Near East center, a conference, or any other activity. Given the current administration's efforts to extend CIA, FBI, and other covert activities, this is a particularly serious matter, especially to those of us who remember McCarthyism and also the use of spurious foundations and the subsidization of publications by the CIA....My guess is that most people in our field, aside from those who run centers, have little idea where money in the field comes from. (pp. 6-7)

And:

In today's renewed cold-war atmosphere, academics specializing in the Middle East may be in greater demand than ever before for overt and covert

governmental work, but we should learn from the experiences of the first cold war that the government's purposes may not be ours. (p. 8)

Similar concerns to these appear in the interview data as well. The first, taken from my conversation with a former Title VI director, stated in especially clear terms:

But I do think that one of the real conundrums for the universities is the issue of independence and if you feed from the Federal trough, how much do you owe them? And on the one hand we're very quick to scream, "You're interfering in our lives and our students lives!"...and, "this is unseemly!" but on the other hand we're very anxious for the money. (Participant 14, transcript 7, lines 113-117)

This theme emerged in a second interview, albeit in an indirect way. This participant, an expert in Arabic working for a national research and advocacy organization, makes reference to waning objections from academics to working with federal programs. He states:

I see after 9/11, I see a lot more openness among academics to receiving funding from the Defense Department and to receiving it ostensibly for national security reasons. A lot more. You hear a lot less in the Middle East Studies Association, Berkeley, and Michigan complaining about having a [National Security Education Program] Flagship there, an Arabic Flagship there. Michigan would have been an ideal place to do that. (Participant 3, transcript 4, lines 383-387)

Although he refers to the post-9/11 context, i.e. a time period beyond the scope of this dissertation, his comments suggest the extent to which experts in Middle East studies and Arabic language education had raised concerns in the past to working with defense- or security-related federal programs.

As salient as this theme was across the document and interview data, I also identified a considerable amount of disconfirming evidence. That is, on the one hand many Title VI-relevant actors framed federal control over their programs as a potential threat. On the other, particularly among the interview data, participants with experience in Title VI programs either could not recall any federal interference in their program; or they spoke to their program's independence. For example, one participant described her own experiences as a graduate student funded by a Title VI program, the Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowship program. I had asked her whether she were aware of any specific expectations from her university or from the FLAS program once she had been selected to receive the award. She responded:

You know, we were graduate students. We didn't really care, to be honest. What I knew was, I don't know if I knew, but I was very much under the impression that for somebody who came in with linguistics training and who said from the get-go that I really wanted to teach Arabic that I was more likely to be funded than some of my classmates who had more academic, you know, it was easier to fund me than, say, to fund an anthropologist. At least that was the impression I had. Whether it was true or not... You know FLAS, all of the Title VI funding was for us, it was just kind of there. And we were grateful for it, but it wasn't something that impinged a lot on what we did. I don't think the awareness of government policy and the effect of government of policy on education is, well I think graduate students certainly are more aware of it now than we might have been, today that is. We were, we didn't care, it was money. It was funding. You know, you applied for everything you could get, you could think of, dropped

everything in a box and hoped for the best. (Participant 4, transcript 2, lines 117-128)

Moreover, in my interview with one director of a Middle East Title VI center, I asked him who had the greatest influence on choosing the content and scope of the courses that the center offered. My question flummoxed him, as it was so obvious from his perspective that only the faculty at his institution made such decisions. This point was underscored in the only other interview with a Middle East Title VI center administrator. I cited this portion of the interview earlier, however it is relevant to this discussion here, inasmuch as she points out that her center regularly sponsors events and classes by people who voice perspectives critical of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. She stated:

And we do a lot, but we're a little center, you know, but we do take the mandate seriously and so we do try to have programming, you know, that deals in one way or another with these issues. And of course, a lot of the speakers we bring to campus, you know, talk about U.S. foreign policy and national security issues, *[laughs]* I have to say though usually from a more critical perspective, um, but we're still discussing it, everything's on the plate. You know, it's not all medieval Islam stuff. *[laughs]* (Participant 9, transcript 8, lines 150-160)

Finally, two sets of evidence from interviews with Arabic instructors tied to Middle East Title VI centers provide further disconfirming evidence of the extent to which the threat of federal control of such centers was ever, in fact, realized. The first characterized the relationship between the stated goals of Title VI and his center's curriculum thus:

But I don't think there's ever any specific attempt to say, 'Okay. Here is what the enabling legislation is, therefore we have to do this.' The assumption is that if we

offer a Middle East studies program of sufficient breadth and depth that those goals will be met within the context of some courses or some research projects by some graduate students and some undergraduate students. And the rest are doing Middle East studies writ large. (Participant 10, transcript 10, lines 358-362)

The second excerpt relates to an interview I conducted with an Arabic instructor originally from Egypt. At the time of our conversation, the instructor had been at this university for nine years. And yet when I asked to him to reflect on Title VI and how it was structured at his institution, he told me he did not know what Title VI was. When I referenced the full name of the center at his institution, he was aware of that and we were able to carry on our conversation. However, he had no knowledge that this center was tied to federal legislation or funding, nor that Title VI had been funding his institution's program since 1961.

In conclusion to this section of the discussion of findings, there is less consistency among the data regarding bottom-up interpretations of the boundaries of the safety zone with respect to national security and Arabic language education. It is interesting to note that this discrepancy, i.e. perceptions of federal support for Title VI as control or as a threat, and lived experiences of Title VI programs fairly free of federal control, mirrors the two broad data sources that inform this research. That is, the document data speak directly to the threats that Title VI-relevant actors perceived; while the interview data provide almost all of the disconfirming evidence.

The Impact of Title VI on Arabic language instruction

The findings I have reported thus far have addressed various aspects related to the first research question that motivated this study, i.e. how perceived notions of national security have influenced historically the formation and implementation of federal language education policies such as Title VI. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the second research question and the multiple themes in the data that relate to it. To reiterate that question: What have been the implications of the relationship between national security concerns and Title VI for heritage language learners and Arabic language education? In turning to the data related to this second research question, I first discuss the direct impact of Title VI on Middle East centers and Arabic language education before moving onto a broader discussion of interpretations of that impact, and of the relationship between Title VI and heritage language education more generally.

In the narrative history of Title VI offered in chapter 5, I presented a limited amount of data that documented the impact of Title VI on higher education programs of Arabic. A portion of that data looked at the extent of growth in Title VI funding for Middle East language and area studies centers in the first decade of the program. To recall, Middle East centers were initially not the primary target for funding. In its first authorization, Title VI did seem poised to fund Middle East centers, and as an extension the study of Arabic, in a fairly substantial way. The first round of allocations produced: \$1.4 million for study of Middle Eastern languages that funded 83 fellowships in the first year; sixteen more in the second year; ten language and area centers, five of which were initiated in the second year; and around 20 research projects. Another \$1 million were allocated for development of language teaching materials, with a further \$300,000

budgeted for 1961, the third year of the original legislation. Finally, the original Title VI funded a Middle East languages conference that led to eight research contracts (part of the 20 cited above), and an additional 12 projects that received funding in the second authorization of the program in 1961.

A table in U.S. Department of Education archives dated July 1968 documents the increase in funding for Title VI centers for the Middle East, and its relation to overall language and area center funding. From this table we can see how support for Middle East centers ultimately waned in the initial years of Title VI. For the period 1959-1967, Title VI allocated \$4.34 million to fund a total of 12 Middle East centers. This represented 13% of overall language and area studies center funding over the period, and placed Middle East centers the fifth-most funded out of eight regions identified by Title VI center funding (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1968). However, from 1973 to the most recent grant competition of language and area studies centers (which are now called National Resource Centers), the Middle East as a funded region has counted as one of only four regions to average more than 12 centers. (The other regions with such support include East Asia, Latin America, and Russia/Eastern Europe). In fact, since 1975 Title VI has funded between 11 and 17 Middle East language and area studies centers (O'Connell & Norwood, 2007).

Unfortunately, ED records on Title VI do not include such summarizing data regarding the amount of funding for language and area studies centers in the 1970s and 1980s. Other secondary sources, e.g. the recent National Research Council study of Title VI (O'Connell & Norwood, 2007) or Ruther (1994), do include data describing overall Title VI funding for language and area studies centers beyond the first decade of the

program some of which is cited above. However, they do not break the data down by region, only by program type (i.e. center funding versus FLAS funding versus research and grant funding, etc.). As stated in the discussion on methods in chapter 3, the online database that ED now administers does have much more complete information; however, that information relating to language and area studies centers only goes as far back as 2000, and is therefore of little use to this study.

Chapter 5 briefly discussed the extent of Title VI funding for summer programs in Arabic. Some detail was provided as to overseas programs, such as CASA, that partially relied on Title VI funding for its operating costs. In addition, however, CAL's *The Linguistic Reporter* published articles based on U.S. Office of Education press releases throughout the years that served to document the specific amount of support Title VI provided to these summer institutes. (In this, *The Linguistic Reporter* proved to be an invaluable source of data for this study. Much of the data I expected to find in ED archives I ultimately found in the pages of CAL's newsletter.) Table 6 below reports the number of summer institutes that Title VI sponsored for Arabic, and which institutions hosted them. The last year reported is the summer of 1970 because the institutes were cut during the budget battles over Title VI that year.

Table 6

Title VI Summer Institutes for Arabic, 1961-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total # of institutes</u>	<u># for Arabic / # of languages offered</u>	<u>Host institutions</u>
1961	55	0 / 6	n/a
1963	16	2 / 28	Harvard, Utah
1964	22	3 / 33	Harvard, UCLA, Utah
1965	19	2 / 34	Harvard, Michigan
1966	24	3 / 40	Columbia, Harvard, Utah
1967	21	3 / 36	Michigan, Princeton, Utah
1968	21	2 / 44	New York Univ., UCLA
1969	21	2 / 47	UC-Berkeley, Univ. of Penna.
1970	21	3 / 45	Columbia, Indiana, Washington

Note: Data compiled from *The Linguistic Reporter*

Although Title VI did contribute to Arabic language programs abroad, it is clear from this data that the policy did not support an extensive number of summer programs in the language.

Another major program within Title VI policy funded the development of materials and novel teaching methods through research and project grants. Again, *The Linguistic Reporter* played a critical role in documenting this data over the years of Title VI funding. Spanning volumes 2 through 24, *The Linguistic Reporter* listed in a variety of supplements both the number and type of research grants that the U.S. Office of Education had awarded through Title VI. Moreover, the newsletter reported, where appropriate, which language(s) the research projects targeted. Table 7 below lists the number of projects that focused on Arabic. A few words of explanation help to better understand this table. I compiled into one large table the data for all the research projects and all the languages they supported. However, due to space and format considerations I have included in table 7 below only the data with respect to Arabic. In addition, because *The Linguistic Reporter* did not clarify from one supplement to the next whether

“Arabic” meant all regional varieties, MSA, or both, I was only able to tally the data under the category of “Arabic” in order to be consistent. Moreover, beginning in the 1960s, a portion of the funding allocated for these projects was supplied by a food aid program, P.L. 84-480, the Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Under this act, profits made from the sale of U.S.-manufactured farm equipment in countries targeted by this food aid bill were used to augment funding of domestic programs, such as Title VI. Unfortunately, *the Linguistic Reporter* was not consistent in how it reported which Title VI projects received this supplemental funding or in what quantity. Therefore, I have left all dollar amounts off this table. Finally, not every project listed a specific language as part of its investigation; in addition, some projects listed multiple languages. Therefore, the number of languages targeted in the studies does not match the total number of projects funded.

Table 7

Number of Title VI Research Projects Awarded for Arabic, 1959-1979

<u>Year</u>	<u># of projects for Arabic</u>	<u>Total # of languages targeted</u>	<u>Total # of projects funded</u>
1959/ 1960*	10	156	110
1961	0	33	46
1962	2	20	42
1963	2	27	33
1964	2	34	47
1965	1	41	66
1966	0	30	55
1967	3	40	57
1968	0	0	0
1969	0	15	31
1970	1	18	34
1971	0	0	0
1972	2	17	34
1973	2	5	13
1974	3	13	22
1975	4	14	21
1976	2	15	30
1977	0	11	24
1978	4	23	35
1979	3	7	20
Total	41	519	718

Note: Data compiled from supplements to *The Linguistic Reporter*, volumes 2-24.

*Data for these two years were combined in *The Linguistic Reporter's* analysis.

As mentioned above, space and format considerations preclude reporting the entire set of data with respect to Title VI funding for research projects between 1959 and 1979.

However, table 8 below does report all languages for which the total number of projects targeting each language over that time period was 10 or higher.

Table 8

*Total Number of Title VI Research
Projects per Language, 1959-1979,
n ≥ 10*

<u>Language</u>	<u>Total number of projects</u>
Arabic	41
Chinese	38
<i>Cantonese</i>	2
<i>Mandarin</i>	6
French	24
German	15
Hindi	17
<i>Urdu</i>	14
Japanese	22
Korean	12
Russian	22
Spanish	20
Thai	14

Note: The Linguistic Reporter supplements were not consistent in reporting language and/or language varieties; therefore I have listed the data exactly as reported for Chinese and Hindi-Urdu.

Even allowing for the discrepancies over the years in supplements to *The Linguistic Reporter* as to how languages versus language varieties were named, Arabic was by far one of the most-funded languages in terms of research project grants for pedagogical and materials development.

This finding is corroborated by email communication I had with one participant. The participant, an Arab American and Arabic instructor with over 40 years' experience in connection with a Title VI center at a public university in the Midwest, was not available for a full interview as I had hoped. Nevertheless, we exchanged a series of emails in which he provided me very useful information with respect to my interview questions. He documented seven specific Arabic teaching resources that he was part of developing through Title VI research and project grants over the years. In addition, he

identified seven other Arabists who have made extensive use of the Title VI research and project grant to develop their own materials. (To list their names here would reveal to which campus, and therefore to which individual, I am referring.) He closed his last email to me with the following summary of his experiences with Title VI, in particular with the research and projects grant program:

As you can see the federal language education policies have been of great value to the development of Arabic teaching materials focused on modern standard Arabic, the dialects, Arabic for specific purposes, technology-based multimedia program, and the national Arabic Proficiency Test. Another strong evidence of the importance of federal policies to the teaching of Arabic is development of the new Al-Kitab for teaching Arabic series by Mahmoud Al-Batal et al., the several current initiatives aimed to professionalize the Arabic teaching profession, the serious attempts to introduce Arabic into public schools, and NESP [sic] flagship funding for undergraduate and graduate students to enable them [to] continue their Arabic study in their universities and to provide them with the opportunity to study Arabic abroad. In brief my interpretation of the historical federal language education policies is clear: POSITIVE ALL THE WAY. (Participant 11, personal communication, January 17, 2008; emphasis in the original)

An additional means by which to assess the impact of Title VI on higher education Arabic language programs would be to look at the extent of student participation in Title VI Arabic programs over the years. However, I was unable to find sufficient data to document such experiences. My interviews and communication with Title VI center administrators clarified that many centers historically have not kept such

data. Moreover, it is only recently that ED has begun to track such data more systematically and, as a consequence, to require such data keeping from participating universities.

In fact, I found only two attempts among ED's files at systematic study of FLAS fellowship recipients or graduates of language and area studies center. The first, a table entitled "Career Choices of NDEA Language and Area Studies Center Graduates" and dated February 2, 1972, reported the careers that center graduates had chosen, broken down by degree type (e.g. B.A., M.A. and Ph.D.). The categories reported included: higher education; elementary and secondary education; U.S. or State government; foreign organizations or governments; journalism; banking and industry; domestic non-profit; international organizations; library; continued studies; unknown; unemployed by preference; and unemployed by other than preference. As might expected, given the original expectations of Title VI as reported in chapter 5, the vast majority of B.A. and M.A. recipients reported continued studies, while the vast majority of Ph.D. recipients took academic jobs. I was unable to find similar tables for earlier or later years ("Career Choices", 1972).

The second systematic effort to study language and area studies center students and/or FLAS fellowship recipients focused primarily on proficiency outcomes, with limited information on career choices (Lambert, 1984). That study, however, was quite influential: ED adopted its criteria to assess the language ability of FLAS fellowship awardees and center graduates. The survey asked students to assess themselves on two scales. The first ranged from "No practical usable proficiency" to "Fluency, accuracy and range of an educated native user of the language" with three additional choices in

between. In addition, the survey offered a series of specific uses of the target language and asked awardees to rate their ability to perform each task. Six tasks were offered, from most proficient to least proficient, and included: "Teach a course in your academic language;" "Understand a native speaker who is speaking slowly in a face-to-face conversation;" and "Give biographical information about yourself." Again, neither the data in the Lambert, et al. report nor in ED's files broke this information down by language. Therefore it is difficult to interpret this data for its impact on Arabic in particular. While these surveys in general document the low level of language proficiency center and FLAS students had developed, the data were simply incomplete in terms of answering some of the specific research questions I had.

Nevertheless, the data I was able to find, in particular with respect to support for language and area studies centers, summer institutes, and research and project grants, presents a mixed picture as to the impact Title VI had on higher education study of Arabic. On the one hand, in the first ten years of Title VI, the Middle East as a region was among the least funded. However, as Title VI progressed into the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East was only one of four regions that averaged 12 centers or more, and this in a period when the overall number of language and area studies center had been cut by well over one-half after the budget battles in 1970-1971. By contrast, Arabic was not a well-supported language within the summer institute program. However, Arabic was among the best-funded language in terms of research and projects grants. In fact, the words of the one Arabic instructor cited above suggest the extent to which current Arabic language programs have benefited from years of Title VI support for materials development. His words are confirmed across many of the interviews I conducted.

Namely, most participants felt that the cadre, no matter how small, of Arabists and of effective materials that do exist in the U.S. would not have been possible without the monies provided by Title VI over the years.

Complicating this mixed picture further still is the assessment offered by the Arabic expert at a national research and advocacy organization. In our interview, she stated:

Arabic has always been [*pause*] the intriguing language, I guess that's what to call it. It comes up in conversation. But it has always been this kind of language that nobody wanted to deal with. There was a very small group of people who dealt with it. And I'm not quite sure why. I think partly it is a difficult language. Two, I think there is this sort of whole sense of equating it with the Muslim world and the Arab world, and so therefore having a love-hate relationship with the language...It's tough, there's no question about it. But it's not that tough, it's not unlearnable. So the small group of people in the 60s and 70s, mostly coming out of the University of Michigan who kept, pushed this kind of cooperative stuff and...kept at it, but in a very low key sort of way. But they've always been relegated to the back of the bus, always. I mean it's just very interesting to me that they were not [*pause*] Georgetown maybe and Michigan became fairly well known for their Arabic language programs. But they were small compared to what was happening in other languages. (Participant 2, transcript 3, lines 26-43)

This participant begins to offer an explanation as to why she feels Arabic has been so “intriguing,” i.e. the “love-hate relationship” between the language and those who speak

it natively. I will return to the implications of her insights in a later discussion. For now, the important point is that both in terms of data regarding Title VI support for Arabic instruction and participant interpretations of that support, there are consequential inconsistencies in the interpretations of the impact Title VI has had.

A final aspect of the impact that Title VI had on Arabic language education is to consider the question from the perspective of Arabic as a heritage language. In this sense, an immediate question would be the extent to which heritage speakers of Arabic were involved in Title VI programs—as students, instructors, professors, administrators, etc. This turned out to be a very difficult question to answer, or even to approximate. I will speak to the issue of Title VI and heritage language education more broadly below. In fact, it is this broader view of Title VI and its influence on heritage language education generally that clarifies why this question of the policy's impact on Arabic as a heritage language was so difficult to answer. Of course, part of the difficulty results from the considerable gaps in the data mentioned above. Thus, in discussing the impact of Title VI on Arabic as a heritage language, I am relying as much on insights offered by the interview participants as much as I am on inferences based on document data.

I will start with the document data, as there is so little of it. In the data discussed above with respect to definitions of security and interpretation of the uses of foreign language education in maintaining security, I mentioned that the AAS was the most prominent area studies organization among those that testified or submitted statements to Congress during many years of deliberations over Title VI. By contrast, MESA, the primary Middle East studies organization in North America, was not formed until 1967, although Title VI funded Middle East centers from the very beginning in 1958. My

examination of the Congressional Index Survey, the database I used to find Congressional documents related to my research questions, did not find any testimony directly by MESA representatives. Nor did I find any mention of the other Arab American organizations, some of whose representatives I interviewed for this study, as having testified or submitted a written statement. There were a few instances of directors of Title VI Middle East centers testifying or having submitted written statements. However, in no case was the director Arab American. Lockman (2004) sheds some light as to why no center directors would have been Arab American. He writes, in the context of the early years of Title VI:

As senior American-trained scholars who could launch and run these new [Title VI] centers were in short supply, a number of them were initially led by senior scholars imported from the Middle East or Europe. (p. 126)

He returns to the topic in a later chapter, looking back at thirty years of experience with Title VI centers. He comments:

Thirty years ago the academic study of the Middle East was conducted in the United States largely by American-born white males. Over the decades since, the gender balance in this field as in many other domains shifted dramatically; a shift that also certainly contributed to increased scholarly attention to gender as a key analytical category. *And although statistics are hard to come by, it would also seem* that a significantly higher proportion of the faculty and graduate students in Middle East studies was now of Middle Eastern background or origin than had been the case earlier on. Among them were native speakers of Middle Eastern

languages who may also already have had a deep familiarity with one or more societies in the region. (p. 240; researcher emphasis)

Lockman's claim about greater Arab American participation is corroborated in part by an analysis of the new ED database that compiles abundant data on many international education programs that ED administers. The full title of this database is the U.S. Department of Education, International Education Programs Service International Resource Informational System (IEPS-IRIS). I explain further below several of the limitations of this database. However, with respect to the FLAS fellowship program in particular, I was able to deduce several findings from what is currently stored there (see the IEPS-IRIS at <http://ieps-iris.org/iris/ieps/search.cfm?type=FEL&Tab=FEL> for complete FLAS fellow data). Currently, the IEPS-IRIS database contains FLAS fellow information for multiple varieties of Arabic dating back only to 1985 FLAS awards. I analyzed the listings to determine the number of awards for all varieties of Arabic from the period 1985 through 1990 (which would have included the 1990-1991 academic year, i.e. the last year within the scope of this study). Because the IEPS-IRIS does not include any demographic data about FLAS fellows, I had to decide whether or not even to try to assign a heritage to the over 2000 names stored. Ultimately, I decided that I would sort through the names and for those that indicated a heritage from the Arab world to consider them, however tentatively, as heritage learners. This is, of course, a very precarious decision. There are any number of reasons these FLAS fellow may have had last names suggesting Arab heritage when, in fact, these fellows may have had no exposure to Arabic prior to formal university study. I justified my decision, however,

partly based on the fact that the absence of any demographic data left me no other choice than to “profile” the fellows in this crude way.

In an attempt to lend a bit more validity to my approach to the IEPS-IRIS data, I compared my findings to a 1987 survey of 568 students of Arabic at 14 U.S. and Canadian universities (Belnap, 1987). That survey, which included Title VI-related and independent Arabic language programs, found that around 10% of respondents reported a nationality from the Middle East. In addition, 8.1% of respondents listed “heritage” as one of their top three reasons for studying Arabic; overall, “heritage” appeared as one of the respondents’ reasons 14.4% of the time. Finally, 16.7% of respondents to this survey listed reading the Qur’an or other religious texts as one of their top three reasons for studying Arabic; overall, religion appeared as one of the reasons reported 29.8% of the time. Using this survey as a baseline, I assumed that the percentage of FLAS fellows with last names indicating Middle East heritage should fall close to the percentages reported in Belnap (1987), seeing as the time periods of the survey and the FLAS data overlapped so closely.

In fact, I did find similar percentages among the FLAS data on the IEPS-IRIS database. Between 1985 and 1990, an average of 119 FLAS awards were granted each year for study of Arabic. (This figure includes all varieties of Arabic listed on the IEPS-IRIS, although for this period of time every grant but one was listed under “Arabic.” The only exception was listed under “Arabic-Gulf.”) The average percentage of these FLAS grants awarded to individuals with last names suggesting Middle Eastern heritage was 16.8%. The range of that percentage for each year ran between 11% and 26%. Even with the crude means by which I assigned “heritage” to the FLAS awards listed on the

IEPS-IRIS database, I feel comfortable reporting these number as they seem to line up with the Belnap (1987) survey.

Certainly, part of understanding the limited impact of Title VI, particularly in the early years, on Arabic as a heritage language is tied to the history of immigration from the Arab world to the United States. The data presented in chapter 4 make clear that there were indeed Arabic speakers in the U.S.: By the 1940s, Arabic was the 13th largest LOTE, and by 1970, there were upwards of 200,000 Arabic speakers in the country (Fishman, et al., 1986; Kloss 1977/1998). Nevertheless, significant immigration from the Arab world to the United States did not begin again in earnest until immigration laws were changed in 1965, and in particular not until conflicts in the Middle East began to intensify, starting with the Six Days War in 1967.

Interview data offer another set of insights as to the success Title VI may (or may not) have had in attracting Arab Americans or Arabic heritage speakers to its programs. The first excerpt presented is from my interview with a former Title VI director. Her comments refer to a variety of federal policies motivated by national security that fund critical language instruction; nevertheless, her comments offer some insights as to why heritage speakers may not have flocked to Title VI programs. She stated:

Well you know, I'm going to be honest with you. I completely recognize that the heritage learners offer us an untapped pool of talent and possibility, but I [*pause*] the federal government has blotted its copybook so thoroughly on invasion of privacy, on holding records that they said they wouldn't hold, on identifying people, on misusing people, I know I'm going to sound political but this is me personally, but I would be scared to death if I were an Arab American and uh a

person, a well meaning social worker were to come around school and say, “Oh you’re an immigrant, you should be keeping your children going into the language and here, let me take your name!” I mean I would be terrified. Utterly terrified, because you know, they’ve blotted it so often. (Participant 14, transcript 7, lines 318- 326)

The second excerpt is from an interview with an Arabic instructor. He characterized the relationship between Arabic language programs and heritage speakers thus:

Then you’re getting into the heritage thing. The Arab American community is very shy about advertising itself and about expecting its students to be competent in the heritage language. I’ve had students come in here from Arab American backgrounds saying, “My parents told me I can’t do Arabic here. So I want to know what my grandma is saying when she swears at me”... you can even make a distinction between Arabic and Persian. You go to Austin and you go to UCLA, Persian classes. I mean they’ve got multiple sections of first-year Persian. Why? You’ve got this huge Persian community saying, “You get yourself in there and learn Persian.” Arab? No. They say, “You’re American, you’re in America and don’t make waves.” And in general there’s this—look, it—it’s somewhat changing... Um, it’s gradually shifting a bit but unless you’re in Michigan and close to Detroit where, okay, things are different, or in Brooklyn, there’s very much a desire to melt into the larger community and not advertise your Arabness and not to draw attention to anything by indeed taking Arabic. (Participant 10, transcript 10, lines 436-453)

The most thoroughly documented conflict with respect to Title VI Middle East language and area studies centers, one which helps to make sense of the above participants' interpretations of "blotted copybooks" and Arab American "shyness," is that which occurred at the University of Arizona (UA) in the early 1980s. This history has been published already, as a chapter in the 1985 edition of Paul Findley's *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby* (see chapter 8 for a complete discussion of this history); therefore, I cannot present this case as research findings *per se*. However, the conflict is relevant in helping to explain participant interpretations. In addition, though, my research in ED's records uncovered several files' worth of documents about the conflict at UA that were not included or referred to in Findley's earlier study. Therefore, I believe the case merits brief mention here.

The conflict began in 1980 when representatives of the Tucson Jewish Community Council (TJCC) met with Sheila Scoville, the outreach coordinator for UA's Title VI Middle East Center. Scoville was responsible for, among other things, overseeing a professional development course on Middle East studies. The course was held in the library of a Tucson Unified School District (TUSD) elementary school, and TUSD participants were eligible, upon successful completion of the course, for salary advancement credit. The TJCC representative alleged in that first meeting that, based on their interpretation of that course and its content, Scoville was sponsoring a "pro-Arab propaganda network" (Findley, 1985, p. 212).

This first meeting initiated a two-and-a-half-year long conflict of accusations and recriminations between the TJCC and various representatives of UA, both from the Title VI center itself and the university administration at large. During that period of time, two

separate panels of outside experts were convened to review the content of the UA center's outreach materials, and eventually of the entire UA Title VI center itself and its library holdings. In addition, some TJCC representatives raised multiple, extreme personal accusations against UA staff, including the claim that the chair of the Middle East studies department was a former *Wehrmacht* officer and war criminal in Nazi Germany. Findley's study documents that neither outside panels of experts found any evidence of systematic anti-Israeli bias in UA courses, library holdings, or materials and activities in its outreach programs. In addition, he clarifies that the personal accusations made against UA staff were entirely untrue; in fact, the UA professor accused of being a Nazi war criminal had actually survived the concentration camps himself, although he was not Jewish. Findley also conducts a thorough analysis of media reports. He notes that the accusations made by the TJCC almost always received prominent coverage, on the air and in print, while the conclusions exonerating the UA went uncovered entirely or relegated to shorter, less prominent pieces. The only accusation levied by the TJCC that outside reviewers sustained was that Scoville was too lax in her oversight of the outreach programs. Findley concludes his chapter with quotes from Jewish professors at the UA and other members of the Jewish community in Tucson to stress that the conflict initiated by the TJCC was not representative of attitudes among the entire Jewish community, but rather of a few committee members in the organization.

My research in archival records at ED uncovered an immense amount of information about this conflict. In fact, I learned about the experience first in these files; only later, when I asked Ed McDermott, the ED program officer for Middle East programs, did he refer me to Findley's book. ED's archival records consist of four legal-

size manila file folders, each three to four inches thick, with correspondence, documents and media clippings regarding the conflict. The typewritten file labels affixed to these four folders read: "U of AZ: Time of Troubles." One explanation for the extent of ED's files is that TJCC representatives repeatedly consulted with Congressional representatives from Arizona. TJCC representatives persuaded these representatives to write several letters on their behalf to ED officials, including the Secretary of Education, calling for a thorough review of UA's Title VI Middle East center. Copies of that correspondence are contained in ED's files; the responses by ED officials indicate that because UA had just recently undergone the grant competition process, which by design included an outside review of the university's program by area experts and scholars, ED would consider that sufficient scrutiny of the program and declined further action.

ED's files also contained a letter written by TUSD Assistant Superintendent Jack Murrieta, in which he references "allegations of substantial discrimination" in the UA-sponsored course at the heart of the conflict, "Oriental Studies 497nx." As a result, TUSD acted to rescind any salary advancement credits it had awarded to course participants, and expressly forbade the use of any lesson plans developed or drawing on the course in TUSD classes.

One of the turning points in the case overall was the tactics that the TJCC employed to gather information about the UA outreach courses. During the investigation, it came to light that the TJCC had asked members of its organization who were also TUSD teachers to enroll in the course in order to collect information about it. Part of that data collection included making audio recordings of class discussion without disclosing the recordings to course participants. In addition, the TJCC teachers included in the

report of their findings that the course materials neither included any maps of the region identifying the state of Israel, nor was there significant discussion of the country. ED's files contain a letter written by the librarian at the TUSD school that hosted the course, addressed to TUSD Assistant Superintendent Murrieta. In the letter, the librarian refers directly to the TJCC report that found a lack of information about Israel. She clarifies that the course focused on the history of Islam through World War II. As Israel was not founded until three years after the war's conclusion, she argued, it should not be surprising that historical maps of the region would not include the country.

Interestingly, the bulk of records contained in ED's files regarding this conflict are TUSD and UA correspondence, not ED correspondence. Thus, although ED officials formally declined to involve itself in the conflict between UA and the TJCC, they clearly kept close track of the scandal as it unfolded over two-and-a-half years. Ultimately, the TJCC issued no formal apologies for its accusations against UA, or in particular for the personal attacks levied against UA staff. On the contrary, the TJCC named the two principal actors in the conflict (including the man who accused the Middle East studies department chair of being a Nazi war criminal) "Man and Woman of the Year" in 1982 (Findley, 1985, p. 215).

Findley (1985) raises important questions as to the timing of the TJCC's accusations. Although the UA Title VI Middle East center had been established six years earlier, it was not until 1981 that the first allegations were made. Findley ties that timing to the release of an American Jewish Committee (AJC) report, entitled "Middle East Centers at Selected American Universities," but known more broadly as the Schiff Report. The report asserted that Arab governments and what it called pro-Arab

corporations (e.g. major U.S.-based oil companies) had provided a significant amount of private funding to augment Title VI funds. This outside funding was construed as *de facto* anti-Israeli bias. Findley traces in some detail the extent to which TJCC representatives worked in conjunction with national organizations, such as the AJC and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, in conducting its investigation of the UA program. He also alludes to other campaigns, e.g. against Middle East centers at UCLA and the University of Washington-Seattle, arguing that the UA case was a “test case in preparation for similar attacks on other Middle East centers in the United States” (p. 235). However, my own research did not uncover document evidence of other such organized campaigns against Title VI Middle East language and area studies centers, nor did interview participants raise other specific instances, beyond the general assessments cited above.

The Impact of Title VI on Heritage Language Education Overall

The second research question behind this dissertation aimed to understand the impact that the relationship between national security and language policies such as Title VI had on Arabic as a heritage language. The previous section addresses that question insofar as there was data to report. I offer several explanations of why that data with respect to Arabic was in fact quite limited. However, it would be inaccurate to assert that the data was limited *only* for Arabic, when in fact there was limited data regarding heritage language education *at all*, irrespective of the specific heritage language. I consider this itself an important finding, and therefore have separated discussion of this topic into a distinct section of this chapter.

Indeed, the most salient finding regarding national security, Title VI and heritage language education is a null category, i.e. the absence of data. In the discussion above regarding Title VI and Arabic, I mentioned several data sources that looked at language proficiency outcomes and mentioned that those sources never disaggregated data to examine demographic data, such as country of origin, first language, ethnicity or race, etc. An additional example is the “NDFL Follow Up Survey,” dated April 11, 1968. The title refers to the National Defense Foreign Language program, which was authorized by Title IV of the NDEA, not Title VI. Still the approach to data taken with this program indicates the overall approach to data keeping on NDEA fellowship awardees. I found the survey in ED documents and noted the information it reported. The survey comprised 2179 responses and focused mostly on career choices of past NDFL fellows. The demographic data it asked of respondents was limited to gender, age, and marital status (to which one person wrote in “nun”, as that was not a given category). However, no questions were listed asking about ethnic, racial, national, or linguistic background (“NDFL Follow Up Survey”, 1968). It seems this tradition of data collection will continue with respect to ED’s international and language education programs. The IEPS-IRIS database, to which I have referred several times, still does not report any demographic data on individual grant awardees, although it does list their first and last names.

Exclusion of heritage language issues from discussions of national security and Title VI was not just in the negative, i.e. an absence of data. Instead, several sources specifically document the effective exclusion of heritage speakers from Title VI programs. For example, my analysis of ED-produced brochures advertising the FLAS

program reveals shifting eligibility rules that at the time expressly excluded heritage speakers of funded languages. The brochures were produced for the FLAS program in AY 61-62, 62-63, 65-66, and 66-67 (although the program then was called the Modern Language and Area Studies Fellowship). The section describing participant eligibility included both steadfast rules and program preferences. For the first four years for which I found program brochures, they stated that preference in awarding fellowships would be made to “candidates who do not have the advantage of being native speakers of the language they propose to study.” In AY 66-67, however, that language did not appear, although it is impossible to know if this translated into more active recruitment of native or heritage speakers. When I first found this pattern in the brochures, I thought it was of little significance, because “native speaker” most likely meant a candidate born in a country in which the target language is the native language, i.e. a fluent, educated speaker. However, when I compared this preference with the eligibility rules, I reconsidered my decision. These rules stipulated that participants in the fellowship were required to be either U.S. citizens or “resident aliens” who could prove they would remain in the U.S. after completion of their studies and contribute “in a significant way” to the country. Resident alien status comes only with a green card, not simply a student visa. Therefore, the FLAS program automatically excluded international students who were in the U.S. solely for the purpose of higher education on student visas. These two rules, then, *did* apply to students who might have immigrated as children, but who also had spent enough time in the U.S. to qualify for resident alien status. It was precisely this pool of applicants, then, who were excluded from the FLAS program from 1961-1966 based on their heritage language competencies. I need to acknowledge here that, of

course, “heritage language speaker” and “heritage language education” were not salient terms either to policy makers or to language experts at this time; I simply use those contemporary terms to refer to actual practice reflected in the data.

In addition to the effect of Title VI rules on heritage language speakers, other evidence in the data speak to the broader assumption that foreign language education was a project for monolingual, white, native-born U.S. citizens, not for native or heritage speakers of the target language. The most jarring example of such assumptions is found in Richard Ohmann’s speech to the MLA in March 1968. He remarked:

Second, it is reasonable to ask of a specific proposal in the name of education: education for whom, and to what end? The study of a foreign language is of great value to a diplomat, a foreign representative of a business firm, a literary scholar, a leisured traveler; it has use of a different kind for the generally cultivated man. For ghetto dwellers and poor farmers, however, other educational needs must have higher priority—even, perhaps, other educational needs within MLA fields. By investing money and effort in the teaching of foreign languages, the MLA has made a social choice whose beneficent impact is primarily on the middle and upper classes. (Ohmann, 1968, p. 989)

A significant strand in the data with respect to this assumption of a homogenous student population for foreign language education recognized that the homogeneity was largely the result of Americanization campaigns around World War I and the effects of beliefs about the “melting pot.” For example, in the report, *Strength through Wisdom*, issued in 1979 by President Carter’s commission on international and language education, the authors state:

Americans' unwillingness to learn foreign languages is often viewed by others, not without cause, as arrogance. The melting-pot tradition that denigrates immigrants' maintenance of their skill to speak their native tongue still lingers, and this unfortunately causes linguistic minorities at home to be ignored as a potential asset. (While recommendations on the essentially domestic aspects of bilingualism are not within the Commission's assignment, we do emphasize that a comprehensive language policy ought to recognize this important national resource.) ("Strength through Wisdom", 1980, p. 12)

While the report focuses more closely on the negative impact of the melting pot tradition, it does suggest a role for native speakers of LOTEs in broader project of foreign language education.

In this, the *Strength through Wisdom* report points to an additional theme in the data that, when the topic of heritage language speakers was broached at all, it was in the context of how heritage language speakers could aid the monolingual English-speaking majority. For example, later in the *Strength through Wisdom* report, the authors describe how heritage language speakers can contribute to the nation:

The United States is blessed with a largely untapped resource of talent in the form of racial and ethnic minorities who, by being brought into the mainstream of educational and employment opportunities in the areas of foreign language and international studies, can be expected to make rapid, new and valuable contribution to America's capacity to deal persuasively and effectively with the world outside its border. ("Strength through Wisdom", 1980, p. 14)

The report concludes with a list of bulleted recommendations to improve international and language education in the United States. Only one of those points addresses heritage language speakers. It reads:

[S]pecial attention should be given to encouraging ethnic and other minority-group members to enter linguistic and international studies, and to build on their existing linguistic resources so they may contribute more to American education, diplomacy and international business;... (“Strength through Wisdom”, 1980, p. 19)

In fact, when heritage language education, or heritage language speakers more precisely, were mentioned in this context of the assistance they could provide to the project of foreign language education, Title VI-relevant policy actors often also spoke of control. The following example of this theme is taken from an exchange in the Congressional record from the original deliberations over the NDEA and Title VI. Archibald MacAllister, then director and instructor in the Department of Modern Languages at Princeton University, was the witness, and was taking questions from Senator Gordon L. Allott, Republican of Colorado. In a section of the hearings report entitled “Finding Skilled Instructors,” the two engaged in the following exchange:

Senator Allott: I realize that attitude. Is it not actually a great source of opportunity that we are overlooking For example, the reverse of the situation, if I may use the name, is Congressman Sadlak, of Connecticut, who, although native-born, speaks Polish⁷. People I have spoken with say he speaks Polish better than

⁷ Referring to Congressmen’s heritage was a regular point of discussion, even when it reflected a mere casual acquaintance with language history. Sen. Brademas, for example, registered his support for

anybody they have ever seen. I guess he is the son of Polish parents, but born in this country. Certainly if that is true, out of all these thousands of thousands of people who have come to this country, if we were not so persnickety about methodology and methods of education, we could find people who could actually start putting to work the beginnings and the rudiments for teaching these languages.

Dr. MacAllister: I agree.

Senator Allott: Would that be true?

Dr. MacAllister: Under the proper supervision.

Senator Allott: Under the proper supervision and guidance.

MacAllister's response to Sen. Allott's questions recalls Walker's description of the war-time ASTP language classes, in which a native speaker worked as an aide to the trained linguist who was primarily responsible for instruction.

Only in a very few instances were the benefits of heritage language speakers in language education programs such as Title VI discussed in terms of the benefits heritage speakers themselves would accrue. Returning to Mildenerger's 1955 speech to the Wisconsin Modern Foreign Language Teachers Conference, he stated:

For instance, there are more than 22 million persons in the United States with a foreign mother tongue, and these people offer a great reservoir of support for foreign language study. The FL Program has sponsored a conference of persons who specialize in the interest and problems of various cultural groups; these conferees explored possible ways of fostering self-esteem and mutual respect

broadening Title VI to include study of Latin and Ancient Greek, and referred to fellow Congressmen of Italian and Greek heritage to justify his support, (Brademas, 1962).

among these various cultural groups represented in America. (Mildenberger, 1955, p. 6)

Simon (1992) addresses the same topic with particular attention to Spanish speakers in the U.S. He writes:

Because of our rich ethnic mix, the United States is home to millions whose first language is not English. One of every fifty Americans is foreign-born. We are the fourth largest Spanish-speaking country in the world. Yet almost nothing is being done to preserve the language skills we have or to use this rich linguistic resource to train people in the use of a language other than English. (p. 4)

Overall, then, most instances when heritage language education, whether in Arabic or any other language, was mentioned, it was in the context of benefiting the broader project of foreign language education in the United States.

The reader will notice an uneasy balance in this chapter: some 80% discusses the multiple interpretations of the impact of national security on foreign language education, compared to 20% discussing the impact on heritage language education. This imbalance serves to underscore the point I made above that the absence of data concerning the impact Title VI had on heritage language education, either broadly conceived or with respect to Arabic in particular, is itself the most salient finding. The following chapter turns to discuss the implications I see based on the findings presented here.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of findings

The previous three chapters have presented a wide range of findings based on the document, archival and interview research I conducted in the course of this dissertation. Chapter 4 reviewed the history of immigration from the Arab world to the United States. It identified a series of high points in that immigration. The first occurred around the turn of the 20th century and included a mixture of urban merchants and rural peasants from what then was called Greater Syria. By and large, immigrants from this period were Christian and, like many of their immigrant peers at the time, quickly responded to the pressures of Americanization by adopting English as the dominant language of use in the community. Immigration from the Arab world did not continue in a significant way until immigration laws were changed in 1965, and in particular until conditions in the Middle East became less stable with the advent of the Six Days War in 1967. Subsequent political and economic crises in the Middle East created significant push factors leading to increased emigration from the region. Higher education and employment opportunities proved to be the most important pull factors bringing more Arab immigrants to the U.S. Arab immigration after 1965 took on two important characteristics. The first is that immigrants tended to be wealthier, more elite, and members of the professional classes of their home countries. Many even brought with them significant proficiency in English. The second is that Arab immigrants from this period, and to this day, were more likely to be Muslim, even though the vast majority of Arab Americans continued to be Christian. Political and social developments in the Middle East also contributed to the development

of pan-Arab nationalism and a renewed pride in and identity based on Islam. Both developments, coupled with civil rights struggles in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, led Arab Americans to cultivate a stronger Arab (or Arab American) identity, as well as to pass on that identity to their children. Nevertheless, English exerted strong pressures on the Arab American community, such that community language practice shifted toward English by the third generation. In spite of that pressure, by 1970 there were almost 200,000 speakers of Arabic in the United States (Fishman, et al. 1986; Kloss 1977/1998). By means of language maintenance efforts and increased immigration from the Arab world, that number grew to over 600,000, based on 2000 U.S. Census data and figures provided by the Arab American Institute. Irrespective of numerical figures, recent studies have documented the profound symbolic role that Modern Standard Arabic plays within Arab American communities in this country (e.g. Husseinali, 2006; Rouchdy, 2002).

Chapter 5 reviewed the history of the National Defense Education Act, and its Title VI language development program. It grounded that history in three distinct developments in foreign language education that predate the bill's passage in 1958, and stressed that Title VI would likely not have existed at all (and if so, not in the form it took) without the work of Kenneth Mildenerger, William Parker and others involved in the MLA's Foreign Language Project. That discussion also situated the development and passage of the NDEA against powerful political currents that effectively limited federal intervention into public education. In the end, the panic resulting from the Soviet launch of the sputnik satellites overpowered those historical arguments against "big government" and against desegregation. The chapter detailed the structure of Title VI in its original

authorization, and the four principle programs it funded, namely language and area studies centers; summer language institutes; research and project grants to develop materials and pedagogy; and fellowships for advanced students of critical languages to study those languages abroad. The chapter traced the history of Title VI through multiple reauthorizations, and focused in particular on the first budget battle in which funding for the program stood to be cut entirely. Part of what motivated this first attempt to cut the program was growing public and Congressional frustration over the Vietnam War, and in particular recent experiences in which the CIA had used federally funded research programs on university campuses to conduct their own specific projects. An attitude had developed that, if Vietnam represented what “U.S. world leadership” in fact entailed, then perhaps the academy should not be so deeply involved in federally funded projects such as Title VI. The chapter characterized Title VI as a program that grew to be fairly modest in scope, yet stable in how it functioned, how it was funded, and how Congress handled reauthorizations, at least by the mid 1970s. In particular, by the time the NDEA sunset in 1980 and portions of it, including Title VI, were incorporated into the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, the rationale for maintaining Title VI focused more on U.S. economic competitiveness, rather than national security. Drawing on Brecht and Rivers (2000), the chapter concluded by identifying a series of tensions that characterized the history of Title VI: 1) whether the primary focus of Title VI should be language or area study; 2) whether funding should privilege less commonly taught languages or the “big” languages; 3) whether the goal of Title VI programs should be to produce specialized knowledge for advanced scholars or generalized knowledge for larger numbers of higher education students; 4) whether subsequent Title VI funding should work to maintain the

expertise already developed or to expand it; 5) whether Title VI centers should be organized around geographic regions or around themes of study; and 6) whether the primary target for Title VI funding should be at the higher education or K-12 levels.

Chapter 6 moved beyond the narrative histories of Arab immigration and of Title VI from the previous two chapters, and looked more closely at interpretations made by policy-relevant actors of the policy. Those interpretations considered the impact of perceived national security concerns on the formation and implementation of Title VI, as well as the impact of that relationship on Arabic as a heritage language and heritage language education overall. The chapter reported findings based on insights offered by members of three distinct interpretive communities: *policy elites*, including language education researchers, language education advocates, elected officials, and representatives of scholarly and professional organizations; *university actors*, including Title VI administrative staff, Arabic instructors in programs tied to Title VI centers, and former students in Title VI Arabic programs; and *Arab American actors*, who may have belonged to either of the first two communities, and/or who represented Arab American civic and political organizations, and scholarly organizations for Arabic instruction and/or Middle East studies.

In this chapter I reported nine major findings. The first addressed multiple definitions of national security. I identified four distinct interpretations of security that operated in the data, including geopolitical, economic, domestic and social justice and/or human rights approaches to understanding security or defining “the national interest.” A particular point in this discussion was the extent to which geopolitical and economic definitions seemed to commingle. In addition, I stressed that only one excerpt from the

data attempted to define security in explicit terms. By contrast, most other policy-relevant actors embedded their definitions of security into discussions of foreign language education and how it could be of use to bolstering said security. Second, I reported how various notions of common sense emerged in the data. Many Title VI-relevant policy actors invoked common sense as a basis for their interpretations. This common sense was applied either to discussion of the status of the United States in the world, or to the role that foreign language education can (and should) play in maintaining that status, or to both. I closed this section by offering disconfirming evidence that spoke to the contradiction of asserting a critical, indeed “common-sensical” role for language education in maintaining security, and what policy-relevant actors interpreted as severe under-funding of language education policies such as Title VI. Third, Title VI-relevant policy actors used the notion of responsibility to frame various aspects of the policy. Most important, policy-relevant actors described in detail what they held to be the United States’ responsibilities, duties and burdens in the world. Others enumerated specifically what they felt academic and university responsibilities should be with respect to the position of the U.S. internationally. Related to this last issue was the fourth major finding I reported. I returned to the question of foreign language education and how policy-relevant actors identified multiple uses for such education. Some excerpts from the data positioned foreign language education as one means by which to facilitate U.S. world leadership, either in direct service of U.S. foreign policy goals, or to influence the design and execution of that policy. Other excerpts understood foreign language education as a means by which to temper international conflict and foster mutual understanding.

Fifth, I reported the findings based on my analysis of a separate set of data sources that trace the history of U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East, especially from World War II on. The balance of these histories indicated that U.S. policies toward and interventions in the Middle East were conscious, targeted, purposeful, and in many instances not in alignment with the interests of those living in the region. Most important, these histories document the extent to which U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East were tied directly to U.S. geopolitical and economic interests, and how the U.S. might further those interests for its own benefit.

Sixth, my analysis shifted to consider bottom-up interpretations of both research questions. This shift considered how policy-relevant actors regularly ascribed attitudes about foreign language education and its relationship to U.S. power to the public at large, without basing that ascription on any empirical evidence. Related to this was a tendency, particularly in the interview data, to distinguish between expert and novice opinion to explain why most in the U.S. would not be open to foreign language education. This section of findings closed with discussion about the one effort to measure public opinion about foreign language education, a 1979 survey, which in many ways contradicted the attitudes that so many policy-relevant actors ascribed to ordinary people. Seventh, I continued to look at bottom-up interpretations of my research questions and reported how policy-relevant actors identified an entirely different set of threats from those discussed in the first theme with respect to U.S. national security or national interests. Those threats included Cold War ideology and its impact on scholarship, as well as the effect of federal control of academic curricula. These fears were particularly acute among scholars of Middle East studies. However, I also presented significant disconfirming evidence that

suggested greater academic independence from federal control than often had been feared. Eighth, I turned to the second research question to report findings of how Title VI impacted Arabic instruction at the higher education level. I also considered the impact of Title VI on Arabic as a heritage language, primarily by assessing the degree to which Arab Americans were involved in Title VI programs for the Middle East and/or Arabic. The findings indicated a very inconsistent impact. Certain programs funded by Title VI, such as the research and project grants and the language and area studies centers, identified and funded Arabic to a significant degree—or at least to a higher degree than other “critical languages.” Other programs, such as the FLAS fellowships and summer language institutes, did not target Arabic and/or Arab Americans as thoroughly. The most important finding, however, was the incompleteness of the data in records kept by ED or by participating universities. Interview data compounded the difficulty in assessing the findings. Almost all participants indicated the expertise, pedagogical breakthroughs and curricular materials for Arabic language instruction in the U.S. is indeed limited; however, they stressed repeatedly that whatever capacity does exist is thanks almost entirely to the seed money and consistent support that Title VI programs have provided over the last 40 years. Other participants, however, suggested that the impact of Title VI has, in fact, been limited with respect to Arabic because of socio-political concerns surrounding the language and those who speak it. Finally, chapter 6 reported findings that addressed the impact of Title VI on heritage language education overall. The most salient finding, again, was the glaring lack of data concerning this question. While I allowed for the fact that the notion of heritage language education was not salient in the time period on which this dissertation focused, I also identified specific

record-keeping practices, nuances to eligibility requirements, and attitudes about who is best-suited for foreign language study to suggest why heritage speakers of critical languages targeted by Title VI may have, in fact, been left out of its programs.

This wide array of research findings forms the basis for a number of conclusions. These conclusions relate as much to Title VI, its history and the myriad interpretations of it I investigated in this dissertation, as they do to the urgent debates and discussions surrounding contemporary language education policies motivated by national security. In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus my discussion on the conclusions I have drawn with respect to Title VI. However, I should acknowledge that at the research, analysis and write-up stages of my work, I could not get away from the proverbial white elephant in the room: especially in my conversations with interview participants, and then again in my ongoing analysis of the data, the presence of current language education policies motivated by national security loomed large. I would be remiss to close this dissertation without acknowledging that presence and making connections between the specific research conducted here and how it relates to these current policies. Thus, I have chosen to include an epilogue to my dissertation to explore the implications of these research findings and my conclusions based on them for contemporary language education policies motivated by national security.

Political scripture

The first conclusion with respect to Title VI takes us back to the days in which Congress first drafted and deliberated the policy. The data reported in chapter 5 suggest that framing foreign language education with national security concerns was anything but a

foregone conclusion. Instead, policy makers exploited the notion of “national defense” as a calculated response to the confluence of a number political developments: Cold War fear-mongering; the panicked response to the launch of sputnik; concerns over the Democratic Party’s credentials on national defense questions; the hangover of almost a decade of anti-integration and anti-“big government” politicking; and not least the scapegoating of Progressive Education to explain U.S. ills. As several excerpts from the data verify, policy makers made their own calculated choices in response to these political currents. Recall Clowse (1981) and her discussion of Sen. Hill, one of the two main actors behind passage of the NDEA. Earlier, she reports Hill’s signature on the Southern Manifesto, a declaration against any form of racial integration. As she turns to focus on Hill’s leadership during the initial NDEA authorization, Clowse writes:

Senator Hill was also acutely sensitive to the prevailing fears in Alabama and throughout the South over school desegregation. He knew, therefore, that in the 1958 session [of Congress], any educational-aid plan he might sponsor should not seem to be part of that explosive situation. He notified his staff from the start to use the national-security emphasis to assist, if possible, all levels of education. He ordered them to draft titles, however, that would be technically free of latency as desegregation weapons. Hill was hopeful that a bill directed toward national-defense needs might well succeed in steering a course “between the Scylla of race and the Charybdis of religion.” (p. 67)

The political cynicism in how policy-relevant actors framed the NDEA is equally well stated in the following excerpts from the data. Consider the comments by James McCaskill, the lobbyist for the National Education Association at the time. He remarked

in the winter of 1958: “The bill’s best hope is that the Russians will shoot off something else” (cited in Clowse, 1981, p. 77). Moreover, Newhall (2006) cites an oral history of the NDEA from 1958 in which Stewart McClure, clerk of the Senate Committee on Labor, Education and Public Welfare, claims credit for coining the title of the bill. His explanation further underscores the cynicism of the moment, lamenting it simultaneously:

I invented that god-awful title: The National Defense Education Act. If there are any words less compatible, really, intellectually, with the purposes of education—it’s not to defend the country; it’s to defend the mind and develop the human spirit, not to build cannons and battleships. It was a horrible title, but it worked.

It worked. How could you attack it? (p. 203)

Even at the moment of the policy’s baptism, some policy makers were acutely aware of the political calculus involved in getting the measure through Congress, and in the latter case, expressed that awareness as regret.

In many ways, the most compelling evidence to verify this conclusion about historical context is the radical transformation of Sen. Johnson into President Johnson.

Recall the description Clowse (1981) makes of the former:

During a visit to the president on November 6 [1957], Johnson admitted that the Democrats were vulnerable to blame should the hearings reveal government negligence in assuring strategic superiority...Johnson gaveled the hearings to order on November 25, drawing, “We meet today in the atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor.” The Democratic presidential aspirant saw to it that the entire proceedings were conducted in an atmosphere of extremity. He concluded the

hearings by proclaiming in a burst of cold war rhetoric, “We are in a race for survival, and we intend to win that race.” (p. 59)

Merely nine years later, President Johnson addressed the following message to Congress:

We would be shortsighted to confine our vision to this Nation’s shorelines. The same rewards we count at home will flow from sharing in a worldwide effort to rid mankind of this slavery of ignorance and the scourge of disease. We bear a special role in this liberating mission. Our resources will be wasted in defending freedom’s frontiers if we neglect the spirit that makes men want to be free. Half a century ago, the philosopher William James declared that mankind must seek a “moral equivalent of war.”...Only when people know about—and care about—each other will nations learn to live together in harmony. (H. Doc. 89-375, 1966, p. 2)

Although there may still be much issue to take with President Johnson’s comments from 1966 (more on this point shortly), my conclusion still holds: namely, if Washington politicians or Congress *only* interest themselves in language education policies when national security or economic competitiveness are at stake, then Johnson’s message as president would not have been possible. Indeed, Johnson as president likely would never have felt compelled to morph from a Cold War liberal invoking a “race for survival” against the Soviet Union into a world leader seeking “moral equivalents to war.” In order to understand this transformation, one would have to account for radical changes in U.S. society between 1957 and 1966, such as: the peak of the Southern civil rights movement, the shift of that struggle to Northern cities and its subsequent radicalization; the growing influence the civil rights movement had on other social struggles, especially the women’s

liberation movement; increasing concerns over the Vietnam War, a war initiated and widened by two successive Democratic presidents; the collective impact on public opinion of national liberation struggles across the world; and public reaction to the threat of direct nuclear conflict after the Cuban missile crisis.

Obviously, I would need to conduct several additional dissertations to look at the impact of these experiences on U.S. political discourse over the course of those nine years. The broader point, however, is that each shift in historical circumstances provided new social and political constellations in which policy makers appropriated policy; as such, a single interpretation of what Congress will or will not consider, one which draws a straight line from 1958 to 1991 (or worse still, to 2008), seems impossible, or at least insufficient to make sense of the real practice of language education policy. If for no other reason, an interpretation of Title VI history that draws such a straight line effectively excludes the reality that individuals make choices, indeed *history-making* choices, even if they do so under (social, political, historical, economic) conditions *not* of their choosing.

Yet this sort of historical telescoping is precisely what the data indicate many Title VI-relevant policy actors have done. To be sure, Title VI is situated in the historical context of the sputnik moment. But many interpretations of the NDEA and Title VI freeze into place the specific constellation under which the NDEA emerged, and elevate it to political scripture commanding the policy process. That scripture then becomes the text against which subsequent moments in Title VI's history and similar language education policies are measured. For example, Ruther (1994) repeatedly ascribes the ultimate demise of the IEA in the late 60s to the *absence* of national security concerns in

its stated goals. The IEA is one of only three language education policies to which I referred in this dissertation that stated cultural awareness and mutual understanding as primary goals. For Ruther, this is precisely why the measure never got off the ground. Moreover, as I reported in chapter 6, virtually each interview participant reiterated that Congress would only consider a language education policy insofar as it has direct ties to bolstering national security or economic competitiveness. Even at a surface level, the research presented here indicates that this is not the case: in addition to the IEA, Congress passed and funded (no matter how short-term, no matter how stingily, no matter the ideological baggage each of these policies carried) the EHSP and the FLAP. In each case, these policies asserted the goals of developing cross-cultural and foreign language awareness among U.S. grade school and higher education students. That is, under different circumstances, policy actors made different choices, even if those choices did not enjoy the same longevity as Title VI. In my view, this fact underscores the conclusion I am drawing here that effective language policy analysis should then focus on: *how* these very different choices were possible; *why* they made sense to policy actors in that moment; and *how* language education advocates might have shifted their advocacy, from the fossilized assumption that national security sells, to a real-time assessment of actual political circumstances. Instead, the overwhelming balance of the data I found in this research leads me to the conclusion that most Title VI-relevant policy actors have neglected a complete analysis of the contexts in which language policies, such as the NDEA, the IEA, the EHSP or FLAP, were created, and instead have constructed a political rulebook stating that Congress only acts on (language) education when national security and economic competitiveness are at stake. In fact, as the review

of literature indicated, the contemporary incantation of this political scripture goes so far as to argue that the “pragmatic” among us best heed those rules if we are to succeed in our language education advocacy. A more logical approach would be to consider each of these policies in the specific contexts in which they operated; to understand the competing interests and motivations of policy-relevant actors; to understand their choices in those contexts; and to use that understanding to shape more effective language education policy advocacy in the future.

Herder or *das westfälische Volk*?

Related to this static reading of Title VI history I found in the data, many interpretations of Title VI, indeed of the uses of foreign language competency overall, involved policy-relevant actors speaking on behalf of entire groups and populations¹. This pattern manifested itself in the data I reported above in several ways. Most prominent was the ascription of certain attitudes and beliefs to the U.S. population as a whole, without any empirical evidence (be it quantitative or qualitative) to verify such proclamations. I found several perplexing, if also instructive, experiences that resulted from this practice. The first is that different policy-relevant actors came to rather different conclusions based on their reading of public opinion. Recall that the MLA Foreign Language Program staff asserted with some consistency through the 1950s and early 1960s that the public understood the role that the U.S. had adopted in the world and the attendant responsibilities. Therefore, the public generally supported expanding foreign language

¹ What made this pattern in the data all the more intriguing to me is that the representatives of scholarly and civic organizations whom I interviewed stated repeatedly that they felt they could *not* speak on behalf of their organizations’ membership. In one case, the participant told me that her group’s by-laws forbade such practice.

education, both at the K-12 and higher education levels, so that the U.S. could better fulfill its duties to the world. Yet at least one policy analyst drew the opposite conclusion, also relying on broad public attitudes to support her claim. As reported in chapter 6, Gumperz (1970) explains the ultimate demise of policies such as the IEA in terms of Congress having overstepped its mandate and pushed beyond what the public will tolerate. Without any empirical evidence to document trends in public opinion, it is difficult to conclude with confidence so many years later which interpretation was more accurate—or if *both* were accurate, then what might explain the competing conclusions.

Moreover, in chapter 6, I quote an excerpt from Mildenerger (1955) and the speech he delivered to a convention of language teachers. I remarked that this was one of the instances in which conclusions about the public's attitude toward foreign language education were based on conversations with what he called "representatives of [every] phase of society" (p. 2). Those conversations resulted in the article that ran in the *The FL Program Bulletin* entitled "Opinions Worth Hearing." As I noted in chapter 6, this article collected insights from a wide swath of U.S. society as to the benefits of foreign language competency. However, in each case these "opinions worth hearing" were those of the top leadership of the religious, political, educational, civic and military organizations consulted. Moreover, the introduction to the article explicitly excludes the opinions of foreign language professionals, assuming that readers would discount these insights as biased.

This pattern of distinguishing between expert and public opinion was particularly salient in the interview data as well. I described in chapter 6 the general tendency among interview participants to make a critical distinction. One by one, they discuss their own

experiences in learning additional languages in terms of fascination, addiction, love, devotion, curiosity, insights, and expanded horizons (except for the one participant who speaks only English). But participants in general also stated that most people in the U.S. were not open to such experiences. They continued that the broad U.S. public does not understand these benefits and insights gained through study of an additional language. As such, language advocates must rely on instrumental motivations for foreign language study, e.g. career benefits, national interests, etc., to marshal public support for language programs. In fact, several interview participants specified that unless and until public attitudes toward foreign languages change, we will not begin to see expanded foreign language programs, or advocacy for them based on other motivations. As reported in the previous chapter, this contradiction was most glaring in Simon (1992). Without irony or comment, he closes a chapter recounting the history of U.S. chauvinism towards non-English languages and the immigrants who speak them with the results of study indicating overwhelming public support for foreign language competency.

The point here is not to deny that both situations were, in fact, the case. Instead, it strikes me that the challenge would be to *explain* (and in a nod to safety zone theory, not just *describe*) why two such contradictory experiences could coexist; in other words, how did the chauvinism of the Americanization movement translate 50 years later into survey results indicating widespread public support for foreign language education? In my estimation, that challenge went largely unmet in the data I analyzed in this research. Thus, we should be reticent to accept sweeping generalizations about public opinion as a substitute for detailed, grounded analysis.

This approach to interpreting language education policies, or to advocacy for such policies, recalls Hobsbawm's quip, cited in chapter 2, about understanding history. In his collection of lectures on nationalism, Hobsbawm (1990) argues: "What Herder thought about the *Volk* cannot be used for evidence of the thoughts of the Westphalian peasantry" (p. 48). To be sure, the Title VI-relevant policy actors who participated in this study, and those whose insights I found in various documents and secondary sources, have dedicated their careers to foreign language study, the study of Arabic, to advancing Middle East and Arabic studies in the U.S., and to advocating greater financial and public support for such. The ups and downs of budget cuts, of political crises such as the conflict between the TJCC and UA's Middle East studies center in the early 1980s, etc., must certainly be exhausting and demoralizing at times to those so intimately involved. The data indicate that one strategy employed by many Title VI-relevant policy actors has been to generalize about public attitudes to help make sense of those ups and downs and political conflicts. Thus, on the one hand I must treat interpretations of Title VI and its meanings with some caution, when those interpretations are based on broad ascriptions of beliefs and attitudes to others.

On the other, in consulting the literature recounting the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, I found specific analyses that helped me explain the trends in my own data. This specific trend, i.e. Title VI-relevant policy actors ascribing specific attitudes and beliefs to others, seems to map with a central conclusion drawn by Kolko and Kolko (1972) in their exhaustive history of U.S. foreign policy in the first decade after World War II. They write, referring to historical events shortly after the war:

The question of public opinion impinges centrally on the nature of decision-making and power in the United States, and never was the true significance of this factor better revealed than at the end of 1946. Dominant political theory assigns special significance to public opinion as the origins of a democratic state's conduct, but this proposition only reinforces a positive theory of legitimacy that avoids the more durable reality that it is elite opinion and power that is the source of policy. Conventional political theory ignores the nature of interest in a class society, and the manner in which the overwhelming weight of elite opinions, desires, and needs shapes the applications of national power...Even in those periods after March 1947 public attitudes were to remain fickle and tend to relax to a less concerned view of the world scene. For this reason, more rigid and totalitarian means of handling mass opposition to ruling policy were uncalled for and liberal rhetoric was possible in a situation where a society neither endorsed nor opposed the actions of its leaders. In a society without serious opposition, manipulation replaces the knout. (p. 333)

To be sure, Kolko and Kolko's argument does not bring us closer to understanding what, in fact, the public thought about U.S. foreign policy, or in this case, the relationship of foreign language education to that policy. Their central concern here with ideology is its impact in a top-down manner. Still, their argument helps to explain why Title VI-relevant policy actors relied so consistently on "opinions worth hearing" and simply ascribed those opinions to everyone else. In no way am I suggesting that the policy-relevant actors, whose interpretations I analyzed in this study, have intentionally sided with "manipulation" in lieu of the "knout"; the point here is not to malign anyone's

character or to “call out” any individuals. Instead, my argument is that my findings in this research seem to confirm that conflating elite interests with broad public opinion is a commonplace in U.S. society, *especially* with respect to U.S. foreign policy discussions. Not only do the data I analyzed for this dissertation confirm that commonplace, but they serve to verify my conclusion that discussions about language education policies should be driven by real empirical evidence of what the public believes—as inconsistent, inconclusive, and contradictory as those beliefs may in fact be.

Heritage speakers of Arabic excluded from the safety zone

In the previous chapter, I stressed the limitations I encountered gathering data with respect to the impact of Title VI on heritage language education, whether considered overall or specifically in terms of Arabic. With those limitations in mind, I drew a third conclusion about the relationship between Title VI programs and heritage language education. Namely, my research findings seem to confirm the conclusions drawn by Watzke (2003) and discussed in chapter 2, that foreign language education in the United States has historically been a project for native-born, middle- and ruling-class white students. Three findings reported in the previous chapter help to verify this conclusion. The first is the absent data. Certainly, the lack of abundant data restricts drawing strong conclusions about Title VI and heritage language speakers. But another way to understand why the U.S. Office of Education and its successor, ED, did not track data regarding the ethnic, racial, national and/or linguistic heritage of students involved with Title VI programs is because students’ heritage was in fact fairly homogenous—or simply assumed to be so. Second, Lockman (2004) speaks directly to this question in his

assessment of the Middle East studies after World War II. He states that the diversity that did exist in Title VI Middle East programs resulted from hiring scholars either directly from the Arab world or those who had first immigrated to Europe. Lockman acknowledges that both the gender and ethnic make-up of Middle East studies had begun to improve by the 1980s, but that up to that point, the discipline had been largely the province of white men who learned Arabic as a foreign language. Third, Ohmann (1968) states explicitly in a speech to the MLA who has benefited from MLA language programs, including its work with Title VI. He argued: "By investing money and effort in the teaching of foreign languages, the MLA has made a social choice whose beneficent impact is primarily on the middle and upper classes" (p. 989).

Yet, when we consider demographic data from that era about Arab immigration and the Arab American community, it becomes clear that the limited impact that Title VI had on Arabic heritage language speakers was not a *fait accompli*. As I reported in chapters 4 and 6, the number of Arabic speakers in the U.S. by the end of Title VI's first decade was upwards of 200,000; the number of Arab Americans of course would have been considerably higher. Moreover, immigration patterns from the Arab world after World War II, and especially after 1965, document that the majority of Arabs immigrating to the U.S. were from professional and elite backgrounds and came to the U.S. to pursue higher education. Thus, there likely would have been a disproportionately large segment of the Arab American population attending universities, and as an extension, a population that could have involved itself with Title VI centers or Title VI language programs.

Instead, it seems a confluence of circumstances led to limiting the involvement of Arab Americans or heritage speakers of Arabic in Title VI programs. The first is simply the weight of tradition, i.e. the long tradition in the U.S. that Watzke (2003) recounts of language study as an elite project for monolingual English speakers. Related to it are powerful assumptions as reported in chapter 6 based on that tradition, that foreign language education should be an elite project intended for monolingual speakers of English born in the U.S. Third, as also reported in chapter 6, specific mechanisms related to citizenship, residency status, and language proficiency operated in the early years of Title VI which effectively limited, even excluded, heritage speakers of Arabic (and other critical languages).

One important objection I can foresee concerns this last point justifying my conclusion about the exclusion of Arabic heritage language speakers from Title VI programs. After all, many federal programs require citizenship or legal residency in order to qualify; why should we expect Title VI to have been any different, or look back with 50 years' hindsight and raise this as a point of criticism? However, these requirements were often not applied to similar language education policies, or even foreign aid policies operating at the same time as Title VI. For example, the premise of the Fulbright-Hays Act (F-H) was to sponsor the exchange of students and academics. That is, international recipients of F-H awards by definition were neither U.S. citizens nor legal residents. The same was true of federal aid programs, such as the food aid programs that were used in part to augment funding for Title VI programs. The primary target of those programs was developing countries, again, populations who were neither U.S. citizens nor legal residents. In both cases, however, the stated goals of these policies

stressed mutual understanding and humanitarian aid, versus bolstering national security (even if such policies ultimately served security goals). When it came to the NDEA, however, specific mechanisms regarding citizenship and legal residency were included with respect to who was eligible to participate. Compounding those mechanisms were stated preferences in issuing awards that specifically excluded those individuals with experience in the language. Whether intentional or not, it seems that the NDEA had the effect to limit heritage speaker participation in Title VI programs, i.e. to exclude them from the safety zone of U.S. national defense interests. To reiterate, however, the glaring absences in the data from which information was collected and how it was (or was not) archived compels me to shroud this conclusion in a good deal of caution.

“The Myth of Morality”

The first research question I formulated for this dissertation addressed the impact of perceived national security concerns historically on language education policies such as Title VI. One way to address that question relates to the first conclusion discussed above. That is, one could refer to the national security concerns that shaped the NDEA and Title VI, and conclude that Congress supported language education policies because they were tied to security concerns. Another way to answer that question is to look at the extent of federal intervention or control of programs authorized and funded by federal policy. On this point, the data was mixed. While there was a limited number of outrages, such as the CIA overstepping its legal bounds and collaborating with academic programs and scholars; while there was a limited number of politicized conflicts, such as the allegations the Tucson Jewish Community Council levied against the University of Arizona’s Title

VI Middle East program; while several interview participants raised general socio-political conflicts as impacting negatively on Arab American trust in federal programs or on their willingness to assert their "Arabness" (Participant 10, transcript 10, line 453); there was an equal amount of data that indicated no direct federal meddling in Title VI programs for Middle East and Arabic studies. In fact, the balance of the interview data suggests a great deal of independence from specific federal concerns about national security. These two approaches to addressing my first research question then would lead to inconsistent findings and limit my ability to draw warranted conclusions based on them.

After completing the research, the analysis and the write up of the findings, however, I realized how *narrowly* I originally had framed my first research question. More accurately, I focused my analysis of the data at first in a narrow way, i.e. looking for one-to-one instances of how national security concerns impacted Title VI policy. I will be the first to admit that there may have been a part of me lurking in the back of my head that hoped to find scandalous stories of federal meddling with Middle East and Arabic studies programs funded by Title VI. In fairness, such fears of federal control *did* constitute a salient theme in the data. Moreover, interview participants reported profound fears of future federal policing of Title VI in the form of an Advisory Board, which is one of the primary roadblocks preventing its reauthorization right now. The fears and perceived threats did emerge in the data, even if a significant number of actual instances of such did not.

But as I progressed with the data analysis, I realized how narrow, even mechanical, such an approach to the data was. In fact, I was increasingly struck by the

consistency and the nature of the *assumptions* made by policy-relevant actors—assumptions about the role of the U.S. in the world; about the uses of foreign language education; about what constitutes common sense regarding the policy process; assumptions about scholarly responsibility to U.S. national interests; assumptions participants made about my own attitudes towards national security and language education, etc. My analysis of these assumptions challenged me to rethink that first research question, to wonder if perceived national security concerns were operating at a much more fundamental level among the data I had collected.

I was further challenged to rethink my first research question as I analyzed the secondary data sources recalling the history of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. In this, I was reminded of a strand of LPP scholarship that examines public debates around bilingualism and the benefits of bilingual education. In particular, there is growing recognition that these public debates more often turn around powerful *perceptions* and *beliefs* about language, rather than *facts* about language and language learning (e.g., May, 2008; Ricento, 1996). Most prominent among this scholarship is perhaps the question Joshua Fishman (1992) posed: “Why are facts so useless in this discussion?” (p. 167). I concur with these scholars that it is the responsibility of language education advocates and policy analysts to establish sound findings based on research and incorporate those findings into public debates about bilingualism. For this very reason, I specifically set out to include the history of U.S. policy toward and intervention in the Middle East in my analysis of language education policies motivated by national security that targeted Arabic. As I stated in the previous chapter, the purpose of including that history was not to present it as objective fact against which to square the subjective interpretations made

by Title VI-relevant policy actors whose insights I researched. Still, any effort to marshal facts in order to conduct public discussions about language education must also include this history.

I was particularly struck by how distant that history was from public and scholarly discussions about language education policies such as Title VI and Middle East and Arabic studies. I found an astounding gap in the data between what that history of U.S. actions in the region actually was, and how most policy-relevant actors framed a number of topics, including: U.S. leadership in the post-war world; the role that foreign language education could (and should) play in facilitating, impacting, or influencing that role; and why Title VI was relevant to both. To help verify this conclusion, let us re-consider again the most salient interpretations made by Title VI-relevant policy actors with respect to these topics. What follows is just a sample of the data I reported in the last chapter:

Although it is a commonplace that the United States now occupies a position of world leadership, it is still not sufficiently recognized that in order to meet, on a basis of mutual understanding and cooperation, not only the diplomats and military men but also the common people of the other nations of the globe, the United States does not yet have nearly enough persons adequately trained in the languages. (Kenneth Mildenberger, *Scholarship and Loan Program*, 1958, p. 1824)

Even a man of little political sensitivity could not fail, a few days ago, to have appreciated the immense impact of the few words spoken in Spanish by Mrs. Kennedy during the President's visit to Latin America. (Brademas, 1962, p. 28)

After the war, as America was thrust into the role of leadership in a contracting world, the public became convinced of the importance of learning to communicate with other peoples, but leaders in American education seemed unaware of the new relevance of foreign language study. (“FLs in the U.S.”, 1954, p. 2)

At the end of World War II, when the United States was forced to assume a leading role in the development of a peaceful pluralist world, our educational program in high schools and colleges was little prepared for the task of developing an American citizenry equipped to understand and deal with the complexities of world problems. Today, cultural contact and exchange with the rest of the world is still one of the most essential means of contributing to a peaceful international world in a complex and dangerous period. (Franz Michael, *Office of Education and Related Agencies*, 1971, p. 388)

The United States became a world power almost by accident, little more than a decade ago... There remains a danger that instead of adjusting adequately to the changed circumstances which have thrust the United States into the center of the world arena we will fail to provide the essential component of that involvement: an informed public, and a corps of trained professionals... American assistance abroad is not merely altruism, but grows directly from American self-interest. If the international role of the United States is to be effective, however, it must be

based on enlightened self-interest. (*Office of Education Appropriations for 1971, 1970a, pp. 1329-1330*)

As a research-oriented society, we have the possibility of—in fact, we may now be in the midst of—a great creative thrust in which the energies of our people will find a new measure of release and our power as a nation will be raised to a new level of benignity. (*Atlantic Monthly* article in Congressional record, *Education Legislation, 1963, p. 1260*)

We're deeply implicated and involved in the Middle East. We need to know more about the Middle East. So, from the point of view of pedagogy and education and our mission, we see it, most of us see it as vital to teach more about the Middle East, especially the languages of the Middle East...So that's the first thing. Second thing, there is a national need. I mean, because the government needs people, because the army needs people, because the intelligence groups need people. There's a national need. Now, it's not for us to say, you know, we should be occupying Iraq, or we should be doing what we do in our foreign policy. It's a national need. There's a need for these people. I mean, it's our responsibility to respond to that. As citizens you can then do what you want to do. People who learn Arabic can take jobs or not take jobs. People who teach Arabic can have political positions or not. All of us feel that where there is this need, it is our job to try and fill it. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 315-327).

The United States will certainly continue to be deeply involved in world affairs. However, the forms of American involvement are changing and will increasingly be in the field of cultural, economic and commercial activities and less in military, defense, and Government-sponsored technical assistance programs. It is precisely because of this that it is essential to the American world position to have a continued supply of people trained in the language, culture, and comprehension of important foreign areas and available both to Government and to private agencies...American petroleum interests in Libya are important and the fact that the oil companies have on their staff Americans trained in Middle East studies and languages now is, more than ever, an asset to them. (John Badeau, director of Columbia University's Title VI Middle East center, *Office of Education and Related Agencies*, 1971 a, p. 83)

In the previous chapter, I discussed my analysis of these excerpts from the data in terms of the notions of common sense, responsibility and the uses of foreign language education in relation to U.S. foreign policy that each employs. But when we reconsider these data in light of calls to ground debates about language use in society by facts, what is particularly remarkable about them is the deafening silence with respect to actual and specific U.S. practice in the Middle East.

To be sure, the crisis of U.S. defeat in Vietnam did register in the halls of Congress. But, as the data I cited in the previous chapter indicated, policy elites and university actors who testified at this time tended to side *against* public frustration and anger over the war, and urged Congress to take action in reaction to what some

constructed as “New Left Isolationism” and “isolationist radicalism.” I will leave aside a larger discussion about the recurrence of policy-relevant actors making sweeping claims about public opinion—here, equating student anti-war activism with isolationist chauvinism—without marshaling any evidence. Simply at a surface level it would seem more logical to assert that student activism based on solidarity with the Vietnamese people to stop war would foster *greater* international consciousness, not less. Moreover, it strikes me as a rhetorical stretch to conflate student protests of CIA misuses of academic area studies programs, as one example I cited in chapter 6, with a thorough rejection of area and language studies altogether.

But the more prescient issue is that even when historical developments imposed themselves on policy deliberations, they seemed to have little effect on how policy actors framed either the United States’ position in the world, or the relevancy of Title VI to maintaining that position. With respect to the Middle East in particular, I purposefully chose two of the excerpts repeated above because they are among the very few that make direct reference to U.S. actions in the region. The first acknowledges the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq; the second reports that some Title VI Middle East center graduates took jobs with U.S. oil companies in Libya. Otherwise, acknowledgment of, or reference to U.S. interests in the region seemed to play little, if any, role in Title VI policy discussions. As the section in chapter 6 regarding that history indicates, however, the U.S. intervened early, often, consciously and purposefully: in displacing two declining world powers, the U.K. and France; in preventing greater Soviet influence in the region; and siding with whichever regional ally at the moment could best further U.S. interests. In other words, there were plenty of real and pressing conflicts that might have imposed

themselves on Title VI policy discussions. And yet, to recall Parker's concerns about the iron and language curtains, a third curtain—sturdy, opaque and durable—seemed to block any view of concrete U.S. actions in the Middle East as policy actors deliberated and reflected on Title VI. What explains the deafening silence in the data around this history? Why have so few policy relevant actors and analysts, either of the era on which this dissertation focuses, or currently in the literature I cited in chapter 2, considered these facts in their own analyses of foreign language education policy in the United States?

I started to formulate an explanation to these questions in the last chapter by distinguishing between top-down and bottom-up interpretations of national security and its relationship to foreign language education and Title VI. I stated that we should not necessarily be surprised by top-down readings of the policy and its uses for serving the national interest when policy elites and university actors sit before Congress to advocate for their programs. If political scripture indeed states that national security sells, then we should expect policy actors to make their sales pitches in such terms. But this still does not account for the salience among the interview data of these very assumptions about the position of the U.S. in the world, the role of foreign language and Title VI maintaining that role, the absence of historical facts about U.S. intervention in the region. In sum, the gap between policy actor interpretations and the secondary histories of U.S. relations with the Middle East, coupled with my re-analysis of the assumptions I identified in the data, confirmed to me that notions of “national security” were operating at a far deeper level than I had first considered.

Again I turn to insights contained in the histories of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. They provided me analytical tools with which to reconsider the data at a

deeper level. They also seemed to describe fairly accurately the themes that had emerged in the data. For example, Lens (1971/2003) provides an analysis of U.S. strategies abroad that maps very closely to the assumptions I identified in the interpretations of many Title VI-relevant policy actors. In a chapter entitled “The Myth of Morality,” Lens writes:

To many people America’s policies after the second great war seemed the very antithesis of imperialism. The United States gave the Philippines its independence, actively opposed colonialism in the Dutch East Indies, and made available scores of billions of dollars in grants and loans to literally dozens of nations. On the surface at least this did not appear to be selfish self-interest, nor was it easily visible how the sovereignty of other nations was being breached. Modern imperialism, however, differs perceptively from that of the past. It does not center on a single act such as the nineteenth-century occupation of India by Britain or Algeria by France. In an era of national revolution, with dozens of countries winning independence, this old-style imperialism is no longer possible. It would require millions of troops and incredible sums of money and even then—as the experiences in Algeria and Vietnam have shown—might not be successful. Modern imperialism therefore must rely on a variety of techniques. It is a complex *process* that combines economic, political, and military means...The new formula for imperial control did not exclude direct military intervention. When other methods have failed and when satellite military establishments have been incapable of defending satellite governments, the United States has sent in its own forces, as in Lebanon, Korea, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam.

Generally, however, it relied on economic and military assistance and pressures to carry out its objectives. (pp. 5-6; emphasis in original)

In light of the findings presented in this dissertation, I would only have to add to Lens' definition of modern imperialism that the complex process he describes includes not just economic, political, and military means, but also *educational* ones in the form of policies such as Title VI and the NDEA.

Kolko and Kolko (1972) take up the same theme, focusing more on the nature of the rhetoric that is used to describe U.S. interests. They write:

...[B]y the end of 1946 the United States was beginning to systematize and fulfill its unwavering goals by finding new instrumentalities which took into account domestic inhibitions as well as far more formidable foreign resistance to America's objectives than had been anticipated when its aims were articulated during World War II. In this process, the stated purpose of American foreign policy was to become rather more lofty and much more sharply anti-Communist and anti-Russian, but the ends remained the same as they had always been, however obscured by moral rhetoric, and no less self-serving. (p. 332)

When I compare these broader analyses of how modern U.S. imperialism functions against the data indicating how Title VI-relevant policy actors frame the United States' position in the world and how Title VI and foreign language education relates to it, we see a great deal of the "lofty" and "moral" rhetoric that Lens and Kolko and Kolko identify.

Internalizing the Myth

In pressing deeper with an analysis of how perceived notions of national security have impacted language education policies such as Title VI, I acknowledge the danger I confront of painting each and every policy-relevant actor and his or her interpretations of Title VI with the same brush. I believe that I have identified a pattern in the data, and that the analyses of actual U.S. power as Lens (1971/2003) and Kolko and Kolko (1972) describe it do indeed help to make sense of that pattern. At the same time, in no way do I make the claim that each policy actor whose interpretations I considered was a knowing and willing “agent” furthering imperialist aims internationally. Of course, when we consider the context in which the NDEA was initially authorized, then we must conclude that some of these policy actors certainly *did* play that role, and consciously so; but only a dogmatic analysis could ascribe such intentions to every interpretation in the data. Instead, I argue that the pattern I have identified in the data results from living and operating in the heart of a world power; it is the ideological blowback of projecting state power *abroad* that limits the boundaries of the safety zone at *home*. Kolko and Kolko consider this impact at the level of elite opinion, at least. They write:

It is the expansive interests of American capitalism as an economy with specific structural needs that guide the definition of foreign economic policy and the United States' larger global role and needs. *This fact, so internalized by those who rule, delineates the options of the men who decided policy just as it shapes the lives of those who pay for—and fulfill—it.* America is not an abstract, classless society of men of equivalent interests and power; yet it remains now to show the manner in which this overriding social reality determines the definition

and implementation of American foreign policy in the world. (p. 8; researcher emphasis)

The authors indeed dedicate the next 700-odd pages to documenting that manner. In terms of this discussion, however, the internalization among “those who rule” of what constitutes the national interest seemed to apply equally to all members of society, no matter where one stands in relation to actual U.S. power. Recall Lomawaima and McCarty’s discussion of how federal actors appropriate policy with respect to the safety zone. They write: “...we view federal Indian policy as a sociocultural (and therefore ideological) process in which federal authorities *appropriate* policy to serve particular interests and goals” (2006, p. xxiii, emphasis in original). It seems, however, that when the policy target shifts from Indian policy to foreign policy, it was not just federal authorities who appropriated the policy to serve particular interests and goals, but also members of each interpretive communities this dissertation analyzed.

In fact, there are many ways to identify how deeply policy-relevant actors, in their interpretations of Title VI, have internalized elite definitions of the “national interest.” The most jarring at a personal level, again, was how consistently interview participants assumed I favored national security rationales to language education advocacy, until this or the other hint suggested otherwise. This internalization is further reflected in the consistency with which policy actors asserted that Congress would only interest itself in language programs tied to security or economic concerns. I have argued above that such a linear and consistent interpretation of a policy initiated 50 years ago is insufficient; nevertheless the fact that this interpretation predominates among members of all three interpretive communities underscores the extent of the internalization of elite definitions

of the national interest. Related to this is how some policy-relevant actors positioned these elite definitions of the national interest in a way that subordinated other definitions and other interests to them. One example from the data reported in chapter 6 (and repeated above) recalls this tendency. It comes from my interview with the director of a Title VI Middle East studies center. He stated:

Second thing, there is a national need. I mean, because the government needs people, because the army needs people, because the intelligence groups need people. There's a national need. Now, it's not for us to say, you know, we should be occupying Iraq, or we should be doing what we do in our foreign policy. It's a national need. There's a need for these people. I mean, it's our responsibility to respond to that. As citizens you can then do what you want to do. People who learn Arabic can take jobs or not take jobs. People who teach Arabic can have political positions or not. All of us feel that where there is this need, it is our job to try and fill it. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 315-327).

He continued shortly thereafter:

That's because universities understand there's a national need and because everybody sees, "Hey maybe we better know more about his part of the world where we have lots, 100,000 soldiers!" Duh! It's a no-brainer. (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 339-341)

For this participant, at least, the national need—as defined by army, intelligence, and government needs, that is—precludes other policy-relevant actors or interpretive communities from voicing their needs. After all, "it's not for us to say" what the U.S. should or should not be doing in its foreign policy. "Everyone sees" this point, because it

is, after all, a “no-brainer.” This participant does leave room for individual citizens to take action with respect to these national needs as they see fit; otherwise the superordinate position of the national need is both unquestionable and obvious to everyone.

Furthermore, the internalization of elite definitions of the national interest can be seen in the frequency with which arguments on behalf of policies like Title VI may have invoked notions of mutual understanding and humanitarianism, only to follow them with explicit geopolitical definitions of national security. I stated in chapter 6 that my first pass through the data suggested that definitions of security invoking social justice and human rights seemed to constitute the most salient theme in the data. Subsequent, fuller readings of the data told me otherwise. Nevertheless, it is both striking to me and a verification of my conclusion here that even among those efforts to re-define security, to re-define the national interest, most policy-relevant actors ended up back where they began by subordinating those re-definitions to elite ones based on geopolitical terms.

Finally, we can see the extent to which elite definitions of security or the national interest were internalized insofar as this approach to defining U.S. foreign policy, and the relation of Title VI and foreign language education, seemed to span the political spectrum from right to left. I should disclose that I did not do an exhaustive analysis of the number of Democrats or Republicans cited in the literature or in hearings and testimony about Title VI over the years. But even a cursory review of the data I collected, or of the data I reported in chapter 6, shows that members of both parties backed Title VI. Although a Republican president signed the original NDEA into law, the legislation was steered through Congress thanks to two Dixie Democrats. Moreover, each subsequent federal

language education policy, whether motivated by national security or developing greater mutual understanding, has been sponsored by Democrats, including: Fulbright-Hays; the International Education Act; the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act; the Foreign Language Assistance Program; the National Security Education Act of 1991, two of whose programs are named for Senator Boren, Democrat of Oklahoma, who sponsored the bill. In fact, it was not until the National Security Language Initiative of 2006 that a Republican, in this case President Bush, was the primary actor pushing a language education policy forward. Of course, the review of U.S. policy and intervention in the Middle East also underscores that administrations of both parties pursued U.S. interests in the region with equal zeal. This consistency across the political spectrum for language education policies, even those tied to directly to national security concerns confirms a conclusion Kolko and Kolko (1972) drew based on their analysis of U.S. foreign policy more broadly. They wrote:

The fact that, in the last analysis, the conservative Republicans and the liberal Democrats shared a much more fundamental set of diplomatic premises than either cared to acknowledge meant that it was unlikely that the new Congress would repudiate the existing global commitments or prevent their expansion. (p . 335)

In fact, we can see this “fundamental set of diplomatic premises” shared across the political spectrum when we consider each interpretive community identified in this study. The degree of difference across these communities in their interpretations of U.S. world leadership, or the relationship of language education to it, was actually quite narrow. The spectrum of differences I reported in chapter 6 on these issues ranged on the one end

from openly asserting the United States' power in the world and advocating for language education and policies such as Title VI to maintain that power; to framing language education and policies such as Title VI as a way to temper, influence, ensure a more effective and pacific execution of U.S. world leadership. In short, these notions were limited to debating the terms on which the U.S. exerted its power internationally—aggressively or benignly, selfish self-interest (to borrow from Lens) or enlightened self-interest. Rarely was the United States' power itself debated. Rarely was the *right* of the United States to see itself and act as a world power questioned. In fact, even when the crisis of Vietnam impacted deliberations over Title VI, most policy-relevant actors sided *against* student protests of U.S. imperialism, and instead sided *with* bolstering language and area studies so that the U.S. could continue to exert its influence around the globe. To state this conclusion in metaphorical terms: Parker (1961) wrote in his highly influential pamphlet *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*, “One language makes a wall; it takes two to make a gate” (p. 103). Yet neither he, nor virtually any other Title VI-relevant policy actor included in this study, ever pointed out that even with a gate, those walls remain. Rarely was it ever questioned what the impact of those walls were in the world, or what it would take to tear them down altogether.

To honor my claim that I did not aim to use the historical data to beat down a constructed straw figure of “subjective” primary data, I will conclude this discussion *not* by arguing that the policy-relevant actors whose interpretations I analyzed had it all wrong; that they should have known better to square their own opinions against what the U.S. actually was doing in the Middle East at the time they made their comments. Nor do I wish to argue that the only “correct” way to interpret Title VI and how national security

concerns have impacted it is in terms of specific U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Instead, I am drawing what I believe to be a warranted conclusion that explains *why* that history played so little role in the formation and implementation of Title VI in the 33-year time span on which this dissertation focused.

Moreover, I believe this final conclusion I have drawn is a fitting corollary to the calls in some of the LPP literature to carry out debates about bilingualism and language in society based on facts, not just on perceptions and beliefs. As my arguments here make clear, I agree that facts should form the basis of our advocacy. However, what my analysis adds to those calls is that policy actors, and scholars who study language policy, must also reflect on their perceptions and beliefs about language in society, about how the world operates (or should operate), and state them explicitly. Rather than assuming, for example, that all policy-relevant actors agree on the role of the U.S. in the world (even if we debate one or the other mishap in that leadership), let us state those assumptions explicitly. I certainly do not expect all language education advocates will adopt anti-imperialist stances with respect to U.S. power or critical positions on the role language education policy should play with respect to that power. Those are precisely the points the professional and scholarly community should debate out and clarify. However, we cannot genuinely carry out those debates or clarify any positions if we continue to operate, as 40 years' of data analyzed here seems to have done, by internalizing assumptions about the U.S. and its position in the world and assuming that (most) everyone shares the same opinions.

Of course, it would be inaccurate to conclude that every aspect of the data I analyzed reflected the internalization of elite definitions of the safety zone. On the one

hand, alternative language and culture education policies that emerged throughout the period on which this dissertation focuses, e.g. the IEA, the EHSP, and FLAP.

Irrespective of the interpretations in the data of these policies, they represent efforts to frame language and culture education in terms very different from national security and economic competitiveness. In these instances, the policies' stated goals were to develop greater mutual understanding and intercultural awareness (although in the case of the EHSP, language proficiency was not part of its programs). I have already indicated that several interpretations of these policies understand their limited success because they did not sufficiently address national security or economic competitiveness. Ultimately, I think each policy deserves to be the focus of analysis similar to what I have attempted to do here with Title VI to explore more thoroughly the history of these policies. In the latter case, the FLAP has indeed survived since its inception in the late 1970s. In fact, with the passage in 2006 of the National Security Language Initiative, Congress has now brought that policy back under the national security umbrella. This action provides a remarkable opportunity to compare the history of the FLAP program before and after Congress tied it to explicit national security concerns.

Beyond the existence of these specific language and culture education policies, there are several instances in the data I analyzed that began to engage in the sort of reflection about U.S. interests I argue for above. I discuss some of those excerpts in chapter 6 in terms of the multiple definitions of security that operated in the data, including those that understood security in social justice or human rights terms. The data taken from speeches reprinted in the *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* were

perhaps the most consistent in critical interpretations of U.S. national interests and their impact on Middle East and Arabic studies.

As I stated in that discussion, the interview data in particular included especially poignant formulations of language education in social justice or human rights terms. In closing this chapter, I refer to one specific interview and how it raises a number of broad questions about how we might re-consider language education and our advocacy for such.

The last interview I conducted was with an Arabic instructor and former Title VI director. Because of his extensive experience with the topic at the heart of this dissertation, our conversation covered a number of fascinating topics related to Title VI and how Arabic language education in the U.S. has been positioned over the years, both by Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans. I started to wrap up the interview as I did in most of them, by asking the participant to comment on why he thinks national security has proven to be such a salient rationale to support foreign language education in the U.S., and under what conditions the participant thought other rationales might prove to be as effective. This instructor of Arabic had much to say in response to this question. First, I quote directly from the transcripts of our conversation. Unfortunately, the battery for the iPod recorder died as the interview (which lasted over 110 minutes) concluded. Therefore, the second excerpt I cite below is from the 40-50 words I was able to record in my interview field notes upon leaving his office. The participant responded:

Well frankly, it seems to me, and this may go back to before my time, but the entire basis for government funding for non-Western studies of any kind has permanently been based primarily on defense, in other words, strategic matters.

Not on any sort of notion of altruism. I mean that's one thing I keep saying to people in any context at all. If we don't become more altruistic in our attitudes, with this confrontation we think we're in now is going to continue. (Participant 10, transcript 10, lines 380-385)

From my field notes, I recorded additional comments of his on the topic:

Without a change in worldview, we won't see this happen, in other words, without a change from us versus them. (Participant 10, field notes)

This participant's comments recall a point I made when discussing the theoretical framework informing this research. In explaining the various ways in which safety zone theory applied to the research design, I raised a series of "big" questions that I hoped this research would address, including: Is it possible to imagine language policies that support heritage languages that do not endorse empire? Can we imagine—and realize—language education based on the intrinsic benefits that accompany multilingual competence? If not, why not? If so, then how and where do we get started? Certainly, the insights this last participant offered begin to address these very questions. He suggests that the starting point is shifting one's worldview with respect to language and confrontation between the U.S. and other cultures. Based on the conclusions I have drawn from analysis of the findings of this research, I would argue that this shift in worldview begins by basing advocacy for foreign language education policies on two things, both of which entail dispensing with the "moral" and "lofty" rhetoric discussed above. On the one hand, we must insist on the use of facts in language education advocacy: facts about language learning, language use, about what elite U.S. national interests actually are. On the other, shifting this worldview entails exploring our perceptions, beliefs and attitudes

about the U.S. safety zone, and what role (if any) we see for foreign language education in influencing the boundaries of it.

Pragmatism revisited

In the review of literature related to the topic of my dissertation, I cite recent literature about language education and national security that argues for a pragmatic approach to such questions (e.g. McGroarty, 2005; Spolsky, 2004). I can foresee, then, a series of objections to the manner in which I have concluded this discussion. For example, it is simply a utopian vision, given the history of language education policies in the U.S., that Congress or Washington in general will ever take action based on humanistic or intrinsic understandings of the benefits of foreign language education. Moreover, while one section of language education advocates may indeed frame their advocacy in terms of social justice or human rights, there will always be those sections of language education advocates who consciously side with projecting U.S. power abroad and using foreign language competency to aid the process.

To such objections I would raise four responses. The first is that, after 50 years of Title VI and national security rationales for critical language education, both the government and sections of the language education profession continue to believe that U.S. foreign language capacity is woefully lacking. In other words, this approach to language education advocacy has had half a century to prove its effectiveness, and the results are in. This history compels us to turn the pragmatic-utopian argument on its head: is not the utopian position to continue to believe that national security rationales may indeed lead to greater foreign language capacity, given 50 years of Title VI and

related policy history? Is it not the pragmatic position, then, to insist that language education advocates chart new territory in terms of justifying their support for language education?

My second response also relies on basing advocacy on facts. It recalls Mildenberger (1955) and his speech to a Wisconsin language teachers' convention. He argued:

To learn the needs of American society we must turn, not to faculty smokers nor to rationalized objectives of language study listed in venerable text books, but to *American society*...Now what kind of language study is it that American society wants? (p. 2)

In this case, he continues in his speech to refer only to those "opinions worth hearing," i.e. to conflate elite opinions about foreign language study with what "American society" wants. A far more effective, albeit more challenging, approach is to determine what U.S. society expects from language study by asking representative samples of *all* segments of that society. This would entail repeating surveys along the lines of the University of Michigan study of 1979 reported above, coupled with qualitative research among multiple aspects of U.S. society, but especially in communities that practice language use beyond English only. Surely a pragmatic approach to language education advocacy would include basing that advocacy on what people expect from language study—as inconsistent, inconclusive, and contradictory as those beliefs may in fact be.

The third response is to acknowledge that, of course, there will always be divisions and debates among language education advocates as to the purpose of multilingual competence. Some in the profession will always side openly with expanding

U.S. power abroad and argue that language education is essential to that project. Some in the profession will internalize “moral” and “lofty” elite rhetoric; insist that U.S. actions abroad represent an enlightened, benign power; and frame language education as a means to resolve conflict (under U.S. leadership). Others will reject both positions outright and try to imagine foreign language education meeting “national interests” defined from below in terms of social justice and rights. The debates are the problem; instead, the problem is that when this advocacy takes place with unspoken assumptions about these issues, it is often the elite interpretations of those questions that dominate.

Fourth, and for me perhaps most important, we will never know what different approaches to language education advocacy might look like, indeed if they might be (more) effective, if the *starting point* for our advocacy is deference to the political scripture identified above. We will never know what other political choices are possible if we assume that policy actors will only respond in this or the other way. Especially for those language education advocates who may be critical of elite U.S. national interests are, there is simply no hope for challenging, much less changing them, if we leave our own beliefs and attitudes towards them unexamined and unstated. Moreover, there is even less hope for challenging, much less changing, those elite definitions of security, prosperity, democracy, etc. if we assume from the outset of our work that the only way to advance language education is to stay within the narrow spectrum of elite definitions. If we cannot even imagine for ourselves what multilingual competence might look like in accordance with *our* explicitly stated beliefs about how the world should work, we can ensure that such a world will never be realized. Amy Newhall (2006), in her history of the politicization of language education in the U.S. captures in concise, elegant terms

how political worldviews apply to language learning. She writes, "Understanding what people say or think opens worlds of possibilities constrained only by the intentions of the learner" (p. 204). I think her insight applies equally well if we change the last word from "learner" to "language advocate." The world of possibilities for language education and its role in society is constrained above all by the intentions of language education advocates themselves.

Limitations

I have raised a number of limitations to this study and its findings throughout this dissertation. Because I discussed them in the context to which they were most relevant throughout this write-up, I will only review these limitations here.

The first related to the choice of case. The vast majority of enrollments in foreign language education are at the secondary level of education in the U.S. Yet, the policies in which I was most interested, and the critical languages such as Arabic that they support, actually have had the greatest impact at the higher education level. Second, I raised a series of limitations related to the fact that I am an outsider to these questions in virtually every way. Not only am I not Arab American, Muslim or proficient at all in Arabic, but also my academic preparation did not include extensive work in Middle East studies. As such, I have tried throughout the construction, execution and write-up of this dissertation to foreground Arab American interpretations of the questions at play, as well as to let the data speak as much for themselves as possible before offering up my own analysis. I will leave it to the reader to determine how (un)successful I have been at these efforts.

In addition, I discussed a series of limitations related to the interview data. One has to do with when Title VI was first drafted. Because the policy-relevant actors closest to its first authorization are deceased, I had to rely on document data to gain insight into their interpretations of the policy, its goals and its effectiveness. Second, because of the pressing nature of contemporary language education policies tied to national security, a significant portion of each interview addressed those policies and the participants' interpretation of them, rather than Title VI itself. Third, I mentioned two interviews that I felt produced less valuable data because I had to conduct them by phone.

Related to the interviews is another serious limitation of this dissertation. Because I aimed to maintain the anonymity of my interview participants, I was not able to include very much information about them as people when discussing the insights they provided me. Certainly, the information I learned about them helped me to analyze and make better sense of their interpretations of Title VI. But to have reported any more than the barebones information I did about each interviewee would have meant making their identity obvious to anyone even remotely familiar with Arabic instruction in the United States. This created a sterility in how I set up and discuss the interview data, which does a great disservice; the interviews were in fact very lively and I learned a great deal from them and from my participants.

There were specific limitations to the document data I collected for this study. The most important were significant gaps in data that I did not anticipate. On the contrary, I expected to find more data relating to past Title VI grant applications and to student demographics of Title VI grant awardees. The lack of such data forced me both

to reconsider my original plan to conduct a cross-case analysis of four specific NRCs for the Middle East, as well as to approximate student demographic data in fairly crude ways.

Finally, my re-analysis of the data and my initial findings led me to a much broader discussion of the ideological blowback of imperialism in terms of defining the boundaries of the safety zone. I have attempted to ground that analysis as much as possible with reference to the data, even I began to raise higher level questions about the function of language education in society. On the one hand, the reader will have to evaluate whether this deeper analysis is warranted by the data or not. On the other, further research on the impact of imperialism on language education is needed to see if this pattern holds over time, program type, context, etc.

EPILOGUE

I concluded the previous chapter by enumerating a series of limitations that impact the findings of this dissertation and the conclusions I have drawn based on them. Perhaps the most consequential limitation was the particular time frame I set around it, namely focusing my analysis between 1958-1991. To be sure, I stand behind the rationale I offered in chapter 3 as to why I set that particular time boundary. However, sticking to it was a challenge. Most important were real-time conflicts over Arabic instruction in the U.S. and educational exchanges between the U.S. and the Arab world, both of which captivated my attention.

The most recent conflict came to light in the final days of writing this dissertation. The Fulbright-Hays program, administered by the U.S. Department of States (State), had awarded seven fellowships to Palestinian scholars to come to the U.S., but those awards were recently withdrawn. Both State and the Israeli government pointed the finger at the other to explain the mishap. State explained that the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, the region in which the Palestinian scholars live, prevented the seven from using their fellowship. Therefore, to ensure the fellowship monies were used, State reassigned the awards to other scholars in the region. The Israeli government responded by saying that the U.S. never brought the Fulbright awardees to their attention, and if it had, the scholars would have been permitted to leave Gaza (Bronner, 2008a). On June 2, the State Department announced that high-level officials had intervened and restored all seven awards (Bronner, 2008b).

Of even greater consequence is the ongoing conflict over an Arabic-English dual language program in New York City. The Khalil Gibran International Academy opened its doors in Brooklyn, New York on Tuesday, September 4, 2007 in the throes of a full-fledged language panic (Hill, 2001). As one of approximately 70 dual language schools in the New York City Public School system, the Gibran Academy was meant to offer another opportunity for meaningful, long-term world language education. Instead, from its inception, this school has met considerable resistance. In response to the first proposed location to house the new academy, parents objected strongly to sharing their middle school's space (Bosman, 2007a, 2007b). In addition, conservative pundits have been hyperventilating since the academy was first proposed in the winter of 2007 with claims that the school espouses a fundamentalist Islamic curriculum. Consider Daniel Pipes' column, entitled "A Madrassa Grows in Brooklyn," in the *New York Sun* newspaper last spring. He wrote: "In practice, however, I strongly oppose the academy and predict that its establishment will generate serious problems. I say this because Arabic-language instruction is inevitably laden with pan-Arabist and Islamist baggage" (Pipes, 2007, p. 1). His colleague, Alicia Colon (2007) went a step further in her column, entitled "Madrassa Plan in Monstrosity," the following week. She wrote, "Daniel Pipes was too conservative in asking his readers to send e-mails to the Chancellor at JKlein@schools.nyc.gov. I say break out the torches and surround City Hall to stop this monstrosity" (p. 1). Needless to say, her open calls for a mob-mentality response, begging the question as to who the actual terrorists are, went without comment in the mainstream U.S. media. Still, the most vocal opponent to the academy has been the Stop the Madrassa Coalition (see www.stophthemadrassa.worldnet.com). Although the

language on its website positions the organization as a grassroots organization of individuals, the coalition has important ties to large, conservative think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy, the Middle East Forum (which provided support for “Islamofascist Awareness Week” activities at college campuses across the U.S. in fall 2007 and whose executive director, incidentally, is Daniel Pipes), and the Endowment for Middle East Truth.

The fracas over the Gibran Academy came to a head in summer 2007 when its first principal, Debbie Almontaser, was misquoted in an interview in which she was asked about the word *intifada*. Almontaser explained the word’s origins in Arabic, meaning “to shake off,” in addition mentioning its current use in reference to Palestinian resistance to occupation. The *New York Post* article that included the interview omitted her contextualization of the word, accused her of ignoring its connection to Palestinian resistance, and labeled her the “intifada principal” attempting to start a jihad in the “Big Apple” (Bennett & Winter, 2007; Elliott, 2008). Almontaser subsequently resigned her principalship at the academy and was replaced by a Jewish principal who speaks no Arabic (who herself was later replaced). Almontaser has since filed a lawsuit against the city of New York, in which she alleges the city forced her to resign. Several members of the Stop the Madrassa coalition have since filed their own lawsuit against Almontaser, claiming defamation of character for her criticisms of their tactics and message (Elliott, 2008; Goodman, 2008). Neither lawsuit had been resolved as I completed my dissertation.

Lost in much of the hyperbolic commentary about this new school are two facts: that the parent- and community-based committee that developed the Gibran Academy’s

curriculum was composed of members of various faiths, including Judaism; and the ultimate irony that Khalil Gibran himself was Arab American, dedicated much of his poetry and writings to fostering peace, and was Christian. However, as is often the case with language panics, such facts have little sway in the public and political discourse about language. The connection has already been made—and loudly so—that Arab = Muslim = jihadist. And such triads have no place in public schools.

The Gibran Academy to date has not been funded by any of the federal language education policies of interest to this dissertation. Yet it has provided a great deal of insight into the nature of the panic surrounding Arabic and those who speak it in the contemporary United States. This panic is particularly consequential in light of recent language education policies tied to national security that target critical languages such as Arabic. For example, in 2002 the Department of Defense-administered National Security Education Program (NSEP) initiated the National Flagship Language Initiative. The first grants were awarded in 2003. Since then, the project has been renamed the Language Flagship, with its own independent administrative team (see <http://www.thelanguageflagship.org/index.html>). The aim of the flagship programs is to enhance national capacity in strategic languages in order to strengthen U.S. national security. In distinction to the area studies approach of Title VI, however, flagship programs focus on one specific language in an effort to develop advanced proficiency among its students; teaching resources; and greater knowledge of how the language is acquired. Currently, there are three language flagships for Arabic at the following universities: University of Maryland, Michigan State University, and University of

Texas, Austin. These programs work in tandem with Bryn Mawr University and its overseas flagship program in Damascus, Syria.

In addition to the Language Flagships, the National Foreign Language Center administers the Startalk program, which is similar to the summer language institutes that Title VI funded in its early years. Startalk monies fund summer language programs for high school students, as well as professional development for language teachers. Since 2007 Startalk programs have focused primarily on Mandarin and Arabic (see http://www.nflc.org/projects/current_projects/startalk/). Finally, the passage of the National Security Language Initiative in 2006 brought the FLAP program under the rubric of national security for the first time. The FLAP is an ED-administered program that provides matching funds to K-12 school districts to support foreign language instruction. Starting with the 2006 competition for FLAP funding, districts applying for funds to support critical language instruction automatically received 15 extra points on their application review. There was no 2007 competition; in lieu ED decided to fund down the list of grant applications from 2006. To date, there has been a very small increase in the number of Arabic programs: ED awarded two grants in 2004, five in 2006, and three in 2007. By contrast, Mandarin has enjoyed the most significant leap in support among the critical languages: ED awarded six grants in 2004, 49 in 2006 and 22 last year (Bale, 2007).

The emergence of language education policies such as the Language Flagships and Startalk; the shift in priority of long-standing policies such as the FLAP; and the contested responses to bottom-up Arabic language initiatives bring a sense of urgency to the second research question that guided this dissertation, i.e. what the relationship

between national security and language education policies would mean for heritage language education and for Arabic in particular. What adds to this urgency are developments in the Arab American community in the last 15 years with respect to immigration, Arabic language maintenance and other pertinent demographics.

For example, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, there were 1.2 million Arab Americans in the United States. This placed Arab Americans as one of 33 ethnic groups in the U.S. with more than 1 million members. Moreover, the Arab American population increased by over 40% during the 1990s. Of the current population, three-fifths of Arab Americans traced their heritage to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. In fact, the Egyptian population increased faster in numerical terms during the 1990s than any other Arab ancestry group. Meanwhile, the Yemeni population experienced the fastest rate of growth, tripling in size during the 1990s (de la Cruz & Brittingham, 2003). The Arab American Institute (AAI) takes the U.S. Census as a starting point, but uses other indicators to state that the Arab American population in the U.S. in the year 2000 was actually 3.5 million strong. This is roughly three times as large as the 2000 Census reported. Additionally, the AAI states that in 2000, eighty percent of Arab Americans were U.S. citizens and claimed their heritage from 22 countries in the Arab world (Arab American Institute, 2006).

The AAI further reports that 94% of Arab Americans lived in metropolitan areas, with the largest concentrations in Los Angeles, Detroit, New York, Chicago and Washington, DC (Arab American Institute, 2006). These findings largely correspond to the 2000 U.S. Census. The 2000 Census found that half the Arab American population was concentrated in just five states: California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey and New

York. Of these states, Michigan had the largest proportion of Arab Americans, representing about 1.2% of the state's total population. Michigan was also home to the city with the largest proportion of Arab Americans. Dearborn, Michigan's Arab American population comprised just fewer than 30% of the city's total population. While Dearborn had the highest concentration of Arab Americans, New York City had the largest absolute number of Arab Americans, just under 70,000 (de la Cruz & Brittingham, 2003). In addition, the Arab American community continues to be on average wealthier and better educated than the overall U.S. population (Arab American Institute, 2006; de la Cruz & Brittingham, 2003). And the vast majority of Arab Americans is Christian, as has always been the case in the U.S. (Arab American Institute, 2006)

With respect to the Arabic language, the 2000 U.S. Census reported that approximately 614,000 people in the U.S. speak Arabic (Shin & Bruno, 2003; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Given the census undercount of Arab Americans, it is fair to assume that number of heritage speakers of Arabic is actually larger, although by how much is difficult to estimate. Moreover, in 2003 (the last year for which data has been published), Arabic was the seventh-largest home language reported by English language learners at the K-12 level of education (Kindler, 2007).

These demographic developments, when considered against the emergence of several federal language education policies motivated by national security that target "critical" languages such as Arabic, and against the panicked responses such as what happened with the Gibran Academy, present an urgent challenge to language researchers. Most relevant to this dissertation: to what extent will these emergent policies include Arab Americans and heritage speakers in the safety zone of U.S. interests? Or to what

extent will the atmosphere of panic continue to label Arabic—when practiced by native or heritage speakers—as dangerous and thereby further exclude Arab Americans from the safety zone?

The urgency to which I refer was felt repeatedly in the interviews I conducted for this dissertation. As I described in previous chapters, in some ways it took away from the richness of the data I was hoping for with respect to Title VI; my participants were clearly more eager to talk about the elephant in the room, i.e. contemporary policies and what they mean for Arab Americans today. In future studies I will explore their insights in greater detail. Here, however I will close this epilogue by reviewing briefly the major themes that emerged in the interviews.

One level of the discussion about these contemporary policies was the specific challenges associated with carrying them out. Each participant spoke to the veritable explosion in enrollments in Arabic language classes in the last ten years. This has led, in at least one case, to Arabic programs capping their enrollment and conducting screening interviews with prospective students to determine who will be allowed to enroll (Participant 1). Table 9 below draws from various sources to document this remarkable increase in enrollments.

Table 9

Enrollments in higher education Arabic language courses, 1998-2006

<u>Program type</u>	<u>Enrollments</u>			<u>% change</u>			
	<i>N</i>	<u>1998</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>1998 - 2002</u>	<u>2002 - 2006</u>	<u>1998-2006</u>
2-year		1,158	1,859	4,384	61%	136%	279%
undergrad.		3,212	7,502	17,442	134%	132%	443%
graduate		445	531	940	19%	77%	111%
Total		4,815	9,892	22,766	105%	130%	373%

Note: Belknap, 2007; Furman, Goldberg & Lusin, 2007

Related to these challenges was finding enough qualified instructors to staff these growing programs. Several participants acknowledged that because the government language schools, i.e. the FSI, the DLI, etc., were able to pay higher salaries, the universities were not able to attract and/or retain qualified instructors. As one participant phrased it: “You want me to take cab drivers? You really want me to take Yemeni convenience store clerks and have them teach language?” (Participant 1, transcript 1, lines 231-232). In addition, because these contemporary policies envision the creation of a pipeline of language expertise, beginning in the lower grades and continuing through advanced graduate-level study, many participants raised concerns about the dearth of appropriate teaching materials in Arabic for the K-12 level.

Beyond the practical issues related to carrying out the mandates of contemporary language policies supporting Arabic, interview participants consistently raised more ideological concerns about connections between contemporary language policies, the federal agencies administering them, and the impact of national security motivations behind them. The two specific concerns were connected to stipulations made for the Language Flagships. On the one hand, universities applying for language flagships must

agree to admit non-matriculated students into flagship language classes; on the other, students who receive flagship scholarship monies must commit to a number of years of service to the federal government. There is a considerable amount of flux, confusion, and misunderstanding about these stipulations, however. Several participants reported in our conversations that the University of Texas, Austin had recently received a substantial increase in their flagship funds and had negotiated with the program to lift both stipulations on funding. When I mentioned this during the discussion portion of my paper presentation at 2008 annual meeting of the American Association for Applied Linguistics, Dr. Richard Brecht, director of the Center for Advanced Study of Language and deeply involved with NSEP programs, corrected me to say that the information the participants had given me was incorrect, and that no changes in programs rules had occurred.

With respect to the time NSEP fellows owe back to the government, several participants recounted lengthy stories based on their experience with flagship students who, upon completing studies in Damascus, experience great difficulty getting the sort of security clearance they need in order to fulfill their obligation to the federal government. Other participants reported that there simply are not enough jobs with the government so that students can fulfill their obligations. Finally, several participants stated explicitly that Arab American students simply are not applying for these government jobs.

Most participants framed their broad interpretations of current language education policies tied to national security in one of two ways. The first was to compare Title VI directly with these latter-day language policies. And in virtually each case, participants judged Title VI to have been successful at leading to the expertise in Arabic that exists in

the U.S.; by contrast, most participants raised significant concerns about the ability of current policies to have such an effect. Reasons behind those concerns included: that the policies are too instrumentally focused and do not allow for the broad approaches to language learning that are required to achieve significant proficiency; that the flagship programs focus on language only, and not on area studies, meaning that students do not have the opportunity for broader, content-based applications of language; and that the overt national security motivations behind the policies would turn away heritage speakers of the language, especially in the post 9/11 context. The second common comparison was made not between policies, but rather between the federal agencies administering them. Participants reported consistently that the broader field of Arabic education and Middle East studies generally accepted ED-administered programs, such as Title VI—even when the motivations behind those programs are related to national security. By contrast, participants ascribed to their colleagues in the field a general suspicion about programs administered by State, Defense or other federal intelligence agencies.

While these interpretations of current language education policies promoting Arabic were consistent among almost all interview participants, there were also examples of important disconfirming evidence. One of the most compelling was the rhetorical question one participant asked, i.e. whether these current policies were in effect a sheep in wolf's clothing. There are certainly many objections being raised about the motivations and impact of these policies, but this participant wondered out loud if these programs may ultimately lead to significant breakthroughs in materials, pedagogy or real language capacity in the U.S., despite their controversial stated policy goals. A second participant embraced the accountability requirements built into the new policies. He

reported throughout our conversation his frustration with Title VI over the years at preferring area studies to language study, leading to a situation where Title VI students concluded their studies with effectively low-level proficiency in the target language. For this participant, then, the explicit expectations in these newer policies as to proficiency levels graduating students should acquire represent a major step forward.

Future Research

To conclude this dissertation, I list below several avenues for future research that the findings and conclusions of this work suggest. Several relate to the conclusions discussed in the previous, while others flow from the comments made above.

Federal language policies *not* motivated by national security: My research led me to two significant language policies, i.e. the International Education Act of 1966 and the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program of 1974, that were not motivated by explicit concerns about national security. In keeping with my argument in the previous chapter about contextualizing policies in their historical moment to understand how and why they came about, an historical policy analysis along the lines of the methods used in this dissertation would help to understand these policies and what, if any, insights they might offer to improve on contemporary language education advocacy;

The Foreign Language Assistance Program: The FLAP is a long-standing K-12 language education policy that was recently brought under the national security rubric with its inclusion in NSLI. This presents an interesting opportunity to determine the impact FLAP has on language education practice both before and after its inclusion in NSLI.

Contemporary language education policies: My comments in this brief epilogue suggest a number of avenues for future research to investigate whether any of the participants' concerns will in fact be realized. In addition, given the developments within the Arab American community, there is a particularly important opportunity to study the impact of these contemporary language education policies in light of their impact on heritage speakers of the language.

Language, war, and imperialism: At a broader, more ideological level, there is much to be gained for language planning and policy analysis by applying safety zone theory and updated definitions of imperialism to understanding language practices both historical and contemporary.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF CURRENT TITLE VI MIDDLE EAST NRCs

	<u>University</u>	<u>NRC Center Name</u>	<u>Private or Public</u>	<u>Year Est.</u>
1	Columbia University	Middle East Institute	Private	1954
2	Emory University/Georgia State University	Georgia Middle East Studies Consortium	Both	
3	Georgetown University	National Resource Center on the Middle East	Private	1997
4	Harvard University	Center of Middle East Studies	Private	1954
5	New York University	The Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies	Private	1966
6	Ohio State University	Middle East Studies Center	Public	1988
7	Princeton University	Near Eastern Studies	Private	
8	University of Arizona	Center for Middle East Studies	Public	1975
9	University of California, Berkeley	Center for Middle Eastern Studies	Public	1965
10	University of California, Los Angeles	Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies	Public	1966?
11	University of Chicago	Center for Middle Eastern Studies	Private	1965
12	University of Michigan	Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies	Public	1961
13	University of Pennsylvania	The Middle East Center	Private	1965
14	University of Texas, Austin	The Center for Middle Eastern Studies	Public	1960
15	University of Utah	Middle East Center	Public	1960
16	University of Washington	The Middle East Center	Public	1975
17	Yale University	Middle East Studies Council	Private	1954

APPENDIX B

PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT MATERIALS

I. Letter for "policy elite" interpretive community

Dear _____:

My name is Jeff Bale, and I am currently conducting research for my dissertation under the direction of Dr. Terrence G. Wiley at Arizona State University. My research focuses on the history of federal language education policies that supported higher education programs in Arabic. In particular, I am interested in how policy-relevant actors such as elected officials and representatives of language advocacy organizations interpreted these historical policies.

I am writing to request your time and insights in an interview with me. The conversation would take 75-90 minutes, and I would like to audio record it so that I can later transcribe it. Of course, I will share the transcripts with you before any analysis to make sure it accurately reflects our conversation. The audiotapes will be stored in a locked file cabinet in my office for the duration of the study destroyed after the study is complete.

I would like to stress that the purpose of this study is to better understand how people interpreted historical language education policies that targeted Arabic. You may be aware of the many new federal policies emerging to support instruction of less commonly taught languages such as Arabic. I feel that to better make sense of these current language policies, we need insight into how various communities interpreted historical language policies. Your experience with these past policies will be invaluable to me in framing this historical analysis.

Of course, your participation in this research project is voluntary. Moreover, if you choose to participate in the research, you may terminate that participation at any time throughout the study.

All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential. While the results of this study may be used in reports, presentations and publications, I will not identify you, your organization or your role in it in any way. If you would like, I will also be glad to share my findings and analysis with you before any public presentations or publication of them. As such, there are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study.

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these topics with you. Please let me know when a convenient time would be to sit down together. If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at d.bale@asu.edu or on 602.350.0142. You may also contact my professor, Dr. Terrence G. Wiley, at twiley@asu.edu. Finally, you may contact that Institutional Review Board at Arizona State University (research.compliance@asu.edu) at any time if you have concerns about the conduct of this research or about potential risks.

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

II. Letter for "university actors" interpretive community

Dear _____:

My name is Jeff Bale, and I am currently conducting research for my dissertation under the direction of Dr. Terrence G. Wiley at Arizona State University. My research focuses on the history of federal language education policies that supported higher education programs in Arabic. In particular, I am interested in how policy-relevant actors such as university administrators, program directors, professors and instructors interpreted these historical policies.

I am writing to request your time and insights in an interview with me. The conversation would take 75-90 minutes, and I would like to audio record it so that I can later transcribe it. Of course, I will share the transcripts with you before any analysis to make sure it accurately reflects our conversation. The audiotapes will be stored in a locked file cabinet in my office for the duration of the study destroyed after the study is complete.

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I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these topics with you. Please let me know when a convenient time would be to sit down together. If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at d.bale@asu.edu or on 602.350.0142. You may also contact my professor, Dr. Terrence G. Wiley, at twiley@asu.edu. Finally, you may contact that Institutional Review Board at Arizona State University (research.compliance@asu.edu) at any time if you have concerns about the conduct of this research or about potential risks.

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

III. Letter for "Arab American policy actor" interpretive community

Dear _____:

My name is Jeff Bale, and I am currently conducting research for my dissertation under the direction of Dr. Terrence G. Wiley at Arizona State University. My research focuses on the history of federal language education policies that supported higher education programs in Arabic. In particular, I am interested in how policy-relevant actors, such as Arab American students in these programs and representatives of Arab American advocacy organizations, interpreted these historical policies.

I am writing to request your time and insights in an interview with me. The conversation would take 75-90 minutes, and I would like to audio record it so that I can later transcribe it. Of course, I will share the transcripts with you before any analysis to make sure it accurately reflects our conversation. The audiotapes will be stored in a locked file cabinet in my office for the duration of the study destroyed after the study is complete.

I would like to stress that the purpose of this study is to better understand how people interpreted historical language education policies that targeted Arabic. You may be aware of the many new federal policies emerging to support instruction of less commonly taught languages such as Arabic. I feel that to better make sense of these current language policies, we need insight into how various communities interpreted historical language policies. Your experience with these past policies will be invaluable to me in framing this historical analysis.

Of course, your participation in this research project is voluntary. Moreover, if you choose to participate in the research, you may terminate that participation at any time throughout the study.

All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential. While the results of this study may be used in reports, presentations and publications, I will not identify you, your organization or your role in it in any way. If you would like, I will also be glad to share my findings and analysis with you before any public presentations or publication of them. As such, there are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study.

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these topics with you. Please let me know when a convenient time would be to sit down together. If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at d.bale@asu.edu or on 602.350.0142. You may also contact my professor, Dr. Terrence G. Wiley, at twiley@asu.edu. Finally, you may contact that Institutional Review Board at Arizona State University (research.compliance@asu.edu) at any time if you have concerns about

the conduct of this research or about potential risks.

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS

The structure of the interview is taken from Seidman (2005).

I. Interview protocol for "policy elite" interpretive community

A. Background questions

1. name
2. title
3. role the participant plays in his/her respective organization
4. time spent in that role

B. Focused life history

1. Can you take a moment and describe to me where you grew up?
2. What role did languages other than English play where you grew up?
3. Which language did you first learn to speak? Was that the same language that the rest of your family spoke?
4. How did you decide whether you were going to college/university? How did you decide what you were going to study there?
5. What were your own experiences like (if any) in learning a second or foreign language?
 - a. Which language was it?
 - b. Why did you choose that specific language?
 - c. At what age(s) did you learn the language?
 - d. What motivated you to study a second/foreign language?
 - e. What experiences have you had in using that language? For what purposes have you used the language in your own professional, social, personal life?
6. How did you come to be involved with your organization?

C. The details of the experience

1. What was your role in the creation (or implementation) of the LEP?
 - a. How did you become interested in this particular policy?
 - b. How did your role or involvement change over time, if at all?
2. What goals did you have for this LEP? What did you hope it would accomplish?
 - a. At which institutions was this LEP directed?
 - b. Was there a particular community or population this LEP was meant for? Why this community?
3. Which languages did you see as the most important for this policy to support? Why?
4. Who were the other people and organizations you worked with in creating and implementing this LEP? What were your interactions with them like?

D. Reflection on the meaning

1. Which foreign languages do you consider the most important to learn in the U.S.? Why?
2. What do you see as the benefits of learning foreign languages?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
3. What do you see as the benefits of learning Arabic in this country?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
4. How did this LEP work to provide the benefits you've just discussed?
5. What strengths did you see in this LEP? What weaknesses did you see?
6. In what ways, if any, did you consider this LEP in relation to national security?
7. You may be familiar with Richard Brecht, who runs the Center for Advanced Study of Languages at University of Maryland. In reference to new LEPs to support instruction of "strategic" languages, he reportedly said: "Our motivation is national security, not to improve education necessarily." With respect to your involvement with this LEP, did you consider this LEP as more relevant to education policy in the U.S. or national security policy in the U.S., or still another broad policy agenda?
8. How successful was this policy in meeting the goals you identified earlier?
9. Do you recall what the various opinions were of this LEP as it was created and implemented?
 - a. What other policy makers thought
 - b. What the representatives of universities thought
 - c. What participants in the programs the policies targeted thought?

E. Wrap-up

1. Do you have any thoughts about current LEPs tied to national security that support strategic languages that you would like to share?
2. Are there any other ideas and thoughts you would like to add?

II. Interview protocol for "university actors" interpretive community

A. Background questions

1. name
2. title
3. role the participant plays in his/her respective organization
4. time spent in that role

B. Focused life history

1. Can you take a moment and describe to me where you grew up?
2. What role did languages other than English play where you grew up?
3. Which language did you first learn to speak? Was that the same language that the rest of your family spoke?

4. How did you decide whether you were going to college/university? How did you decide what you were going to study there?
5. What were your own experiences like (if any) in learning a second or foreign language?
 - a. Which language was it?
 - b. Why did you choose that specific language?
 - c. At what age(s) did you learn the language?
 - d. What motivated you to study a second/foreign language?
 - e. What experiences have you had in using that language? For what purposes have you used the language in your own professional, social, personal life?
6. How did you come to be involved with your university?

C. The details of the experience

For university administrators:

1. What was your role in the creation (or implementation) of the LEP?
 - a. How did you become interested in this particular policy?
 - b. How did your role or involvement change over time, if at all?

For NRC program directors, professors, instructors in NRCs themselves:

2. What was your role in the creation (or implementation) of your university's NRC?
 - a. How did you become interested in this NRC?
 - b. How did your role or involvement change over time, if at all?

For all:

3. What goals did you have for the NRC? What did you hope it would accomplish?
 - a. Why did your university decide to get involved with this LEP in applying to set up an NRC on the Middle East?
 - b. As your university began to implement the NRC, how was the program advertised or marketed to potential students?
4. What reasons did your university have for establishing an NRC for the Middle East specifically?
 - a. How did your program decide on which languages to support?
 - b. Which variety of Arabic did your NRC teach? Was there a particular region or country within the Arab world that was a focus of study?
5. In your Arabic language classes in the NRC, can you describe the make-up of the typical classroom? Who was enrolled? Did you ask or can you speculate as to their motivations for learning Arabic?
6. What expectations did you or your NRC have for students' use of Arabic once they finished their course of study?
7. What sorts of professional or academic partnerships were in place for students to continue with Arabic after their undergraduate study at your NRC?
8. Who were the other people and organizations you worked with in creating and implementing this LEP? What were your interactions with them like?

D. Reflection on the meaning

1. Which foreign languages do you consider the most important to learn in the U.S.? Why?
2. What do you see as the benefits of learning foreign languages?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
3. What do you see as the benefits of learning Arabic in this country?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
4. How did your university's NRC work to provide the benefits you've just discussed?
5. In what ways, if any, did you consider your university's NRC in relation to national security?
6. You may be familiar with Richard Brecht, who runs the Center for Advanced Study of Languages at University of Maryland. In reference to new LEPs to support instruction of "strategic" languages, he reportedly said: "Our motivation is national security, not to improve education necessarily." With respect to your involvement with the NRC, did you consider it as more relevant to education policy in the U.S. or national security policy in the U.S., or still another broad policy agenda?
7. How successful was the NRC in meeting the goals you identified earlier?
8. Do you recall what the various opinions were of your university's NRC as it was created and implemented?
 - a. What other policy makers thought
 - b. What the representatives of universities thought
 - c. What participants in the programs the policies targeted thought

E. Wrap-up

1. Do you have any thoughts about current LEPs tied to national security that support strategic languages that you would like to share?
2. Are there any other ideas and thoughts you would like to add?

III. Interview protocol for "heritage language community" interpretive community: Arab American former students

A. Background questions

1. name
2. title
3. role the participant plays in his/her respective organization
4. time spent in that role

B. Focused life history

1. Can you take a moment and describe to me where you grew up?
2. What role did languages other than English play where you grew up?
3. Which language did you first learn to speak? Was that the same language that the rest of your family spoke?
4. How did you decide whether you were going to college/university? How did you decide what you were going to study there?
5. What were your own experiences like (if any) in learning a second or foreign language?
 - a. Which language was it?
 - b. Why did you choose that specific language?
 - c. At what age(s) did you learn the language?
 - d. What motivated you to study a second/foreign language?
 - e. What experiences have you had in using that language? For what purposes have you used the language in your own professional, social, personal life?
6. How did you come to be involved with your organization / university?

C. The details of the experience

1. How did you decide to study Arabic at your university's NRC?
2. What other involvement did you have in other programs sponsored by your university's NRC?
3. What steps did the NRC take to invite/recruit/involve you in their programs? If any, how did the NRC or the university market their program?
4. What goals did you have for study in the NRC?
5. Can you describe what the student make-up was of a typical Arabic class at your university's NRC?
6. Which variety of Arabic did your courses focus on the most? Was there a particular region or country in the Arab world that study focused most on?
7. What expectations did you have for using Arabic after your studies in the NRC? What explicit expectations did your NRC have? Were there any implied expectations?
8. What sorts of professional or academic partnerships were you exposed to for continuing with Arabic after your studies?

D. Reflection on the meaning

1. Which foreign languages do you consider the most important to learn in the U.S.? Why?
2. What do you see as the benefits of learning foreign languages?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?

3. What do you see as the benefits of learning Arabic in this country?
 - a. At the individual level, or for yourself?
 - b. At the societal level?
4. How did your university's NRC work to provide the benefits you've just discussed?
5. What were the most effective aspects of Arabic study at your NRC? What were the most negative?
6. In what ways, if any, did you consider your study of Arabic in relation to national security?
7. You may be familiar with Richard Brecht, who runs the Center for Advanced Study of Languages at University of Maryland. In reference to new LEPs to support instruction of "strategic" languages, he reportedly said: "Our motivation is national security, not to improve education necessarily." With respect to your involvement with the NRC, did you consider it as more relevant to education policy in the U.S. or national security policy in the U.S., or still another broad policy agenda?
8. How successful was the NRC in meeting the goals you identified earlier?
9. Do you recall what the various opinions were of your university's NRC?
 - a. What other policy makers thought
 - b. What the representatives of universities thought
 - c. What participants in the programs the policies targeted thought

E. Wrap-Up

1. Do you have any thoughts about current LEPs tied to national security that support strategic languages that you would like to share?
2. Are there any other ideas and thoughts you would like to add?

IV. Interview protocol for "heritage language community" interpretive community: representatives of Arab American or Muslim American advocacy organizations

A. Background questions

1. name
2. title
3. role the participant plays in his/her respective organization
4. time spent in that role

B. Focused life history

1. Can you take a moment and describe to me where you grew up?
2. What role did languages other than English play where you grew up?
3. Which language did you first learn to speak? Was that the same language that the rest of your family spoke?

4. How did you decide whether you were going to college/university? How did you decide what you were going to study there?
5. What were your own experiences like (if any) in learning a second or foreign language?
 - a. Which language was it?
 - b. Why did you choose that specific language?
 - c. At what age(s) did you learn the language?
 - d. What motivated you to study a second/foreign language?
 - e. What experiences have you had in using that language? For what purposes have you used the language in your own professional, social, personal life?
6. How did you come to be involved with your organization?

C. The details of the experience

1. What was your role in the creation (or implementation) of the LEP?
 - a. How did you become interested in this particular policy?
 - b. How did your role or involvement change over time, if at all?
2. What goals did you consider this LEP to have? What did you hope it would accomplish?
 - a. At which institutions did you consider this LEP to be directed?
 - b. Was there a particular community or population you saw this LEP as being meant for? Why this community?
3. Which languages did you see as the most important to this policy? Why?
4. Who were the other people and organizations you worked with in creating and implementing this LEP? What were your interactions with them like?

D. Reflection on the meaning

1. Which foreign languages do you consider the most important to learn in the U.S.? Why?
2. What do you see as the benefits of learning foreign languages?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
3. What do you see as the benefits of learning Arabic in this country?
 - a. At the individual level?
 - b. At the societal level?
4. How did this LEP work to provide the benefits you've just discussed?
5. What strengths did you see in this LEP? What weaknesses did you see?
6. In what ways, if any, did you consider this LEP in relation to national security?
7. You may be familiar with Richard Brecht, who runs the Center for Advanced Study of Languages at University of Maryland. In reference to new LEPs to support instruction of "strategic" languages, he reportedly said: "Our motivation

is national security, not to improve education necessarily.” With respect to your involvement with this LEP, did you consider this LEP as more relevant to education policy in the U.S. or national security policy in the U.S., or still another broad policy agenda?

8. How successful was this policy in meeting the goals you identified earlier?
9. Do you recall what the various opinions were of this LEP as it was created and implemented?
 - a. What other policy makers thought
 - b. What the representatives of universities thought
 - c. What participants in the programs the policies targeted thought

E. Wrap-up

1. Do you have any thoughts about current LEPs tied to national security that support strategic languages that you would like to share?
2. Are there any other ideas and thoughts you would like to add?

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE OF TABLES USED FOR DATA REDUCTION AND DATA DISPLAY

Category 1: World Leadership

<u>Code</u>	<u>Excerpt</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1. Common Sense		
1.1.1	(p. 2) "The most charitable off-hand rejoinder one can make to such quick generalizations is that they stem from ignorance o the world position and responsibilities of the United States."	Speech by Earl J. McGrath Comm of Ed at lg. tch conf, 5/3/1952 in context of dealing with parochial attitudes RAC 4
1.1.2	(p. 1824) "Although it is a commonplace that the United States now occupies a position of world leadership, it is still not sufficiently recognized that in order to meet, on a basis of mutual understanding and cooperation, not only the diplomats and military men but also the common people of the other nations of the globe, the United States does not yet have nearly enough persons adequately trained in the languages of those nations."	Prepared statement by Mildy for cong hearings 1958 GD 2
1.1.3	(p. 1329-30) "The United States became a world power almost by accident, little more than a decade ago... There remains a danger that instead of adjusting adequately to the changed circumstances which have thrust the United States into the center of the world arena we will fail to provide the essential component of that involvement: an informed public, and a corps of trained professionals... The Unite States now plays an important role in virtually every part of the globe. Its wealth and its manpower are heavily invested abroad. Nearly 80 per cent of the Federal budget is spent on matters arising out of our relations with the rest of the world... We have so far been willing to pay for it. But we have not been willing to protect it, or to provide the essential basis for sound use of our wealth and power. That can come only from a continuous flow of trained citizens whose professional concerns are centered on the problems of foreign areas in which the United States is now so deeply involved. It is <i>simple common sense</i> ,	Prepared statement from the Association for Asian Studies entered into the record (Date?) GD 19

as well as a safeguard to the democratic process, to provide this vital component in some reasonable proportion to the scale of our country's international role...*American assistance abroad is not merely altruism, but grows directly from American self-interest. If the international role of the United States is to be effective, however, it must be based on enlightened self-interest.*" (my emphasis)

1.4 Responsibility

- 1.4.0.1 (p. 3) Our leadership in the United Nations Organization, our efforts through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to join free nations in resisting totalitarian aggression, our intellectual and cultural activities in connection with UNESCO, our technical assistance under Point 4 and the Mutual Security Agency, our work in the Organization of American States, our Fulbright program for the exchange of teachers and students—all these activities and a host of others like them make our position of international responsibility and leadership abundantly clear.”
- Speech by Earl J. McGrath Comm of Ed at lg. tch conf, 5/3/1952 in context of dealing with parochial attitudes
RAC- 4
- 1.4.0.2 (p. 2) “We would be shortsighted to confine our vision to this Nation's shorelines. The same rewards we count at home will flow from sharing in a worldwide effort to rid mankind of this slavery of ignorance and the scourge of disease. We bear a special role in this liberating mission. Our resources will be wasted in defending freedom's frontiers if we neglect the spirit that makes men want to be free. Half a century ago, the philosopher William James declared that mankind must seek a ‘moral equivalent of war.’ ...Only when people know about—and care about—each other will nations learn to live together in harmony.”
- LBJ in written statement to Congress re: Int'l Ed and Health programs
2/2/66
GD 11
- 1.4.0.3 (p. 327) “Other governments realize this need and subsidize such studies heavily. The U.S., with heavy responsibilities abroad whether in peacetime or war, cannot afford to lag behind. Even a curtailment of direct
- William Theodore de Bary, President of the Association for Asian Studies, Inc, in a letter from 4/15/70 to Sen

- involvement abroad creates a still greater need for competent handling of our relations with people no longer so directly dependent on us militarily, but all the more dependent on us for informed sympathy, understanding and cooperation.”
- Warren Magnuson during budget battle
GD 18
- 1.4.1 Burden
- 1.4.1.1 (p. 28) My thesis is a simple one and it is this: in a world more troubled than man has ever known, and with the United States more burdened with responsibility for leadership than every before, the American university community, indeed the American educational community generally, has a crucial contribution to make in supplying that leadership, and the university community is *not now doing enough*. (emph in original)—he later quotes Sen Joseph Clark, PA about “the staffing of freedom”
- John Brademas , D-IN, speech to MLA1962
PMLA 5/62
- 1.4.1.2 (p. 11) In the short span of years since Kipling wrote that “East is East and West is West,/And never the twain shall meet” we have witnessed the meeting of East and West. We have become enmeshed in the resulting tangle of dissident philosophies, and who can predict the eventual outcome? The United States, having long wavered between a desire to stay home and be let alone and a missionary zeal to spread liberty throughout the world, now has shouldered massive responsibilities for reconciling and fulfilling the hopes of men everywhere. These responsibilities are as complex and demanding at home as they are in the community of nations and no segment of American life can escape a deep involvement in international events. We are therefore greatly preoccupied with attempts to redefine our American goals. From whatever viewpoint we consider our interests, whether individual or national, freedom and world understanding top the list.
- Marjorie Johnston, Director, Istruactional Resources Branch, US O E speech to MLA’s FL program, 12/29/1962
PMLA 5/63
- 1.4.2 University responsibility
- 1.4.2.1 (p. 1338) “This assembly of scholars and
- Letter from Columbia rep,

library facilities has become a national asset. I do not need to labor the point that we as a nation, in our public life as well as in our scholarly institutions, must have many highly trained people competent to understand and interpret developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and at a time when the Soviet Union has now followed our lead and established an Institute on the United States with several hundred trained researchers, it is ironic that we are moving in the opposite direction. I ask myself: whose responsibility is it in this society to see that this academic and public need is met?

I think it's the head of ME
Instit, but have to check
GD 20

1.4.2.2

We're deeply implicated and involved in the ME. We need to know more about the ME. So, from the point of view of pedagogy and education and our mission, we see it most of us see it as vital to teach more about the ME, especially the languages of the ME. You can't really understand the history or the culture or the politics of a region, an economy, unless you know the language. And those people who think you can are wrong, they're really wrong. They're profoundly wrong, they're ignorant and they're wrong.' So that's the first thing. Second thing, there is a national need. I mean, because the government needs people, because the army needs people, because the intelligence groups need people. There's a national need. Now, it's not for us to say, you know, we should be occupying Iraq, or we should be doing what we do in our foreign policy. It's a national need. There's a need for these people. I mean, it's our responsibility to respond to that. As citizens you can then do what you want to do. People who learn Arabic can take jobs or not take jobs. People who teach Arabic can have political positions or not. All of us feel that where there is this need, it is our job to try and fill it (315-327)

RK 1

- and that's because universities understand there's a national need and because everybody sees, "Hey maybe we better know more about his part of the world where we have lots, 100,000 soldiers!" Duh! It's a no brainer. (339-341)
- 1.4.2.3 I mean we take the mandate seriously, let me put it that way. You know, maybe we could be doing more, but you also have to remember, you know, our center for example, I'm one person. I mean I have full time administrator coordinator, but you know, and a part time research assistant that's a graduate student, but it's basically been a one person show. *[laughs]* And we do a lot, but we're a little center, you know, but we do take the mandate seriously and so we do try to have programming, you know, that deals with one way or another with these issues. And of course, a lot of the speakers we bring to campus, you know, talk about US foreign policy and national security issues, *[laughs]* I have to say though usually from a more critical perspective, um, but we're still discussing it, everything's on the plate. You know, it's not all medieval Islam stuff. *[laughs]* (150-160)
- 1.4.2 FL Educators' responsibility
- 1.4.2.1 (p. 51) All of us are confronted with new and enlarged responsibilities—with new opportunity to work harder and in closer cooperation to meet the needs of a new era. All of us are wondering how, individually and collectively, we can do our part to implement the goal of this new Act—defense of our nation against every enemy of body, mind, or spirit that time may bring. This is a challenge to the patriotism of all of us—and especially to members of associations like yours...It was not, believe me, a rhetorical or promotional stunt, when the Congress decided to call Public Law 85-864 the National *Defense* Education Act. It was a way of saying that language teachers, among others, have an important patriotic
- KS 8
- Closing remarks in speech by Lawrence Derthick, then Commiss of Ed, to MLA, 12/29/58. PMLA article entitled "The Purpose and Legislative History of the FL Titles in the NDEA, 1958"
- PMLA 5/59

duty to perform. I know that you will perform it with credit to yourselves and in harmony with the highest ideals of the good teacher dedicated to our profession and to our country. (emph in original)